Part 12 (1/2)

There is a third aspect of Rubens which cannot be ignored and through which he may be a.s.sociated with the realist artists of the seventeenth century, who succeeded in preserving a purely Flemish and popular tradition in spite of Italian and monarchist influences. The ”Kermesse”

of the Louvre and the wonderful landscapes disseminated in so many European museums are the best proofs that the master did not lose touch with his native land and with the people who tilled it. This special aspect of his art is even more prominent in the works of his follower, Jacques Jordaens (1593-1678). It is significant that the latter became a Calvinist in 1655. While Rubens and Van Dyck represent mostly the aristocratic and clerical side of the Flemish art of the period, Jordaens appears as the direct descendant of Jerome Bosch and Peter Breughel. Breughel's satires, such as the ”Fight between the Lean and the Fat” and the ”Triumph of Death,” show plainly that his sympathies were certainly not on the side of Spanish oppression. His interpretation of the ”Ma.s.sacre of the Innocents” (Imperial Museum, Vienna) is nothing but a tragic description of a raid of Spanish soldiery on a Flemish village. Quite apart from their extraordinary suggestiveness, these works, like most of Breughel's drawings and paintings, const.i.tute admirable ill.u.s.trations of the popular life of the Low Countries during the religious wars. It must never be forgotten that all through the sixteenth century, starting from Quentin Matsys, the founder of the Antwerp school, the popular and Flemish tradition remains distinct from the flowery style of the Italianizants. Though it is impossible to divide the two groups of artists among the two political and religious tendencies in conflict, the works of Breughel and Jordaens may be considered as a necessary counterpart to those of Frans Floris and Rubens if we wish to form a complete idea of the civilization of the period.

Ill.u.s.tration: THE Ma.s.sACRE OF THE INNOCENTS (SIXTEENTH CENTURY).

(Imperial Museum, Vienna.) _P. Breugghel._[i]

CHAPTER XX

POLITICAL DECADENCE UNDER SPAIN

Though the seven Northern provinces could be considered as definitely lost after the failure of Farnese's last attempt to reconquer them, the Spanish Netherlands still included, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the three duchies of Brabant, Limburg (with its dependencies beyond the Meuse, Daelhem, Fauquemont and Rolduc), Luxemburg and a small part of Gelder with Ruremonde; four counties, Flanders, Artois, Hainault and Namur, and the two seigneuries of Malines and Tournai.

When, in 1715, the Southern Netherlands pa.s.sed under Austrian sovereignty, they had lost Maestricht and part of Northern Limburg, Northern Brabant, Zeeland Flanders, Walloon Flanders and Artois, and various small enclaves, most of their fortified towns being further obliged to receive foreign garrisons, maintained at the expense of the State. Antwerp remained closed, and the efforts made during the first years of the seventeenth century to restore the economic situation through industrial and agricultural activity were practically annihilated by incessant wars.

This situation was evidently caused by the weakness of Spain, which, though clinging to its Northern possessions, did not possess the means to defend them against the ambition of European Powers, more especially France. It was due also to the policy of the United Provinces, who considered Belgium as a mere buffer State which they could use for their own protection and whose ruin, through the closing of Antwerp, was one of the conditions of their own prosperity. Up to the War of the Spanish Succession, England played a less prominent part in the various conflicts affecting the Southern Netherlands, but she succeeded, on several occasions, in checking the annexationist projects of France, whose presence along the Belgian coast was a far greater danger than that of a weak and impoverished Spain.

[_WEAKNESS OF BELGIUM_]

There is no better ill.u.s.tration of the paramount importance of a strong and independent Belgium to the peace of Europe than the series of wars which followed each other in such rapid succession during the seventeenth century. It is true that, in nearly every instance, the new situation created in the Netherlands cannot be given as the direct cause of these various conflicts, resulting from territorial ambitions, dynastic susceptibilities and even, as in the case of the Thirty Years'

War, from circ.u.mstances quite independent of those prevalent on the Meuse and the Scheldt. But, whatever the nominal cause of these wars may have been, they certainly acquired a more widespread character from the fact that the Spanish Netherlands lay as an easy prey at the mercy of the invader and const.i.tuted a kind of open arena where European armies could meet and carry on their contests on enemy ground. It is not a mere chance that the separation of the Southern and Northern provinces coincided with a remarkable recrudescence of the warlike spirit all over Europe. The contrast between the fifteenth century, when the Seventeen Provinces const.i.tuted a powerful State under the dukes of Burgundy, and the seventeenth, when the greater part of it was ruined and undefended, at the mercy of foreign invasion, is particularly enlightening. All through the Middle Ages first Flanders, later the Burgundian Netherlands, had exerted their sobering and regulating influence between France, on one side, and England or Germany on the other. The Belgian princes were directly interested in maintaining peace, and, in most cases, only went to war when their independence, and incidentally the peace of Europe, was threatened by the increasing ambition of one of their neighbours. The system of alliances concluded with this object could not possibly prevent conflicts, but it certainly limited their scope and preserved Europe from general conflagration, the combination of the Netherlands with one Power being usually enough to keep a third Power in order. The weakening of the Southern provinces under Spanish rule thus caused an irreparable gap in the most sensitive and dangerous spot on the political map of Europe. Triple and Quadruple Alliances were entered into and inaugurated the system of Grand Alliances which was henceforth to characterize almost every European conflict and increase on such a large scale the numbers of opposed forces and the devastations accompanying their warlike operations.

[_DUTCH POLICY_]

It may be said that the United Provinces might have played the part formerly filled by the Burgundian Netherlands and the county of Flanders, but, in spite of their amazing maritime expansion and of the prosperity of their trade, they did not enjoy the same military prestige on land. Besides, they did not care to undertake such a heavy responsibility, and pursued most of the time a narrowly self-centred policy. Though they had some excellent opportunities of reconst.i.tuting the unity of the Low Countries, and though some of their statesmen contemplated such a step, the United Provinces never embarked upon a definite policy of reconst.i.tution. They played for safety first and were far too wary to sacrifice solid material advantages for a problematic European prestige. Unification would have meant the reopening of the Scheldt and the resurrection of Antwerp, whose rivalry was always dreaded by the Northern ports. It would have meant the admission of a far more numerous population on an equal footing, with religious freedom, to the privileges of the Republic. It would have implied the sacrifice of an extraordinarily strong strategic situation and the risks involved by the defence of weak and extended frontiers.

The maintenance of a weak buffer State, as a glacis against any attacks from the South, seemed far more advantageous, especially if its fortified positions were garrisoned with Dutch forces. It gave all the same strategic advantages which unification might have given, without any of its risks and inconveniences. ”It is far better,” wrote a Dutch Grand Pensioner, at the time, ”to defend oneself in Brussels or Antwerp than in Breda or Dordrecht.” Such an att.i.tude was perfectly justified as long as Holland did not claim the advantages attached to the position of a moderating central Power and ask for the reward without having taken the risks.

We have seen how, in 1632, the delegates of the States General were met at The Hague with the proposal of the creation of a Federative Catholic Republic under the tutelage of France and Holland. This project, already entertained in 1602 by the Grand Pensioner Oldenbarneveldt, was very much favoured by Cardinal Richelieu, who, in 1634, signed a secret convention with the United Provinces, according to which such a proposal would be made to the people of the Southern Netherlands. In the event of their refusing this arrangement, the country would be divided among the two allies, following a line running from Blankenberghe to Luxemburg. If we remember the att.i.tude of the Belgians at the time of the Conspiracy of the n.o.bles, led by the Count of Bergh (1632), such a refusal must have been antic.i.p.ated, so that the proposal amounted really to a project of part.i.tion. This project would anyhow have been opposed by England, since, according to the Dutch diplomat Grotius, Charles I ”would not admit” the presence of France on the Flemish coast.

In 1635 a formal and public alliance was declared between the United Provinces and France, and war broke out once more between Spain and the confederates. The operations which followed form part of the fourth phase of the Thirty Years' War, but we are only concerned here with their result with regard to the Netherlands. While the Dutch took Breda and concentrated near Maestricht, the French advanced through the Southern provinces towards Limburg, where they made their junction with their allies to proceed against Brussels. The Belgians had not answered the Franco-Batavian manifesto, inviting them to rebel, and gave whatever help they could to their Spanish governor, the Cardinal Infant Ferdinand. Students co-operated in the defence of Louvain, and the people showed the greatest loyalty during the campaign. They knew by now that they had very little good to expect from a Franco-Dutch protectorate and that even the shadow of independence they were allowed to preserve under the Spanish regime would be taken from them.

Powerless to reconquer full independence, they preferred a weak rule which secured for them at least religious liberty to the strong rule of those whom they considered as foreigners and as enemies to their country.

[_RICHELIEU AND MAZARIN_]

Operations were pursued with alternating success until 1642, when Mazarin succeeded Richelieu as French Prime Minister. Mazarin favoured a more radical solution of the Netherlands difficulty. He persuaded Louis XIV that the possession of the left bank of the Rhine was essential to the safety of the kingdom, and aimed at the total annexation of the Belgian Provinces. The negotiations begun in that direction met with Dutch and English opposition and the curt refusal of Spain to renounce her rights on her Northern possessions. This new att.i.tude of France brought about a rapprochement between Spain and the United Provinces, who began to fear Louis XIV's ambitious schemes. The two countries settled their difficulties by the treaty of Munster (1648), while, after a new series of defeats, culminating, in 1658, in the Battle of the Dunes, won by Turenne against Don Juan, Philip IV was finally obliged to submit to the treaty of the Pyrenees (1659).

The Dutch plenipotentiaries had practically a free hand in the settling of the Munster treaty. They acquired all the territories they claimed, and they only claimed the territories they wanted and which they already held. Their choice was dictated neither by territorial ambition nor by the desire to realize the unity of the Netherlands. They obtained, of course, the official recognition of their full independence and the maintenance of the closing of the Scheldt and of its dependencies. The annexation of Zeeland Flanders, henceforth known as Flanders of the States, ensured their position on the left bank of the stream, that of North Brabant with Bergen-op-Zoom, Breda and Bois-le-Duc, ensured the protection of their central provinces, while Maestricht, together with Fauquemont, Daelhem and Rolduc, secured their position on the Meuse. These were purely strategic annexations, prompted by strategic motives and by the desire to keep a firm hold on some key positions from which the United Provinces could check any attack, either from Spain or from France, with the least effort.

By the treaty of the Pyrenees Philip IV abandoned to France the whole of Artois and a series of fortified positions in Southern Flanders, Hainault, Namur and Luxemburg. These latter demands were prompted by an evident desire to extend French territory towards the Netherlands and to obtain a position which should afford a good starting-point for such extension.

The treaties of Munster and of the Pyrenees had, broadly speaking, determined the new status of the Southern provinces, considerably diminished to comply with the wishes and the interests of the United Provinces and of France. This status was not considerably altered by the succession of wars which took place during the second half of the seventeenth century and the early years of the eighteenth, and which ended by the subst.i.tution of Austrian for Spanish rule. It was, however, considered as provisional by Louis XIV, whose territorial ambitions extended far beyond Walloon Flanders, and, before obtaining the right to live within her new frontiers, Belgium had still to undergo the ordeal of five devastating wars.

Ill.u.s.tration: PROCLAMATION OF THE PEACE OF MuNSTER IN FRONT OF THE ANTWERP TOWN HALL.

From an old print (1648).

[_PROJECTS OF PARt.i.tION_]

At the time of the death of Philip IV (1665), the Southern provinces, impoverished and inadequately defended, were an easy prey to foreign territorial greed. The Dutch Grand Pensioner De Witt returned to the old plan of 1634, whereby Holland and France should agree to the const.i.tution of a protected buffer State, and, in case this proposal should not meet with the support of the States, to a part.i.tion along a line extending from Ostend to Maestricht. Holland and England, however, were soon to realize that no compromise was possible with France and that their safety required prompt joint action.