Part 14 (1/2)
[Footnote 310: _Ibid._, Chapter III. See Article VI of the Const.i.tution.]
[Footnote 311: _Ibid._, Chapter IV. See also Moses, History of Illinois, Vol. I, p. 324.]
[Footnote 312: Harris, Negro Servitude, pp. 125, 136-357]
[Footnote 313: Journal of the Const.i.tutional Convention of 1847, pp.
453-456.]
[Footnote 314: _Whig Almanac_, 1841.]
[Footnote 315: _Ibid._, 1845.]
[Footnote 316: Smith, Liberty and Free Soil Parties, pp. 326-327.]
[Footnote 317: Smith, Liberty and Free Soil Parties, pp. 328-329.]
[Footnote 318: House Journal, p. 52.]
[Footnote 319: All these fifteen voted for the Democratic candidate for Speaker of the House.]
[Footnote 320: House Journal, p. 52; Senate Journal, p. 44. See also Harris, Negro Servitude in Illinois, p. 177.]
[Footnote 321: See Speech in Senate, December 23, 1851.]
[Footnote 322: See the writer's article on ”The Genesis of Popular Sovereignty” in the _Iowa Journal of History and Politics_ for January, 1905.]
[Footnote 323: Davidson and Stuve, History of Illinois, pp. 241-242.]
[Footnote 324: _Northwestern Gazette_, March 19, 1842.]
[Footnote 325: September 27, 1849.]
[Footnote 326: Compare his utterances on the following dates: January 10, 1849; January 22, 1849; October 23, 1849 at Springfield, Illinois; February 12, 1850; June 3, 1850.]
CHAPTER IX
MEASURES OF ADJUSTMENT
When Congress a.s.sembled in December, 1849, statesmen of the old school, who could agree in nothing else, were of one mind in this: the Union was in peril. In the impressive words of Webster, ”the imprisoned winds were let loose. The East, the North, and the stormy South combined to throw the whole sea into commotion, to toss its billows to the skies, and disclose its profoundest depths.” Clay and Calhoun were equally apprehensive. Yet there were younger men who shared none of these fears. To be sure, the political atmosphere of Was.h.i.+ngton was electric. The House spent weeks wrangling over the Speakers.h.i.+p, so that when the serious work of legislation began, men were overwrought and excitable. California with a free const.i.tution was knocking at the door of the Union. President Taylor gave Congress to understand that at no distant day the people of New Mexico would take similar action. And then, as though he were addressing a body of immortals, he urged Congress to await calmly the action of the people of the Territories.
Douglas was among those unimpressionable younger men who would not believe the Union to be in danger. Perhaps by his Southern connections he knew better than most Northern men, the real temper of the South.
Perhaps he did not give way to the prevailing hysteria, because he was diverted from the great issues by the pressing, particular interests of his const.i.tuents. At all events, he had this advantage over Clay, Webster, and Calhoun, that when he did turn his attention to schemes of compromise, his vision was fresh, keen, and direct. He escaped that subtle distortion of mental perception from which others were likely to suffer because of long-sustained attention. To such, Douglas must have seemed unemotional, unsensitive, and lacking in spiritual fineness.
Illinois with its North and its South was also facing a crisis. To the social and political differences that bisected the State, was added a keen commercial rivalry between the sections. While the State legislature under northern control was appropriating funds for the Illinois and Michigan ca.n.a.l, it exhibited far less liberality in building railroads, which alone could be the arteries of traffic in southern Illinois. At a time when railroads were extending their lines westward from the Atlantic seaboard, and reaching out covetously for the produce of the Mississippi Valley, Illinois held geographically a commanding position. No roads could reach the great river, north of the Ohio at least, without crossing her borders. The avenues of approach were given into her keeping. To those who directed State policy, it seemed possible to determine the commercial destinies of the Commonwealth by controlling the farther course of the railroads which now touched the eastern boundary. Well-directed effort, it was thought, might utilize these railroads so as to build up great commercial cities on the eastern sh.o.r.e of the Mississippi. State policy required that none of these cross-roads should in any event touch St. Louis, and thus make it, rather than the Illinois towns now struggling toward commercial greatness, the entrepot between East and West. With its unrivalled site at the mouth of the Missouri, Alton was as likely a compet.i.tor for the East and West traffic, and for the Mississippi commerce, as St. Louis. Alton, then, must be made the terminus of the cross-roads.[327]
The people of southern Illinois thought otherwise. Against the background of such distant hopes, they saw a concrete reality. St.
Louis was already the market for their produce. From every railroad which should cross the State and terminate at St. Louis, they antic.i.p.ated tangible profits. They could not see why these very real advantages should be sacrificed on the altar of northern interests.
After the opening of the northern ca.n.a.l, they resented this exclusive policy with increased bitterness.
Upon one point, and only one, the people of northern and southern Illinois were agreed: they believed that every possible encouragement should be given to the construction of a great central railroad, which should cross the State from north to south. Such a railroad had been projected as early as 1836 by a private corporation. Subsequently the State took up the project, only to abandon it again to a private company, after the bubble of internal improvements had been p.r.i.c.ked.