Part 24 (1/2)

he tried to show that the concomitance is not between those cases which possess the [email protected] or reason with the cases which possess the sadhya (probandum) but between that which has the characteristics of the [email protected] with that which has the characteristics of the sadhya (probandum); or in other words the concomitance is not between the places containing the smoke such as kitchen, etc., and the places containing fire but between that which has the characteristic of the [email protected], viz. the smoke, and that which has the characteristic of the sadhya, viz. the fire. This view of the nature of concomitance is known as inner concomitance (_antarvyapti_), whereas the former, viz. the concomitance between the thing possessing [email protected] and that possessing sadhya, is known as outer concomitance (_bahirvyapti_) and generally accepted by the Nyaya school of thought. This antarvyapti doctrine of concomitance is indeed a later Buddhist doctrine.

It may not be out of place here to remark that evidences of some form of Buddhist logic probably go back at least as early as the _Kathavatthu_ (200 B.C.). Thus Aung on the evidence of the _Yamaka_ points out that Buddhist logic at the time of As'oka ”was conversant with the distribution of terms” and the process of conversion. He further points out that the logical premisses such as the [email protected] (_Yo yo aggima so so dhumava_--whatever is fiery is smoky), the upanayana (_ayam pabbato dhumava_--this hill is smoky) and the n.i.g.g.ama (_tasmadayam aggima_--therefore that is fiery) were also known. (Aung further sums up the method of the arguments which are found in the _Kathavatthu_ as follows:

”Adherent. Is _A B_? ([email protected]_).

Opponent. Yes.

Adherent. Is _C D_? (_papana_).

Opponent. No.

Adherent. But if _A_ be _B_ then (you should have said) _C_ is _D_.

That _B_ can be affirmed of _A_ but _D_ of _C_ is false.

Hence your first answer is refuted.”)

The antecedent of the hypothetical major premiss is termed @thapana, because the opponent's position, _A_ is _B_, is conditionally established for the purpose of refutation.

The consequent of the hypothetical major premiss is termed papana because it is got from the antecedent. And the conclusion

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is termed [email protected] because the regulation is placed on the opponent. Next:

”If _D_ be derived of _C_.

Then _B_ should have been derived of _A_.

But you affirmed _B_ of _A_.

(therefore) That _B_ can be affirmed of _A_ but not of _D_ or _C_ is wrong.”

This is the [email protected], inverse or indirect method, as contrasted with the former or direct method, anuloma. In both methods the consequent is derived. But if we reverse the hypothetical major in the latter method we get

”If _A_ is _B_ _C_ is _D_.

But _A_ is _B_.

Therefore _C_ is _D_.

By this indirect method the opponent's second answer is reestablished [Footnote ref 1].”

The Doctrine of Momentariness.

Ratnakirtti (950 A.D.) sought to prove the momentariness of all existence (_sattva_), first, by the concomitance discovered by the method of agreement in presence (_anvayavyapti_), and then by the method of difference by proving that the production of effects could not be justified on the a.s.sumption of things being permanent and hence accepting the doctrine of momentariness as the only alternative. Existence is defined as the capacity of producing anything (_arthakriyakaritva_). The form of the first type of argument by anvayavyapti may be given thus: ”Whatever exists is momentary, by virtue of its existence, as for example the jug; all things about the momentariness of which we are discussing are existents and are therefore momentary.” It cannot be said that the jug which has been chosen as an example of an existent is not momentary; for the jug is producing certain effects at the present moment; and it cannot be held that these are all identical in the past and the future or that it is producing no effect at all in the past and future, for the first is impossible, for those which are done now could not be done again in the future; the second is impossible, for if it has any capacity to

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[Footnote: 1: See introduction to the translation of _Kathavatthu_ (_Points of Controversy_) by Mrs Rhys Davids.]

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produce effects it must not cease doing so, as in that case one might as well expect that there should not be any effect even at the present moment. Whatever has the capacity of producing anything at any time must of necessity do it. So if it does produce at one moment and does not produce at another, this contradiction will prove the supposition that the things were different at the different moments. If it is held that the nature of production varies at different moments, then also the thing at those two moments must be different, for a thing could not have in it two contradictory capacities.

Since the jug does not produce at the present moment the work of the past and the future moments, it cannot evidently do so, and hence is not identical with the jug in the past and in the future, for the fact that the jug has the capacity and has not the capacity as well, proves that it is not the same jug at the two moments (_s'aktas'aktasvabhavataya [email protected]@nam [email protected]_). The capacity of producing effects (_arthakriyas'akti_), which is but the other name of existence, is universally concomitant with momentariness ([email protected]@nikatvavyapta_).