Part 24 (1/2)

Proof.--In proportion as an image is a.s.sociated with a greater number of other images, so (II. xviii.) are there more causes whereby it can be aroused. Q.E.D.

PROP. XIV. The mind can bring it about, that all bodily modifications or images of things may be referred to the idea of G.o.d.

Proof.--There is no modification of the body, whereof the mind may not form some clear and distinct conception (V. iv.); wherefore it can bring it about, that they should all be referred to the idea of G.o.d (I. xv.). Q.E.D.

PROP. XV. He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions loves G.o.d, and so much the more in proportion as he more understands himself and his emotions.

Proof.--He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions feels pleasure (III. liii.), and this pleasure is (by the last Prop.) accompanied by the idea of G.o.d; therefore (Def. of the Emotions, vi.) such an one loves G.o.d, and (for the same reason) so much the more in proportion as he more understands himself and his emotions. Q.E.D.

PROP. XVI. This love towards G.o.d must hold the chief place in the mind.

Proof.--For this love is a.s.sociated with all the modifications of the body (V. xiv.) and is fostered by them all (V. xv.); therefore (V. xi.), it must hold the chief place in the mind.

Q.E.D.

PROP. XVII. G.o.d is without pa.s.sions, neither is he affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain.

Proof.--All ideas, in so far as they are referred to G.o.d, are true (II. x.x.xii.), that is (II. Def. iv.) adequate; and therefore (by the general Def. of the Emotions) G.o.d is without pa.s.sions. Again, G.o.d cannot pa.s.s either to a greater or to a lesser perfection (I. xx. Coroll. ii.); therefore (by Def. of the Emotions, ii. iii.) he is not affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain.

Corollary.--Strictly speaking, G.o.d does not love or hate anyone. For G.o.d (by the foregoing Prop.) is not affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain, consequently (Def. of the Emotions, vi. vii.) he does not love or hate anyone.

PROP. XVIII. No one can hate G.o.d.

Proof.--The idea of G.o.d which is in us is adequate and perfect (II. xlvi. xlvii.); wherefore, in so far as we contemplate G.o.d, we are active (III. iii.); consequently (III. lix.) there can be no pain accompanied by the idea of G.o.d, in other words (Def. of the Emotions, vii.), no one can hate G.o.d. Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Love towards G.o.d cannot be turned into hate.

Note.--It may be objected that, as we understand G.o.d as the cause of all things, we by that very fact regard G.o.d as the cause of pain. But I make answer, that, in so far as we understand the causes of pain, it to that extent (V. iii.) ceases to be a pa.s.sion, that is, it ceases to be pain (III. lix.); therefore, in so far as we understand G.o.d to be the cause of pain, we to that extent feel pleasure.

PROP. XIX. He, who loves G.o.d, cannot endeavour that G.o.d should love him in return.

Proof.--For, if a man should so endeavour, he would desire (V.

xvii. Coroll.) that G.o.d, whom he loves, should not be G.o.d, and consequently he would desire to feel pain (III. xix.); which is absurd (III. xxviii.). Therefore, he who loves G.o.d, &c. Q.E.D.

PROP. XX. This love towards G.o.d cannot be stained by the emotion of envy or jealousy: contrariwise, it is the more fostered, in proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to be joined to G.o.d by the same bond of love.

Proof.--This love towards G.o.d is the highest good which we can seek for under the guidance of reason (IV. xxviii.), it is common to all men (IV. x.x.xvi.), and we desire that all should rejoice therein (IV. x.x.xvii.); therefore (Def. of the Emotions, xxiii.), it cannot be stained by the emotion envy, nor by the emotion of jealousy (V. xviii. see definition of Jealousy, III. x.x.xv. note); but, contrariwise, it must needs be the more fostered, in proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to rejoice therein. Q.E.D.

Note.--We can in the same way show, that there is no emotion directly contrary to this love, whereby this love can be destroyed; therefore we may conclude, that this love towards G.o.d is the most constant of all the emotions, and that, in so far as it is referred to the body, it cannot be destroyed, unless the body be destroyed also. As to its nature, in so far as it is referred to the mind only, we shall presently inquire.

I have now gone through all the remedies against the emotions, or all that the mind, considered in itself alone, can do against them. Whence it appears that the mind's power over the emotions consists:----

I. In the actual knowledge of the emotions (V. iv. note).

II. In the fact that it separates the emotions from the thought of an external cause, which we conceive confusedly (V.

ii. and V. iv. note).

III. In the fact, that, in respect to time, the emotions referred to things, which we distinctly understand, surpa.s.s those referred to what we conceive in a confused and fragmentary manner (V. vii.).

IV. In the number of causes whereby those modifications[17]

are fostered, which have regard to the common properties of things or to G.o.d (V. ix. xi.).