Part 57 (1/2)

He promptly rose, mounted his horse, and said: ”If this army goes forward I will fill that gap, with or without orders.” Unfortunately, orders came to him to withdraw, and with others of his corps (Eighth) form in reserve near the turnpike. His withdrawal left, at the last moment, a gap which could only be filled by obliqueing my division to the left as it was moving forward. This produced some unsteadiness in the line, and the right brigade (Emerson's) continued the movement too long, causing some ma.s.sing of troops in the centre of the division, and some disorder resulted while they were under a severe infantry and artillery fire. This necessary movement also caused an interval between Wheaton's division and mine, thereby imperilling my right. Our attack, however, was not checked until we had gone forward about one mile. The enemy's centre was driven back upon his partially intrenched line on the heights mentioned.

This brought my division under a most destructive fire of artillery and infantry from front and flanks. My right flank was especially exposed, as it had gone forward farther than the troops on the right.

The loss in the division was severe, and it became impossible to hold the exposed troops to the charge. They had not fired as they advanced. The division retired a short distance, where it was halted and promptly faced about. In less than five minutes it was again charging the Confederate left centre. The right of Getty's division and Wheaton's left went forward with the second charge, and an advance position in close rifle range of the enemy was gained and held. My division was partly protected by a stone fence located on the north of an open field, while the Confederates held the farther side of the field, about three hundred yards distant, and were also protected by a stone fence as well as by some temporary breastworks. The enemy occupied the higher ground, and the field was lower in the centre than on either side. The battle here was obstinate and, for a time, promised to extend into the night.

Early's artillery in my front did little execution, as it was located on the crest of the hills behind his infantry line, and the gunners, when they undertook to work their guns, were exposed to our infantry fire. Wheaton's division and that part of the Nineteenth Corps to his right, though not keeping pace with the centre, steadily gained ground; likewise the cavalry. Getty, though under orders to hold his left on the pike, moved his division forward slowly, making a left half wheel. In this movement Getty's left reached Middletown, and his right swung somewhat past it on the west.

Merritt's cavalry pushed around east of Middletown. At this juncture, Kershaw's division and part of Gordon's division were in front of my right and part of Ramseur's in front of my left.

Pegram's and Wharton's divisions were in front of Getty, Wharton being, in part, east of the pike confronting our cavalry. Early's left was held by Gordon's troops, including some of his cavalry.(17) Early now made heroic efforts to hold his position, hoping at night he could withdraw with some of the fruits of victory. Sheridan made every possible exertion to dislodge the enemy, and to accomplish this he was much engaged, personally, on the flanks with the cavalry.

Wright, calm, confident, and unperturbed, gave close attention to his corps, and was constantly exposed. I frequently met him at this crisis. He ordered a further charge upon the enemy's centre.

This seemed impossible with the tired troops. Preparation was, however, made to attempt it. The firing in this last position had continued for about an hour, during which both sides had suffered heavily. As the sun was going down behind the mountains that autumnal evening it became apparent something decisive must take place or night would end the day of blood leaving the enemy in possession of the princ.i.p.al part of the battle-field.

So confident was Early of final victory that, earlier, in the day, he ordered up his headquarters and supply trains, and by 4 P.M.

they commenced to arrive on the field.

It must be remembered that the two armies had been manoeuvring and fighting for twelve hours, with little food or rest and an insufficient supply of water. Exhausted troops may be held in line, especially when under some cover, but it is difficult to move then in a charge with the spirit essential to success. There remained a considerable interval between Wheaton's left and my right. An ill.u.s.trative incident again occurred here in resupplying our men with ammunition.

Three mules loaded with boxes filled with cartridges were conducted by an ordnance sergeant through the interval on my right in open view of both armies, and with indifferent leisure to and behind the stone wall occupied by the Confederates. The sergeant and his party were not fired on. Word was pa.s.sed along the line for my division to make a charge on a given signal, and all subordinate officers were instructed to use the utmost exertion to make it a success. The incident of the sergeant and his party going into the enemy's line served to suggest to me the possibility of penetrating it with a small body of our soldiers.

Before giving an order to charge, I instructed Colonel Emerson, commanding the First Brigade, to hastily form, under a competent staff officer, a small body of men, and direct them to advance rapidly along the west of a stone wall extending traversely from my right to the enemy's position, and to penetrate through a gap between two of the enemy's brigades, with instructions to open an enfilading fire on him as soon as his flank was reached. The gap was between two of Gordon's brigades. The order was promptly and handsomely executed, and its execution produced the desired effect.

Captain H. W. Day (151st New York, Acting Brigade Inspector) was charged with the execution of this order.(18)

The party consisted of about 125 men, each of whom knew that if unsuccessful death or capture must follow. Colonel Moses H. Granger (122d Ohio) voluntarily aided, and, in some sense, directed the movement of this small party. The gap was penetrated on the run and a fire opened on the exposed flanks of the Confederates which started them from the cover of their works and the stone wall. At this juncture the division, as ordered, poured a destructive fire upon the now exposed Confederates, and at once charging across the field, drove the enemy in utter rout. A panic seized Gordon's troops, who were the first struck, then spread to Kershaw's and Ramseur's divisions, successively on Gordon's right.(19)

I quote from the report of Colonel Emerson, commanding my First Brigade, in which he describes the final battle, including the breaking of Early's line:

”The brigade lay here under a fire of sh.e.l.l until about 4 P.M., when Captain Smith came with an order to move forward connecting on the left with the Second Brigade. The brigade moved through the woods, when it received a very heavy fire on the right flank, under which it was broken, but soon reformed in its old position, and again moved forward to a stone fence, the enemy being behind another stone wall in front with a clear field intervening. There was a stone wall running from the right flank of the brigade to the wall behind which the enemy lay. Some of my men lay scattered along this last named wall. The First Division lay to the right and in advance, nearly parallel with the enemy. Everything appeared to be at a deadlock, with heavy firing of artillery and musketry.

At this stage Colonel Keifer, commanding division, came to me and inquired what men were those lying along the wall running from our line to the enemy's, and ordered me to send them forward to flank the enemy and drive them from their position. The execution of the order was entrusted to Captain H. W. Day, Inspector of the [Second] Brigade, who proceeded along the wall, and getting on the enemy's flank dislodged them, when the brigade was moved rapidly forward, in connection with the Second Brigade, and did not stop until we arrived in the works of the Nineteenth Corps, when, in accordance with orders from Colonel Keifer, the brigade went into its position of the morning, got its _breakfast_, and encamped, satisfied that it had done a good day's work before breakfast.”(20)

Also from a report of Colonel Ball, commanding Second Brigade:

”About 3 P.M. the whole army advanced in one line upon the enemy.

Immediately before advancing the troops were withdrawn to the left, and my left connected with the Second Division, Sixth Army Corps, while my right connected with the First Brigade, Third Division.

We advanced half a mile to the edge of the woods, when we were met by a well-directed fire from the right flank. This fire was returned with spirit some fifteen minutes, when the troops wavered and fell back a short distance in some disorder. The Second and Third Divisions gave way at the same time. The line was speedily reformed and moved forward and became engaged with the enemy again, each force occupying a stone wall. Advantage was taken of a wall or fence running perpendicular to and connecting with that occupied by the enemy. After the action had continued here about three quarters of an hour a heavy volley was fired at the enemy from the transverse wall. A hurried and general retreat of the enemy immediately followed, and our troops eagerly followed, firing upon the retreating army as it ran, and giving no opportunity to the enemy to reform or make a stand.

”Several efforts were made by the enemy during the pursuit to rally, but the enthusiastic pursuit foiled all such efforts. Our troops were subject to artillery fire of solid shot, sh.e.l.l, and grape during the pursuit, and we reached the intrenchments of the Nineteenth Army Corps (which were captured in the morning) as the sun set.

Here the pursuit by the infantry was discontinued. The first and second, and probably the third colors planted on the recovered works of the Nineteenth Army Corps were of regiments composing this brigade.”(21)

General Early tells the effect on his army of penetrating his line by the small body of our troops:

”A number of bold attempts were made during the subsequent part of the day, by the enemy's cavalry, to break our line on the right, but they were invariably repulsed. Late in the afternoon, the enemy's infantry advanced against Ramseur, Kershaw, and Gordon's lines, and the attack on Ramseur and Kershaw's front was handsomely repulsed in my view, and I hoped that the day was finally ours, but a portion of the enemy had penetrated an interval which was between Evans' brigade, on the extreme left, and the rest of the line, when that brigade gave way, and Gordon's other brigades soon followed. General Gordon made every possible effort to rally his men and lead them back against the enemy, but without avail. The information of this affair, with exaggerations, pa.s.sed rapidly along Kershaw and Ramseur's lines, and their men, under the apprehension of being flanked, commenced falling back in disorder, though no enemy was pressing them, and this gave me the first intimation of Gordon's condition. At the same time the enemy's cavalry, observing the disorder on our ranks, made another charge on our right, but was again repulsed. Every effort was made to stop and rally Kershaw and Ramseur's men, but the ma.s.s of them resisted all appeals, and continued to go to the rear without waiting for any effort to retrieve the partial disaster.”(22)

The charge of the division resulted in the total overthrow of Early's army. Pegram and Wharton's divisions on our extreme left near Middletown were soon involved in the disaster, and our whole army went forward, meeting little resistance, taking many prisoners and guns, only halting when Early's forces were either destroyed, captured, or driven in the wildest disorder beyond Cedar Creek.(23) Our cavalry under Merritt and Custer pursued until late in the night to Fisher's Hill, south of Strasburg, and made many captures.

It often has been claimed that the cavalry on the right is ent.i.tled to the credit of overthrowing Early's army. It is true Custer did make some attempts on Gordon's left and rear, but the appearance of Rosser's cavalry on Custer's right, north and east of Cedar Creek, called him off, and it was not until after Early's position had been penetrated and a general retreat had commenced that Custer again appeared on the enemy's flank and rear. His presence there had much to do with the wild retreat of Early's men. Custer, who claimed much for his cavalry, and insisted that it captured forty- five pieces of artillery, etc., did not in his report of the battle pretend that his division caused the final break in Early's forces.

Speaking of his last charge on the left, Custer says:

”Seeing so large a force of cavalry bearing rapidly down upon an unprotected flank and their line of retreat in danger of being intercepted, the lines of the enemy, already broken, now gave way in the utmost confusion.”(24)

Part of Early's artillery and caissons, with ammunition and supply trains, also ambulances and many battle flags, were captured north of Cedar Creek. The cavalry, however, seized, south of the Creek, other substantial fruits of the great victory, including many guns and headquarters baggage and other trains, and some prisoners. A panic seized teamsters on the turnpike; they cut out mules or horses to escape upon, leaving the teams to mingle in the greatest disorder.

Drivers of ambulances filled with dead and wounded also fled, and the animals ran with them unguided over the field. The scene was of the wildest ruin. The gloom of night soon fell over the field to add to its appalling character.

The guns lost by the Eighth and Nineteenth Corps were taken in the morning to the public square of Strasburg and triumphantly parked on exhibition. Our cavalry found them there at night. Little that makes up an army was left to Early; the disaster reached every part of his army save, possibly, his cavalry which operated on the remote flanks. In a large sense, Rosser's cavalry, throughout the day, had been neutralized by a portion of Custer's, and Lomax had been held back by Powell on the Front Royal road. Dismay indescribable extended to the Confederate officers as well as the private soldiers.