Part 16 (1/2)

The case was twice argued by eminent lawyers; Blair and G. F. Curtis for Dred Scott, and by Geyer and Johnson for the defendant.

Dred Scott brought a suit in the United States Circuit Court in Missouri for trespa.s.s against one Sanford, charging him with a.s.sault on him, his wife, and two children--in fact, for his and their freedom.

The facts, as agreed, were as follows:

”In the year 1834, the plaintiff (Dred Scott) was a negro slave belonging to Dr. Emerson, who was a surgeon in the army of the United States. In that year, 1834, said Dr. Emerson took the plaintiff from the State of Missouri to the military post at Rock Island, in the State of Illinois, and held him there as a slave until the month of April or May, 1836. At the time last mentioned, said Dr. Emerson removed the plaintiff from said military post at Rock Island to the military post at Fort Snelling, situate on the west bank of the Mississippi River, in the Territory known as Upper Louisiana, acquired by the United States of France, and situate north of the lat.i.tude of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes north, and north of the State of Missouri. Said Dr. Emerson held the plaintiff in slavery at said Fort Snelling from said last-mentioned date until the year 1838.

”In the year 1835, Harriet, who is named in the second count of the plaintiff's declaration, was the negro slave of Major Taliaferro, who belonged to the army of the United States. In that year, 1835, said Major Taliaferro took said Harriet to said Fort Snelling, a military post, situated as hereinbefore stated, and kept her there as a slave until the year 1836, and then sold and delivered her as a slave at said Fort Snelling unto the said Dr. Emerson hereinbefore named. Said Dr. Emerson held said Harriet in slavery at said Fort Snelling until the year 1838.

”In the year 1836, the plaintiff and said Harriet, at said Fort Snelling, with the consent of said Dr. Emerson, who then claimed to be their master and owner, intermarried, and took each other for husband and wife. Eliza and Lizzie, named in the third count of the plaintiff's declaration, are the fruits of that marriage.

Eliza is about fourteen years old, and was born on board the steams.h.i.+p _Gipsey_, north of the north line of the State of Missouri, and upon the river Mississippi. Lizzie is about seven years old, and was born in the State of Missouri, and at the military post called Jefferson Barracks.

”In the year 1838, said Dr. Emerson removed the plaintiff and said Harriet and their said daughter Eliza from said Fort Snelling to the State of Missouri, where they have ever since resided.

”Before the commencement of this suit, said Dr. Emerson sold and conveyed the plaintiff, said Harriet, Eliza, and Lizzie, to the defendant as slaves, and the defendant has ever since claimed to hold them and each of them as slaves.

”At the times mentioned in the plaintiff's declaration, the defendant, claiming to be the owner as aforesaid, laid his hands upon said plaintiff, Harriet, Eliza, and Lizzie, and imprisoned them, doing in this respect, however, no more than what he might lawfully do if they were of right his slaves at such times.”

It is our purpose here only to set forth what was decided, or attempted to be decided, bearing upon slavery and its political status in the United States.

This purpose we can accomplish no better than by quoting parts of the Syllabi of the case.

We quote:

”A free negro of the African race, whose ancestors were brought to this country and sold as slaves, is not a 'citizen' within the meaning of the Const.i.tution of the United States.

”When the Const.i.tution was adopted, they were not regarded in any of the States as members of the community which const.i.tuted the State, and were not numbered among its 'people or citizens.'

Consequently, the special rights and immunities guaranteed to citizens do not apply to them. And not being 'citizens' within the meaning of the Const.i.tution, they are not ent.i.tled to sue in that character in a court of the United States, and the Circuit Court has no jurisdiction in such a suit.

”The only two clauses in the Const.i.tution which point to this race treat them as persons whom it was _morally_ lawful to deal in as articles of property and to hold as slaves.

”The change in public opinion and feeling in relation to the African race which has taken place since the adoption of the Const.i.tution cannot change its construction and meaning, and it must be construed and administered now according to its true meaning and intention when it was formed and adopted.

”The plaintiff, having admitted (by his demurrer to the plea in abatement) that his ancestors were imported from Africa and sold as slaves, he is not a citizen of the State of Missouri according to the Const.i.tution of the United States, and was not ent.i.tled to sue in that character in the Circuit Court.

”The clause in the Const.i.tution authorizing Congress to make all needful rules and regulations for the government of the territory and other property of the United States applies only to territory within the chartered limits of some of the States when they were colonies of Great Britain, and which was surrendered by the British Government to the old Confederation of States in the treaty of peace. It does not apply to territory acquired by the present Federal Government, by treaty or conquest, from a foreign nation.

”The United States, under the present Const.i.tution, cannot acquire territory to be held as a colony, to be governed at its will and pleasure. But it may acquire and may govern it as a Territory until it has a population which, in the judgment of Congress, ent.i.tles it to be admitted as a State of the Union.

”During the time it remains a Territory Congress may legislate over it within the scope of its const.i.tutional powers in relation to citizens of the United States--and may establish a territorial government--and the form of this local government must be regulated by the discretion of Congress--but with powers not exceeding those which Congress itself, by the Const.i.tution, is authorized to exercise over citizens of the United States, in respect to their rights of persons or rights of property.

”The Territory thus acquired is acquired by the people of the United States for their common and equal benefit, through their agent and trustee, the Federal Government. Congress can exercise no power over the rights of persons or property of a citizen in the Territory which is prohibited by the Const.i.tution. The government and its citizens, whenever the Territory is open to settlement, both enter it with their respective rights defined and limited by the Const.i.tution.

”Congress has no right to prohibit the citizens of any particular State or States from taking up their home there, while it permits citizens of other States to do so. Nor has it a right to give privileges to one cla.s.s of citizens which it refuses to another.

The territory is acquired for their equal and common benefit--and if open to any it must be open to all upon equal and the same terms.

”Every citizen has a right to take with him into the Territory any article of property which the Const.i.tution of the United States recognizes as property.

”The Const.i.tution of the United States recognizes slaves as property, and pledges the Federal Government to protect it. And Congress cannot exercise any more authority on property of that description than it may const.i.tutionally exercise over property of any other kind.

”The act of Congress, therefore, prohibiting a citizen of the United States from taking with him his slaves when he removes to the Territory in question to reside, is an exercise of authority over private property which is not warranted by the Const.i.tution--and the removal of the plaintiff, by his owner, to that Territory, gave him no t.i.tle to freedom.