Part 7 (2/2)

Capt. Jan S. Hildebrand, the 3-21st Infantry battalion surgeon, in his aid station at Mai Xa Chanh West. Courtesy J. S. Hildebrand Courtesy J. S. Hildebrand.

Sfc. Buford Mathis (left) and his RTO, Pfc. Charles C. c.o.x, of D/3-21, about two hours before the 4 May 1968 a.s.sault on Nhi Ha. Courtesy C. C. c.o.x Courtesy C. C. c.o.x.

Sgt. Larry See (wearing gla.s.ses), D/3-21. Courtesy L. H. See Courtesy L. H. See.

Capt. Dennis A. Leach, CO of C/3-21. Leach commanded the task force that seized Nhi Ha and held it despite repeated NVA counterattacks. Courtesy J. S. Hildebrand Courtesy J. S. Hildebrand.

The Gimlets took this church bell as a souvenir when they took Nhi Ha on 5 May 1968. It was eventually donated to an orphanage in Tarn Ky. Courtesy J. S. Hildebrand Courtesy J. S. Hildebrand.

Lt. Col. Snyder sits in the ruins of the church at Nhi Ha after the operation. Courtesy J. S. Hildebrand Courtesy J. S. Hildebrand.

Sgt. Starr awaits medical evacuation after being blinded in his right eye during the attack on the night of 5-6 May 1968. Courtesy R. W. Starr Courtesy R. W. Starr.

Sgt. James L. Stone, A/3-21. Courtesy J. L. Stone Courtesy J. L. Stone.

Capt. Robert E. Corrigan, CO of B/3-21 (at far left), after receiving the Silver Star. Courtesy W. P. Snyder Courtesy W. P. Snyder.

2d Lt. Terry D. Smith, a platoon leader in A/3-21, was shot and also hit by mortar fragments during an ambush near Nhi Ha on 6 May 1968. Courtesy T. D. Smith Courtesy T. D. Smith.

Sgt. Larry Haddock, A/3-21. Courtesy N. E. Hannan Courtesy N. E. Hannan.

Sp4 Neil E. Hannan, A/3-21. Courtesy N. E. Hannan Courtesy N. E. Hannan.

Sp4 Thomas E. Hemphill, a grenadier in A/3-21, in front of his position on the Nhi Ha perimeter. Courtesy T. E. Hemphill Courtesy T. E. Hemphill.

Sp4 William W. Karp (center), senior medic in A/3-21. Courtesy W. W. Karp Courtesy W. W. Karp.

Sp4 Bill A. Baird (center), A/3-21, was wounded and captured on 6 May 1968. He remained a prisoner in North Vietnam until 1973. Courtesy N. E. Hannan Courtesy N. E. Hannan.

Another patrol saddles up in Nhi Ha. Courtesy J. L. Stone Courtesy J. L. Stone.

Lt. Col. William P. Snyder (right) receives a commemorative plaque before leaving U.S. Army Vietnam headquarters to a.s.sume command of the 3-21st Infantry. Courtesy W. R Snyder Courtesy W. R Snyder.

Lieutenant Skrzysowski and his RTO were alongside a burial mound when they were joined by a Marine with a major's leaf on his helmet, a cane in one hand, and one foot in a cast. ”Who's in charge of this route-step outfit?” the major snapped.

Lieutenant Skrzysowski, who wore no rank insignia, identified himself, then asked, ”Where are we? I'm looking for the rest of my people.”

The major explained that ”all your companies are getting briefed. We got a lot of activity just north of here and it's going to be your job to help us clean it out.” The major explained that they were in the middle of an expanding campaign that involved several NVA regiments coming down from the DMZ in an effort to cross the Cua Viet River. He said that the NVA knew the terrain, and added that ”most of them are in reinforced bunkers. You're not going to really see these guys until you're right on top of 'Em. The bunkers are located within hedgerows, and what ya gotta do is get those M60 machine guns right down low to the ground and start firing into those hedgerows to cover your a.s.sault.”

”What? No artillery, no air?” Skrzysowski said incredulously. No artillery, no air?” Skrzysowski said incredulously.

The major explained that there were often simultaneous contacts at several locations-and not always enough supporting arms to go around. Skrzysowski finally asked the major what had happened to his leg. The major joked that he'd had ”a meeting engagement with an RPG.”

Upon receipt of the redeployment order, Lieutenant Colonel Snyder had Capt. John M. Householder, the 3-21st's S2, helicopter up to Camp Kistler at the mouth of the Cua Viet to establish liaison with the 3d Marines. Snyder flew up to join him shortly. In Snyder's absence, Maj. Paul N. Yurchak, the S3, organized the truck convoy that would soon head north with supplies, while the company commanders conducted impromptu airlifts from their positions in and around FSB Belcher. The Marines provided most of the helicopters; the fifty-kilometer flight to the BLT 2/4 AO placed the Gimlets closer to the DMZ than any other U.S. Army battalion in Vietnam.

The airlift began at 1613. The first battalion element to move north was Captain Humphries's D/3-21 (call sign Black Death), which landed in Mai Xa Chanh East.

Captain Robert E, Corrigan's B/3-21 (Barracuda) was inserted next, landing above Mai Xa Chanh West in accordance with the battalion's mission to secure both sides of Jones Creek.

Because its captain was temporarily absent, 1st Lt. Gerald R. Kohl, the company exec, took C/3-21 (Charlie Tiger) into Mai Xa Chanh East. Next came Capt. Stephen F. Russell's HHC/3-21 and 1st Lt. Jerry D. Perkins's E/3-21 (Eliminator), which were, respectively, the battalion's headquarters and combat support companies. Eliminator controlled two reconnaissance platoons (a.s.sa.s.sin and Spectre) and a mortar platoon (Fastb.a.l.l.s). The battalion headquarters began establis.h.i.+ng hasty positions behind the two grunt companies in Mai Xa Chanh East.

The last line company, Capt. Cecil H. Osborn's2 A/3-21 (Alpha Annihilator), landed in Mai Xa Chanh East between 1740 and 1900, at which point operational control of the Gimlets pa.s.sed to the 3d Marine Regiment. A/3-21 (Alpha Annihilator), landed in Mai Xa Chanh East between 1740 and 1900, at which point operational control of the Gimlets pa.s.sed to the 3d Marine Regiment.

Wait a minute, back up a minute, thought 2d Lt. John R. Jaquez, the Charlie Tiger FO. This is sounding more like World War II, instead of chasing VC through the jungle and worrying about b.o.o.by traps! A Marine officer had his map spread out on the dirt for the Army officers huddled around him, and Jaquez listened incredulously as the Marine casually ran through the suspected locations of the NVA companies, battalions, and regiments in the area. The Marine emphasized that these were NVA regulars, well equipped with AK-47s, RPGs, 12.7mm heavy machine guns, and 60mm and 82mm mortars. Jaquez, already well aware of their proximity to the pinkline-the DMZ-listened carefully as the Marine made it abundantly clear that the enemy had artillery positions that were in range and protected against air strikes by antiaircraft batteries. There's a whole different animal here, thought Jaquez. These aren't d.i.n.ks. These are real soldiers. It's like real war now.

The Gimlets' supporting artillery, D/3-82 FA, had not caught up with them yet, so 2d Lt. William A. Stull, the Alpha Company FO, had a face-to-face conference with a Marine officer about fire support for that night. Marine artillery was heavily engaged against targets in the Dai Do complex, and the Marine fire support coordinator said, ”Okay, now you've got eighty rounds tonight-”

”What the h.e.l.l do you mean 'eighty rounds'?” asked Stull.

”We've allocated eighty rounds for your company, but don't use 'Em unless you need 'Em.”

”s.h.i.+t, I shoot more than eighty rounds just getting our targets set up for the night,” answered Stull.

The Marine was adamant. ”No, those eighty rounds are for if you get into a big battle.”

Lieutenant Stull shook his head. We're jumping through hoops, trying to find out who's going to be our support and what the frequencies are, he thought-and then they come up with this eighty rounds c.r.a.p! He complained to Capt. Charles W. Hitzemann, the artillery liaison officer with the 3-21st Infantry. Hitzemann laughed. He said he would work the problem through channels. The answer came back that the 3-82d Field Artillery would slingload ammunition up to the Marines to replace round for round whatever they had to fire for the Army.

The Gimlets were quickly learning just how rich in material they were in comparison to the Marines. The GIs, who had begun digging in almost as soon as they got off the helicopters, were accustomed to trip flares, claymore mines, and concertina wire in abundance, as well as to bunkers built with timber, steel runway matting, and multiple layers of sandbags. The Marine bunkers didn't compare. ”The village we occupied was a mess with nothing significant done in the way of defending it by the Marines,” wrote Sp4 Don Miller of the 106mm recoilless rifle section in HHC/3-21. ”The Marines were using NVA trenches (too small for us), and even punji punji stakes within the perimeter hadn't been removed. One of our guys flopped down in the gra.s.s and a stake went through his rucksack. The esprit de corps of the Marines is not in question, but their tactics and leaders.h.i.+p always seemed suspect-and I stakes within the perimeter hadn't been removed. One of our guys flopped down in the gra.s.s and a stake went through his rucksack. The esprit de corps of the Marines is not in question, but their tactics and leaders.h.i.+p always seemed suspect-and I know know they were poorly supplied. They begged us for the most basic kind of stuff, like rifle cleaning equipment, oil, brushes, bore rods, etc. They seemed so raggedy.” they were poorly supplied. They begged us for the most basic kind of stuff, like rifle cleaning equipment, oil, brushes, bore rods, etc. They seemed so raggedy.”

Lieutenant Colonel Snyder was immediately impressed with Colonel Hull, who struck him as an experienced old infantryman with a no-nonsense, to-the-point manner. Hull wanted Snyder to seize and hold Nhi Ha and Lam Xuan West. They spoke in front of the operations map in Hull's CP bunker, and Hull outlined the circ.u.mstances that had left these positions uncovered. Whether or not the NVA had already moved back in was an open question. Hull cautioned Snyder that twice before when the Marines had relinquished control of the two hamlets because of other operational commitments they had had to launch attacks to regain the area. Nhi Ha and Lam Xuan West, which straddled Jones Creek and were linked by a footbridge, were important to the NVA because they were situated along the primary infiltration route from southeastern North Vietnam to the enemy base area in the Hai Lang forest south of Quang Tri City. Nhi Ha had served as a way station and rest area for NVA troops on their first day's march south from the DMZ. Both hamlets provided an ideal location from which to launch operations against the Marines' logistical lifeline, the Cua Viet River.

Hull and Snyder spoke until after dark about enemy tactics and capabilities in the area. Hull said to antic.i.p.ate that Nhi Ha and Lam Xuan West had been occupied by the NVA in at least company strength. ”Don't be surprised if the NVA are back in there. Expect them to be in there. We can support you with artillery and mortar fire. Let me know what you need-and go do it.”

Lieutenant Colonel Snyder and Captain Householder, along with the colonel's radiotelephone operator (RTO), departed Camp Kistler at 2130 to join the battalion at Mai Xa Chanh East. They did not travel by helicopter as they expected, but on a skimmer moving at top speed through the dark on the Cua Viet River. Since the young Marine driving the skimmer was nonchalant, Snyder and Householder, figuring that he must know the score, masked their own concerns. Nevertheless, it was an exceptionally hairy experience for the newcomers.

As soon as Lieutenant Colonel Snyder put ash.o.r.e and was led into rubbled Mai Xa Chanh East, Capt. Jan S. Hildebrand, the battalion surgeon, was at his elbow. The doctor was concerned about medical supplies. Captain Hildebrand and two of his battalion medics arrived on one of the first helicopters. Each had worn a helmet and flak jacket, and carried a pistol and M16 for the flight. They'd added whatever medical supplies they could carry on their backs. Hildebrand had wanted to be on the scene in case of heavy contact near the landing zone. When there was none, Hildebrand had concerned himself with getting a fully stocked battalion aid station established. He told Snyder that he didn't have enough medical supplies on hand to sustain the unit in the event of battle. ”I have have to get my supplies in!” he implored the battalion commander. to get my supplies in!” he implored the battalion commander.

Army Chinooks were shuttling materials in from FSB Belcher, and Snyder replied, ”Don't worry, Jan. I won't let that last helicopter come in without your stuff.” The very last Chinook of the night did, in fact, bring in a mermite can for Hildebrand, which he immediately opened-only to discover that it was full of beer! ”The top sergeant back at Belcher thought we needed beer more than anything,” explained Hildebrand. ”I closed that thing so d.a.m.n fast and hid it from Snyder. Fortunately, nothing happened that night. The next morning, everything came in.”

At 2300, Lieutenant Colonel Snyder called his company commanders to the small, roofless building in which he had established his command post. They stood outside in the glow of the illumination rounds going up to the southwest over Dai Do, and northwest over Alpha 1, where an NVA probe was being repelled with ma.s.sed artillery. Snyder pointed out across the flare-lit paddies, and explained to his company commanders what their objectives were and who was to do what when their attack kicked off in the morning. The terrain ahead of them was bleak and foreboding, like a photo of Verdun.

Lieutenant Colonel Snyder, who was not a harsh man, also expressed concern about their night defensive positions. He told his company commanders to get tied in better so they wouldn't be in too bad a shape during the night. ”It was really screwed up. My S3 wasn't on the scene yet himself, so until I got back those guys didn't have a clue as to what they were supposed to do, or who they might be on the lookout for,” Snyder later commented. A perimeter had been established in his absence, and while the individual companies were reasonably well deployed, ”they didn't have any good sense of how they were located in relation to one another. It's hard to form a night defensive position when you've never been there before, don't know where to go, don't know what you're going to be expected to do, and it was a troublesome scene because it was dark, people were tired, and they didn't know where they were. I mean we were vulnerable. If we'd been hit that night we'd have been in some trouble.”

1. The new position was christened FSB Belcher in honor of Capt. Roland Belcher, the previous commander of D/3-21. Belcher was killed on 8 January 1968 during a savage ambush in Hiep Due Valley, northwest of FSB Center. The new position was christened FSB Belcher in honor of Capt. Roland Belcher, the previous commander of D/3-21. Belcher was killed on 8 January 1968 during a savage ambush in Hiep Due Valley, northwest of FSB Center.2. This officer was later relieved of command. His real name is not used here. This officer was later relieved of command. His real name is not used here.

Search and Destroy

LIEUTENANT C COLONEL S SNYDER a.s.sUMED COMMAND OF the Gimlets on 1 February 1968. They were based at the time on FSB Center and operating in the Hiep Due and Song Chang valleys of Quang Tin Province. It was Snyder's first infantry a.s.signment in twelve years, and he decided to visit each of his companies in the bush. The first time that Capt. Dennis A. Leach, CO of C/3-21 (and recognized as the best company commander in the battalion), saw Snyder, the new colonel stumbled as he jumped from his Huey. Leach concealed a grimace. He knew that Snyder was a West Pointer with a Ph.D. from Princeton, but he also knew that the new battalion commander had no combat credentials. Leach saw Snyder as another of the Army's fair-haired boys sent to get a minimum of six months of battalion command time and the basic load of hero medals as he got his ticket punched on the way to full colonel. the Gimlets on 1 February 1968. They were based at the time on FSB Center and operating in the Hiep Due and Song Chang valleys of Quang Tin Province. It was Snyder's first infantry a.s.signment in twelve years, and he decided to visit each of his companies in the bush. The first time that Capt. Dennis A. Leach, CO of C/3-21 (and recognized as the best company commander in the battalion), saw Snyder, the new colonel stumbled as he jumped from his Huey. Leach concealed a grimace. He knew that Snyder was a West Pointer with a Ph.D. from Princeton, but he also knew that the new battalion commander had no combat credentials. Leach saw Snyder as another of the Army's fair-haired boys sent to get a minimum of six months of battalion command time and the basic load of hero medals as he got his ticket punched on the way to full colonel.

Captain Leach, who was on his second tour, knew that Lieutenant Colonel Snyder was going to be a disaster. Snyder had chosen to visit Charlie Tiger at that time because Leach had reported a body count. When alerted that the new colonel was on his way, Leach had grinned and said, ”Well, guys, dress 'Em up a little bit. Lay 'Em on the rice paddy dike and gun 'Em a couple more times so we'll have a nice little picture here for the colonel.”

Lieutenant Colonel Snyder looked at the thoroughly blasted Viet Cong as Leach had the squad leader involved describe how they'd originally bagged them. Snyder was a thin, medium-sized family man with eyegla.s.ses and a soft-spoken manner; as he walked back to his helicopter with Leach he remarked, ”You know, those are the first dead people I've ever seen.”

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