Part 7 (2/2)

[Footnote 173: _Globe_, 28 Cong. I Sess. pp. 276-277.]

[Footnote 174: J.Q. Adams, Memoirs, XI, p. 510.]

[Footnote 175: _Globe_, 28 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 549-550. For the trend of public opinion in the district which Douglas represented, see Peoria _Register,_ September 21, 1839.]

[Footnote 176: _Globe,_28 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 527-528]

[Footnote 177: _Globe_, 28 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 534.]

[Footnote 178: Illinois _State Register_, February 9, 1844.]

[Footnote 179: _Ibid._, May 17, 1844.]

[Footnote 180: It was intimated that he had at first aided Tyler in his forlorn hope of a second term.]

[Footnote 181: _Globe_, 28 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 598 ff.]

[Footnote 182: Illinois _State Register_, August 30, 1844.]

[Footnote 183: _Ibid._, September 27, 1844.]

[Footnote 184: Sheahan, Douglas, pp. 70-71.]

[Footnote 185: Official returns in the office of the Secretary of State.]

CHAPTER V

MANIFEST DESTINY

The defeat of President Tyler's treaty in June, 1844, just on the eve of the presidential campaign, gave the Texas question an importance which the Democrats in convention had not foreseen, when they inserted the re-annexation plank in the platform. The hostile att.i.tude of Whig senators and of Clay himself toward annexation, helped to make Texas a party issue. While it cannot be said that Polk was elected on this issue alone, there was some plausibility in the statement of President Tyler, that ”a controlling majority of the people, and a majority of the States, have declared in favor of immediate annexation.” At all events, when Congress rea.s.sembled, President Tyler promptly acted on this supposition. In his annual message, and again in a special message a fortnight later, he urged ”prompt and immediate action on the subject of annexation.” Since the two governments had already agreed on terms of annexation, he recommended their adoption by Congress ”in the form of a joint resolution, or act, to be perfected and made binding on the two countries, when adopted in like manner by the government of Texas.”[186] A policy which had not been able to secure the approval of two-thirds of the Senate was now to be endorsed by a majority of both houses. In short, a legislative treaty was to be enacted by Congress.

The Hon. Stephen A. Douglas had taken his seat in the House with augmented self-a.s.surance. He had not only secured his re-election and the success of his party in Illinois, but he had served most acceptably as a campaign speaker in Polk's own State. Surely he was ent.i.tled to some consideration in the councils of his party. In the appointment of standing committees, he could hardly hope for a chairmans.h.i.+p. It was reward enough to be made a member of the Committee of Elections and of the Committee on the Judiciary. On the paramount question before this Congress, he entertained strong convictions, which he had no hesitation in setting forth in a series of resolutions, while older members were still feeling their way. The preamble of these ”Joint Resolutions for the annexation of Texas” was in itself a little stump speech: ”Whereas the treaty of 1803 had provided that the people of Texas should be incorporated into the Union and admitted as soon as possible to citizens.h.i.+p, and whereas the present inhabitants have signified their willingness to be re-annexed; therefore”.... Particular interest attaches to the Eighth Resolution which proposed to extend the Missouri Compromise line through Texas, ”inasmuch as the compromise had been made prior to the treaty of 1819, by which Texas was ceded to Spain.”[187] The resolutions never commanded any support worth mentioning, attention being drawn to the joint resolution of the Committee on Foreign Affairs which was known to have the sanction of the President. The proposal of Douglas to settle the matter of slavery in Texas in the act of annexation itself, was perhaps his only contribution to the discussion of ways and means. An aggressive Southern group of representatives readily caught up the suggestion.

The debate upon the joint resolution was well under way before Douglas secured recognition from the Speaker. The opposition was led by Winthrop of Ma.s.sachusetts and motived by reluctance to admit slave territory, as well as by const.i.tutional scruples regarding the process of annexation by joint resolution. Douglas spoke largely in rejoinder to Winthrop. A clever retort to Winthrop's reference to ”this odious measure devised for sinister purposes by a President not elected by the people,” won for Douglas the good-natured attention of the House.

It was President Adams and not President Tyler, Douglas remonstrated, who had first opened negotiations for annexation; but perhaps the gentleman from Ma.s.sachusetts intended to designate his colleague, Mr.

Adams, when he referred to ”a president not elected by the people”![188] Moreover, it was Mr. Adams, who as Secretary of State had urged our claims to all the country as far as the Rio del Norte, under the Treaty of 1803. In spite of these just boundary claims and our solemn promise to admit the inhabitants of the Louisiana purchase to citizens.h.i.+p, we had violated that pledge by ceding Texas to Spain in 1819. These people had protested against this separation, only a few months after the signing of the treaty; they now asked us to redeem our ancient pledge. Honor and violated faith required the immediate annexation of Texas.[189] Had Douglas known, or taken pains to ascertain, who these people were, who protested against the treaty of 1819, he would hardly have wasted his commiseration upon them.

Enough: the argument served his immediate purpose.

To those who contended that Congress had no power to annex territory with a view to admitting new States, Douglas replied that the Const.i.tution not only grants specific powers to Congress, but also general power to pa.s.s acts necessary and proper to carry out the specific powers. Congress may admit new States, but in the present instance Congress cannot exercise that power without annexing territory. ”The annexation of Texas is a prerequisite without the performance of which Texas cannot be admitted.”[190] The Const.i.tution does not state that the President and Senate may admit new States, nor that they shall make laws for the acquisition of territory in order to enable Congress to admit new States. The Const.i.tution declares explicitly, ”_Congress_ may admit new States.” ”When the grant of power is to Congress, the authority to pa.s.s all laws necessary to its execution is also in Congress; and the treaty-making power is to be confined to those cases where the power is not located elsewhere by the Const.i.tution.”[191]

With those weaklings who feared lest the extension of the national domain should react unfavorably upon our inst.i.tutions, and who apprehended war with Mexico, Douglas had no patience. The States of the Union were already drawn closer together than the thirteen original States in the first years of the Union, because of the improved means of communication. Transportation facilities were now multiplying more rapidly than population. ”Our federal system,” he exclaimed, with a burst of jingoism that won a round of applause from Western Democrats as he resumed his seat, ”Our federal system is admirably adapted to the whole continent; and, while I would not violate the laws of nations, nor treaty stipulations, nor in any manner tarnish the national honor, I would exert all legal and honorable means to drive Great Britain and the last vestiges of royal authority from the continent of North America, and extend the limits of the republic from ocean to ocean. I would make this an ocean-bound republic, and have no more disputes about boundaries, or 'red lines'

upon the maps.”[192]

<script>