Part 4 (1/2)
”The practical conclusion is that neither Greeks, Servians, nor Bulgarians have a right to claim Central Macedonia. The fact that they all do so shows how weak each claim must be.”
Yet it was Bulgaria's intransigent a.s.sertion of her claim to Central Macedonia which led to the war between the Allies.
It will be instructive to consider the att.i.tude of each of the governments concerned on the eve of the conflict. I hope I am in a position correctly to report it. Certainly I had unusual opportunities to learn it. For besides the official position I held in Athens during the entire course of both Balkan wars I visited the {91} Balkan states in June and was accorded the privilege of discussing the then pending crisis with the prime ministers of Roumania, Servia, and Bulgaria. It would of course be improper to quote them; nay more, I feel myself under special obligation sacredly to respect the confidence they reposed in me. But the frank disclosures they made in these conversations gave me a point of view for the comprehension of the situation and the estimate of facts which I have found simply invaluable. And if Mr. Venizelos in Athens, or Mr. Maioresco in Bukarest, or Mr. Pas.h.i.+tch in Belgrade, or Dr. Daneff, who is no longer prime minister of Bulgaria, should ever chance to read what I am saying, I hope each will feel that I have fairly and impartially presented the att.i.tude which their respective governments had taken at this critical moment on the vital issue then confronting them.
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THE ATt.i.tUDE OF SERVIA
I have already indicated the situation of Servia. Compelled by the Great Powers to withdraw her troops from Albania, after they had triumphantly made their way to the Adriatic, she was now requested by Bulgaria to evacuate Central Macedonia up to the Ochrida-Golema Vreh line in accordance with the terms of the treaty between the two countries which was ratified in March, 1912. The Servian government believed that for the loss of Albania, which the treaty a.s.sumed would be annexed to Servia, they were ent.i.tled to compensation in Macedonia.
And if now, instead of compensation for the loss of an outlet on the Adriatic, they were to withdraw their forces from Central Macedonia and allow Bulgaria to establish herself between New Servia and New Greece, they would block their own way to Saloniki, which was the only prospect now left of a Servian outlet to the sea. Nor was this the whole {93} story by any means. The army, which comprised all able-bodied Servians, was in possession of Central Macedonia; and the military leaders, with the usual professional bias in favor of imperialism, dictated their expansionist views to the government at Belgrade. If Bulgaria would not voluntarily grant compensation for the loss of Albania, the Servian people were ready to take it by force. They had also a direct claim against Bulgaria. They had sent 60,000 soldiers to the siege of Adrianople, which the Bulgarians had hitherto failed to capture. And the Servians were now asking, in bitter irony, whether they had gone to war solely for the benefit of Bulgaria; whether besides helping her to win all Thrace and Eastern Macedonia they were now to present her with Central Macedonia, and that at a time when the European Concert had stripped them of the expected prize of Albania with its much desired Adriatic littoral! This argument was graphically presented on a map of which I secured a {94} copy in Belgrade. The legend on this map reads as follows:
”Territories occupied by Servia 55,000 square miles. Servia cedes to her allies in the east and south 3,800 square miles. Servia cedes to Albania 15,200 square miles. Servia retains 36,000 square miles.
Territories occupied by Bulgaria to Enos-Midia, 51,200 square miles.
The Bulgarians demand from the Servians still 10,240 square miles.
According to Bulgarian pretensions Bulgaria should get 61,520 square miles and Servia only 25,760!”
PROPOSED REVISION OF TREATY AND ARBITRATION
When the treaty between Servia and Bulgaria was negotiated, it seems to have been a.s.sumed that the theatre of a war with Turkey would be Macedonia and that Thrace--the country from the Mesta to the Black Sea--would remain intact to Turkey. And if the rest of Turkey in Europe up to the Adriatic {95} were conquered by the two Allies, the Ochrida-Golema Vreh line would make a fairly equitable division between them of the spoils of war. But with Albania denied to Servia and Thrace occupied by Bulgaria, conditions had wholly changed. The Servian government declared that the changed conditions had abrogated the Treaty of Part.i.tion and that it was for the two governments now to adjust themselves to the logic of events! On May 28 Mr. Pas.h.i.+tch, the Servian prime minister, formally demanded a revision of the treaty. A personal interview with the Bulgarian prime minister, Mr. Gueshoff, followed on June 2 at Tsaribrod. And Mr. Gueshoff accepted Mr.
Pas.h.i.+tch's suggestion (which originated with Mr. Venizelos, the Greek prime minister) of a conference of representatives of the four Allies at St. Petersburg. For it should be added that, in the Treaty of Part.i.tion, the Czar had been named as arbiter in case of any territorial dispute between the two parties.
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What followed in the next few days has never been clearly disclosed.
But it was of transcendent importance. I have always thought that if Mr. Gueshoff, one of the authors of the Balkan Alliance, had been allowed like Mr. Venizelos and Mr. Pas.h.i.+tch, to finish his work, there would have been no war between the Allies. I did not enjoy the personal acquaintance of Mr. Gueshoff, but I regarded him as a wise statesman of moderate views, who was disposed to make reasonable concessions for the sake of peace. But a whole nation in arms, flushed with the sense of victory, is always dangerous to the authority of civil government. If Mr. Gueshoff was ready to arrange some accommodation with Mr. Pas.h.i.+tch, the military party in Bulgaria was all the more insistent in its demands on Servia for the evacuation of Central Macedonia. Even in Servia Mr. Pas.h.i.+tch had great difficulty in repressing the jingo ardor of the army, whose bellicose spirit was believed to find expression in the att.i.tude {97} of the Crown Prince.
But the provocation in Bulgaria was greater, because, when all was said and done, Servia was actually violating an agreement with Bulgaria to which she had solemnly set her name. Possibly the military party gained the ear of King Ferdinand. Certainly it was reported that he was consulting with leaders of the opposition. Presumably they were all dissatisfied with the conciliatory att.i.tude which Mr. Gueshoff had shown in the Tsaribrod conference. Whatever the expiation, Mr.
Gueshoff resigned on June 9.
DELAY AND OPPOSITION OF BULGARIA
On that very day the Czar summoned the Kings of Bulgaria and Servia to submit their disputes to his decision. While this demand was based on a specific provision of the Servo-Bulgarian treaty, His Majesty also urged it on the ground of devotion to the Slav cause. This pro-Slav argument provoked much criticism in Austro-Hungarian circles which {98} resented bitterly the a.s.sumption of Slav hegemony in Balkan affairs.
However, on June 12 Bulgaria and Servia accepted Russian arbitration.
But the terms were not agreed upon. While Mr. Venizelos and Mr.
Pas.h.i.+tch impatiently awaited the summons to St. Petersburg they could get no definite information of the intentions of the Bulgarian government. And the rivalry of Austria-Hungary and Russia for predominance in the Balkans was never more intense than at this critical moment.
On June 14 Dr. Daneff was appointed prime minister in succession to Mr.
Gueshoff. He had represented Bulgaria in the London Peace Conference where his aggressive and uncompromising att.i.tude had perturbed his fellow delegates from the other Balkan states and provoked some criticism in the European press. He was known as a Russophil. And he seems now to have got a.s.surance from Russia that she would maintain the Bulgarian view of the treaty with Servia, although she {99} had at one time favored the Servian demand for an extensive revision of it.