Volume Ii Part 16 (2/2)

The session lasted until the thirtieth day of March, and though Congress had then completed all the business pressing upon its attention the Republican leaders would not permit an adjournment _sine die_. They decided to meet again in midsummer. The same necessity that had induced them to convene in March persuaded them that the President should not be allowed to have control of events for eight months without the supervision of the legislative branch of the Government. It was resolved therefore that Congress should meet on Wednesday, July 3d. The vigilance and determination evinced by this action did not prove useless or go unrewarded. Only a few weeks after Congress had taken its recess the danger antic.i.p.ated by the Republican leaders, from hostile interpretation of the Reconstruction Acts by the Attorney-General, was made fully apparent. On the 24th of May and the 12th of June Mr. Stanbery gave two opinions to the President, which in many respects neutralized the force both of the original and supplementary acts of Reconstruction. His adverse views were elaborately and skilfully presented, and tended to embarra.s.s the military commanders of the Southern districts in the administration of law, and to hinder the registration of voters and the holding of elections for const.i.tutional conventions. Republican leaders therefore felt not only justified in the precautions they had taken to keep the power of Congress alive, but esteemed it peculiarly fortunate that they could so promptly prevent the evil effects which might otherwise flow from the unfriendly constructions of the Attorney-General. The princ.i.p.al business of the July session was to provide a second supplementary Act which effectually remedied all the objections and obstructions which Mr. Stanbery's acute legal knowledge had suggested.

The bill pa.s.sed both branches by the 13th of July and reached the President on the 14th--meeting at his hands the same fate that its predecessors had incurred. On the 19th he vetoed it--rehearsing the objections he had repeatedly stated on the same issues.

The President complained that within less than a year Congress had attempted to strip the Executive Department of the Government of some of its essential powers. ”The military commander,” said he, ”is, as to the power of appointment, made to take the place of the President, and the General of the Army the place of the Senate, and any attempt on the part of the President to a.s.sert his own Const.i.tutional power may, under pretense of law, be met by official insubordination. It is to be feared that these military officers, looking to the authority given by these laws, rather than to the letter of the Const.i.tution, will recognize no authority but the commander of the district or the General of the Army. . . . If there were no other objection than this to the proposed legislation it would be sufficient. While I hold the chief executive authority of the United States, while the obligations rests upon me to see that all laws are faithfully executed, I can never willingly surrender that trust or the powers given for its execution.

I can never give my a.s.sent to be made responsible for the faithful execution of laws, and at the same time surrender that trust and the powers which accompany it to any other executive officer, high or low, or to any number of executive officers.”

Many of those who kept closest watch of the controversy between the President and Congress saw in the foregoing words something ominous.

In their apprehensions of evil they construed it as a threat that the President would exercise his power as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy with which he was fully invested by the Const.i.tution, to change the a.s.signment of military officers at will. Should he stubbornly or capriciously a.s.sert this power he might seriously embarra.s.s the entire administration of the Reconstruction Acts in the approaching registrations and elections in the Southern States. A change of officers at a single point might frustrate all the preparations for the reconstruction of a State, and a general change might produce chaos in the South and possibly develop a spirit of violence of which no man could measure the effect. The President's words made a deep impression on Congress. Mr. Boutwell saw in them a deadly intent ”which provokes and demands the exercise of the highest and gravest duty of this House”--meaning that the President should be impeached. Mr. Randall of Pennsylvania taunted Mr. Boutwell with the declaration that all the talk of impeachment was ”mere bl.u.s.ter;” while Mr. Thaddeus Stevens, though believing that Mr. Johnson deserved impeachment, considered it ”a vain and futile thing.” ”There are,”

said he, ”unseen agencies at work, invisible powers operating everywhere in the country, which will protect a man like Johnson when called upon.” Debate, however, was very brief, and the House pa.s.sed the bill over the veto by _ayes_ 108, _noes_ 25. In the Senate there was no discussion whatever on the President's message, that body being content to pa.s.s the bill against his objections by 30 _ayes_ to 6 _noes_.

The Senate and the House were both ready to adjourn on the 20th of July, but Mr. Sumner, Mr. Howard of Michigan, and others of the most radical type in both branches, desired that Congress might remain in session for the summer and autumn, or at least have such short vacations as would practically amount to a continuous session. Their object was to keep constant watch of the course of the Administration and be at all times ready to neutralize its evil purpose. Aside from the great personal inconvenience which this would occasion to many members, the judgment of the majority was against so radical a step.

The more conservative members of the Republican party feared that a continuous session of Congress would seriously increase the uneasiness and excitement in the country by creating the impression that the Senate and House were sitting as a committee of public safety, in the apprehension of a civil revolution. The reply of those who opposed the adjournment was that the condition of public affairs did actually tend to revolution, and that instead of fanning the popular excitement by remaining in session, Congress would be thus most wisely allaying the fears which had entered the minds of so large a number of the people. But this argument did not prevail, and the conservative view secured a majority in both Houses. The vote in the Senate however was very close, there being only one more Republican in the affirmative that in the negative, leaving to Democratic votes, really, the decision of the question. A very inconvenient compromise was made by an adjournment to the 21st of November--only a fortnight before Congress would convene in regular annual session on the first Monday of December. No good reason was a.s.signed for so extraordinary a step, and no benefit resulted from it.

The Reconstruction Acts, both original and supplementary, were now in full operation throughout the South. The President did not interpose serious objection to the a.s.signment of the Army officers whose names were suggested by General Grant, and the ten insurrectionary States not yet re-admitted to representation were remanded to military government with apparent quiet and order. General Schofield was directed to take charge of the district of Virginia; General Sickles was placed in command of the district of North Carolina and South Carolina; General John Pope was a.s.signed to the district of Georgia, Alabama, and Florida; General Ord to the district of Mississippi and Arkansas; and General Sheridan to the district of Louisiana and Texas. These a.s.signments were made with due promptness after the enactment of the laws, and the several commanders at once proceeded to their novel and responsible duties.(1)

Under the enlargements of suffrage in the direction of loyalty, and its restrictions in the direction of disloyalty, the Southern States once more turned their attention to the question of Reconstruction. They saw, as the law intended them to see, that military government would exist until the loyal inhabitants of those States should present themselves before Congress with a const.i.tution adapted to the changed circ.u.mstances resulting from the war, and to the necessities superinduced by the abolition of slavery. The Southern men who had defiantly rejected the Fourteenth Amendment, and had with confidence relied upon the power of President Johnson to vindicate their position, now discovered their mistake, and were reluctantly but completely convinced that the only road to representation in Congress for their States was through submission to the conditions imposed by the Acts of Reconstruction,--conditions far more exacting than those which had been required by the preceding Congress and which they had so unwisely refused to accept.

The a.s.signments of Army officers to the Southern districts were made early in the spring of 1867. From that time onward it was hoped that the preservation of order would be secured in the South, and that the rights of all cla.s.ses would be adequately protected. But notwithstanding the antic.i.p.ation of this desirable result, there was throughout the summer and autumn of 1867 a feeling of great anxiety concerning the condition of the Southern States,--a constant apprehension that some outbreak similar to that in New Orleans the preceding year might lead to deplorable consequences, among the least of which would be the postponement of the organization of State governments. The cause of this solicitude among Northern people was the novel experiment in the South of allowing loyal men regardless of race or color to share in the suffrage and to partic.i.p.ate in the administration of the Government. Under any less authoritative mandate than that which is conveyed in a military order with the requisite force behind it, the Southern communities would never have accepted or submitted to the conditions thus imposed. But the sympathy which their condition under other circ.u.mstances might have evoked in the North, was stifled by the pertinent consideration that they had refused other forms of Reconstruction, and had wilfully drawn upon themselves all that was unwelcome in the one now about to be enforced.

It was to be noted moreover that the feature which was most unwelcome --impartial suffrage--was the one especially founded upon justice, abstract as well as practical.

Conventions were held successively in all the States, the elections being conducted in good order, while every man ent.i.tled to vote was fully secured in his suffrage. The conventions were duly a.s.sembled, const.i.tutions formed, submitted in due time, and approved by popular vote. State governments were promptly organized under these organic laws, Legislatures were elected, and the Fourteenth Amendment ratified in each of the States with as hearty a unanimity as in the preceding winter it has been rejected by the same communities. The proceedings were approximately uniform in all the States, and the const.i.tutions, with such minor differences and adaptations as circ.u.mstances required, were in all essential points the same. All were ordained in the spirit of liberty, all prohibited the existence of any form of slavery, and all heartily recognized the supreme sovereignty of the National Government as having been indisputably established by the overthrow of the Rebellion which was undertaken to confirm the adverse theory of State-rights.

These proceedings in the South were in full progress when the second or long session of the Fortieth Congress began, on the first Monday of December, 1867. While President Johnson had not interposed any obstructions to the working of the Reconstruction Act which had not been effectively cured by the two supplementary Acts, he had neither concealed nor abated his utter hostility to the policy of Congress,--a form of hostility that grew in rancor in proportion as he had been thwarted and rendered powerless by the enactment of the laws over his veto. When Congress came together he seemed to have gathered all his strength for a final a.s.sault upon its Reconstruction work and for a final vindication of his own policy. His message was laden with every form of attack which ingenuity could devise to throw discredit upon Congress, and if possible to affright the people by the dismal consequences destined in his judgment to follow the flagrant violation of the Const.i.tution which he saw in the Reconstruction policy. He appealed to the people on the ground of patriotism, public safety, and personal interest. He pictured anew the advantage and the grandeur of having the old Union fully restored; he warned the people of the danger of sowing the seeds of another rebellion by allowing continued maltreatment of the Southern people; and he appealed to the commercial and financial interests of the country by pointing out how every form of property was endangered by the chaotic conditions of affairs to which, in his belief, the policy of Congress was steadily tending.

Beyond these considerations he endeavored to arouse among the people all possible prejudice against negro suffrage. He declared that ”of all the dangers which our Nation has yet encountered, none are equal to those which must result from the success of the effort now making to Africanize the half of our country.” ”We must not,” said he, ”delude ourselves. It will require a strong standing army, and probably more than two hundred millions per annum, to maintain the supremacy of negro governments after they are established,--a sum thus thrown away which would, if properly used, form a sinking-fund large enough to pay the whole National debt in less than fifteen years.”

The argument of the President however was not merely a twice-told tale.

It had been repeated many times and though never more artfully stated than now, it fell upon unlistening ears, making no impression whatever upon Congress and very little upon the country. The process of Reconstruction went on, and its first fruit was the presentation of a const.i.tution from Arkansas, framed in exact accordance with the requirements prescribed by Congress, and accompanied by proof that the State had ratified the Fourteenth Amendment to the Const.i.tution. A bill was introduced in the House by Mr. Stevens, on the 7th of May (1868), to admit the State of Arkansas to representation in Congress.

The question of Reconstruction had been debated so elaborately and for so long a period of time that there was little disposition now to open the subject afresh, and with far less resistance than had been antic.i.p.ated the Arkansas bill was pa.s.sed in both branches, and the State declared ent.i.tled to all those rights in the Union which she, with her sisters in rebellion, had so flippantly thrown aside in 1861.

A fundamental condition was attached to the admission, declaring ”that the Const.i.tution of Arkansas shall never be so amended or changed as to deprive any citizen or cla.s.s of citizens of the United States of the right to vote, who are ent.i.tled to vote by the Const.i.tution herein recognized, except as a punishment for such crimes as are now felonies at common law, whereof they shall have been duly convicted under laws equally applicable to all the inhabitants of said State.”

The Act re-admitting Arkansas to the right of representation was followed immediately by one of the same general scope with respect to the States of North Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida. The same fundamental condition already cited as imposed on Arkansas was imposed on all these States, and the further condition was exacted from Georgia that certain provisions in her Const.i.tution should be a solemn Act of her Legislature be declared null and void. The provision to be thus annulled related to the collection of debts, and their spirit and intent may be inferred from the opening declaration that ”no court in the State shall have jurisdiction to try or determine any suit against any resident of this State upon any contract or agreement made or implied prior to the first day of June, 1865, or upon any contract made in renewal of any debt existing prior to the date named.” The provision as the Georgia convention had framed it would have wrought great injury to a large number of creditors in the North. It was a complete outlawry of thousands of dollars legally and equitably due to honest creditors, and Georgia was compelled to agree to its nullification before her senators and representatives could be admitted to seats in Congress.

The bills admitting these States to representation did not secure Executive approval. On the 20th of June (1868) the President sent a message to the House of Representatives with his objections to the Arkansas bill. ”The approval of this bill,” said he, ”would be an admission on the part of the Executive that the Act for the more efficient government of the rebel States, pa.s.sed March 2, 1867, and the Act supplementary thereto, were proper and const.i.tutional. My opinion however in reference to these measures has undergone no change, but on the contrary has been strengthened by the results which have attended their execution.” He then proceeded to state his objections as he had so often done before, with no variation of argument, without the production of new facts.--Five days later, on the 25th of June, the President communicated his objections to the bill admitting the other Southern States to representation. He had apparently become fatigued with the reiteration of his arguments, and he frankly stated that he would not ”undertake at this time to re-open the discussion upon the grave Const.i.tutional question involved in the Reconstruction Acts.” He declared that ”the bill a.s.sumed authority over the States which has never been delegated to Congress,” and ”imposes conditions which are in derogation of equal rights.” The vetoes did not evoke long debate in either House, and both bills were promptly pa.s.sed over the objections of the President by a party vote, amounting indeed to more than three to one in both Senate and House.

In the arguments which the President had found such frequent occasion to submit, he quietly ignored the facts of secession, the crime of rebellion, the ruthless sundering of Const.i.tutional bonds which these States had attempted. He took no note of the immense losses both of life and property which they had inflicted upon the Nation, and gave no consideration to the suffering which they had causelessly brought upon the people. If the President's logic should be accepted as indicting the true measure of Const.i.tutional obligation imposed on the different members of the Union, then any State might rebel at any time, seize and destroy the National property, levy war, form alliances with hostile nations, and thus subject the Republic to great peril and great outlay, her citizens to murder and to pillage. If the rebellious State be finally subdued, the National Government must not attach the slightest condition to her re-admission to the Union; must not impose discipline or even administer reproof. The fact that the rebellion fails is the full warrant for its guilty authors to be at once repossessed of all the rights and all the privileges which in the frenzy of anger and disobedience they had thrown away. Such was in effect the argument of the President throughout the Reconstruction contest; such was the demand of the leaders of the Rebellion; such was the concession which the Democratic party constantly urged in Congress, through the press, and in all the channels through which its great power was exerted.

The position of the Republicans was steadily the opposite of that described. They held that the States which had rushed into a rebellion so wicked, so causeless, and so destructive, should not be allowed to resume their places of authority in the Union except under such conditions as would guard, so far as human foresight could avail, against the outbreak of another insurrection. They should return to the Union on precisely the same terms as those on which the loyal States held their places; they should have the same privileges and be subjected to the same conditions. As slavery had been the chief inciting cause of disunion, slavery should die. As the vicious theory of State-rights had been constantly at enmity with the true spirit of Nationality, the Organic Law of the Republic should be so amended that no standing-room for the heresy would be left. As the basis of representation in the Const.i.tution has always given the slave States an advantage, these States, now that slavery was abolished, should not be permitted to oppress the negro population and use them merely for an enlarged Congressional power to the white men who had precipitated the rebellion. As the war to maintain Union and Liberty had cost a vast treasure and sacrificed countless lives, the States that had forced the b.l.o.o.d.y contest should agree by solemn amendment to the Const.i.tution that the National debt and the pension to the soldier should be secured. Those conditions--applying to all the States alike, to the loyal and the disloyal in the same measure--must be honorably agreed to by the States that had gone into Disunion before they should be permitted to resume and enjoy the blessings of Union. History and the just judgment of mankind will vindicate the wisdom and the righteousness of the Republican policy, and that vindication will always carry with it the condemnation of Andrew Johnson.

The long contest over Reconstruction, so far as it involved the re-admission of the States to representation, was practically ended.

Eight of the eleven Confederate States, at the close of June 1868, had their senators and representatives in Congress. Three--Virginia, Mississippi, and Texas--were prevented by self-imposed obstacles from enjoying the same privilege until after President Johnson had retired from office. Of the representatives on the floor of the Fortieth Congress from the eight states lately in rebellion, only two were Democrats. The senators were unanimously Republican. Of the aggregate number about one-half were natives of the South. The war upon the ”Carpet-bagger” had not yet reached the era of savage atrocity, but the indignation pervading the governing cla.s.ses of the South, as they were termed, was poured forth in unstinted measure upon the heads of all native Southerners who consented to accept offices conferred by negro votes. It was evident that the admission of the States to representation was to be taken as the signal for a new contest in the South--embittered in its character and sanguinary in its results. The men who had been foremost in plunging their States into the vortex of rebellion were determined to rule them--their determination being of that type which disregards the restraint of law and considers that the end justifies the means.

With all the advantages of old a.s.sociation and in numberless instances of kindly relation with the colored race, the former masters showed themselves singularly deficient in the tact and management necessary to win the negroes and bind them closely to their interest, in the new conditions which emanc.i.p.ation had created. Of the evil results that flowed from the contest now about to ensue--a contest that had many elements of provocation and of wrong on both sides--one of the most remarkable features was the complete control which the white men from the North, entire strangers to the negro, to his habits and to his prejudices, so readily obtained over him. The late slave-masters did not adapt themselves to the new situation. They gave way to repining and regretting, to sulking and to anger, to resentment and revenge, and thereby lost a great opportunity for binding together the two races in those ties of sympathy and confidence which must be maintained as an indispensable condition of prosperity, or even of domestic order and the reign of law, in the Southern States. The lack of moral courage among the physically brave men of the South has already been indicated and ill.u.s.trated. It was something of this same defect that held back the slave-masters from the condescension, as they esteemed it, of establis.h.i.+ng any relation whatever with the negro in his new condition of freedom. Such action was frowned upon by the public opinion of this cla.s.s throughout the South, and for lack of bold leaders.h.i.+p at the critical period, for lack of that consideration which in many subsequent instances has been lavished upon the colored man, the current of fatal prejudice was set strongly against the old master in the mind of his former slave. Events, as they developed in the stirring and sorrowful years that followed, were but a continual proof of that form of original blunder on the part of the Southern whites, which in affairs of civil administration is worse than a crime.

In excuse, or at least in explanation, of this unfortunate blunder on the part of Southern men, the obstinacy and wrong-headed course of President Johnson must be pleaded. It was his causeless, voluntary, unpardonable quarrel with his party which misled Southern men at the time when they most needed lessons of wisdom and moderation. The different result which we may well conceive might have followed in the South under the considerate and kindly spirit which Mr. Lincoln would have brought to the problem, gives us by contrast some faint appreciation of the enormity of Johnson's conduct and of the evil effects flowing from it. At the very moment when the President should have stood as a generous mediator, calming the irritation of the South --an irritation inevitably incident to defeat--and restraining somewhat, at least in the manner of preferring them, the demands and requirements which the Government in its hour of victory was justified in making, Johnson committed the grievous fault of espousing the Southern cause and quarreling with the party which had confided to him the power he was abusing.

Under the patronage and protection of the President, Southern men would have been more or less than human if they had not grown arrogant and defiant towards the men of the North. The chivalric sympathy which always moves the magnanimous in their treatment of a fallen foe, was therefore drowned in the indignation to which Northern men were naturally moved by provocations as unexpected as they were extraordinary. Stimulated by the protection of the President and encouraged by his contumacious quarrel with Congress, the South was driven from one unwise step to another, until the entire situation became hopelessly entangled, and every movement affected by anger and pa.s.sion;--the North resolving more and more to insist on the fruits of victory, the South resolving more and more to act as though they had conquered in the contest. It was not unnatural, under the anxieties and discouragements of the crisis, that the South should have clung to Mr. Johnson for protection; but in the calm review which the lapse of twenty years affords, the most ardent Southern partisan must see that the President's policy was at enmity with the interest and happiness of his section.

It is not to be forgotten, however, that Mr. Johnson's course was marked by the inherent qualities of his mind. He had two signal defects, either of which would impair his fitness for Executive duty; united they rendered him incapable of efficient administration:--he was conceited and he was obstinate. Conceit without obstinacy may be overcome by the advice of judicious counselors; united with obstinacy it carries its possessor beyond the bounds of prudence, almost beyond the control of reason. Obstinacy united with good judgment is softened into the virtue of firmness. It has often been said that self-made men, as they are termed, are necessarily conceited. Like all aphorisms, this must be taken with numberless exceptions, but it was singularly applicable to Johnson, who was in all respects a self-made man. His great career was never absent from his thoughts, and he was always looking at himself as he fancied he would appear in history. He came to regard himself as the hero upon a remarkable stage of action, and naturally made the reflection that if he could have had in his early years the advantages which so many possess without improving, he would have made strides in life which would have left him without rivals. It would be impossible to gain a full and correct apprehension of Mr. Johnson's character without taking into account these qualities --qualities which were both the remote and immediate cause of his extraordinary career as Chief Magistrate.

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