Volume III Part 36 (1/2)
James Monroe, in his letters, does not deny the right of government to withdraw its confidence from any one of its delegates, representatives, or agents. He has hinted, it is true, that caprice and temper are not in accordance with the spirit of paternal rule, and that whenever a representative government punishes or rewards, good faith, integrity and justice should replace _the good pleasure of Kings_.
In the present case, they have done more than recall an agent. Had they confined themselves to depriving him of his appointment, James Monroe would have kept silence; but he has been accused of lighting the torch of discord in both Republics. The refutation of this absurd and infamous reproach is the chief object of his correspondence. If he did not immediately complain of these slanders in his letters of the 6th and 8th [July], it is because he wished to use at first a certain degree of caution, and, if it were possible, to stifle intestine troubles at their birth. He wished to reopen the way to peaceful negotiations to be conducted with good faith and justice.
The arguments of the Secretary of State on the rights of the supreme administration of the United States are peremptory; but the observations of Monroe on the hidden causes of his recall are touching; they come from the heart; they are characteristic of an excellent citizen. If he does more than complain of his unjust recall as a man of feeling would; if he proudly asks for proofs of a grave accusation, it is after he has tried in vain every honest and straightforward means. He will not suffer that a government, sold to the enemies of freedom, should discharge upon him its shame, its crimes, its ingrat.i.tude, and all the odium of its unjust dealings.
Were Monroe to find himself an object of public hatred, the Republican party in the United States, that party which is the sincere ally of France, would be annihilated, and this is the aim of the English government.
Imagine the triumph of Pitt, if Monroe and the other friends of freedom in America, should be unjustly attacked in France!
Monroe does not lay his cause before the Senate since the Senate itself ratified the unconst.i.tutional treaty; he appeals to the house of Representatives, and at the same time lays his cause before the upright tribunal of the American nation.
x.x.xI. PRIVATE LETTER TO PRESIDENT JEFFERSON.
Paris, October 1, 1800.
Dear Sir,--I wrote to you from Havre by the s.h.i.+p Dublin Packet in the year 1797. It was then my intention to return to America; but there were so many British frigates cruising in sight of the port, and which after a few days knew that I was at Havre waiting to go to America, that I did not think it best to trust myself to their discretion, and the more so, as I had no confidence in the captain of the Dublin Packet (Clay).(1) I mentioned to you in that letter, which I believe you received thro'
the hands of Colonel [Aaron] Burr, that I was glad since you were not President that you had accepted the nomination of Vice President.
The Commissioners Ellsworth & Co.(2) have been here about eight months, and three more useless mortals never came upon public business. Their presence appears to me to have been rather an injury than a benefit.
They set themselves up for a faction as soon as they arrived. I was then in Belgia.(3) Upon my return to Paris I learnt they had made a point of not returning the visits of Mr. Skipwith and Barlow, because, they said, they had not the confidence of the executive. Every known republican was treated in the same manner. I learned from Mr. Miller of Philadelphia, who had occasion to see them upon business, that they did not intend to return my visit, if I made one. This, I supposed, it was intended I should know, that I might not make one. It had the contrary effect. I went to see Mr. Ellsworth. I told him, I did not come to see him as a commissioner, nor to congratulate him upon his mission; that I came to see him because I had formerly known him in Congress. ”I mean not,”
said I, ”to press you with any questions, or to engage you in any conversation upon the business you are come upon, but I will nevertheless candidly say that I know not what expectations the Government or the people of America may have of your mission, or what expectations you may have yourselves, but I believe you will find you can do but little. The treaty with England lies at the threshold of all your business. The American Government never did two more foolish things than when it signed that Treaty and recalled Mr. Monroe, who was the only man could do them any service.” Mr. Ellsworth put on the dull gravity of a Judge, and was silent. I added, ”You may perhaps make a treaty like that you have made with England, which is a surrender of the rights of the American flag; for the principle that neutral s.h.i.+ps make neutral property must be general or not at all.” I then changed the subject, for I had all the talk to myself upon this topic, and enquired after Samuel Adams, (I asked nothing about John,) Mr. Jefferson, Mr.
Monroe, and others of my friends; and the melancholy case of the yellow fever,--of which he gave me as circ.u.mstantial an account as if he had been summing up a case to a Jury. Here my visit ended, and had Mr.
Ellsworth been as cunning as a statesman, or as wise as a Judge, he would have returned my visit that he might appear insensible of the intention of mine.
1 The packet was indeed searched for Paine by a British cruiser.--_Editor._
2 Oliver Ellsworth (Chief Justice), W. V. Murray, and W. R.
Davie, were sent by President Adams to France to negotiate a treaty. In this they failed, but a convention was signed September 30, 1800, which terminated the treaty of 1778, which had become a source of discord, and prepared the way for the negotiations of Livingston and Monroe in 1803.-- _Editor._
3 Paine had visited his room-mate in Luxembourg prison, Vanhuele, who was now Mayor of Bruges.--_Editor._.
I now come to the affairs of this country and of Europe. You will, I suppose, have heard before this arrives to you, of the battle of Marengo in Italy, where the Austrians were defeated--of the armistice in consequence thereof, and the surrender of Milan, Genoa etc. to the french--of the successes of the french Army in Germany--and the extension of the armistice in that quarter--of the preliminaries of Peace signed at Paris--of the refusal of the Emperor [of Austria] to ratify these preliminaries--of the breaking of the armistice by the french Government in consequence of that refusal--of the ”gallant”
expedition of the Emperor to put himself at the head of his Army--of his pompous arrival there--of his having made his will--of prayers being put in all his churches for the preservation of the life of this Hero--of General Moreau announcing to him, immediately on his arrival at the Army, that hostilities would commence the day after the next at sunrise unless he signed the treaty or gave security that he would sign within 45 days--of his surrendering up three of the princ.i.p.al keys of Germany (Ulm, Philipsbourg, and Ingolstadt) as security that he would sign them.
This is the state things are now in, at the time of writing this letter; but it is proper to add that the refusal of the Emperor to sign the preliminaries was motived upon a note from the King of England to be admitted to the Congress for negociating Peace, which was consented to by the french upon the condition of an armistice at Sea, which England, before knowing of the surrender the Emperor had made, had refused. From all which it appears to me, judging from circ.u.mstances, that the Emperor is now so compleatly in the hands of the french, that he has no way of getting out but by a peace. The Congress for the peace is to be held at Luneville, a town in France. Since the affair of Rastadt the French commissioners will not trust themselves within the Emperor's territory.
I now come to domestic Affairs. I know not what the Commissioners have done, but from a paper I enclose to you, which appears to have some authority, it is not much. The paper as you will perceive is considerably prior to this letter. I know that the Commissioners before this piece appeared intended setting off. It is therefore probable that what they have done is conformable to what this paper mentions, which certainly will not atone for the expence their mission has incurred, neither are they, by all the accounts I hear of them, men fitted for the business.
But independently of these matters there appears to be a state of circ.u.mstances rising, which if it goes on, will render all partial treaties unnecessary. In the first place I doubt if any peace will be made with England; and in the second place, I should not wonder to see a coalition formed against her, to compel her to abandon her insolence on the seas. This brings me to speak of the ma.n.u.scripts I send you.
The piece No. I, without any t.i.tle, was written in consequence of a question put to me by Bonaparte. As he supposed I knew England and English Politics he sent a person to me to ask, that in case of negociating a Peace with Austria, whether it would be proper to include England. This was when Count St. Julian was in Paris, on the part of the Emperor negociating the preliminaries:--which as I have before said the Emperor refused to sign on the pretence of admitting England.
The piece No. 2, ent.i.tled _On the Jacobinism of the English at sea_, was written when the English made their insolent and impolitic expedition to Denmark, and is also an auxiliary to the politic of No. I. I shewed it to a friend [Bonneville] who had it translated into french, and printed in the form of a Pamphlet, and distributed gratis among the foreign Ministers, and persons in the Government. It was immediately copied into several of the french Journals, and into the official Paper, the Moniteur. It appeared in this paper one day before the last dispatch arrived from Egypt; which agreed perfectly with what I had said respecting Egypt. It hit the two cases of Denmark and Egypt in the exact proper moment.
The Piece No. 3, ent.i.tled _Compact Maritime_, is the sequel of No. 2, digested in form. It is translating at the time I write this letter, and I am to have a meeting with the Senator Garat upon the subject.