Volume Xviii Part 6 (1/2)

The first Punic war was occasioned by a desire on the part of the Carthaginians to enlarge and secure their acquisitions in Sicily, and to preserve their dominion of the sea, and by a determination on the part of the Romans to check the progress of the Carthaginians in that island, so immediately adjoining the continent of Italy. An opportunity soon occurred, which seemed to promise to each the accomplishment of their respective objects: the Mamertines, being hard pursued by Hiero king of Syracuse, and shut up in Messina, the only city which remained to them, were divided in opinion; some were for accepting the protection offered them by Hannibal, who at that time commanded the Carthaginian army in Sicily; others were for calling in the aid of the Romans. Both these powers gladly accepted the proffered opportunity of extending their conquests, and checking their rival.

The consul Appius Claudius, was ordered by the senate to proceed to Sicily: previously to his departure, he despatched Caius Claudius, a legionary tribune, with a few vessels to Rhegium, princ.i.p.ally, it would seem, to reconnoitre the naval force of the Carthaginians. The consul himself soon followed with a small fleet, hired princ.i.p.ally from the Tarentines, Locrians, and Neapolitans. This fleet being attacked by the Carthaginian fleet, which was not only much more numerous, but better equipped and manned, and a violent storm rising during the engagement, which dashed many of the Roman vessels in pieces among the rocks, was completely worsted. The Carthaginians, however, restored most of the vessels they captured, only expostulating with the Romans on the infraction of the treaty at that time subsisting between the two republics. This loss was in some measure counterbalanced by Claudius capturing, on his voyage back to Rhegium, a Carthaginian quinquireme, the first which fell into the possession of the Romans, and which served them for a model. According to other historians, however, a Carthaginian galley, venturing too near the sh.o.r.e, was stranded, and taken by the Romans; and after the model of this galley, the Romans built many of their vessels.

Claudius was not in the least discouraged by his defeat, observing that he could not expect to learn the art of navigation without paying dear for it; but having repaired his fleet, he sailed again for Sicily, and eluding the vigilance of the Carthaginian admiral, arrived safe in the port of Messina.

After the alliance formed between the Romans and Hiero king of Syracuse, and the capture of Agrigentium, they resolved to use all their efforts for the entire subjugation of Sicily. As, however, the Carthaginians were extremely powerful by sea, they could not hope to accomplish this object, unless they were able to cope with them on that element. They resolved, therefore, no longer to trust in any degree to hired vessels, but to build and equip a formidable fleet of their own. Powerfully actuated by this resolution, they began the arduous undertaking with that ardour and spirit of perseverance, which so eminently distinguished them; they deemed it absolutely necessary to have 120 s.h.i.+ps. Trees were immediately cut down in the forests, and the timber brought to the sea sh.o.r.e: and the whole fleet, according to Polybius, was not only built, but perfectly equipped and ready for sea, in two months from the time the trees were felled. Of the 120 vessels of which it was composed, 100 had five benches of rowers, and 20 of them had three benches.

There was, however, another difficulty to be overcome. It was absolutely necessary that the men, who were to navigate and fight these s.h.i.+ps, should possess some knowledge of their art; but it was in vain to expect that with the Carthaginians, so powerful and watchful at sea, the Roman s.h.i.+ps would be permitted to cruise safely long enough to make them practised sailors and fighters. To obviate this difficulty, they had recourse, according to Polybius, to a singular but tolerably effectual mode. ”While some men were employed in building the galleys, others, a.s.sembling those who were to serve in the fleet, instructed them in the use of the oar after the following manner: they contrived benches on the sh.o.r.e in the same fas.h.i.+on and order as they were to be in the galleys, and placing their seamen, with their oars, in like manner on the benches, an officer, by signs with his hand, instructed them how to dip their oars all at the same time, and how to recover them out of the water. By this means they became acquainted with the management of the oar; and as soon as the vessels were built and equipped, they spent some time in practising on the water, what they had learnt ash.o.r.e.”

The necessity of possessing a fleet adequate to cope with that of the Carthaginians became more and more apparent; for though the Romans had obtained possession of all the inland cities in Sicily, the Carthaginians compensated for this by having the ascendancy by sea, and in the cities on the coast. The Roman fleet was commanded by Cornelius Scipio, who put to sea with seventeen s.h.i.+ps, in order to secure at Messina reception and security for the whole fleet; but his enterprise was unfortunate; for, being deceived by false information, he entered the port of Lipara, where he was blockaded by the enemy, and obliged to surrender. This partial loss, however, was soon counterbalanced by a naval victory; for the remainder of the Roman fleet, amounting to 103 sail, being encountered by a Carthaginian fleet under Hannibal, who despising the Romans, had advanced to the contest with only fifty galleys, succeeded in capturing or destroying the whole of them.

In the mean time, the senate had appointed Duilius commander of the fleet; and his first object was to survey it accurately, and, if possible, to improve the construction or equipment of the vessels, if they appeared defective, either for the purpose of sailing or fighting. It seemed to him, on examining them, that they could not be easily and quickly worked during an engagement, being much heavier and more unwieldy than those of the Carthaginians. As this defect could not be removed, he tried whether it could not be compensated; and an engineer in the fleet succeeded in this important object, by inventing that machine which was afterwards called _corvus_.

The immediate purpose which this machine was to serve is clearly explained by all the ancient authors who mention it: its use was to stop the enemy's s.h.i.+ps as soon as the Roman vessels came up with them, and thus to give them an opportunity of boarding them; but the construction and mode of operation of these machines it is not easy to ascertain from the descriptions of ancient authors. Polybius gives the following description of them: ”They erected on the prow of their vessels a round piece of timber, about one foot and a half in diameter, and about twelve feet long, on the top of which a block or pully was fastened. Round this piece of timber a stage or platform was constructed, four feet broad, and about eighteen feet long, which was strongly fastened with iron. The entrance was lengthways, and it could be moved about the piece of timber, first described, as on a spindle, and could be hoisted within six feet of the top. Round this there was a parapet, knee high, which was defended with upright bars of iron, sharpened at the end. Towards the top there was a ring, through which a rope was fastened, by means of which they could raise and lower the engine at pleasure. With this machine they attacked the enemy's vessels, sometimes on their bow, and sometimes on their broadside. When they had grappled the enemy with these iron spikes, if the s.h.i.+ps happened to swing broadside to broadside, then the Romans boarded them from all parts; but when they were obliged to grapple them on the bow, they entered two and two, by the help of this engine, the foremost defending the forepart, and those who followed the flanks, keeping the boss of their bucklers level with the top of the parapet.”

From this description of the corvus, it is evident that it had two distinct uses to serve: in the first place, to lay hold of and entangle the enemy's s.h.i.+ps; and, secondly, after it had accomplished this object, it served as a means of entering the enemy's vessels, and also as a protection while the boarding was taking place. With respect to the question, whether the _harpagones_ or ma.n.u.s ferraeae; were the same with the _corvi_, it appears to us that the former were of much older invention, as they certainly were much more simple in their construction; and that, probably, the engineer who invented the corvi, borrowed his idea of them from the harpagones, and in fact incorporated the two machines in one engine. The harpagones were undoubtedly grappling irons, but of such light construction that they could be thrown by manual force; but they were of no other service; whereas the corvi were worked by machinery, and served, as we have shown, not only to grapple, but to a.s.sist and protect the boarders. We have been thus particular in our account of the corvus, because it may fairly be regarded as having essentially contributed to the establishment of the Roman naval power over that of the Carthaginians.

After Duilius had made a trial of the efficacy of this machine, he sailed in quest of the enemy. The Carthaginians, despising the Romans as totally inexperienced in naval affairs, did not even take the trouble or precaution to draw up their s.h.i.+ps in line of battle, but trusting entirely to their own superior skill, and to the greater lightness of their s.h.i.+ps, they bore down on the Romans in disorder. They, however, were induced, for a short time, to slacken their advance at the sight of the corvi; but not giving the Romans credit for any invention which could counterbalance their want of skill, experience, and self-confidence, they again pushed forward and attacked the Romans. They soon suffered, however, the consequences of their rashness: the Romans, by means of their corvi, grappled their s.h.i.+ps so closely and steadily, that the fight resembled much more a land than a sea battle; and thus feeling themselves, as it were, on their own element, while their enemies seemed to themselves no longer to be fighting in s.h.i.+ps, the confidence of the former rose, while that of the latter fell, from the same cause, and nearly in the same proportion. The result was, that the Romans gained a complete victory. The loss of the Carthaginians is variously related by the Roman writers: this is extraordinary, since they must have had access to the best possible authority; the inscription of the Columna Rostrata of Duilius, which is still preserved at Rome. According to this inscription, Duilius fitted out a fleet in sixty days, defeated the Carthaginians, commanded by Hannibal, at sea, took from them thirty s.h.i.+ps, with all their rigging, and the septireme which carried the admiral himself; sunk thirty, and took several prisoners of distinction. When Hannibal saw the Romans about to enter his septireme, he leaped into a small boat and escaped.

A circ.u.mstance occurred during this engagement which clearly manifested the ardour and perseverance, by means of which the Romans had already become expert, not only in the management of their s.h.i.+ps, but also in the use of their corvi. It has already been noticed that the Carthaginians bore down on them in disorder, each s.h.i.+p endeavouring to reach them as soon as possible, without waiting for the rest: among the foremost was Hannibal.

After the defeat of this part of the fleet, the rest, amounting to 120, having come up, endeavoured to avoid the fate of their companions by rowing as quickly as possible round the Roman s.h.i.+ps, so as not to allow them to make use of the corvi. But the Romans proved themselves to be even more expert seamen than their enemies; for, though their vessels were much heavier, they worked them with so much ease, celerity, and skill, that they presented the machines to the enemy on whatever side they approached them.

The vanquished Hannibal was disgraced by his country; whereas the victorious Roman was honoured and rewarded by the senate, who were fully sensible of all the advantages derived by a naval victory over the Carthaginians. The high and distinguished honour of being attended, when he returned from supper, with music and torches, which was granted for once only to those who triumphed, was continued to Duilius during life. To perpetuate the memory of this victory, medals were struck, and the pillar, to which we have already alluded, was erected in the forum. This pillar, called Columna Rostrata, from the beaks of the s.h.i.+ps which were fastened to it, was discovered in the year 1560, and placed in the capital.

In the year after this splendid victory the Romans resolved to attempt the reduction of Corsica and Sardinia; for this purpose L. Cornelius Scipio sailed with a squadron under his command. He easily succeeded in reducing Corsica; but it appears, from an inscription on a stone which was dug up in the year 1615, in Rome, that he encountered a violent storm off the coast of that island, in which his fleet was exposed to imminent danger. The words of the inscription are, ”He took the city of Aleria and conquered Corsica, and built a temple to the tempests, with very good reason.” This storm is not mentioned in any of the ancient authors. Scipio was obliged to be more cautious in his attempts on Sardinia, but afterwards the Romans succeeded in gaining possession of this island.

The Romans having thus acquired Corsica and Sardinia, and all the maritime towns of Sicily, determined to invade, or at least to alarm, the African dominions of Carthage. Accordingly Sulpicius, who commanded their fleet, circulated a report that he intended to sail for the coasts of Africa: this induced the Carthaginians to put to sea; but after the hostile fleets had approached each other, and were about to engage, a storm arose and separated them, and obliged them both to take shelter in the ports of Sardinia. As soon as it abated, Sulpicius put to sea again, surprised the Carthaginians, and captured or destroyed most of their s.h.i.+ps.

Five years after the victory of Duilius, the Romans were able to put to sea a fleet of 330 covered gallies. Ten of these were sent to reconnoitre the enemy, but approaching too near, they were attacked and destroyed. This unfortunate event did not discourage the consul Attilius Regulus, who commanded: on the contrary, he resolved to wipe off this disgrace by signalizing his consuls.h.i.+p in a remarkable manner. He was ordered by the senate to cross the Mediterranean, and invade Carthage. The Roman fleet, which consisted of 330 galleys, on board of each of which were 120 soldiers and 300 rowers, was stationed at Messina: from this port they took their departure, stretching along the coast of Sicily, till they doubled Cape Pachynum, after which they sailed directly to Ecnomos. The Carthaginian fleet consisted of 360 sail, and the seamen were more numerous, as well as more skilful and experienced, than those of the Romans: it rendezvoused at Heraclea, not far from Ecnomos. Between these two places the hostile fleets met, and one of the most obstinate and decisive battles ensued that are recorded in ancient history. As Polybius has given a very particular account of the manner in which the respective fleets were drawn up, and of all the incidents of the battle, we shall transcribe it from him, because the issue of it may justly be regarded as having proved the Roman superiority at sea, and because the details of this accurate historian will afford us a clear insight into the naval engagements of the ancients.

As there were 330 s.h.i.+ps, and each s.h.i.+p had on board 300 rowers, and 120 soldiers, the total number of men in the fleet amounted 140,000. The whole fleet was formed into four divisions: the first was called the first legion; the second, the second; and the third, the third legion. The fourth division had a different name; they were called triarians: the triarii who were on board this division, being old soldiers of approved valour, who, in land battles, formed the third line of the legion, and hence obtained their appellation. The first division was drawn up on the right, the second on the left, and the third in the rear of the other two, in such a manner that these three divisions formed a triangle, the point of which was the two gallies, in which were the consuls, in front of their respective squadrons, parallel to the third legion, which formed the base of the triangle, and in the rear of the whole fleet; the triarian division was drawn up, but extended in such a manner as to out-flank the extremes of the base. Between the triarian division and the other part of the squadron, the transports were drawn up, in order that they might be protected from the enemy, and their escape accelerated and covered in case of a defeat; on board of the transports were the horses, and baggage of the army.

According to Polybius, the seamen and troops on board the Carthaginian fleet amounted to 150,000 men. Their admiral waited to see the disposition of the Roman fleet before he formed his own in order of battle; he divided it into four squadrons, drawn up in one line; one of these was drawn up very near the sh.o.r.e, the others stretched far out to sea, apparently for the purpose of out-flanking the Romans. The light vessels were on the right, under the command of Hanno; the squadron on the left, which was formed of heavier vessels, was under the command of Hamilcar.

It is evident from this description of the order of battle of the Carthaginians, that their line, being so much extended, could easily be broken; the Romans perceiving this, bore down on the middle with their first and second divisions. The Carthaginians did not wait the attack, but retired immediately with the intention of drawing the Romans after them, and thus by separating, weakening their fleet. The Romans, thinking the victory was their own, pushed after the flying enemy, thus weakening their third division, and at the same time exposing themselves to an attack while they were scattered. The Carthaginians, perceiving that their manoeuvre had so far succeeded, tacked about, and engaged with their pursuers. But the Romans, by means of their corvi, which they were now very skilful in using, grappled with the enemy, and as soon as they had thus rendered the engagement similar to a land battle, they overcame them.

While these things were going on between Hamilcar with the left wing of the Carthaginian fleet, and the first and second divisions of the Romans, Hanno, with his light vessels, which formed the right wing, attacked the triarians, and the s.h.i.+ps which were drawn up near the sh.o.r.e, attacked the third legion and the transports. These two attacks were conducted with so much spirit and courage, that many of the triarians, transports, and third legion were driven on sh.o.r.e, and their defeat would probably have been decisive, had not the Roman first and second divisions, which had defeated and chased to a considerable distance the Carthaginians opposed to them, returned most opportunely from the chace, and supported them. The Carthaginians were no longer able to withstand their enemies, but sustained a signal defeat; thirty of their vessels having been sunk, and sixty-three taken. The immediate result of this victory was, that the Romans landed in Africa without opposition.

The next victory obtained by the Romans over the Carthaginians was achieved soon after the defeat and captivity of Regulus, and was justly regarded by them as an ample compensation for that disaster. It was a wise and politic maxim of the Roman republic never to appear cast down by defeat, but, on the contrary, to act in such a case with more than their usual confidence and ardour. Acting on this maxim they equipped a fleet and sent it towards Africa, immediately after they learnt the defeat of Regulus. The Carthaginians, who were endeavouring to take all possible advantage of their victory, by expelling the Romans from Africa, as soon as the news arrived of the sailing of this fleet, abandoned the seige of Utica, before which they had sat down,--refitted their old s.h.i.+ps, built several new ones, and put to sea. The hostile fleets met near Cape Herme, the most northern point of Africa, a little to the north-east of Carthage. They were again unsuccessful on what they had formerly justly regarded as their own element. One hundred and four of their s.h.i.+ps were captured, and 15,000 men, soldiers, and rowers, were killed in the action.

This victory, however, proved of little benefit to the Romans in their grand enterprise of establis.h.i.+ng a firm and permanent footing, in Africa; for, in consequence of their inability to obtain a regular supply of provisions for their army, they were obliged soon afterwards to evacuate Clupea and Utica, the princ.i.p.al places they held there, and to re-embark their troops for Italy.

In order to make up for this hard necessity, they resolved to land in Sicily on their return, and, if possible, reduce some cities which the Carthaginians still retained in that island. Such was the plan of the consuls, but it was vehemently opposed by the pilots of the fleet, who represented to them, that as the season was far advanced, the most prudent measure would be to sail directly for Italy, and not go round the northern coast of Sicily, as the consuls wished. The latter, however, persisted in their resolution; the consequences were extremely fatal; a most violent storm arose, during which the greater part of the fleet was destroyed or rendered completely useless, either foundering, or being driven on sh.o.r.e.

All the sea coast from Camarina to Pachynum, was covered with dead bodies of men and horses, as well as with the wrecks of the s.h.i.+ps. The exact number of s.h.i.+ps that were lost is differently represented by different authors, but according to the most accurate account, out of 370 which composed the fleet, only eighty escaped. Besides the destruction of these vessels, a numerous army was lost, with all the riches of Africa, which had been ama.s.sed and deposited in Clupea, by Regulus, and which was in the act of being conveyed to Rome.

The Carthaginians, animated by the news of this event, resolved to attempt the subjugation of Sicily, Africa being now liberated from the enemy. But the Romans, by incredible efforts, fitted out a new fleet in the short s.p.a.ce of three months, consisting of 120 s.h.i.+ps; which, with the old vessels which had escaped, made up a fleet of 250 sail. With these, they pa.s.sed over to Sicily, where they were successful in reducing the Carthaginian capital in that island.

The next year they sent to sea a fleet of 260 s.h.i.+ps to attempt the reduction of Lilibaeum, but this place being found too strong, the consuls directed their course to the eastern coast of Africa, on which they carried on a predatory warfare. Having filled their s.h.i.+ps with the spoils, they were returning to Italy, when they narrowly escaped s.h.i.+pwreck. On the coast of Africa, there were two sand-banks, called the Greater and Lesser Syrtes, which were very much dreaded by the ancients, on account of their frequently changing places; sometimes being easily visible, and at other times considerably below the water. On the Lesser Syrtes the Roman fleet grounded; fortunately it was low water, and moderate weather at the time, so that on the return of flood tide, the vessels floated off, with little or no damage, but the consuls were dreadfully alarmed.

This, however, was only a prelude to real disaster: the fleet arrived safe at Panormus, where they remained a short time. On their departure for Italy, the wind and weather were favourable till they reached Cape Palinurus; here a dreadful storm arose, in which 160 galleys, and a considerable number of transports, were lost. This second storm seems to have so dispirited the Roman senate, that they resolved to confine their efforts to land, and accordingly a decree was issued, that, as it seemed the will of the G.o.ds that the Romans should not succeed against their enemy by sea, no more than fifty vessels should in future be equipped; and that these should be employed exclusively in protecting the coasts of Italy, and in transporting troops to Sicily.

This decree, however, was not long acted upon; for the Carthaginians, perceiving that the Romans no longer dared to meet them at sea, made such formidable preparations for invading Sicily, by equipping a fleet of 200 sail, and raising an army of 30,000 men, besides 140 elephants, that the Romans, being reduced to the alternative of either losing that valuable island, or of again encountering their enemy at sea, resolved on the latter measure. Accordingly a new fleet was built, consisting of 240 galleys, and sixty smaller vessels, and Lilibaeum was besieged by sea and land. This city was deemed impregnable, and as it was the only place of retreat for the Carthaginian armies in Sicily, it was defended with the utmost obstinacy.