Volume II Part 31 (1/2)
”Department of War,
”December 30, 1837.
”Sir:--In answer to the resolution of the House of Representatives, in relation to the protection of the western frontiers of the United States, I have the honour to transmit the accompanying reports of the chief engineer and the acting quarter-master general, together with a report of the commissioner of Indian affairs. That expected from General Gaines will be sent as soon as it is received.
”In presenting these doc.u.ments, which are ably drawn up, and contain full and satisfactory information on all the topics embraced by the resolution, I might have considered my duty fully discharged, had not other plans been previously recommended, which I regard as entirely inefficient, but which have received, in some measure, the sanction of Congress. A survey has been directed to determine the line of a road, which, it is contemplated, shall extend from some point of the Upper Mississippi to Red River, pa.s.sing west of Missouri and Arkansas; and it is proposed to place a cordon of temporary posts of ordinary construction along it, as a sufficient measure for the defence of that part of the country. In pursuance of the orders of Congress, officers have been appointed to perform that duty, and, upon their report being received, measures will be taken to carry into effect the intentions of Congress, unless, upon a deliberate review of the whole matter, some more eligible plan of defence shall be adopted. My own opinion has been, from the time I first considered the subject, that such a chain of posts, strung along the best road that can be constructed, furnished with all the means to operate, and with competent garrisons to occupy them, is not calculated to afford that protection which the border States have a right to expect from the Government, nor to redeem its pledge to protect the emigrant tribes from the savage and warlike people that surround them. The only possible use of such a road would be to facilitate occasional communications between the posts in time of peace.
Supplies would not be transported along it, for they must be brought from the interior. Succours could not reach the posts by that direction, for they would be furnished by the militia within the line; and any attempt to concentrate the forces composing the garrisons in the event of an outbreak, would probably be attended with disastrous consequences; for the troops, whose route must be well known, would be exposed to be attacked and destroyed in detail. The enemy, having nothing to dread on their flanks or rear, might approach this road without risk, and attack the detachments on their line of march, before they could concentrate their forces so as to offer an effectual resistance.
”After mature reflection, I am of opinion that military posts ought to be established and kept up within the Indian territory, in such positions as to maintain peace among the Indians, and protect the emigrant and feebler tribes against the stronger and more warlike nations that surround them; which the United States are bound to do by treaty stipulations. To withdraw those which now exist there, would be to violate our faith, as there is reason to apprehend that it would be the signal of war. Persons well acquainted with that country a.s.sure us that war would break out among the Indians, 'just so soon as the troops are removed from those posts,' and all accounts from that quarter confirm that impression.
”Independently of the military protection which the existence of these posts in the interior of the Indian country afford to the emigrating tribes, and the good they are calculated to effect by the beneficial influence the officers are enabled to exert over the surrounding Indians, they more effectually cover and protect the frontier than ten times the number of fortresses, strung along in one line, could do.
”With the very limited knowledge of that country as yet in possession of this department, it appears to me that six or seven permanent exterior posts would be sufficient to preserve the peace of that frontier. It will be necessary, at the same time, to establish, at convenient points, an interior line of posts, to serve as places of refuge for the inhabitants in periods of danger and alarm, until the militia can march to their succour from the interior, and the troops be put in motion upon the rear of the invaders. Eight of these would be amply sufficient, from which patrols might be kept up along the frontier to enforce the intercourse laws. Both descriptions of forts should be so constructed as to be defended by a small garrison, and in a manner that each part may be successfully maintained against a very superior force, both during the time the whole is being completed, and in the event of any portion of it being burnt or destroyed. This arrangement would require the establishment of a few depots of arms and supplies, from which communications should be opened to the posts. The accompanying skeleton map presents a view of the relative positions of the posts and depots, and of the communications from them to the line of defence for the speedy transportation of succours and supplies. A regular force of five thousand men would be sufficient to garrison these posts, and, with a competent reserve at Jefferson barracks, and an effective force at Baton Rouge, would, I think, both ensure the safety of the western frontier, and enable the Government to fulfil all its treaty stipulations, and preserve its faith with the Indians. I would recommend, as an important auxiliary to this system of defence, the organisation of an efficient volunteer force, to be raised in each of the frontier States; the men to be mustered into service for a certain term of time, the officers to be appointed according to their State laws, and to be instructed a certain number of days in each year by the regular officers of the United States army at the posts within the States, and to receive pay during that period. In this manner an efficient corps of officers may be created, and a body of volunteers be at hand to march to the succour of the border settlers and repel the invaders, whenever they are called upon by the proper authority.
”I venture to hope, if these measures are adopted by Congress, and carried into effect at an early day, so as to antic.i.p.ate any hostile movement of the Indians, peace will be preserved on our Western borders; but if they should, unfortunately, be delayed until the discontent which exists among many of the tribes breaks out into open hostility, and the first movements of that wild and warlike people prove successful, as they infallibly would do in our present unprepared state, it might require double the force and quadruple the means I have here indicated to restore and preserve peace along that extended frontier. All which is respectfully submitted.
”JR Poinsett.
”Honourable James K Polk,
”Speaker of the House of Representatives.”
The acting quarter-master-general, in his report, makes the following observation:--
”The obligations of the Government in reference to the Western frontier are of a very peculiar character. It is first bound, by a common duty, to protect its own border settlements, extending along a line of one thousand miles, against the incursions of numerous savage tribes, separated from those settlements by mere imaginary lines; and it is next bound, by the solemn treaty stipulations, with such of those tribes as have emigrated to that frontier, 'to protect them at their new residences against all interruptions or disturbances from any other tribes or nations of Indians, or _from_ any other person or persons whatsoever.'
”If these obligations are to be scrupulously fulfilled in good faith, which would seem to be due to our character as a nation professing a paternal care over these people, a military force of _thirty thousand men_ on the Western frontier would scarcely be adequate to enable the Government to discharge its duties to its own citizens, and redeem these pledges of protection to the Indians.
”It is not my intention, however, to propose such a force. Political expediency, I presume, would not tolerate it, however it might be justified by military considerations. It is merely adverted to here in connexion with the _heavy obligations_ which rest upon Government, and which have probably been contracted from time to time, without any very nice calculation of the means that would be necessary to a _faithful discharge of them_. I will, therefore, without enlarging upon this point, proceed to state the _minimum_ force that is deemed necessary to give protection to the border settlements, and a.s.sist in preserving peace among them and their Indian neighbours along the line of the frontier. These are great and important objects of themselves, without superadding the yet more difficult task of protecting the emigrant tribes, whom our policy has placed beyond the frontier, from the wild and warlike Indians of the Far-West.”
And Colonel Gratiot, in his report, makes the following admission.
Speaking of the second, or middle, section, he says:--
”_Second, or Middle Section_.--The country beyond this line is mostly elevated and free from marshy ground; is abundantly watered, thinly wooded, healthy, and has been a.s.signed for the permanent residence of the tribes which have been, or are to be, removed from the States and territories east of the Mississippi, and is still occupied by the Aborigines originally found within its limits. In numbers they count, according to some estimates, 131,000, and can send to the field 26,200 warriors. As yet, no community of feeling except of deep and lasting hatred to the white man, and more particularly to the Anglo-Americans, exists among them; and, unless they coalesce, no serious difficulty need be apprehended from them. Not so, however, should they be induced to unite for purposes offensive and defensive: their strength would then become apparent, create confidence, and, in all probability, induce them to give vent to their long-suppressed desire to revenge past wrongs, which is restrained, as they openly and freely declare, by fear alone.
That such a union will be formed at no distant day, we have every reason to believe; and the period may be accelerated by their growing wants, and the policy of Mexico to annoy Texas, and raise an impenetrable barrier in the direction of her frontier.”
That at present the Western frontier is defenceless is undeniable, and the Florida war does not appear to be at all nearer to a conclusion than it was two or three years ago. That the Indians to the west of the Mississippi are not ignorant of what is going on is very certain; and the moral effect arising from the protracted defence of the Seminoles may eventually prove most serious, and be attended with enormous expense to the United States.
The Federal Government takes every precaution to impress the Indians with an idea of the impossibility of their opposing the white men. The agents persuade the chiefs to go down to Was.h.i.+ngton to see their great father, the President. On these occasions they are accompanied by the Indian agent and interpreter, and, of course, all their expenses are paid. They are lodged at the hotels, taken to all places of public amus.e.m.e.nt, and provided with conveyances. But the policy of the Government is to cause them to make a circuit through all the most populous cities, as the crowds attracted by the appearance of the Indians give them an extraordinary and incorrect idea of the American population. Wherever they go they are in a crowd. If they are at the windows of an hotel, still the crowds are immense; and this is what the Government is anxious should take place. I was at Boston when the two deputations of the Sioux and Sacs and Foxes tribes arrived. The two nations being at enmity, the Sioux were conducted there first, and left the town on the arrival of the Sacs and Foxes, or there would probably have been a fight. The Governor received the latter in the Town-hall, and made a speech; I was present. I thought at the time that it was not a speech that I would have made to them, and if I mistook not, it brought up recollections not very agreeable to the chiefs, although they were too politic to express their feelings. But a few years before, their lands east of the Mississippi had been wrested from them in the most unfair way, as I have mentioned in my remarks upon the treatment of the Indians by the American Government.
Governor Everett commenced his speech as follows:--
”Chiefs and warriors of the confederated Sacs and Foxes, you are welcome to our Hall of Council. You have come a far way, from your red friends of the West, to visit your white brethren of the East. We are glad to take you by the hand. We have heard before of the Sac and the Fox tribes: we have heard much of their chiefs, warriors, and great men: we are now glad to see them here. We are of Ma.s.sachusets: the red men once resided here: their wigwams were on yonder hill: and their Council Chamber was here. When our fathers came over the great waters, they were a small band, and you were powerful: the red man stood on the rock by the seaside, and looked at them with friendly eyes: he might have pushed them into the water, but took them by the hand, and said welcome, white man. Our fathers were hungry, and the red man gave them corn and venison. Our fathers were cold, and the red man spread his blanket over them and made them warm. We are now great and powerful, but we _will remember_ in our prosperity the benefits bestowed by our red brethren in our adversity.”
Up to the present, they certainly have forgotten them!!
But the fate of the red man appears to be nearly decided. What between their wars with each other, the use of spirituous liquors, and the diseases imported by the whites, they dwindle away every day. The most fatal disease to them is the small-pox. The following account, which I have extracted from one of the American papers, was confirmed to me by a letter from Fort Snelling:--
_Appalling destruction of North-west Indians by Small-pox_.