Part 2 (1/2)
But, however zealous this small knot of Lombards might be for the progress and freedom of their country, none of them supposed that Lombardy could throw off the yoke of Austria without a.s.sistance from other Powers. The question therefore was, to whom they should look for help.
Their nearest neighbour, the King of Sardinia, had some special grounds for grievance against the Emperor of Austria, besides the tradition of dislike which he had inherited from Victor Amadeus. That unfortunate king had had reason to regret the prominent part which he had taken in defying the French Republic in 1796. For he found that Francis of Austria was eager on every occasion to take advantage of the weakness of his ally. When Savoy was hard pressed by the French, the Austrians had demanded that, in return for any help that they might give to the King of Sardinia, he should surrender to them part of the territory in Lombardy which had been secured to him by recent treaties. Victor Amadeus endeavoured to resist this proposal as long as he could; but he was induced by the pressure of English diplomatists to consent that, if in the war any lands were taken from Austria, he would compensate the Austrians by part of the territory which they demanded.
Victor Emmanuel found in 1815 that alliance with Austria cost him as dear as it had cost his predecessor in 1796. For, even in the last desperate struggle against Napoleon, the Austrians demanded that the treaty of alliance between Austria and Sardinia should contain a clause for the destruction of the fortifications of Alessandria; and in the Congress of Vienna they tried to take from Victor Emmanuel the district of Novara. By the help of Alexander of Russia these intrigues were defeated; but the Austrians, in revenge, made all the delay that they could devise in evacuating Piedmont; and, when they finally left it in 1816, they destroyed the fortress outside Alessandria. Under these circ.u.mstances it was natural enough that the King of Sardinia should bear a bitter grudge against the House of Austria.
But, on the other hand, there was great reason to doubt whether Victor Emmanuel could be persuaded to take the lead in any war that savoured of revolution. For, hostile as he was to the claims of Austria, the newly-restored king resented yet more strongly the changes which had been introduced during the French occupation. On his restoration in 1814, he abolished by one sweeping Act all laws pa.s.sed since 1800 in Piedmont; primogeniture, aristocratic privileges, ecclesiastical tribunals, tortures, secret inquisitions, were all restored. Even at the universities learned men were deposed, as likely to be friendly to the French, and were replaced by men who had no claim but their social rank. A system of espionage was introduced, at least as inquisitorial and degrading as that of Metternich, and it was soon found that to maintain that system it was necessary to sacrifice national dignity, and to have recourse to the great master in the art of tyranny. Thus it came about that Austrian officers were chosen to control the police in Turin.
In two important respects the government of Victor Emmanuel was even worse than that of Austria. Clerical injustice and oppression were as distasteful to Francis and Metternich as they had been to Joseph and Leopold; while in Piedmont, on the contrary, friars and monks were allowed a licence which speedily became a new source of evil. The other point of difference was that, tyrannical and unjust as the Austrian tribunals were in cases where political questions were involved, they were perfectly pure in cases between man and man unconnected with politics; whereas in Piedmont judicial decisions were sold to the highest bidder.
Under these circ.u.mstances, the eyes of the champions of Italian liberty naturally turned to that kingdom from which the last effort had been made for the unity of Italy.
Naples had contributed a very large proportion of those who had died for the cause of liberty in the earlier struggles, and even before that time had produced at least one man who had left his mark on sciences which tended to promote good government. Gaetano Filangieri had been one of the most distinguished writers on law and political economy, and had gained great influence at one period over Ferdinand I. of Naples. Ferdinand himself, though intensely weak, and capable of cruelty under certain circ.u.mstances, was not a man of habitually cruel character, nor even of so despotic a temperament as Victor Emmanuel of Sardinia.
But, like most of the sovereigns of Italy, he found himself compelled to rely more and more on Austria for the re-establishment of his power. He appointed Nugent, the Austrian general, as the head of his army, and a central council interfered with the liberties which had grown up in Naples. His refusal to carry out the promises of liberty which he had made in his time of difficulty naturally irritated his people against him, while the recollections of Murat stirred in them the desire for new efforts for freedom.
But the great ally which Naples supplied at this time to the cause of liberty was the Society of the Carbonari. Connected by vague traditions with some societies of the past, Carbonarism had received its first distinct political shape in the year 1811, when Murat was reigning in Naples. In 1814, when Murat had shown signs of a despotic spirit, it transferred its allegiance to King Ferdinand, then reigning only in Sicily. When Ferdinand had been restored to the throne of Naples, he found Carbonarism a dangerous element in his kingdom, and he began to prosecute the members of the Society. This had not, however, deprived the Carbonari of their monarchical sympathies; they merely transferred them from Ferdinand to his son Francis, who, having a.s.sisted at the establishment of the Const.i.tution of 1812 in Sicily, was supposed to be committed to the cause of liberty.
A vague talk about equality, and a more definite demand for the independence of Italy, const.i.tuted the programme of the Carbonari. But the Society was surrounded by various symbols of an impressive character, and its rules were enforced by a secret and vigorous discipline. It was evident that, in some way, it was suited to the wants of the time; for it spread rapidly from Naples to other parts of Italy, and took root both in Lombardy and Piedmont. In Lombardy it speedily attracted the attention of the Austrian police, and in 1818 several arrests were made; but such attempts merely strengthened the growth of the movement, and Carbonarism soon appeared in Spain.
In the latter country the betrayal of the Const.i.tutional cause had been, perhaps, baser than in any other part of Europe.
With the exception of Frederick William of Prussia, no sovereign had owed more to the zeal of his people in the struggle against Napoleon than Ferdinand of Spain. In 1812, before he had been restored to his throne, he had been forced to grant a Const.i.tution to his people, which, on recovering full power, he had abolished; and anyone who ventured to speak of liberty had been exiled or imprisoned. Among those who had been forced to fly from the country was Rafael del Riego, who had been one of the earliest to rise on behalf of Ferdinand against Napoleon. He had succeeded, by the help of the Carbonari, in establis.h.i.+ng relations with many of the discontented soldiers in the Spanish army; and in January, 1820, he suddenly appeared at Cadiz and proclaimed the Const.i.tution of 1812.
His success was rapid, and Ferdinand was compelled once more to swear to maintain the Const.i.tution.
This, the first Const.i.tution proclaimed since the downfall of Napoleon, was remarkable for its democratic character. Parliament was to have the power of making laws in conjunction with the king, and if they pa.s.sed a law three times, the king was to lose the right of vetoing it. Ministers were to be responsible to Parliament. Freedom of the press was to be secured, and a Council of State was to advise the king on questions of peace or war and the making of treaties. At the same time, the nation was to prohibit the practice of any but the Roman Catholic religion.
The news rapidly spread to Naples; for not only was there continual communication between the Carbonari of Spain and those of Naples, but even official duty would make speedy communication necessary, since Ferdinand of Naples was the next heir to the Spanish throne, and it was therefore held that this Const.i.tution would be binding on him.
The Carbonari were ready for the emergency; and while some of them, in the city of Naples, were demanding concessions, the more revolutionary districts of Calabria and Salerno had already risen in open insurrection. Ferdinand was able to arrest some of the leaders in the city; but he soon found that the insurrectionary spirit had spread even among the generals of his army. Officer after officer declared for the Const.i.tution; and even those who were not ready to take that step were suspected by, and suspicious of, their fellows. Guglielmo Pepe, known as a supporter of the previous movement of Murat, and at one time sentenced to death for his opposition to the Bourbon rule, was marked out by the Carbonari as their leader. He at first hesitated to join them, and was even chosen by Nugent to lead the king's forces against the insurgents; but Ferdinand distrusted him, and opposed his appointment, and Pepe was finally driven to accept the leaders.h.i.+p of the revolution. On July 5th he gathered round him a great body of the officers and soldiers, and led them to Naples; and Ferdinand, finding that he had no one to rely upon, yielded to the insurgents and consented to the appointment of a provisional Junta (composed to a great extent of the previous supporters of Murat), and swore to accept the Spanish Const.i.tution.
Metternich was greatly startled at the completeness of this popular victory. He had been convinced that, with a people like the Neapolitans, blood would flow in streams; and he was alarmed to find that the leading Carbonari were men of high character. He at once a.s.sumed that Alexander of Russia was at the bottom of the conspiracy; and he set himself to convert him once more to the side of order. But that fickle Prince seems never to have seriously resumed the champions.h.i.+p of liberalism in Europe, after the death of Kotzebue; and though he may have wished occasionally to play with the Carbonari, and may have been flattered by their appealing to him, he was much more anxious to put in force those principles which Mme de Krudener had taught him, which forbade kings to keep faith with those subjects to whom they had granted liberties. He therefore readily consented to come to Troppau, to consider the best means of checking the Neapolitan insurrection.
In the meantime, suspicions had arisen between the Carbonari and the old followers of Murat, and the want of organization in their forces seemed to doom the insurrection to failure.
But a still more fatal cause of division was the att.i.tude of Sicily.
The news of the proclamation of the Spanish Const.i.tution had, at first, been welcomed there; but the n.o.bles of Palermo cherished the recollection of that short time of independence when Ferdinand, driven out of Naples, had ruled Sicily as a separate kingdom; the Sicilian Const.i.tution of 1812, which was welcome to the n.o.bles of Palermo, as more aristocratic in its character than the Spanish Const.i.tution, was acceptable to all the Palermitans as the symbol of Sicilian independence. The cry, therefore, of ”the Const.i.tution of 1812”
was raised in Palermo, in opposition to the cry of ”the Spanish Const.i.tution.”
A Neapolitan intriguer, named Naselli, did his best to fan the flame of this division; riots arose; and the news spread to Naples that the Sicilians were enemies of Naples, and were opposing the Spanish Const.i.tution. The Palermitans, on their part, appealed to the King by the memory of the old fidelity which the Sicilians had shown him when he was in exile. The King, and some others, might have responded to this appeal; and General Florestano Pepe, who was sent to suppress the rising, ended by conceding to the Sicilians the right of deciding by popular vote between the two Const.i.tutions. But the Neapolitan pride was excited; a cry arose that the King was surrendering an important part of the kingdom, and thereby violating the Const.i.tution.
In the meantime, however, it had become clear that the preference of the Palermitans for the Const.i.tution of 1812 was not shared by the whole body of the Sicilian people. Messina, followed by other towns, rose on behalf of the Spanish Const.i.tution; and, while the Neapolitans were preparing new forces to suppress the rising in Palermo, the Palermitans were sending their troops against Messina.
During this state of confusion the news arrived that the representatives of the Powers at the Congress of Laybach had urged pacific means of intervention, but at the same time had advised the Neapolitans to modify their Const.i.tution.
Under these circ.u.mstances, considerable alarm was caused by the news that the King intended to go to Laybach. Ferdinand, to check this alarm, declared to the Parliament that, whatever happened, he would defend the fundamental principles of the Const.i.tution, freedom of the press, equality before the law, sole right of representatives to vote taxes, independence of judicial power, and responsible ministry.
This speech, instead of calming the fears of the people, raised new alarms; for it seemed as though the King were meditating already _some_ changes in the Government; and the people declared that they could only allow him to depart if he went to defend the Spanish Const.i.tution. But Ferdinand earnestly a.s.sured them that he had meant nothing against the Const.i.tution, and that, if he could not defend the rights of the people and the crown by his words at Laybach, he would return to defend them by his sword.
The Duke of Ascoli, an old friend and confidant of the King, asked him privately for more specific directions; and Ferdinand urged him to try to maintain peace; but, if it should be necessary, to prepare for war. With such promises, Ferdinand left Naples for Laybach in January, 1821.
In the meantime, the work of the Carbonari had been spreading in Piedmont; and other sects of a similar character, and with more definite objects, had sprung up by their side. Unlike the Neapolitans, the Piedmontese Liberals had no French political traditions, either to encourage or to hamper them. Although the House of Savoy was French in its origin, both rulers and people had been forward in their resistance to the aggressions of the French Republic. Their ideas of liberty were derived, not from France, but from their own poet, Vittorio Alfieri; and these ideas had been strengthened by the love of independence which they had developed in the struggle against France, and which was now wholly directed against Austria.