Part 4 (1/2)

But the absence of a consciousness of ; the presence of a consciousness of is to all sublimity, the second only to one kind of it,--to that where we _atte _If_ we ination to number the stars or to find an end to time, then it is essential to sublimity that we should fail, and so fail that the idea of ies In likewill appear sublireatness is surpassed or even equalled by that of so else; and, if this process of co will be found subliined) And this kind of sublimity, which arises froly striking But it is only one kind For it is an entire delusion--though a very common one in theories of the sublime--to suppose that we _must_ attempt to measure or compare On the contrary, in the reatness is accoreatness has a measure, nor by the idea that it is immeasurable or infinite[13]

It will not do, then, to lay it down that the sublime is the beautiful which has iest that, after the explanations given, weas we re where we do notwhere we try toso, it seems that we may say that _all_ sublireatness or of the Infinite eh a certain check or li of it, we reach the perception or the i which, on the one hand, has a positive nature, and, on the other, is either _not_ determined as finite or _is_ determined as infinite But we must not add that this makes the sublih in a different way, is an ie of infinity In 'beauty,' as we said, that which appears in a sensuous form seems to rest in that form, to be wholly embodied in it; it shows no tendency to pass beyond it, and intiht strain or break it So that the 'beautiful' thing is a whole complete in itself, and in moments when beauty fills our souls we knohat Wordsworth s see but one of many, must from another point of view, here suppressed, be finite 'Beauty,' then, we e of the total presence of the Infinite within any lie of its boundlessness, and of its rejection of any pretension to independence or absoluteness on the part of its finite fore of its immanence, the other of its transcendence

Within an hour I could attempt no more than an outline of our subject

That is inevitable; and so is another defect, which I regretany kind of aesthetic experience we have to begin by disentangling the threads that , no ti how they are interwoven We distinguish, for example, one kind of sublimity from another, and we le instance, these kinds oftento overlook the field in which sublianic things, and of things vital, and of things spiritual, and that these kinds differ And this is true; and perhaps it is also true that sometimes we experience one of these kinds, so to say, quite pure and unmixed with others But it is not always, perhaps not usually so More frequently kind les with kind, and we mutilate the experience e naination, touched at one point, tingles all over and responds at all points It is offered an is from the other end of its world reminiscences of quite another order, and fuses the impression with thereatness, but there rises before the iination a vision with the outlines and hues of material Nature

Offer it a sunset--a mere collection of coloured lines and spots--and they becos too deep for tears

Tell it of souls made perfect in bliss, and it sees an iht of all the gems on earth

The truth that a sparrow and a mountain are different, and that Socrates is not Satan, interests it but little What it cares for is the truth that, when they are sublime, they are all the same; for each becomes infinite, and it feels in each its own infinity

1903

NOTES[14]

I add here a few remarks on some points which it was not convenient to discuss in the lecture

1 We have seen that in the apprehension of sublimity we do not always e overwhelreat it is not necessary to have before the reat, or any standard of greatness To argue that thisexcept as opposed to 's that I cannot have a perception of pride without thinking of humility

This point seeo below consciousness, what is it that happens in us? The apprehension of subli impression This as a er than so else must be, so to say, a standard hich the impression is unconsciously coeneral terth of impressions

But this unconscious standard takes particular concrete forms in various classes of cases Not seldoe hu felt to be sublienere_ with ourselves A sublime lion, for exae enieff's sparrow in courage and love, a God in all sorts of ways

And the use of this unconscious standard is probably the reason of the fact, noted in the lecture, that it is difficult to feel subliards vital force, in a creature smaller than ourselves

But this is not the only standard A sublienerally also exceptional ae or thunderstorm So that we seee of the kind to which the thing belongs An average thunderstorly superior to us in power[15]

What, again, is the psychical machinery employed e attempt to measure the shoreless sea, or time, and find them immeasurable? Is there any standard of the 'usual' here? I will leave this question to ists than myself

2 Since the impression produced by sublith, we are not able to feel it continuously for long, though we can repeat it after a pause In this the sublime differs from the 'beautiful,' on which we like to _dwell_ after our first surprise is over A tragedy or sy to end could not be so experienced Living a mountains, we feel their beauty more or less constantly, their sublimity only by flashes

3 If our account of the impression produced by sublimity is true, why should not any sensation whatever produce this ith? It seeth it conforeneral require the requisite accession of strength did not remove this conformity But this, in one respect at least, it would do It would ically painful, and we should feel it as painful or even dangerous We find this in the case of lightning If it is to be felt as aesthetic it htness; or, as we sometimes say, it must not be too 'near'

FOOTNOTES:

[1] I have learned so from many discussions of this subject

In its outline the view I have taken is perhaps nearer to Harte coincides roughly with this sense Indeed, it can hardly be said to recognise the wider one at all 'Beauty' and 'beautiful,' in that wider sense, are technical tere of Aesthetics should thus differ froe of speech and literature; but the misfortune seems to be unavoidable, for there is no word in the ordinary language which ives aesthetic satisfaction,' and yet that idea _must_ have a name in Aesthetics

[3] I do not mean to ienerally, reatness But here we are _reflecting_ on this apprehension