Part 6 (1/2)
Meantime the Imperial German Government maintains its plea of ”not guilty.” It still denies all previous knowledge of, and all part in, the nefarious Austrian ultimatum to Servia which precipitated the world war.
The denial is both impudent and mendacious.
”Credat Judaeus Apella!”
III
THE RUSSIAN MOBILIZATION
It has been loudly a.s.serted and persistently maintained by the Potsdam gang that the cause of this abominable war was the mobilization of Russia in preparation to maintain the sovereignty of her little sister state Servia if necessary. ”Germany,” it is said, ”earnestly desired, from the purest of motives, to 'localize the conflict'”--which means in plain words to let Austria deal with Servia as she liked, without interference--rather a one-sided proposition, considering the relative size of the two parties in the benevolently urged single combat. ”But Russia rashly interfered with this beautiful design by declaring that she could not remain indifferent to the fate of a small nation of kindred blood, and by calling up troops to prevent any wiping out of Servia by Austria, to whom Germany had already given carte blanche and promised full support. This was a wicked threat against the life and liberty of Germany. This was an action which rendered the great war inevitable.” So say the German authorities.
The subt.i.tle of the official German White Book reads: ”How Russia and Her Ruler Betrayed Germany's Confidence and Thereby Made the European War.”
[Footnote 6]
[Footnote 6: I quote from a copy of the original pamphlet, given to me with the compliments of Herr von Muller, German Minister at The Hague.
Professor von Mach in his Off. Dip. Doc. does not reproduce this t.i.tle-page.]
This is the Potsdam contention in regard to the cause of the war. The doc.u.ments indicate that it is a false contention, based upon suppressions of the truth. This is what I intend to show.
I hold no brief for the late Imperial Russian Government. Doubtless it was shady in its morals and tricky in its ways.
The telegrams recently discovered by an excellent American journalist, Mr. Herman Bernstein, and published in the ”New York Herald,” show that the late Czar Nicolas and the still Kaiser Wilhelm were plotting together, a very few years ago, to make a secret ”combine” which should control the world. When that plan failed, no doubt the vast power and resources of Russia, under an absolute imperial Government, were regarded by the equally autocratic Government of Germany with jealousy and distrust, not to say fear. No doubt Russia was an actual and formidable obstacle to the Pan-German purpose of getting Servia out of the path of the ”Berlin-Baghdad-Bahn”.
Grant all this. Pa.s.s over, also, the interminable and inextricable dispute about the precise meaning and application of the terms ”mobilization,” ”partial mobilization,” ”complete mobilization,”
”precautionary measures,” ”Kriegsgefahr,” an so on. That is an unfathomable mora.s.s wherein many deceptions hide. In that controversy each opponent always charges the other with lying, and a wise neutral doubts both. It seems to be true--mark you, I only say it seems--that the first great European Power to order partial mobilization was Austria, July 26, 1914. (Off. Dip. Doc., p. 197.) On July 28 the order for complete mobilization was signed, war was declared against Servia (pp. 272, 273), and on July 29 Belgrade was bombarded (p. 354).
On July 29 Russia ordered partial mobilization in the districts of Odessa, Kief, Moscow, and Kasan, and declared that she had no aggressive intention against Germany. (Off. Dip. Doc., p. 294.) The Russian preparations obviously had relation only to Austria's war on Servia which was already under way.
On July 30 Germany had effected her ”covering dispositions” of troops along the French border, from Luxembourg to the Vosges, part of which by chance I saw in June (see p. 36 ff.), and on the same day the Berlin semi-official press announced that a complete mobilization had been ordered. (Off. Dip. Doc., pp. 324, 342.) This announcement was contradicted and withdrawn later on the same day by government orders.
On July 31, at 1 a.m., the Austrian order of complete mobilization, which was signed on the 28th, was issued. (Off. Dip. Doc., p. 356.) Later in the same day the Russian Government ordered complete mobilization and the German Government proclaimed a state of Kriegsgefahr, ”wardanger.” (Off. Dip. Doc., pp. 356-357.) At seven o'clock in the evening of the same day Germany sent an ultimatum to France, and at midnight an ultimatum to Russia.
On August 1 she declared war on Russia, and on August 3 she declared war on France, having previously invaded French territory and sent her army through neutral Luxembourg.
Now in all this the German Government tries to make it appear that it was simply acting on the defensive, taking necessary steps to guard against the peril threatened by the military measures of Russia.
The falsity of this pretense is easily shown from two facts: First, the Russian Government was all the time pleading for a peaceful settlement of the Austro-Servian dispute, by arbitration, or by a four-power conference. Second, definite offers were made to halt the Russian military measures at once on conditions most favorable to Austria, if Austria and Germany would agree to an examination by the Great Powers of Austria's just claims on Servia.
On the first point, I do not propose to retell the long story of the efforts supported by France, England, Italy, and Russia herself, to get Germany to consent to some plan, any plan, which might avert war by an appeal to reason and justice. To these efforts Germany answered in effect that she could not ”coerce” her ally Austria.
But one doc.u.ment in this line seems to me particularly interesting--even pathetic. It is a telegram sent by the late Czar Nicolas to his Imperial Cousin, Kaiser Wilhelm. It is dated July 29, 1914, and reads as follows:
”Thanks for your telegram which is conciliatory and friendly, whereas the official message presented to-day by your Amba.s.sador to my Minister was conveyed in a very different tone. I beg you to explain this divergency. It would be right to give over the Austro-Servian problem to The Hague Tribunal. I trust in your wisdom and friends.h.i.+p.”
”NICOLAS.”
This telegram is not contained in the ”German White Book.” But Professor von Mach gives it in his ”Official Diplomatic Doc.u.ments” (p. 596).