Part 12 (2/2)
Sedgwick at the same time ordered out from Newton's division two other columns, one under Col. Spear, consisting of two regiments, supported by two more under Gen. Shaler, and one under Col. Johns of equal size, to move on the plank road, and to the right of it, flanked by a line under Col. Burnham, with four regiments, on the left of the plank road. This line advanced manfully at a double-quick against the rifle-pits, neither halting nor firing a shot, despite the heavy fire they encountered, until they had driven the enemy from their lower line of works, while the columns pressed boldly forward to the crest, and carried the works in their rear. All the guns and many prisoners were captured. This was a mettlesome a.s.sault, and as successful as it was brief and determined.
Howe's columns, in whose front the Confederate skirmishers occupied the railroad-cutting and embankment, while Hays and two regiments of Barksdale were on Lee's and adjacent hills, as soon as the firing on his right was heard, moved to the a.s.sault with the bayonet; Neill and Grant pressing straight for Cemetery hill, which, though warmly received, they carried without any check. They then faced to the right, and, with Seaver sustaining their left, carried the works on Marye's heights, capturing guns and prisoners wholesale.
A stand was subsequently attempted by the Confederates on several successive crests, but without avail.
The loss of the Sixth Corps in the a.s.sault on the Fredericksburg heights was not far from a thousand men, including Cols. Spear and Johns, commanding two of the storming columns.
The a.s.sault of Howe falls in no wise behind the one made by Newton. The speedy success of both stands out in curious contrast to the deadly work of Dec. 13. ”So rapid had been the final movement on Marye's hill, that Hays and Wilc.o.x, to whom application had been made for succor, had not time to march troops from Taylor's and Stansbury's to Barksdale's aid.” (Hotchkiss and Allan.)
The Confederates were now cut in two: Wilc.o.x and Hays were left north of the plank road, but Hays retreated round the head of Sedgwick's column, and rejoined Early. Wilc.o.x, who, on hearing of Sedgwick's manoeuvres Sunday morning, had hurried with a portion of his force to Barksdale's a.s.sistance at Taylor's, but had arrived too late to partic.i.p.ate in the action, on ascertaining Sedgwick's purpose, retired slowly down the plank road, and skirmished with the latter's head of column. And he made so determined a stand near Guest's, that considerable time was consumed in brus.h.i.+ng it away before Sedgwick could hold on his course.
Early appears to deem the carrying of the Fredericksburg heights to require an excuse on his part. He says in his report about our preliminary a.s.saults: ”All his efforts to attack the left of my line were thwarted, and one attack on Marye's hill was repulsed. The enemy, however, sent a flag of truce to Col. Griffin, of the Eighteenth Mississippi Regiment, who occupied the works at the foot of Marye's hill with his own and the Twenty-first Mississippi Regiment, which was received by him imperfectly; and it had barely returned before heavy columns were advanced against the position, and the trenches were carried, and the hill taken.” ”After this the artillery on Lee's hill, and the rest of Barksdale's infantry, with one of Hays's regiments, fell back on the Telegraph road; Hays with the remainder being compelled to fall back upon the plank road as he was on the left.” Later, ”a line was formed across the Telegraph road, at c.o.x's house, about two miles back of Lee's hill.”
Barksdale says, ”With several batteries under the command of Gen. Pendleton, and a single brigade of infantry, I had a front of not less than three miles to defend, extending from Taylor's hill on the left, to the foot of the hills in the rear of the Howison house.”
Gen. Wilc.o.x, he goes on to state, from Banks's Ford, had come up with three regiments as far as Taylor's, and Gen. Hays was also in that vicinity; but ”the distance from town to the points a.s.sailed was so short, the attack so suddenly made, and the difficulty of removing troops from one part of the line to another was so great, that it was utterly impossible for either Gen. Wilc.o.x or Gen. Hays to reach the scene of action in time to afford any a.s.sistance whatever. It will then be seen that Marye's hill was defended by but one small regiment, three companies, and four pieces of artillery.”
Barksdale further states that, ”upon the pretext of taking care of their wounded, the enemy asked a flag of truce, after the second a.s.sault at Marye's hill, which was granted by Col. Griffin; and thus the weakness of our force at that point was discovered.”
The bulk of Early's division was holding the heights from Hazel Run to Hamilton's Crossing; and the sudden a.s.sault on the Confederate positions at Marye's, and the hills to the west, gave him no opportunity of sustaining his forces there. But it is not established that any unfair use was made of the flag of truce mentioned by Barksdale.
The loss in this a.s.sault seems heavy, when the small force of Confederates is considered. The artillery could not do much damage, inasmuch as the guns could not be sufficiently depressed, but the infantry fire was very telling; and, as already stated, both colonels commanding the a.s.saulting columns on the right were among the casualties.
The enemy's line being thus cut in twain, sundering those at Banks's Ford and on the left of the Confederate line from Early at Hamilton's Crossing, it would now have been easy for Sedgwick to have dispersed Early's forces, and to have destroyed the depots at the latter place. But orders precluded anything but an immediate advance.
The question whether Sedgwick could have complied with his instructions, so as to reach Hooker in season to relieve him from a part of Lee's pressure on Sunday morning, is answered by determining whether it was feasible to carry the Fredericksburg heights before or at daylight. If this could have been done, it is not unreasonable to a.s.sume that he could have left a rear-guard, to occupy Early's attention and forestall attacks on his marching column, and have reached, with the bulk of his corps, the vicinity of Chancellorsville by the time the Federals were hardest pressed, say ten A.M., and most needed a diversion in their favor.
Not that Hooker's salvation in any measure depended on Sedgwick's so doing. Hooker had the power in his own hand, if he would only use it. But it should be determined whether Hooker had any legitimate ground for fault-finding.
Putting aside the question of time, Sedgwick's whole manoeuvre is good enough. It was as well executed as any work done in this campaign, and would have given abundant satisfaction had not so much more been required of him. But, remembering that time was of the essence of his orders, it may be as well to quote the criticism of Warren-
”It takes some men just as long to clear away a little force as it does a large one. It depends entirely upon the man, how long a certain force will stop him.”
”The enemy had left about one division, perhaps ten thousand or twelve thousand men, at Fredericksburg, to watch him. They established a kind of picket-line around his division, so that he could not move any thing without their knowing it. Just as soon as Gen. Sedgwick began to move, a little random fire began, and that was kept up till daylight. At daylight, the head of Gen. Sedgwick's troops had got into Fredericksburg. I think some little attempt had been made to move forward a skirmish-line, but that had been repulsed. The enemy had considerable artillery in position.”
”My opinion was, that, under the circ.u.mstances, the most vigorous effort possible ought to have been made, without regard to circ.u.mstances, because the order was peremptory.” But this statement is qualified, when, in his examination before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, to a question as to whether, in his opinion, Gen. Sedgwick's vigorous and energetic attempt to comply with Hooker's order would have led to a different result of the battle, Warren answered: ”Yes, sir! and I will go further, and say that I think there might have been more fighting done at the other end of the line. I do not believe that if Gen. Sedgwick had done all he could, and there had not been harder fighting on the other end of the line, we would have succeeded.”
If, at eleven P.M., when Sedgwick received the order, he had immediately marched, regardless of what was in his front, straight through the town, and up the heights beyond, paying no heed whatever to the darkness of the night, but pus.h.i.+ng on his men as best he might, it is not improbable that he could have gained the farther side of this obstacle by daylight. But is it not also probable that his corps would have been in questionable condition for either a march or a fight? It would be extravagant to expect that the organization of the corps could be preserved in any kind of form, however slight the opposition. And, as daylight came on, the troops would have scarcely been in condition to offer brilliant resistance to the attack, which Early, fully apprised of all their movements, would have been in position to make upon their flank and rear.
Keeping in view all the facts,-that Sedgwick was on unknown ground, with an enemy in his front, familiar with every inch of it and with Sedgwick's every movement; that he had intrenchments to carry where a few months before one man had been more than a match for ten; that the night was dark and foggy; and that he was taken unawares by this order,-it seems that to expect him to carry the heights before daylight, savors of exorbitance.
But it may fairly be acknowledged, that more delay can be discovered in some of the operations of this night and morning, than the most rigorous construction of the orders would warrant. After the repulse of Wheaton and Shaler, a heavier column should at once have been thrown against the works. Nor ought it to have taken so long, under the stringency of the instructions, to ascertain that Gibbon would be stopped by the ca.n.a.l, and Howe by Hazel Run; or perhaps to organize the a.s.saulting columns, after ascertaining that these flank attacks were fruitless.
All this, however, in no wise whatsoever s.h.i.+fts any part of the responsibility for the loss of this campaign, from Hooker's to Sedgwick's shoulders. The order of ten P.M. was ill-calculated and impracticable. Hooker had no business to count on Sedgwick's corps as an element in his problem of Sunday at Chancellorsville.
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