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and ”horse.” Thus according to him the meanings of words can only be known from words occurring in injunctive sentences; he deduces from this the conclusion that words must denote things only as related to the other factors of the injunction (_anvitabhidhana vada_), and no word can be comprehended as having any denotation when taken apart from such a sentence. This doctrine holds that each word yields its meaning only as being generally related to other factors or only as a part of an injunctive sentence, thus the word _gam_ accusative case of _go_ (cow) means that it is intended that something is to be done with the cow or the bovine genus, and it appears only as connected with a specific kind of action, viz. bringing in the sentence _gam anaya_--bring the cow.

k.u.marila however thinks that words independently express separate meanings which are subsequently combined into a sentence expressing one connected idea (_abhihitanvayavada_). Thus in _gam anaya_, according to k.u.marila, _gam_ means the bovine cla.s.s in the accusative character and _anaya_ independently means

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[Footnote 1: According to Nyaya G.o.d created all words and a.s.sociated them with their meanings.]

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bring; these two are then combined into the meaning ”bring the cow.” But on the former theory the word _gam_ means that it is connected with some kind of action, and the particular sentence only shows what the special kind of action is, as in the above sentence it appears as a.s.sociated with bringing, but it cannot have any meaning separately by itself. This theory of k.u.marila which is also the Nyaya theory is called abhihitanvayavada [Footnote ref 1].

Lastly according to Prabhakara it is only the Veda that can be called [email protected], and only those sentences of it which contain injunctions (such as, perform this sacrifice in this way with these things). In all other cases the validity of words is only inferred on the ground of the trustworthy character of the speaker. But k.u.marila considers the words of all trustworthy persons as [email protected]

The [email protected] of Non-perception (anupalabdhi).

In addition to the above [email protected] k.u.marila admits a fifth kind of [email protected], viz. _anupalabdhi_ for the perception of the non-existence of a thing. k.u.marila argues that the non-existence of a thing (e.g. there is no jug in this room) cannot be perceived by the senses, for there is nothing with which the senses could come into contact in order to perceive the non-existence. Some people prefer to explain this non-perception as a case of anumana.

They say that wherever there is the existence of a visible object there is the vision of it by a perceiver. When there is no vision of a visible object, there is no existence of it also. But it is easy to see that such an inference presupposes the perception of want of vision and want of existence, but how these non-perceptions are to be accounted for is exactly the point to be solved. How can the perception of want of vision or want of existence be grasped?

It is for this that we have to admit a separate mode of [email protected] namely anupalabdhi.

All things exist in places either in a positive (_sadrupa_) or in a negative relation (_asadrupa_), and it is only in the former case

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[Footnote 1: See [email protected]_ by Dr [email protected] Jha and S.N.

Dasgupta's _Study of Patanjali_, appendix. It may be noted in this connection that [email protected] did not favour the [email protected] doctrine of sound which consists in the belief that apart from the momentary sounds of letters composing a word, there was a complete word form which was manifested ([email protected]) but not created by the pa.s.sing sounds of the syllables. The work of the syllable sounds is only to project this word manifestation. See Vacaspati's _Tattvabindu, S'lokavarttika_ and [email protected]_. For the doctrine of anvitabhidhana see Sahkanatha's [email protected]@rtti_.]

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that they come within the purview of the senses, while in the latter case the perception of the negative existence can only be had by a separate mode of the movement of the mind which we designate as a separate [email protected] as anupalabdhi. Prabhakara holds that non-perception of a visible object in a place is only the perception of the empty place, and that therefore there is no need of admitting a separate [email protected] as anupalabdhi. For what is meant by empty s.p.a.ce? If it is necessary that for the perception of the non-existence of jug there should be absolutely empty s.p.a.ce before us, then if the place be occupied by a stone we ought not to perceive the non-existence of the jug, inasmuch as the place is not absolutely empty. If empty s.p.a.ce is defined as that which is not a.s.sociated with the jug, then the category of negation is practically admitted as a separate ent.i.ty. If the perception of empty s.p.a.ce is defined as the perception of s.p.a.ce at the moment which we a.s.sociated with a want of knowledge about the jug, then also want of knowledge as a separate ent.i.ty has to be accepted, which amounts to the same thing as the admission of the want or negation of the jug. Whatever attempt may be made to explain the notion of negation by any positive conception, it will at best be an attempt to s.h.i.+ft negation from the objective field to knowledge, or in other words to subst.i.tute for the place of the external absence of a thing an a.s.sociated want of knowledge about the thing (in spite of its being a visible object) and this naturally ends in failure, for negation as a separate category has to be admitted either in the field of knowledge or in the external world. Negation or abhava as a separate category has anyhow to be admitted.

It is said that at the first moment only the ground is seen without any knowledge of the jug or its negation, and then at the next moment comes the comprehension of the non-existence of the jug.

But this also means that the moment of the perception of the ground is a.s.sociated with the want of knowledge of the jug or its negation. But this comes to the same thing as the admission of negation as a separate category, for what other meaning can there be in the perception of ”only the ground” if it is not meant that it (the perception of the ground) is a.s.sociated with or qualified by the want of knowledge of the jug? For the perception of the ground cannot generate the notion of the non-existence of the jug, since even where there is a jug the ground is perceived.

The qualifying phrase that ”only the ground is perceived” becomes

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meaningless, if things whose presence is excluded are not specified as negative conditions qualifying the perception of the ground. And this would require that we had already the notion of negation in us, which appeared to us of itself in a special manner unaccountable by other means of proof. It should also be noted that non-perception of a sensible object generates the notion of negation immediately and not through other negations, and this is true not only of things of the present moment but also of the memory of past perceptions of non-existence, as when we remember that there was no jug here. Anupalabdhi is thus a separate [email protected] by which the absence or want of a sensible object--the negation of a thing--can be comprehended.

Self, Salvation, G.o.d.

[email protected] has to accept the existence of soul, for without it who would perform the Vedic commandments, and what would be the meaning of those Vedic texts which speak of men as performing sacrifices and going to Heaven thereby? The soul is thus regarded as something entirely distinct from the body, the sense organs, and buddhi; it is eternal, omnipresent, and many, one in each body. Prabhakara thinks that it is manifested to us in all cognitions. Indeed he makes this also a proof for the existence of self as a separate ent.i.ty from the body, for had it not been so, why should we have the notion of self-persistence in all our cognitions--even in those where there is no perception of the body?

k.u.marila however differs from Prabhakara about this a.n.a.lysis of the consciousness of self in our cognitions, and says that even though we may not have any notion of the parts of our body or their specific combination, yet the notion of ourselves as embodied beings always appears in all our cognitions. Moreover in our cognitions of external objects we are not always conscious of the self as the knower; so it is not correct to say that self is different from the body on the ground that the consciousness of self is present in all our cognitions, and that the body is not cognized in many of our cognitions. But the true reason for admitting that the self is different from the body is this, that movement or willing, knowledge, pleasure, pain, etc., cannot be attributed to the body, for though the body exists at death these cannot then be found. So it has to be admitted that they must belong to some other ent.i.ty owing to the a.s.sociation with which the body appears

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to be endowed with movement etc. Moreover knowledge, feeling, etc. though apparent to the perceiver, are not yet perceived by others as other qualities of the body, as colour etc., are perceived by other men. It is a general law of causation that the qualities of the const.i.tuent elements (in the cause) impart themselves to the effect, but the earth atoms of which the body is made up do not contain the qualities of knowledge etc., and this also corroborates the inference of a separate ent.i.ty as the vehicle of knowledge etc. The objection is sometimes raised that if the soul is omnipresent how can it be called an agent or a mover? But [email protected] does not admit that movement means atomic motion, for the principle of movement is the energy which moves the atoms, and this is possessed by the omnipresent soul.

It is by the energy imparted by it to the body that the latter moves. So it is that though the soul does not move it is called an agent on account of the fact that it causes the movement of the body. The self must also be understood as being different from the senses, for even when one loses some of the senses he continues to perceive his self all the same as persisting all through.