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induced knowledge in us. But it regarded knowledge as a unique phenomenon which at once revealed itself, the knower and the known. We are not concerned with physical collocations, for whatever these may be it is knowledge which reveals things--the direct apprehension that should be called the [email protected]

[email protected] in this sense is the same as pramiti or prama, the phenomenon of apprehension. [email protected] may also indeed mean the collocations so far as they induce the prama. For prama or right knowledge is never produced, it always exists, but it manifests itself differently under different circ.u.mstances.

The validity of knowledge means the conviction or the specific att.i.tude that is generated in us with reference to the objective world. This validity is manifested with the rise of knowledge, and it does not await the verdict of any later experience in the objective field ([email protected]_). Knowledge as nirvikalpa (indeterminate) means the whole knowledge of the object and not merely a non-sensible hypothetical indeterminate cla.s.s-notion as Nyaya holds. The savikalpa (determinate) knowledge only re-establishes the knowledge thus formed by relating it with other objects as represented by memory [Footnote ref 1].

Prabhakara rejected the [email protected] conception of a dual element in consciousness as involving a transcendent intelligence (_cit_) and a material part, the buddhi; but it regarded consciousness as an unique thing which by itself in one flash represented both the knower and the known. The validity of knowledge did not depend upon its faithfulness in reproducing or indicating (_pradars'akatva_) external objects, but upon the force that all direct apprehension (_anubhuti_) has of prompting us to action in the external world; knowledge is thus a complete and independent unit in all its self-revealing aspects. But what the knowledge was in itself apart from its self-revealing character Prabhakara did not enquire.

k.u.marila declared that jnana (knowledge) was a movement brought about by the activity of the self which resulted in producing consciousness (_jnatata_) of objective things. Jnana itself cannot be perceived, but can only be inferred as the movement necessary for producing the jnatata or consciousness of things.

Movement with k.u.marila was not a mere atomic vibration, but was a non-sensuous transcendent operation of which vibration

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[Footnote 1: [email protected] considered nirvikalpa as the dim knowledge of the first moment of consciousness, which, when it became clear at the next moment, was called savikalpa.]

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was sometimes the result. Jnana was a movement and not the result of causal operation as Nyaya supposed. Nyaya would not also admit any movement on the part of the self, but it would hold that when the self is possessed of certain qualities, such as desire, etc., it becomes an instrument for the accomplishment of a physical movement. k.u.marila accords the same self-validity to knowledge that Prabhakara gives. Later knowledge by experience is not endowed with any special quality which should decide as to the validity of the knowledge of the previous movement. For what is called [email protected] or later testimony of experience is but later knowledge and nothing more [Footnote ref 1]. The self is not revealed in the knowledge of external objects, but we can know it by a mental perception of self-consciousness. It is the movement of this self in presence of certain collocating circ.u.mstances leading to cognition of things that is called jnana [Footnote ref 2].

Here k.u.marila distinguishes knowledge as movement from knowledge as objective consciousness. Knowledge as movement was beyond sense perception and could only be inferred.

The idealistic tendency of Vijnanavada Buddhism, [email protected], and [email protected] was manifest in its attempt at establis.h.i.+ng the unique character of knowledge as being that with which alone we are in touch. But Vijnanavada denied the external world, and thereby did violence to the testimony of knowledge. [email protected] admitted the external world but created a gulf between the content of knowledge and pure intelligence; Prabhakara ignored this difference, and was satisfied with the introspective a.s.sertion that knowledge was such a unique thing that it revealed with itself, the knower and the known, k.u.marila however admitted a transcendent element of movement as being the cause of our objective consciousness, but regarded this as being separate from self. But the question remained unsolved as to why, in spite of the unique character of knowledge, knowledge could relate itself to the world of objects, how far the world of external objects or of knowledge could be regarded as absolutely true. Hitherto judgments were only relative, either referring to one's being prompted to the objective world, to the faithfulness of the representation of objects, the suitability of fulfilling our requirements, or to verification by later

[Footnote 1: See _Nyayaratnamala_, [email protected]@[email protected]]

[Footnote 2: See _Nyayamanjari_ on [email protected], _S'lokavarttika_ on [email protected], and Gaga [email protected]@ta's [email protected]@[email protected]_ on [email protected]]

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uncontradicted experience. But no enquiry was made whether any absolute judgments about the ultimate truth of knowledge and matter could be made at all. That which appeared was regarded as the real. But the question was not asked, whether there was anything which could be regarded as absolute truth, the basis of all appearance, and the unchangeable, reality. This philosophical enquiry had the most wonderful charm for the Hindu mind.

Vedanta Literature.

It is difficult to ascertain the time when the _Brahma-sutras_ were written, but since they contain a refutation of almost all the other Indian systems, even of the S'unyavada Buddhism (of course according to [email protected]'s interpretation), they cannot have been written very early. I think it may not be far from the truth in supposing that they were written some time in the second century B.C. About the period 780 A.D. [email protected] revived the monistic teaching of the [email protected] by his commentary on the [email protected]@dukya [email protected] in verse called [email protected]@dukyakarika_. His disciple Govinda was the teacher of [email protected] (788--820 A.D.). [email protected]'s commentary on the _Brahma-sutras_ is the root from which sprang forth a host of commentaries and studies on Vedantism of great originality, vigour, and philosophic insight. Thus anandagiri, a disciple of [email protected], wrote a commentary called [email protected]_, and Govindananda wrote another commentary named _Ratna-prabha_.

Vacaspati Mis'ra, who flourished about 841 A.D., wrote another commentary on it called the _Bhamati._ Amalananda (1247--1260 A.D.) wrote his _Kalpataru_ on it, and [email protected] (1550 A.D.) son of [email protected] of Kanci wrote his _Kalpataruparimala_ on the _Kalpataru._ Another disciple of [email protected], Padmapada, also called Sanandana, wrote a commentary on it known as _Pancapadika_. From the manner in which the book is begun one would expect that it was to be a running commentary on the whole of [email protected]'s bhasya, but it ends abruptly at the end of the fourth sutra. Madhava (1350), in his [email protected],_ recites an interesting story about it. He says that Sures'vara received [email protected]'s permission to write a varttika on the bhasya.

But other pupils objected to [email protected] that since Sures'vara was formerly a great [email protected] ([email protected]@dana Misra was called Sures'vara after his conversion to Vedantism) he was not competent to write

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a good _varttika_ on the [email protected] Sures'vara, disappointed, wrote a treatise called [email protected]_ Padmapada wrote a @tika but this was burnt in his uncle's house. [email protected], who had once seen it, recited it from memory and Padmapada wrote it down.

Prakas'atman (1200) wrote a commentary on Padmapada's _Pancapadika_ known as [email protected] [email protected]@dananda wrote his _Tattvadipana,_ and the famous [email protected]@mhas'rama Muni (1500) wrote his [email protected]'ika_ on it. Amalananda and Vidyasagara also wrote commentaries on _Pancapadika,_ named [email protected]_ and [email protected]_ respectively, but the [email protected]_ had by far the greatest reputation.

[email protected] who is generally identified by some with Madhava (1350) wrote his famous work [email protected]@mgraha_ [Footnote ref 1], elaborating the ideas of [email protected]_; [email protected] wrote also another excellent work named _Jivanmuktiviveka_ on the Vedanta doctrine of emanc.i.p.ation. Sures'vara's (800 A.D.) excellent work [email protected]_ is probably the earliest independent treatise on [email protected]'s philosophy as expressed in his [email protected] It has been commented upon by Jnanottama Mis'ra.

[email protected] also wrote another work of great merit known as _Pancadas'i,_ which is a very popular and illuminating treatise in verse on Vedanta. Another important work written in verse on the main teachings of [email protected]'s [email protected] is [email protected]@sepas'ariraka_, written by Sarvajnatma Muni (900 A.D.). This has also been commented upon by Ramatirtha. [email protected] (1190 A.D.) wrote his [email protected]@[email protected]@dakhadya_, the most celebrated work on the Vedanta dialectic. Citsukha, who probably flourished shortly after [email protected], wrote a commentary on it, and also wrote an independent work on Vedanta dialectic known as _Tattvadipika_ which has also a commentary called _Nayanaprasadini_ written by Pratyagrupa. [email protected] Mis'ra and Raghunatha also wrote commentaries on [email protected]@[email protected]@dakhadya._ A work on Vedanta epistemology and the princ.i.p.al topics of Vedanta of great originality and merit known as [email protected]_ was written by Dharmarajadhvarindra (about 155OA.D.). His son [email protected]@snadhvarin wrote his [email protected]_ on it and Amaradasa his [email protected]_ The [email protected]_ with these two commentaries forms an excellent exposition of some of the fundamental principles of Vedanta. Another work of supreme importance