Part 29 (1/2)

In another Vietnam-era a.n.a.lysis, Frank Baldwin asked (Without Parallel, (Without Parallel, pp. 1516), ”What would have happened in Korea if the United States had not intervened?” His answer: ”The war would have been over in two or three weeks with total casualties of perhaps less than 50,000. Several million people opposed to communism would have come under communist rule and probably, but not certainly, there would have been reprisals. A single communist Korean state would have been established, the unity of a millennium restored, and national energies immediately directed to urgent economic and social reconstruction.” Baldwin listed negative consequences of the Korean War, including: ”a very costly commitment to South Korea's security, reversal of the tentative policy of accommodation with the People's Republic of China and the subsequent twenty years of hostility to China, domestic mobilization and the creation of a garrison economy (Pentagon capitalism). ... The United States intervention prolonged the war by more than three years, bringing an estimated 4.5 million Korean, Chinese and American casualties. The United States achieved its objective of keeping the Southern half of the peninsula non-communist, but the Koreans remain divided almost three decades later.” pp. 1516), ”What would have happened in Korea if the United States had not intervened?” His answer: ”The war would have been over in two or three weeks with total casualties of perhaps less than 50,000. Several million people opposed to communism would have come under communist rule and probably, but not certainly, there would have been reprisals. A single communist Korean state would have been established, the unity of a millennium restored, and national energies immediately directed to urgent economic and social reconstruction.” Baldwin listed negative consequences of the Korean War, including: ”a very costly commitment to South Korea's security, reversal of the tentative policy of accommodation with the People's Republic of China and the subsequent twenty years of hostility to China, domestic mobilization and the creation of a garrison economy (Pentagon capitalism). ... The United States intervention prolonged the war by more than three years, bringing an estimated 4.5 million Korean, Chinese and American casualties. The United States achieved its objective of keeping the Southern half of the peninsula non-communist, but the Koreans remain divided almost three decades later.”

51. Halliday and c.u.mings, Halliday and c.u.mings, Korea, Korea, p. 204. A photo caption (p. 209) reads, ”Kim Il-Sung and Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh, Hanoi, November 1958. The manifest contrast in personalities does not explain the different responses that the two leaders and the two revolutions evoked in the West. Yet the two wars had much in common, including the same enemy” p. 204. A photo caption (p. 209) reads, ”Kim Il-Sung and Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh, Hanoi, November 1958. The manifest contrast in personalities does not explain the different responses that the two leaders and the two revolutions evoked in the West. Yet the two wars had much in common, including the same enemy”

Compare McCormack's argument quite a few years later that the character of the Communist Party of Vietnam ”has long been completely different from that of North Korea. Leninist and authoritarian, to be sure, but even during the life of Ho Chi Minh the cult of the personality was abjured, and after his death in 1969, a collective leaders.h.i.+p brought the nation to victory in the war against the United States without resort to the dismal monolithicity of opinion so vaunted in North Korea” (”Kim Country”).

One might argue, further, that the contrast between the personalities of the two leaders alone was sufficiently stark to explain the different responses of many Americans. While Kim Il-sung might have sought since the 1930s to emulate the Indochinese leader, in the end he was no Ho Chi Minh. Ho Chi Minh did not purge his colleagues; he won wars-instead of losing them and then concocting elaborate lies to pretend he had won them; he was a man of ”goodness and simplicity” (see David Halberstam, Ho Ho [New York: Random House, 1971], especially pp. 1417; 42). [New York: Random House, 1971], especially pp. 1417; 42).

52. Baldwin, Baldwin, Without Parallel, Without Parallel, pp. 2324. pp. 2324.

53. From the ”Statement of Purpose” of the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, adopted March 2830, 1969, in Boston. The group sought ”to develop a humane and knowledgeable understanding of Asian societies and their efforts to maintain cultural integrity and to confront such problems as poverty, oppression and imperialism.” The committee reportedly argued in 1970 (this according to op-ed contributor Stephen B. Young, ”Vietnam War: Was.h.i.+ngton Was Right” From the ”Statement of Purpose” of the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, adopted March 2830, 1969, in Boston. The group sought ”to develop a humane and knowledgeable understanding of Asian societies and their efforts to maintain cultural integrity and to confront such problems as poverty, oppression and imperialism.” The committee reportedly argued in 1970 (this according to op-ed contributor Stephen B. Young, ”Vietnam War: Was.h.i.+ngton Was Right” [The Wall Street Journal, [The Wall Street Journal, November 13, 1995, p. 6]; I have not found the original source doc.u.ment) that ”communism has generally proved itself dynamic and viable in developing nations.” Regarding North Korea, that was a defensible argument in 1970. November 13, 1995, p. 6]; I have not found the original source doc.u.ment) that ”communism has generally proved itself dynamic and viable in developing nations.” Regarding North Korea, that was a defensible argument in 1970.

54. Baldwin, Baldwin, Without Parallel, Without Parallel, pp. 3132. pp. 3132.

55. Ibid., p. 35. Ibid., p. 35.

56. Journalists and other writers who visited the North got encouragement for such logic from North Korean officials. The officials made it very clear that if they should judge one's work unfair, one would not be welcome back in the country. Quite a few reporters failed the test and never Journalists and other writers who visited the North got encouragement for such logic from North Korean officials. The officials made it very clear that if they should judge one's work unfair, one would not be welcome back in the country. Quite a few reporters failed the test and never 'were 'were permitted to return. On the other hand, the officials were understandably pleased that several reporters and researchers who visited North Korea returned home to write almost unremittingly glowing accounts of the brave new world they had witnessed there. I think, for example, of a pair of Tokyo-based researcher-activists who campaigning for U.S. troop withdrawal from South Korea and reconciliation with the North. I have lost my copy of their report for an American church group of a 1980 North Korea visit (they likewise misplaced their only copy as I learned when I contacted them in 2003); but I clearly recall reading it at the time with a feeling of amazement that so little about the country seemed to have troubled them. permitted to return. On the other hand, the officials were understandably pleased that several reporters and researchers who visited North Korea returned home to write almost unremittingly glowing accounts of the brave new world they had witnessed there. I think, for example, of a pair of Tokyo-based researcher-activists who campaigning for U.S. troop withdrawal from South Korea and reconciliation with the North. I have lost my copy of their report for an American church group of a 1980 North Korea visit (they likewise misplaced their only copy as I learned when I contacted them in 2003); but I clearly recall reading it at the time with a feeling of amazement that so little about the country seemed to have troubled them.

However, sympathy with the North Koreans' revolutionary society did not always or necessarily translate into unstinting praise of the regime. As Frank Baldwin noted, ”the apparently totalitarian controls and the personality cult of Kim Il-sung left even empathetic foreign observers puzzled and ambivalent about North Korea” (Without Parallel, (Without Parallel, p. 31). p. 31).

8. Flowers of His Great Love Are Blooming.

1. Scalapino and Lee, Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea Communism in Korea (see chap. 2, n. 28), p. (see chap. 2, n. 28), p. 677. 677.

2. ”Very recently, some reduction of military expenditures appears to have been undertaken” in the North, Scalapino and Lee wrote just after the joint communique appeared (p. 684). They argued however (pp. 678679) that ”current North Korean policy does not represent an abandonment of past pledges to liberate' the South. In intent, at least, the s.h.i.+ft is a tactical one, with greater emphasis to be placed in the immediate future upon a political-diplomatic offensive designed to put the [Park Chung-hee] government on the defensive with its own people by making a strenuous bid for the 'peace, unification and national independence' vote in the South. Thus, the Communists advance a liberal exchange program, advocate substantial military reductions, emphasize peaceful unification, and focus attention upon getting rid of the American presence in South Korea. All available evidence suggests that Kim Il-song hopes to utilize the new era to penetrate the South more deeply politically, setting aside military efforts at this point. If this accords with the present international environment, it also accords ... with the current needs of the North-where intensive militarization and extreme tension had reached a point of greatly diminished returns. Secure in the control of their own society, with a complete monopoly of organization and media in the North, the Communists hope to cultivate 'people to people' relations so as to exploit the looser, more open political system of the South. Already they have caused a considerable tightening of the latter system in response.” ”Very recently, some reduction of military expenditures appears to have been undertaken” in the North, Scalapino and Lee wrote just after the joint communique appeared (p. 684). They argued however (pp. 678679) that ”current North Korean policy does not represent an abandonment of past pledges to liberate' the South. In intent, at least, the s.h.i.+ft is a tactical one, with greater emphasis to be placed in the immediate future upon a political-diplomatic offensive designed to put the [Park Chung-hee] government on the defensive with its own people by making a strenuous bid for the 'peace, unification and national independence' vote in the South. Thus, the Communists advance a liberal exchange program, advocate substantial military reductions, emphasize peaceful unification, and focus attention upon getting rid of the American presence in South Korea. All available evidence suggests that Kim Il-song hopes to utilize the new era to penetrate the South more deeply politically, setting aside military efforts at this point. If this accords with the present international environment, it also accords ... with the current needs of the North-where intensive militarization and extreme tension had reached a point of greatly diminished returns. Secure in the control of their own society, with a complete monopoly of organization and media in the North, the Communists hope to cultivate 'people to people' relations so as to exploit the looser, more open political system of the South. Already they have caused a considerable tightening of the latter system in response.”

3. Selig S. Harrison argues on pp. 118119 of Selig S. Harrison argues on pp. 118119 of Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002) that the ”danger of a war triggered by 'misunderstanding and inadvertence' has been magnified by a basic transformation that has taken place in Operations Plan 5027, the Pentagon's official scenario for the conduct of any new conflict in Korea. During the first decades after the 1953 armistice, Op Plan 5027 envisaged a replay of the Korean War. The United States and South Korea had a limited objective: repelling a North Korean invasion and reestablis.h.i.+ng the DMZ at the thirty-eighth parallel. In this defensive strategy, Seoul was to be evacuated. American and South Korean forces would pull back in phases to the Han River, which bisects the capital. In 1973, however, the United States proclaimed a new ”Forward Defense” concept in which U.S. forces would seize Kaesong, a key North Korean city close to the DMZ, while round-the-clock B-52 strikes would stop a North Korean advance north of Seoul, ending the war in nine days. In response to this new strategy and the accompanying forward deployment of U.S. and South Korean artillery along the southern edge of the DMZ, North Korea moved its own artillery forward, where it has remained ever since.” (A further, ”more dramatic” s.h.i.+ft in the U.S. strategy was to come in 1992, as Harrison notes.) (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002) that the ”danger of a war triggered by 'misunderstanding and inadvertence' has been magnified by a basic transformation that has taken place in Operations Plan 5027, the Pentagon's official scenario for the conduct of any new conflict in Korea. During the first decades after the 1953 armistice, Op Plan 5027 envisaged a replay of the Korean War. The United States and South Korea had a limited objective: repelling a North Korean invasion and reestablis.h.i.+ng the DMZ at the thirty-eighth parallel. In this defensive strategy, Seoul was to be evacuated. American and South Korean forces would pull back in phases to the Han River, which bisects the capital. In 1973, however, the United States proclaimed a new ”Forward Defense” concept in which U.S. forces would seize Kaesong, a key North Korean city close to the DMZ, while round-the-clock B-52 strikes would stop a North Korean advance north of Seoul, ending the war in nine days. In response to this new strategy and the accompanying forward deployment of U.S. and South Korean artillery along the southern edge of the DMZ, North Korea moved its own artillery forward, where it has remained ever since.” (A further, ”more dramatic” s.h.i.+ft in the U.S. strategy was to come in 1992, as Harrison notes.) 4. Kang Myong-do's testimony in Kang Myong-do's testimony in JoongAng Ilbo JoongAng Ilbo (see chap. 2, n. 7). (see chap. 2, n. 7).

5. See Nathan N. White, See Nathan N. White, U.S. Policy Toward Korea: a.n.a.lysis, Alternatives and Recommendations U.S. Policy Toward Korea: a.n.a.lysis, Alternatives and Recommendations (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1979), pp. 58 ff (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1979), pp. 58 ff 6. Author's August 1996 interview with Ahn Choong-hak. For a U.S. Army Korea specialist's description of the response to the axe-killings, see James V Young, Author's August 1996 interview with Ahn Choong-hak. For a U.S. Army Korea specialist's description of the response to the axe-killings, see James V Young, Eye on Korea: An Insider Account of Korean-American Relations, Eye on Korea: An Insider Account of Korean-American Relations, edited and with introduction by William Stueck (College Station, Texas: Texas A & M University Press, 2003), pp. 2126. edited and with introduction by William Stueck (College Station, Texas: Texas A & M University Press, 2003), pp. 2126.

7. ”Such s.h.i.+fting policies as those of President Carter's zigzag on maintaining American ground forces in South Korea have reminded [South Koreans] of Truman-Acheson's lukewarm commitment to the defense of South Korea, which was at least partly responsible for the Korean War of 1950 to 1953. .Many Koreans think it terribly ironic and inconsistent for the United States to divide the Korean peninsula along the 38th parallel in 1945, then fail to unify the country, refuse to train and equip South Korean troops (unlike the Soviets in North Korea), and withdraw its troops and phase out its commitment in South Korea- then get reinvolved when the North attacked the South and modernize the South Korean forces (under Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon), then cause anxiety about the reliability of the American commitment (under Carter) and, finally, rea.s.sert a firm pledge for the security of their country (under Reagan)” (Wayne Patterson and Hilary Conroy ”Duality and Dominance,” in Patterson and Lee, ”Such s.h.i.+fting policies as those of President Carter's zigzag on maintaining American ground forces in South Korea have reminded [South Koreans] of Truman-Acheson's lukewarm commitment to the defense of South Korea, which was at least partly responsible for the Korean War of 1950 to 1953. .Many Koreans think it terribly ironic and inconsistent for the United States to divide the Korean peninsula along the 38th parallel in 1945, then fail to unify the country, refuse to train and equip South Korean troops (unlike the Soviets in North Korea), and withdraw its troops and phase out its commitment in South Korea- then get reinvolved when the North attacked the South and modernize the South Korean forces (under Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon), then cause anxiety about the reliability of the American commitment (under Carter) and, finally, rea.s.sert a firm pledge for the security of their country (under Reagan)” (Wayne Patterson and Hilary Conroy ”Duality and Dominance,” in Patterson and Lee, One Hundred Years One Hundred Years [see chap. 2, n. 6] pp. 1011). [see chap. 2, n. 6] pp. 1011).

8. Bradley K .Martin, ”Mansfield Says Troops Would Go to Korean War,” Bradley K .Martin, ”Mansfield Says Troops Would Go to Korean War,” Baltimore Sun, Baltimore Sun, March 2, 1978. March 2, 1978.

9. Bradley K Martin, ”Korea Maneuvers Test U.S. Mood,” Bradley K Martin, ”Korea Maneuvers Test U.S. Mood,” Baltimore Sun, Baltimore Sun, March 19, 1978. The United States always insisted that Team Spirit was not provocative but essentially a defensive type of exercise. March 19, 1978. The United States always insisted that Team Spirit was not provocative but essentially a defensive type of exercise.

10. Bradley K. Martin, ”U.S., South Korea 'Kind of Outflanked' by North's Willingness,” Bradley K. Martin, ”U.S., South Korea 'Kind of Outflanked' by North's Willingness,” Baltimore Sun, Baltimore Sun, March 1, 1979. March 1, 1979.

11. ”Suddenly the estimate of North Korean capabilities was almost doubled,” Carter told Harrison in an interview in 2000 (see ”Suddenly the estimate of North Korean capabilities was almost doubled,” Carter told Harrison in an interview in 2000 (see Korean Endgame, Korean Endgame, p. 179). ”I have always felt that the intelligence community played fast and loose with the facts, but I couldn't prove it.” Carter earlier had said much the same to Don Oberdorfer p. 179). ”I have always felt that the intelligence community played fast and loose with the facts, but I couldn't prove it.” Carter earlier had said much the same to Don Oberdorfer (The Two Koreas (The Two Koreas [Reading, Ma.s.s.: Addison-Wesley 1997], p. 103). [Reading, Ma.s.s.: Addison-Wesley 1997], p. 103).

Young (Eye on Korea, (Eye on Korea, pp. 3956) provides a detailed account of officials' ultimately successful effort to derail the troop-withdrawal plan. He offers no support for the proposition that the intelligence was doctored: ”The findings were initially challenged by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency and the CIA, but in every case our army a.n.a.lysts pp. 3956) provides a detailed account of officials' ultimately successful effort to derail the troop-withdrawal plan. He offers no support for the proposition that the intelligence was doctored: ”The findings were initially challenged by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency and the CIA, but in every case our army a.n.a.lysts 'were 'were able to conclusively defend their findings, methodology, and conclusions” (p. 42). Young proudly acknowledges, nevertheless, that the effort to persuade Carter to change his mind was an all-out one. Among the civilians involved, notably a.s.sistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, a bureaucratic strategy emerged: ”declare support for Carter's plan officially and publicly while delaying its actual implementation” to buy time for Congress to put its foot down (p. 48). able to conclusively defend their findings, methodology, and conclusions” (p. 42). Young proudly acknowledges, nevertheless, that the effort to persuade Carter to change his mind was an all-out one. Among the civilians involved, notably a.s.sistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, a bureaucratic strategy emerged: ”declare support for Carter's plan officially and publicly while delaying its actual implementation” to buy time for Congress to put its foot down (p. 48).

12. The Chinese example already may have inspired Kim to seek accommodation with Seoul in the early 1970s. See Scalapino and Lee, The Chinese example already may have inspired Kim to seek accommodation with Seoul in the early 1970s. See Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, Communism in Korea, p. 678. p. 678.

13. Bradley K. .Martin, ”North Korea Eyes Ping-Pong Diplomacy,” Bradley K. .Martin, ”North Korea Eyes Ping-Pong Diplomacy,” Baltimore Sun, Baltimore Sun, April 22, 1978. Nearly a year later, as the tournament opening approached, the same operative told me, ”Whether some important persons are included in your delegation, we don't know.” Clearly he hoped that there would be. And he volunteered a suggestion that U.S. congressmen visiting China that month might drop into Pyongyang. Bradley K .Martin, ”Side Visit to North Korea Suggested for Congressmen Who Will Be in China,” April 22, 1978. Nearly a year later, as the tournament opening approached, the same operative told me, ”Whether some important persons are included in your delegation, we don't know.” Clearly he hoped that there would be. And he volunteered a suggestion that U.S. congressmen visiting China that month might drop into Pyongyang. Bradley K .Martin, ”Side Visit to North Korea Suggested for Congressmen Who Will Be in China,” Baltimore Sun, Baltimore Sun, April 20, 1979. April 20, 1979.

14. Bradley K Martin, ”North Korea Asks South to Talk Unity” (February 6); ”Korean Reunification-Talk Furor May Produce at Least New Meetings” (February 13); ”North, South Korea Agree on Time for Talks” (February 14); ”North and South Korea Agree on Meeting Site” (February 16); ”Friendly Approach Taken by North Koreans at Talks” (February 18); ”2 Koreas Talk Detente” (February 23); ”Big Question: Is North Korea's 'Smile Offensive' More than Skin Deep?” (March 3); ”The Two Koreas Play Diplomatic Ping-Pong” (April 15), Bradley K Martin, ”North Korea Asks South to Talk Unity” (February 6); ”Korean Reunification-Talk Furor May Produce at Least New Meetings” (February 13); ”North, South Korea Agree on Time for Talks” (February 14); ”North and South Korea Agree on Meeting Site” (February 16); ”Friendly Approach Taken by North Koreans at Talks” (February 18); ”2 Koreas Talk Detente” (February 23); ”Big Question: Is North Korea's 'Smile Offensive' More than Skin Deep?” (March 3); ”The Two Koreas Play Diplomatic Ping-Pong” (April 15), Baltimore Sun, 1979. Baltimore Sun, 1979.

15. Editor-in-chief Andre Fontaine of Editor-in-chief Andre Fontaine of Le Monde, Le Monde, visiting Pyongyang in 1974 along with a French television crew, had heard similar stories of divided families. Some North Koreans told Fontaine their parents visiting Pyongyang in 1974 along with a French television crew, had heard similar stories of divided families. Some North Koreans told Fontaine their parents 'were 'were on the other side of the DMZ-whether dead or alive, they did not know. Fontaine's party, planning to go on from there to Seoul, asked if the North Koreans had messages they would like to have pa.s.sed on to relatives in the South. ”Don't do that!” they responded. Fontaine a.s.sumed their alarm at the notion showed their fear of ”the consequences of any attempt to establish contact with family in South Korea” (Andre Fontaine, ”A Postcard from Pyongyang,” on the other side of the DMZ-whether dead or alive, they did not know. Fontaine's party, planning to go on from there to Seoul, asked if the North Koreans had messages they would like to have pa.s.sed on to relatives in the South. ”Don't do that!” they responded. Fontaine a.s.sumed their alarm at the notion showed their fear of ”the consequences of any attempt to establish contact with family in South Korea” (Andre Fontaine, ”A Postcard from Pyongyang,” j.a.pan Times, j.a.pan Times, July 24, 1994). July 24, 1994).

16. Bradley K. Martin, ”Pyongyang Offers U.S. Guarantees,” Bradley K. Martin, ”Pyongyang Offers U.S. Guarantees,” Baltimore Sun, Baltimore Sun, May 8, 1979. May 8, 1979.

17. Bradley K. Martin, ”U.S. Joins Appeal to North on Korea Unification Talks” and ”South Korean Leader Park, like Carter, Finds Support Eroding,” Bradley K. Martin, ”U.S. Joins Appeal to North on Korea Unification Talks” and ”South Korean Leader Park, like Carter, Finds Support Eroding,” Baltimore Sun, Baltimore Sun, July 1, 1979. July 1, 1979.

18. Bradley K. Martin, ”Seoul Could Attend Talks, North Says” (July 11) and ”North Korean Voices U.S.-talk Confidence” (July 25), Bradley K. Martin, ”Seoul Could Attend Talks, North Says” (July 11) and ”North Korean Voices U.S.-talk Confidence” (July 25), Baltimore Sun, Baltimore Sun, 1979. 1979.

19. Bradley K Martin, ”Quick Resolution of Korean Standoff Unlikely,” Bradley K Martin, ”Quick Resolution of Korean Standoff Unlikely,” Baltimore Sun, Baltimore Sun, August 12, 1979. August 12, 1979.

20. The recollection is from a North Korean defector to the South, who is quoted in The recollection is from a North Korean defector to the South, who is quoted in The Korea Times, The Korea Times, July 12, 1994. July 12, 1994.

21. Bradley K Martin, ”Where Is the Large North Korean Army Unit?” Bradley K Martin, ”Where Is the Large North Korean Army Unit?” Baltimore Sun, Baltimore Sun, May 11, 1980. For this report I contacted U.S. officials in Seoul and Hideko Takayama in Tokyo contacted j.a.panese officials. On May 13, the U.S. Department of State issued a statement to the press dismissing the South Korean claims: ”From our information we see no movement of troops in North Korea out of the usual and we see no movement which would lead us to believe that some sort of attack upon the South is imminent” (Young, May 11, 1980. For this report I contacted U.S. officials in Seoul and Hideko Takayama in Tokyo contacted j.a.panese officials. On May 13, the U.S. Department of State issued a statement to the press dismissing the South Korean claims: ”From our information we see no movement of troops in North Korea out of the usual and we see no movement which would lead us to believe that some sort of attack upon the South is imminent” (Young, Eye on Korea, Eye on Korea, p. 98). p. 98).

22. The former official was Kim Jong-min, quoted in Cho, ”Interview of Former High-level Official of DPRK Ministry of Public Security Who Defected to South Korea” (see chap. 6, n. 88). The former official was Kim Jong-min, quoted in Cho, ”Interview of Former High-level Official of DPRK Ministry of Public Security Who Defected to South Korea” (see chap. 6, n. 88).

One aspect of U.S. policy after the incident began was to ”[c]ontinue signals that the U.S. will defend South Korea from North Korean attack.” U.S. forces in Korea were beefed up with AWACs early warning aircraft and naval units. (Young, Eye on Korea, Eye on Korea, p. 103). p. 103).

23. Bradley K .Martin, ”Kw.a.n.gju Revisited,” Bradley K .Martin, ”Kw.a.n.gju Revisited,” Far Eastern Economic Review, Far Eastern Economic Review, May 26, 1994, and Bradley K. .Martin, ”Yun Sang Won: The Knowledge in Those Eyes,” in Henry Scott-Stokes and Lee Jai Eui, eds., May 26, 1994, and Bradley K. .Martin, ”Yun Sang Won: The Knowledge in Those Eyes,” in Henry Scott-Stokes and Lee Jai Eui, eds., The Kw.a.n.gju Uprising The Kw.a.n.gju Uprising (Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), pp. 87105. (Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), pp. 87105.

24. Bradley K. Martin, ”N. Korea Halts U.S. Courts.h.i.+p with Anti-Reagan Blast,” Bradley K. Martin, ”N. Korea Halts U.S. Courts.h.i.+p with Anti-Reagan Blast,” Baltimore Sun, Baltimore Sun, April 15, 1982. April 15, 1982.

25. If it is any consolation for Was.h.i.+ngton, outgoing U.S. officials have had the opportunity to use an impending change of administration as an opportunity to try to wring concessions from Pyongyang by playing ”good cop/bad cop,” warning that the next administration would be tougher so it would be wise to make a deal immediately. Democrats have tended to take advantage of such opportunities. This is precisely what the Johnson Administration did to win the release of the If it is any consolation for Was.h.i.+ngton, outgoing U.S. officials have had the opportunity to use an impending change of administration as an opportunity to try to wring concessions from Pyongyang by playing ”good cop/bad cop,” warning that the next administration would be tougher so it would be wise to make a deal immediately. Democrats have tended to take advantage of such opportunities. This is precisely what the Johnson Administration did to win the release of the Pueblo Pueblo crew after the 1968 election. And it is what the Clinton Administration attempted late in 2000 as the inauguration of George W. Bush loomed-but without great result. crew after the 1968 election. And it is what the Clinton Administration attempted late in 2000 as the inauguration of George W. Bush loomed-but without great result.

Part of the problem for the United States has been that very few of its officials have focused entirely on North Korea, even for the length of their time in office. And officials with responsibilities covering the larger Asian region often have had other things on their minds. I met thena.s.sistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke at a Tokyo reception shortly after my 1979 North Korea trip and immediately mentioned the trip, naively thinking he might be interested in hearing about it since very few Americans then could claim such an experience. Holbrooke didn't miss a beat. He gazed past me, spied someone more important across the room, turned and strode rapidly away.

9. He Gave Us Water and Sent Us Machines.