Volume 3, Part 1, Slice 1 Part 37 (1/2)

[56] _Ibid._ i. 124.

[57] _Ibid._ i. 6.

[58] The word _Idola_ is manifestly borrowed from Plato. It is used twice in connexion with the Platonic Ideas (_N. O._ i. 23, 124) and is contrasted with them as the false appearance. The [Greek: eidolon] with Plato is the fleeting, transient image of the real thing, and the pa.s.sage evidently referred to by Bacon is that in the _Rep._ vii. 516 A, [Greek: kai proton men tas skias an rhaista kathoroie, kai meta touto en tois hudasi ta te ton anthropon kai ta ton allon eidola, husteron de auta]. It is explained well in the _Advancement_, bk. i. (_Works_, iii. 287). (For valuable notes on the _Idola_, see T. Fowler's _Nov. Org._ i. 38 notes; especially for a comparison of the _Idola_ with Roger Bacon's _Offendicula_.)

[59] _N. O._ i. 58.

[60] _N. O._ i. 79, 80, 98, 108.

[61] On the meaning of the word _form_ in Bacon's theory see also Fowler's _N. O._ introd. -- 8.

[62] _N. O._ ii. 1.

[63] This _better known in the order of nature_ is nowhere satisfactorily explained by Bacon. Like his cla.s.sification of causes, and in some degree his notion of form itself, it comes from Aristotle. See _An. Post._ 71 b 33; _Topic_, 141 b 5; _Eth. Nic._ 1095 a 30. It should be observed that many writers maintain that the phrase should be _notiora natura_; others, _notiora naturae_. See Fowler's _N. O._ p. 199 note.

[64] _N. O._ ii. 17.

[65] _Ibid._ i. 51.

[66] _Ibid._ i. 75.

[67] _Ibid._ ii. 2.

[68] _Valerius Terminus_, iii. 228-229.

[69] Cf. _N. O._ ii. 27. Bacon nowhere enters upon the questions of how such a science is to be constructed, and how it can be expected to possess an independent method while it remains the mere receptacle for the generalizations of the several sciences, and consequently has a content which varies with their progress. His whole conception of _Prima Philosophia_ should be compared with such a modern work as the _First Principles_ of Herbert Spencer.

[70] It is to be noticed that this scale of nature corresponds with the scale of ascending axioms.

[71] Cf. also for motions, _N. O._ ii. 48.

[72] The knowledge of final causes does not lead to works, and the consideration of them must be rigidly excluded from physics. Yet there is no opposition between the physical and final causes; in ultimate resort the mind is compelled to think the universe as the work of reason, to refer facts to G.o.d and Providence. The idea of final cause is also fruitful in sciences which have to do with human action. (Cf. _De Aug._ iii. cc. 4, 5; _Nov. Org._ i. 48, ii. 2.)

[73] _De Aug._ iii. 4. In the _Advancement (Works_, iii. 355) it is distinctly said that they are not to be inquired into. One can hardly see how the Baconian method could have applied to concrete substances.

[74] Thus the last step in the theoretical a.n.a.lysis gives the first means for the practical operation. Cf. Aristotle, _Eth. Nic._ iii. 3. 12, [Greek: to eschaton en tei a.n.a.lusei proton einai en tei genesei]. Cf. also _Nov.

Org._ i. 103.

[75] _Cogitationes_ (_Works_, iii. 187).

[76] _N. O._ ii. 10.

[77] Pref. to _Instaur._ Cf. _Valerius Term._ (_Works_, iii. 224), and _N. O._ i. 68, 124.

[78] Pref. to _Inst._

[79] Bacon's summary is valuable. ”In the whole of the process which leads from the senses and objects to axioms and conclusions, the demonstrations which we use are deceptive and incompetent. The process consists of four parts, and has as many faults. In the first place, the impressions of the sense itself are faulty, for the sense both fails us and deceives us. But its shortcomings are to be supplied and its deceptions to be corrected.

Secondly, notions are all drawn from the impressions of the sense, and are indefinite and confused, whereas they should be definite and distinctly bounded. Thirdly, the induction is amiss which infers the principles of sciences by simple enumeration, and does not, as it ought, employ exclusions and solutions (or separations) of nature. Lastly, that method of discovery and proof according to which the most general principles are first established, and then intermediate axioms are tried and proved by them, is the parent of error and the curse of all science.”--_N. O._ i. 69.

[80] _N. O._ i. 105.