Part 49 (2/2)

[Footnote 2: Discussing the question of the validity of knowledge Ganges'a, a later naiyayika of great fame, says that it is derived as a result of our inference from the correspondence of the perception of a thing with the activity which prompted us to realize it. That which leads us to successful activity is valid and the opposite invalid. When I am sure that if I work in accordance with the perception of an object I shall be successful, I call it valid knowledge. [email protected]_, K.

Tarkavagis'a's edition, [email protected]_.

”The [email protected] sutras_ tacitly admit the Vedas as a [email protected] The view that [email protected] only admitted two [email protected], perception and inference, is traditionally accepted, _”[email protected]@[email protected] [email protected] [email protected] anumananca taccapi,_ etc.” Pras'astapada divides all cognition (_buddhi_) as _vidya_ (right knowledge) and _avidya_ (ignorance). Under _avidya_ he counts [email protected]'aya_ (doubt or uncertainty), _viparyaya_ (illusion or error), _anadhyavasaya_ (want of definite knowledge, thus when a man who had never seen a mango, sees it for the first time, he wonders what it may be) and _svapna_ (dream). Right knowledge (_vidya_) is of four kinds, perception, inference, memory and the supernatural knowledge of the sages ([email protected]_). Interpreting the [email protected] sutras_ I.i. 3, VI. i. 1, and VI.

i. 3, to mean that the validity of the Vedas depends upon the trustworthy character of their author, he does not consider scriptures as valid in themselves. Their validity is only derived by inference from the trustworthy character of their author. _Arthapatti_ (implication) and _anupalabdhi_ (non-perception) are also cla.s.sed as inference and _upamana_ (a.n.a.logy) and _aitihya_ (tradition) are regarded as being the same as faith in trustworthy persons and hence cases of inference.]

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Nyaya adds a fourth, _upamana_ (a.n.a.logy). The principle on which the four-fold division of [email protected] depends is that the causal collocation which generates the knowledge as well as the nature or characteristic kind of knowledge in each of the four cases is different. The same thing which appears to us as the object of our perception, may become the object of inference or s'abda (testimony), but the manner or mode of manifestation of knowledge being different in each case, and the manner or conditions producing knowledge being different in each case, it is to be admitted that inference and s'abda are different [email protected], though they point to the same object indicated by the perception. Nyaya thus objects to the incorporation of s'abda (testimony) or upamana within inference, on the ground that since the mode of production of knowledge is different, these are to be held as different [email protected] [Footnote ref 1].

Perception ([email protected]).

The naiyayikas admitted only the five cognitive senses which they believed to be composed of one or other of the five elements.

These senses could each come in contact with the special characteristic of that element of which they were composed. Thus the ear could perceive sound, because sound was the attribute of akas'a, of which the auditory sense, the ear, was made up. The eye could send forth rays to receive the colour, etc., of things.

Thus the cognitive senses can only manifest their specific objects by going over to them and thereby coming in contact with them.

The cognitive senses (_vak, pani, pada, payu_, and _upastha_) recognized in [email protected] as separate senses are not recognized here as such for the functions of these so-called senses are discharged by the general motor functions of the body.

Perception is defined as that right knowledge generated by the contact of the senses with the object, devoid of doubt and error not a.s.sociated with any other simultaneous sound cognition (such

[Footnote 1:

_Samagribhedai phalabhedacca [email protected]@h Anye eva hi samagriphale [email protected]@[email protected] Anye eva ca samagriphale [email protected] Nyayamanjari_, p. 33.]

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as the name of the object as heard from a person uttering it, just at the time when the object is seen) or name a.s.sociation, and determinate [Footnote ref 1]. If when we see a cow, a man says here is a cow, the knowledge of the sound as a.s.sociated with the percept cannot be counted as perception but as sound-knowledge ([email protected]_).

That right knowledge which is generated directly by the contact of the senses with the object is said to be the product of the perceptual process. Perception may be divided as indeterminate (_nirvikalpa_) and (_savikalpa_) determinate. Indeterminate perception is that in which the thing is taken at the very first moment of perception in which it appears without any a.s.sociation with name.

Determinate perception takes place after the indeterminate stage is just pa.s.sed; it reveals things as being endowed with all characteristics and qualities and names just as we find in all our concrete experience. Indeterminate perception reveals the things with their characteristics and universals, but at this stage there being no a.s.sociation of name it is more or less indistinct. When once the names are connected with the percept it forms the determinate perception of a thing called [email protected] If at the time of having the perception of a thing of which the name is not known to me anybody utters its name then the hearing of that should be regarded as a separate auditory name perception. Only that product is said to const.i.tute nirvikalpa perception which results from the perceiving process of the contact of the senses with the object. Of this nirvikalpa (indeterminate) perception it is held by the later naiyayikas that we are not conscious of it directly, but yet it has to be admitted as a necessary first stage without which the determinate consciousness could not arise. The indeterminate perception is regarded as the first stage in the process of perception. At the second stage it joins the other conditions of perception in producing the determinate perception.

The contact of the sense with the object is regarded as being of six kinds: (1) contact with the dravya (thing) called [email protected], (2) contact with the [email protected] (qualities) through the thing ([email protected]_) in which they inhere in samavaya (inseparable) relation, (3) contact with the [email protected] (such as colour etc.) in the generic character as universals of those qualities, e.g. colourness (rupatva), which inhere in the [email protected] in the samavaya relation.

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[Footnote 1: Ganges'a, a later naiyayika of great reputation, describes perception as immediate awareness ([email protected] [email protected] [email protected]@nam_).]

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This species of contact is called [email protected], for the eye is in contact with the thing, in the thing the colour is in samavaya relation, and in the specific colour there is the colour universal or the generic character of colour in samavaya relation. (4) There is another kind of contact called samavaya by which sounds are said to be perceived by the ear. The auditory sense is akas'a and the sound exists in akas'a in the samavaya relation, and thus the auditory sense can perceive sound in a peculiar kind of contact called samaveta-samavaya. (5) The generic character of sound as the universal of sound (s'abdatva) is perceived by the kind of contact known as samaveta-samavaya. (6) There is another kind of contact by which negation (_abhava_) is perceived, namely [email protected] [email protected]@na (as qualifying contact). This is so called because the eye perceives only the empty s.p.a.ce which is qualified by the absence of an object and through it the negation.

Thus I see that there is no jug here on the ground. My eye in this case is in touch with the ground and the absence of the jug is only a kind of quality of the ground which is perceived along with the perception of the empty ground. It will thus be seen that Nyaya admits not only the substances and qualities but all kinds of relations as real and existing and as being directly apprehended by perception (so far as they are directly presented).

The most important thing about the [email protected] theory of perception is this that the whole process beginning from the contact of the sense with the object to the distinct and clear perception of the thing, sometimes involving the appreciation of its usefulness or harmfulness, is regarded as the process of perception and its result perception. The self, the mind, the senses and the objects are the main factors by the particular kinds of contact between which perceptual knowledge is produced. All knowledge is indeed _arthaprakas'a,_ revelation of objects, and it is called perception when the sense factors are the instruments of its production and the knowledge produced is of the objects with which the senses are in contact. The contact of the senses with the objects is not in any sense metaphorical but actual. Not only in the case of touch and taste are the senses in contact with the objects, but in the cases of sight, hearing and smell as well.

The senses according to [email protected] are material and we have seen that the system does not admit of any other kind of transcendental (_atindriya_) power (_s'akti_) than that of actual vibratory

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