Part 5 (1/2)

CHAPTER SIXTEEN.

IF SOME INCIDENT SHOULD FREE A POPULACE ACCUSTOMED TO LIVING UNDER A PRINCE, THEY WILL BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN THIS FREEDOM ONLY WITH DIFFICULTY.

In the annals of ancient history there are countless examples that demonstrate the difficulty a populace that is accustomed to living under a prince have in conserving their freedom should they by some chance obtain it, as the Romans did after the Tarquins were expelled. This difficulty is to be expected, because such a populace is not unlike a wild animal, which might be fierce and feral by nature but has been raised in captivity and servitude. If this animal is released into the open, not used to feeding itself or knowing where to take shelter, it will fall prey to the first man who seeks to chain it up again.

The same thing happens to a populace who are accustomed to living under the government of others without knowing how to reach decisions in matters of public defense or offense. Not understanding the new rulers or being understood by them, this populace quickly end up under a yoke that is often heavier than the one they had managed to shake off. Although their nature is not corrupted, the populace find themselves in this difficulty because a people that is corrupted through and through cannot live in liberty for even a short period, as I shall discuss in the following two chapters. Therefore our discourse will concern peoples in whom corruption has not spread too widely, and in whom there remains more of the good than the corrupted.

Added to this difficulty is that a state which becomes free creates hostile factions, as opposed to factions that are on its side. All those who took advantage of the previous tyrannical state and fed off the wealth of the prince become hostile factions. Having lost the opportunity of partaking of the tyrant's wealth, they cannot live contentedly in the new state, and will try to restore the tyranny so they can regain their power. Nor will this new state acquire friendly supporters, as I have already said, because a free state can offer honors and prizes on only a few honest occasions, beyond which it will offer neither prizes nor honors to anyone. For once a man has secured the honors and benefits he thinks he deserves, he no longer feels obligated to those who rewarded him. Furthermore, the common benefit that results from living in freedom is not recognized by people while they possess it: In other words, being able to enjoy one's possessions freely and without fear, not having to worry about the honor of one's women or sons, or to fear for oneself. In fact, no one will ever admit to owing an obligation to someone who does not harm him.

But, as I have said above, a state that is free and newly created inevitably has hostile factions and not friendly ones. To resolve this problem, and the turmoil created by the difficulties I mentioned above, there is no stronger remedy or one more valid, secure, and vital, than killing the sons of Brutus.71 These, as history shows, were driven to conspire with other Roman youths against their city for no other reason than that they did not enjoy the same status under the consuls as they had under the kings. These, as history shows, were driven to conspire with other Roman youths against their city for no other reason than that they did not enjoy the same status under the consuls as they had under the kings.72 In their eyes, the liberty of the people had brought about their own slavery. In their eyes, the liberty of the people had brought about their own slavery.

Whoever undertakes to govern a mult.i.tude, either by means of liberty or by means of a princ.i.p.ality, and does not secure himself from those who are hostile to the new order, is creating a state that will be short-lived. In fact, I consider those princes unfortunate who are compelled to secure their state by exceptional means because the populace is their enemy, for he who has as his enemy the few can secure himself easily and without much turmoil, but he who has the whole populace as his enemy can never secure himself. And the more cruelty he employs, the weaker his princ.i.p.ality becomes. Hence the best remedy is to seek to make the populace his friend.73 My discussion here might deviate from what I have written above, as I am speaking here of princes and there of republics, but I would nevertheless like to mention this matter briefly so that I will not have to return to it again. Should a prince wish to win over a populace hostile to him-I am speaking of princes who have become tyrants of their own cities-he has to weigh what the people desire. He will find that they always want two things: first, to avenge themselves against those who are the cause of their becoming enslaved, and second, to regain their liberty. The first desire the prince can fulfill entirely, the second partially. I can offer a perfect example of how a ruler can fulfill the first desire: Clearchus, the tyrant of Heraclea, was in exile when there was a clash between the people and the n.o.bles of Heraclea.74 Realizing that they were at a disadvantage, the n.o.bles turned to Clearchus for support and, conspiring with him, put him in power against the will of the people, taking away their liberty. Clearchus, finding himself caught between the arrogance of the n.o.bles, whom he could neither curb nor satisfy, and the anger of the populace, who could not endure having lost their freedom, he decided to free himself from the ballast of the n.o.bles and win over the people in a single stroke. A good opportunity arose and he seized it, ma.s.sacring all the n.o.bles, to the great satisfaction of the populace. By this means he fulfilled one of the populace's desires, that of vengeance. But as for their second desire-to regain their liberty-the prince, unable to fulfill it, would have to examine the reasons that made them want liberty. Here the prince will find that a small part of the populace desire liberty so they can rule, but that all the rest, who are innumerable, desire liberty only so that they can live securely. In all states, regardless of how they are organized, the ranks of command are never attained by more than forty or fifty citizens. As this is a small number, the prince can easily protect himself, either by getting rid of these few citizens or by heaping them with so many honors that, depending on their status, they will for the most part be happy. The rest of the citizenry, desiring merely to live securely, can easily be satisfied with inst.i.tutions and laws that protect both the prince's power and public safety. When a prince does this, and the populace see that he will not break those laws under any circ.u.mstances, they will soon enough begin living securely and happily. We have the example of the kingdom of France, which exists securely for no other reason than that its kings are bound by innumerable laws that also ensure the security of all their subjects. The founder of the French state intended these kings to act as they pleased in military and financial matters, but in all other things under their jurisdiction they had to do as the laws specified. The princes or republics that do not secure themselves at the beginning must do so as soon as they can, as the Romans did. The ruler who lets the opportunity slip by will later regret that he did not do what he should have done. Realizing that they were at a disadvantage, the n.o.bles turned to Clearchus for support and, conspiring with him, put him in power against the will of the people, taking away their liberty. Clearchus, finding himself caught between the arrogance of the n.o.bles, whom he could neither curb nor satisfy, and the anger of the populace, who could not endure having lost their freedom, he decided to free himself from the ballast of the n.o.bles and win over the people in a single stroke. A good opportunity arose and he seized it, ma.s.sacring all the n.o.bles, to the great satisfaction of the populace. By this means he fulfilled one of the populace's desires, that of vengeance. But as for their second desire-to regain their liberty-the prince, unable to fulfill it, would have to examine the reasons that made them want liberty. Here the prince will find that a small part of the populace desire liberty so they can rule, but that all the rest, who are innumerable, desire liberty only so that they can live securely. In all states, regardless of how they are organized, the ranks of command are never attained by more than forty or fifty citizens. As this is a small number, the prince can easily protect himself, either by getting rid of these few citizens or by heaping them with so many honors that, depending on their status, they will for the most part be happy. The rest of the citizenry, desiring merely to live securely, can easily be satisfied with inst.i.tutions and laws that protect both the prince's power and public safety. When a prince does this, and the populace see that he will not break those laws under any circ.u.mstances, they will soon enough begin living securely and happily. We have the example of the kingdom of France, which exists securely for no other reason than that its kings are bound by innumerable laws that also ensure the security of all their subjects. The founder of the French state intended these kings to act as they pleased in military and financial matters, but in all other things under their jurisdiction they had to do as the laws specified. The princes or republics that do not secure themselves at the beginning must do so as soon as they can, as the Romans did. The ruler who lets the opportunity slip by will later regret that he did not do what he should have done.

As the Roman populace was not yet corrupted when they regained their liberty after the death of Brutus's sons and the elimination of the Tarquin kings, they managed to maintain it through the means and inst.i.tutions I have already discussed. Had the Roman populace been corrupted, there would have been no effective way for them to keep their liberty, as I will show in the following chapter.

71. According to Roman tradition, Lucius Junius Brutus, a legendary figure of the sixth century According to Roman tradition, Lucius Junius Brutus, a legendary figure of the sixth century BCE BCE, ousted the last Tarquin king of Rome in 509, founding the Roman Republic. He condemned his own sons to death when they joined in a conspiracy to restore the Tarquins. See also Book III, chapter 3 above.72. Livy (Book II, chapter 3) writes: ”[The youths] missed their former freedom to do as they pleased, and complained that the liberty others enjoyed had turned into slavery for them.” Livy (Book II, chapter 3) writes: ”[The youths] missed their former freedom to do as they pleased, and complained that the liberty others enjoyed had turned into slavery for them.”73. See See The Prince The Prince, chapter 9: ”A prince who obtains a state with the help of the people maintains his position with less difficulty than a prince who acquires it with the help of the n.o.bility, because in the latter case he is surrounded by men who consider themselves his equals and whom he therefore cannot command or govern as he pleases.”74. Clearchus (d. 353 Clearchus (d. 353 BCE BCE) was tyrant of Heraclea, a Greek city on the Black Sea. Machiavelli closely follows the incidents described by Justin in Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus (Book XVI, chapters 4 and 5). (Book XVI, chapters 4 and 5).

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN.

ON HOW, WHEN CORRUPT POPULACES GAIN THEIR FREEDOM, THEY WILL BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN IT ONLY WITH THE GREATEST DIFFICULTY.

I believe that had the kings of Rome not been eliminated, Rome would very quickly have become worthless and weak. If we consider how corrupt these kings had become, if two or three more generations of their kind had followed, and the corruption within them had begun to spread throughout their branches, once the branches were corrupted, it would have been impossible ever to reform Rome again. But because the head was lost while the body was still whole, the Romans could easily adjust to living in freedom and good order. We must accept as an absolute truth that a corrupt state under a prince will not be able to adjust to liberty, even if the prince and all his offspring are eliminated. In fact, it would be better if one prince ousted another. Without the creation of a new ruler, the state will never be sound if the goodness and skill of a single ruler does not keep it free. But this liberty will last only for the duration of that ruler's life, as was the case in Syracuse with Dion and Timoleon. Their skill kept the state free while they were alive, but after their deaths it reverted to its former tyranny. However, there is no better example than that of Rome, which managed immediately to seize and maintain that liberty once the Tarquins were expelled. But with the deaths of Caesar, Gaius Caligula, and Nero, and the whole of Caesar's line extinguished,75 Rome could not maintain its liberty, let alone lay a foundation for it. Such diverse results came about only because in the era of the Tarquin kings the Roman populace were not yet corrupted, while by the later imperial times they had become quite corrupt. In the early years it was sufficient to make the populace swear that they would never consent to anyone becoming king of Rome. In later years, Brutus's authority and severity, with all his eastern legions, were not enough to make the Romans want to maintain the liberty that he, like the first Brutus, Rome could not maintain its liberty, let alone lay a foundation for it. Such diverse results came about only because in the era of the Tarquin kings the Roman populace were not yet corrupted, while by the later imperial times they had become quite corrupt. In the early years it was sufficient to make the populace swear that they would never consent to anyone becoming king of Rome. In later years, Brutus's authority and severity, with all his eastern legions, were not enough to make the Romans want to maintain the liberty that he, like the first Brutus,76 had restored to them. This was the result of the corruption that the factions of Caius Marius had triggered among the people. Caesar, as the leader of these factions, could blind the ma.s.ses so that they did not see the yoke into which they were slipping their own heads. had restored to them. This was the result of the corruption that the factions of Caius Marius had triggered among the people. Caesar, as the leader of these factions, could blind the ma.s.ses so that they did not see the yoke into which they were slipping their own heads.

This Roman example is the best, but I would nonetheless like to mention examples from our times. I suggest, for instance, that no incident, however momentous or violent, could ever render Milan or Naples free, their natures being so corrupt.77 This can be seen after Filippo Visconti's death, when Milan strove to regain its liberty but did not know how to maintain it. This can be seen after Filippo Visconti's death, when Milan strove to regain its liberty but did not know how to maintain it.78 Hence it was Rome's great fortune that its kings became corrupt quickly, so that they were driven out before their corruption could spread into the bowels of the city. This absence of corruption in the Roman populace was the reason that Rome's infinite clashes and tumults, sparked by men of good intentions, did no harm but were in fact beneficial to the republic. Hence it was Rome's great fortune that its kings became corrupt quickly, so that they were driven out before their corruption could spread into the bowels of the city. This absence of corruption in the Roman populace was the reason that Rome's infinite clashes and tumults, sparked by men of good intentions, did no harm but were in fact beneficial to the republic.

One can come to the following conclusion: When a city's nature is not corrupted, the clashes and tumults are not harmful, but when it is corrupted, even the soundest laws are of no use unless they are enacted by someone who can ensure with great force that they are observed, so that the state's nature becomes good. I do not know whether this has ever occurred or if it even can occur, because it is clear that a state which has gone into decline through the corruption of its nature can rise again only through the skill of a single ruler who happens to be alive at the time, and not by the skill of the whole populace supporting the good inst.i.tutions. But the moment that ruler dies, the state will regress to its original ways, as happened in Thebes, which through the skill of Epaminondas was able, while he was alive, to have the form of a republic and an empire. When Epaminondas died, Thebes returned to its previous disarray79 The reason is that no man can live long enough to tame a state that has had bad habits for a long time. One ruler with an exceptionally long life, or two skillful rulers in a row, can restore a state, but the lack of such rulers, as I said above, will ruin it, unless with great danger and much blood they have brought about its rebirth. Hence, such corruption and lack of capacity for maintaining a life of liberty arise from an inequality that exists in such a state. Should one wish to restore equality, it will be necessary to use the most exceptional measures, which few want or know how to use, as I will discuss in greater detail elsewhere. The reason is that no man can live long enough to tame a state that has had bad habits for a long time. One ruler with an exceptionally long life, or two skillful rulers in a row, can restore a state, but the lack of such rulers, as I said above, will ruin it, unless with great danger and much blood they have brought about its rebirth. Hence, such corruption and lack of capacity for maintaining a life of liberty arise from an inequality that exists in such a state. Should one wish to restore equality, it will be necessary to use the most exceptional measures, which few want or know how to use, as I will discuss in greater detail elsewhere.80 75. Nero (d. 68 Nero (d. 68 CE CE) was the fifth Roman emperor and, by adoption, the last descendant of Caesar.76. Machiavelli is contrasting Lucius Junius Brutus, who led the revolt that overthrew the last king of Rome, with Marcus Junius Brutus, who was one of Caesar's a.s.sa.s.sins. Machiavelli is contrasting Lucius Junius Brutus, who led the revolt that overthrew the last king of Rome, with Marcus Junius Brutus, who was one of Caesar's a.s.sa.s.sins.77. See chapter 55 below, in which Machiavelli further discusses the corruption of the Kingdom of Naples, the Papal States, the Romagna, and Lombardy. See chapter 55 below, in which Machiavelli further discusses the corruption of the Kingdom of Naples, the Papal States, the Romagna, and Lombardy.78. When Filippo Maria Visconti died in 1447, the short-lived Ambrosian Republic of Milan (144750) followed. After internal dissension, Francesco Sforza, who had married Visconti's daughter Bianca, took over the city and had himself declared duke. When Filippo Maria Visconti died in 1447, the short-lived Ambrosian Republic of Milan (144750) followed. After internal dissension, Francesco Sforza, who had married Visconti's daughter Bianca, took over the city and had himself declared duke.79. Epaminondas (c. 410362 Epaminondas (c. 410362 BCE BCE) was a Theban statesman and general who ended Spartan dominance over Thebes and the other Greek city-states when he defeated the Spartans at the Battle of Leucra in 371. His Theban empire, or predominance over the other Greek states, lasted only from 371 to 362 BCE BCE, when he was killed in the Battle of Mantineia.80. See chapter 26 below, in which Machiavelli outlines some of the ”exceptional measures” a ruler must take to restore equality: ”He must create a new government with new offices that have new names and new powers and are occupied by new men. He must make the rich poor and the poor rich.” See chapter 26 below, in which Machiavelli outlines some of the ”exceptional measures” a ruler must take to restore equality: ”He must create a new government with new offices that have new names and new powers and are occupied by new men. He must make the rich poor and the poor rich.”

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN.

ON HOW A FREE GOVERNMENT CAN BE MAINTAINED IN A CORRUPTED STATE IF A FREE GOVERNMENT ALREADY EXISTS, OR, IF IT DOES NOT, HOW IT CAN BE ESTABLISHED.

I do not believe it is out of place or at odds with what I have been discussing to consider whether one can maintain a free government in a corrupted state if a free government already exists, or, if it does not, how to establish it. I would like to point out right away that it is extremely difficult to do one or the other. It is almost impossible to lay down a rule on how to proceed, because in such a situation it would be necessary to act according to the extent of the corruption. However, I do not want to pa.s.s over this, as it is good to discuss all cases. As an example, I would like to consider a state that is extremely corrupted, though this will make the subject more difficult, because such a state will not have any laws or inst.i.tutions formidable enough to halt a corruption that is widespread. For just as good customs require good laws so that they can be maintained, laws require good customs in order to be observed. Furthermore, the inst.i.tutions and laws created in a state at its birth, when men were good, are no longer relevant once men have become evil. Even if laws in a state vary according to circ.u.mstances, its inst.i.tutions rarely, if ever, do. This means that new laws are not enough, because the inst.i.tutions that remain unchanged will corrupt them.

To clarify this further, I suggest that in Rome there was originally a system of government, or rather of the state, and later, laws, that, in conjunction with magistrates, kept the citizens in check. The system of the state included the power of the populace, the Senate, the tribunes, and the consuls, as well as the method of proposing and appointing magistrates and the method of making laws. During all that occurred in Rome, these inst.i.tutions changed little, if at all. What did change as citizens became increasingly corrupted were the laws that put a check on them: the adultery law, the sumptuary law, the law against ruthless ambition, and many others.81 But the inst.i.tutions of the state remained fixed, unable to counter the corruption, while the laws that were being redrawn did not suffice to keep men good. And yet such laws would have been quite useful if the inst.i.tutions of the state had been changed along with them. But the inst.i.tutions of the state remained fixed, unable to counter the corruption, while the laws that were being redrawn did not suffice to keep men good. And yet such laws would have been quite useful if the inst.i.tutions of the state had been changed along with them.

That it is true that such inst.i.tutions in a corrupted state would not be good can be clearly seen in two princ.i.p.al matters: the creating of magistrates and the making of laws. The Roman populace accorded the consuls.h.i.+p and the other foremost positions of the city only to men who sought these positions. This system was good in the beginning, because those who wanted these positions were citizens who judged themselves worthy, and to be rejected would have been a disgrace. Hence, in order to be judged worthy, they comported themselves well. Later, in the corrupted city, this system became extremely destructive, for it was no longer the men with the greatest skill who stood as candidates for the magistrature, but those with the most power, while men without power, though skillful, declined to stand out of fear.

Rome did not reach this dire condition all at once, but by degrees, as all dire conditions are reached. Once the Romans had subjugated Africa and Asia and had reduced almost all of Greece to their rule, they became complacent about their liberty and did not feel that they had any enemies left whom they needed to fear. This sense of security, and the weakness of their enemies, made the Roman populace value popularity over ability when selecting their consuls, electing those who were best at amusing the populace and not those best at conquering the enemy. Then the Romans slipped even further, not giving the office to men who were popular but to men with the most power. The faultiness of this system resulted in worthy men being entirely excluded from office. A tribune or any other citizen could propose a law, and every citizen could debate either in favor or against it before the law was put in effect. This system worked when the citizens were good, because it has always been proper for anyone who thinks something is for the common benefit to propose it. And it is right that everyone can speak his mind so that the populace, having heard all sides, can then choose what is best. But once the citizens had become corrupt, this system became very bad indeed, because only those with power proposed laws, and the laws they proposed were not for the common good but for their own power. Out of fear of the powerful, n.o.body could speak up against this, so that the populace ended up being either deceived or forced into choosing their own ruin.

If Rome was to remain free amid the corruption, it was therefore necessary for it to create new inst.i.tutions, just as it had created new laws throughout its history, because when a populace is corrupt, inst.i.tutions and ways of living must be organized differently than when a populace is good. There cannot be the same form in matter that is completely different. These inst.i.tutions must be reformed either in a single stroke the moment it is clear that they are no longer good, or little by little before everyone realizes they are no longer good. But I maintain that both these options are practically impossible to execute. If one wants to reform the inst.i.tutions little by little, then the reformer must be someone extremely prudent, who can see the nascent problems from a distance as they begin to emerge. Such a man might never appear during the entire existence of a state, and even if he does, he might not be able to persuade the other citizens of what he himself can discern. Men used to living in a certain way do not wish to change, especially if they cannot actually see the evil for themselves, but need to have it explained to them with theories and conjectures. As for changing the state's inst.i.tutions all at once, when everyone can clearly see that they are not good, I propose that a problem, once it is clearly visible, is difficult to set right again. It will not be enough to use ordinary means, as ordinary means will have become corrupt. Exceptional means such as violence and arms will be necessary, and the legislator will have to strive to become the prince of that state so that he will be able to set it up as he wishes. Rearranging a state in order to make it a vital civic system presupposes a good man, while becoming a prince through violent means presupposes a bad man. Therefore it is quite rare that a good man will want to become a prince through evil means even if his aims are good, or that an evil man, once he has become a prince, would want to do good or would ever consider using beneficially the authority he has acquired in such an evil way.

The difficulty or the impossibility of a corrupt state's creating or maintaining a republic arises from all the things I have mentioned above. Such a state would have to be shaped more as a monarchy than a democracy, so that arrogant men who cannot be controlled by the laws would in one way or another be held in check by an authority that is almost regal. Attempting to make them good by other means would be either an extremely cruel undertaking or entirely impossible. I have already cited the example of Cleomenes. He murdered the ephors in order to rule alone, just as Romulus killed his brother and t.i.tus Tatius for the same reason.82 After these deeds, Cleomenes and Romulus made good use of the power they gained, but we must nevertheless remember that neither of them had subjects tainted by the corruption we have been discussing in this chapter. Therefore they could set their goal and achieve it. After these deeds, Cleomenes and Romulus made good use of the power they gained, but we must nevertheless remember that neither of them had subjects tainted by the corruption we have been discussing in this chapter. Therefore they could set their goal and achieve it.

81. The The Lex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis Lex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis (18 (18 BCE BCE) made conjugal unfaithfulness a public and private offense; various sumptuary laws were pa.s.sed to prevent general extravagance in the private expenses of citizens, such as inordinate expenditure for banquets and clothes; the Lex Cornelia de ambitu Lex Cornelia de ambitu proscribed the purchasing of votes or public offices. proscribed the purchasing of votes or public offices.82. See chapter 9 above, in which Machiavelli describes Cleomenes's tactics in detail, and discusses Romulus's murder of his brother and the death of his co-ruler, t.i.tus Tatius. In that chapter, however, Machiavelli does not state that Romulus murdered t.i.tus Tatius, but only that he ”consented to the death of t.i.tus Tatius.” See chapter 9 above, in which Machiavelli describes Cleomenes's tactics in detail, and discusses Romulus's murder of his brother and the death of his co-ruler, t.i.tus Tatius. In that chapter, however, Machiavelli does not state that Romulus murdered t.i.tus Tatius, but only that he ”consented to the death of t.i.tus Tatius.”

CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR.

STATES THAT ARE WELL ORGANIZED INTRODUCE REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS FOR THEIR CITIZENS, BUT NEVER LET THE GOOD DEEDS EXCUSE THE BAD.

Horatius's merit was great, as evidenced by his skill in defeating the Curiatii. But as he killed his sister, his sin was atrocious, and the murder so infuriated the Romans that they wanted to condemn him to death despite his merit having been so great and so recently demonstrated.83 Whoever considers this matter cursorily might regard it as an example of the ingrat.i.tude of the populace. But if one examines the matter more closely and gives some thought to the inst.i.tutions that a state must have, one will sooner blame the populace for ultimately absolving Horatius than for having wanted to condemn him for his deed. The reason is that no state that is properly set up will ever allow a citizen's merits to cancel out his demerits. A state ensures rewards for a good deed and punishment for a bad one. In other words, having rewarded a man for having done something good, the state must also punish him if he acts badly, and this without regard for any past good deeds. If this system is observed, a city will live in freedom for a long time; otherwise, it will rapidly come to ruin. Citizens who have committed a notable deed for the state are given the status that this deed brings them, but if they then become overweening and confident that they can commit bad deeds without fear of punishment, they will soon become so insolent that every form of civil life will disappear. Whoever considers this matter cursorily might regard it as an example of the ingrat.i.tude of the populace. But if one examines the matter more closely and gives some thought to the inst.i.tutions that a state must have, one will sooner blame the populace for ultimately absolving Horatius than for having wanted to condemn him for his deed. The reason is that no state that is properly set up will ever allow a citizen's merits to cancel out his demerits. A state ensures rewards for a good deed and punishment for a bad one. In other words, having rewarded a man for having done something good, the state must also punish him if he acts badly, and this without regard for any past good deeds. If this system is observed, a city will live in freedom for a long time; otherwise, it will rapidly come to ruin. Citizens who have committed a notable deed for the state are given the status that this deed brings them, but if they then become overweening and confident that they can commit bad deeds without fear of punishment, they will soon become so insolent that every form of civil life will disappear.