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Part 9 (1/2)

The Panama Canal J. Saxon Mills 101150K 2022-07-22

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11. Nearly the whole of the Atlantic seaboard in the Old World and the New is brought nearer to the Pacific ports of the United States and Canada.

12. The Panama Ca.n.a.l cannot invade the main traffic field of the Suez route--the countries of Southern Asia, East Africa, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf. The compet.i.tive region of the two ca.n.a.ls lies east of Singapore.

[Ill.u.s.tration: THE ISTHMUS OF PANAMA]

The reader will gather from the last proposition that the scene of the new battle of the routes will lie in the Western Pacific, and this probably will also be the scene of the main industrial and commercial compet.i.tions of the future. It is in these regions, Australasia and the countries along the Pacific Asiatic coasts, that the traffic zones of the Suez and Panama Ca.n.a.ls touch or overlap. The positive effect on relative distances from American and European ports is of great importance to commercial developments in these regions. Let us look at the geographical results of the Panama Ca.n.a.l a little more closely. On pages 252, 253 are two tables transcribed from the official report of 1912 on Panama Ca.n.a.l Traffic and Tolls, by Mr. Emory R. Johnson.

The following tables are given by Dr. Vaughan Cornish:--

Reduction miles New York to-- (geog.).

Yokohama { by Suez 13,564 } { by Panama 9,835 } 3,729

Shanghai { by Suez 12,514 } { by Panama 10,855 } 1,629

Sydney { by Cape of Good Hope 13,658 } { by Panama (_via_ Tahiti) 9,852 } 3,806

Melbourne { by Cape of Good Hope 13,083 } { by Panama (_via_ Tahiti) 10,427 } 2,656

Wellington, { by Straits of Magellan 11,414 } N.Z. { by Panama 8,872 } 2,542

Hong-kong { by Suez 11,655 { by Panama 11,744

Manila { by Suez 11,601 } (Philippines) { by Panama _via_ San Francisco } 16 { and Yokohama 11,585 } { by Panama, Honolulu and Guam 11,729

Comparative distances (in nautical miles) from New York and Liverpool to New Zealand, Australia, Philippines, China and j.a.pan, _via_ Suez and Panama Ca.n.a.ls.

Distances (in nautical miles) from Liverpool _via_ the Panama and Suez routes to Australia, New Zealand, the Philippine Islands, China, and j.a.pan.

----------+---------------+---------+---------------+---------+---------- | | | | | In favour To | Suez Route. |Distance.| Panama Route. |Distance.|of Suez -, || | | | Panama +.

As figures are rather confusing and difficult to retain in the memory, let us find a more graphic way of indicating this zone in the Western Pacific where the chief conflict of ca.n.a.l and commerce is likely to take place in the future. Let us mark out a block of sea and land between the lines of lat.i.tude 40 north and 40 south and the lines of longitude 120 east and 160 east of Greenwich. This zone includes j.a.pan and Korea, Shanghai and the Philippines, New Guinea, and all Australia except the farthest western coastline. New Zealand lies outside it. Now along its western margin, the Suez and Panama routes to New York are equal in length. Along its eastern margin, which lies outside j.a.pan and Australia (_not_ New Zealand), and only traverses the scattered islets of the Pacific, the Suez and Panama routes to Liverpool are equal in length. Now look down an imaginary line near the centre of the zone but running rather west of north and east of south. Along this line all places are the same distance from New York and Liverpool by Panama and Suez respectively.

Can we, then, roughly forecast the changes in ocean trade-routes which will result from this new channel of communication between East and West? For this purpose we may divide the world traffic into three parts--firstly, that part of it which the ca.n.a.l is almost certain to secure; secondly, that for which it will have to fight with compet.i.tive routes; thirdly, that which it will have no chance of securing.

As regards the first, Panama will almost certainly attract most, if not all, the traffic which flows from the eastern American and Gulf ports to Hawaii and the west coast of North and South America, and of the traffic from the United Kingdom and the west of Europe to the whole western seaboard of America. We have already seen the regions where the Panama Ca.n.a.l will have to compete with the existing routes. Roughly, they comprise Pacific Asia, a part of the East Indies, and Australasia. These regions represent an enormous volume of traffic from which Panama will have to try to detach as large a share as possible. The third part is the main traffic-field of Suez--that is, Southern Asia, East Africa, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf. No efforts on the part of Panama, no reductions of ca.n.a.l tolls, could possibly lure any of this traffic from its determination to Suez; the compet.i.tive region of the two ca.n.a.ls lies all east of Singapore, and the greater part of the commerce of that region with Western Europe will still continue to move _via_ Suez.

The question of tolls at Panama is, of course, very important in its bearing upon the future popularity of the ca.n.a.l. It would certainly not have done to make the Panama charges higher than those at Suez. These latter have been reduced as from January 1, 1912. They are now 6.25 francs ($1.206) per net ton for loaded vessels. The pa.s.senger tolls are 10 francs a pa.s.senger above twelve years of age, and 5 francs for each child from three to twelve years old. If these figures had been exceeded at Panama the traffic there would have suffered. On the other hand, the attempt to attract traffic by a great reduction on tolls would have involved a loss on the a.s.sured traffic between the eastern and western coasts of America which would have more than counterbalanced the probable gain.

Mr. Taft's proclamation fixing the Panama tolls will be found at the end of the book. It will be seen that the charge of $1.20 is almost identical with the Suez toll. There are, however, to be no pa.s.senger tolls at Panama. It must not be forgotten that the Suez Ca.n.a.l could very well afford to lower its charges to meet the new compet.i.tion. A dividend of 30 per cent. leaves a considerable margin for this purpose.

[Ill.u.s.tration]

And we must remember that tolls, however important, are not by any means the only determinants of traffic-routes. All sorts of commercial and freight considerations come into play. For example, the shortest way from j.a.pan to the eastern coasts of North America will be _via_ Panama.

Fully loaded vessels will certainly go that way. But the s.h.i.+p that leaves the land of the cherry blossom only partly loaded and wanting to make up a full freight may choose the route past Asia and through the Suez Ca.n.a.l as being more likely to serve that object.

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