Part 63 (2/2)

the true, that is at the root of illusion. It is the [email protected]@na taken as the self-luminous self that reflects itself in the cit as the notion of the ego. Just as when we say that the iron ball (red hot) burns, there are two ent.i.ties of the ball and the fire fused into one, so, here also when I say ”I perceive”, there are two distinct elements of the self, as consciousness and the mind or antahkarana fused into one. The part or aspect a.s.sociated with sorrow, materiality, and changefulness represents the [email protected]@na, whereas that which appears as the unchangeable perceiving consciousness is the self.

Thus the notion of ego contains two parts, one real and other unreal.

We remember that this is distinctly that which Prabhakara sought to repudiate. Prabhakara did not consider the self to be self-luminous, and held that such is the threefold nature of thought ([email protected]_), that it at once reveals the knowledge, the object of knowledge, and the self. He further said, that the a.n.a.logy of the red-hot iron ball did not hold, for the iron ball and the fire are separately experienced, but the self and the [email protected]@na are never separately experienced, and we can never say that these two are really different, and only have an illusory appearance of a seeming unity. Perception (_anubhava_) is like a light which illuminates both the object and the self, and like it does not require the a.s.sistance of anything else for the fulfilment of its purpose. But the Vedanta objects to this saying that according to Prabhakara's supposition, it is impossible to discover any relation between the self and the knowledge. If knowledge can be regarded as revealing itself, the self may as well be held to be self-luminous; the self and the knowledge are indeed one and the same. k.u.marila thinks this thought (_anubhava_), to be a movement, Nyaya and Prabhakara as a quality of the self [Footnote ref 1]. But if it was a movement like other movements, it could not affect itself as illumination. If it were a substance and atomic in size, it would only manifest a small portion of a thing, if all pervasive, then it would illuminate everything, if of medium size, it would depend on its parts for its own

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[Footnote 1: According to Nyaya the _atman_ is conscious only through a.s.sociation with consciousness, but it is not consciousness(_cit_).

Consciousness is a.s.sociated with it only as a result of suitable collocations. Thus, _Nyayamanjari_ in refuting the doctrine of self-luminosity {_svaprakas'a_) says (p.432)

_sacetanas'cita yogattadyogena vina [email protected]@h narthavabhasadanyaddhi [email protected] nama [email protected]]

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const.i.tution and not on the self. If it is regarded as a quality of the self as the light is of the lamp, then also it has necessarily to be supposed that it was produced by the self, for from what else could it be produced? Thus it is to be admitted that the self, the atman, is the self-luminous ent.i.ty. No one doubts any of his knowledge, whether it is he who sees or anybody else.

The self is thus the same as vijnana, the pure consciousness, which is always of itself self-luminous [Footnote ref 1].

Again, though consciousness is continuous in all stages, waking or sleeping, yet [email protected] is absent during deep sleep.

It is true that on waking from deep sleep one feels ”I slept happily and did not know anything”; yet what happens is this, that during deep sleep the [email protected]@na and the [email protected] are altogether submerged in the ajnana, and there are only the ajnana and the self; on waking, this [email protected] as a state of [email protected]@na is again generated, and then it a.s.sociates the perception of the ajnana in the sleep and originates the perception ”I did not know anything.” This [email protected] which is a mode ([email protected]_) of the [email protected]@na is thus const.i.tuted by avidya, and is manifested as jnanas'akti (power of knowledge) and kriyas'akti (power of work). This kriyas'akti of the [email protected] is illusorily imposed upon the self, and as a result of that the self appears to be an active agent in knowing and willing. The [email protected] itself is regarded, as we have already seen, as a mode or [email protected] of the [email protected]@na, and as such the [email protected] of a past period can now be a.s.sociated; but even then the [email protected] of [email protected]@na, [email protected], may be regarded as only the active side or aspect of the [email protected]@na. The same [email protected]@na is called manas in its capacity as doubt buddhi in its capacity as achieving certainty of knowledge, and citta in its capacity as remembering [Footnote ref 2]. When the pure cit s.h.i.+nes forth in a.s.sociation with this [email protected]@na, it is called a jiva. It is clear from the above account that the ajnana is not a mere nothing, but is the principle of the phenomena. But it cannot stand alone, without the principle of the real to support it (_as'raya_); its own nature as the ajnana or indefinite is perceived directly by the pure consciousness; its movements as originating the phenomena remain indefinite in themselves, the real as underlying

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[Footnote 1: See _Nyayamakaranda_, pp. 130-140, _Citshkha_ and [email protected]@mgraha_, pp. 53-58.]

[Footnote 2: See [email protected]_, p. 88, Bombay edition.]

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these phenomenal movements can only manifest itself through these which hide it, when corresponding states arise in the [email protected]@na, and the light of the real s.h.i.+nes forth through these states. The [email protected]@na of which [email protected] is a moment, is itself a beginningless system of ajnana-phenomena containing within it the a.s.sociations and impressions of past phenomena as merit, demerit, instincts, etc. from a beginningless time when the jiva or individual soul began his career.

Anirvacyavada and the Vedanta Dialectic.

We have already seen that the indefinite ajnana could be experienced in direct perception and according to Vedanta there are only two categories. The category of the real, the self-luminous Brahman, and the category of the indefinite. The latter has for its ground the world-appearance, and is the principle by which the one unchangeable Brahman is falsely manifested in all the diversity of the manifold world. But this indefinite which is different from the category of the positive and the negative, has only a relative existence and will ultimately vanish, when the true knowledge of the Brahman dawns. Nothing however can be known about the nature of this indefinite except its character as indefinite. That all the phenomena of the world, the fixed order of events, the infinite variety of world-forms and names, all these are originated by this avidya, ajnana or maya is indeed hardly comprehensible. If it is indefinite nescience, how can all these well-defined forms of world-existence come out of it? It is said to exist only relatively, and to have only a temporary existence beside the permanent infinite reality. To take such a principle and to derive from it the mind, matter, and indeed everything else except the pure self-luminous Brahman, would hardly appeal to our reason. If this system of world-order were only seeming appearance, with no other element of truth in it except pure being, then it would be indefensible in the light of reason.

It has been proved that whatever notions we have about the objective world are all self-contradictory, and thus groundless and false. If they have all proceeded from the indefinite they must show this character when exposed to discerning criticism. All categories have to be shown to be so hopelessly confused and to be without any conceivable notion that though apparent before us yet they crumble into indefiniteness as soon as they are

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examined, and one cannot make such a.s.sertion about them as that they are or that they are not. Such negative criticisms of our fundamental notions about the world-order were undertaken by [email protected] and his commentator and follower Citsukha. It is impossible within the limits of this chapter, to give a complete account of their criticisms of our various notions of reality.

I shall give here, only one example.

Let us take the examination of the notion of difference (_bheda_)from [email protected]@[email protected]@dakhadya_. Four explanations are possible about the notion of difference: (1) the difference may be perceived as appearing in its own characteristics in our experience (_svarupa-bheda_) as Prabhakara thinks; (2) the difference between two things is nothing but the absence of one in the other (_anyonyabhava_), as some Naiyayikas and [email protected]@tas think; (3) difference means divergence of characteristics (_vaidharmya_) as the [email protected] speak of it; (4) difference may be a separate quality in itself like the [email protected] quality of Nyaya. Taking the first alternative, we see that it is said that the jug and the cloth represent in themselves, by their very form and existence, their mutual difference from each other. But if by perceiving the cloth we only perceive its difference from the jug as the characteristic of the cloth, then the jug also must have penetrated into the form of the cloth, otherwise how could we perceive in the cloth its characteristics as the difference from the jug?

i.e. if difference is a thing which can be directly perceived by the senses, then as difference would naturally mean difference from something else, it is expected that something else such as jug, etc. from which the difference is perceived, must also be perceived directly in the perception of the cloth. But if the perception of ”difference” between two things has penetrated together in the same identical perception, then the self-contradiction becomes apparent. Difference as an ent.i.ty is not what we perceive in the cloth, for difference means difference from something else, and if that thing from which the difference is perceived is not perceived, then how can the difference as an ent.i.ty be perceived? If it is said that the cloth itself represents its difference from the jug, and that this is indicated by the jug, then we may ask, what is the nature of the jug? If the difference from the cloth is the very nature of the jug, then the cloth itself is also involved in the nature of the jug. If it is said that

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the jug only indicates a term from which difference is intended to be conveyed, then that also becomes impossible, for how can we imagine that there is a term which is independent of any a.s.sociation of its difference from other things, and is yet a term which establishes the notion of difference? If it is a term of difference, it cannot be independent of its relation to other things from which it is differentiated. If its difference from the cloth is a quality of the jug, then also the old difficulty comes in, for its difference from the cloth would involve the cloth also in itself; and if the cloth is involved in the nature of the jug as its quality, then by the same manner the jug would also be the character of the cloth, and hence not difference but ident.i.ty results. Moreover, if a cloth is perceived as a character of the jug, the two will appear to be hanging one over the other, but this is never so experienced by us. Moreover, it is difficult to ascertain if qualities have any relation with things; if they have not, then absence of relation being the same everywhere, everything might be the quality of everything. If there is a relation between these two, then that relation would require another relation to relate itself with that relation, and that would again require another relation and that another, and so on. Again, it may be said that when the jug, etc. are seen without reference to other things, they appear as jug, etc., but when they are viewed with reference to cloth, etc. they appear as difference.

But this cannot be so, for the perception as jug is entirely different from the perception of difference. It should also be noted that the notion of difference is also different from the notions of both the jug and the cloth. It is one thing to say that there are jug and cloth, and quite another thing to say that the jug is different from the cloth. Thus a jug cannot appear as difference, though it may be viewed with reference to cloth.

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