Part 5 (1/2)

Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Whatsoever takes place in the individual object of any idea, the knowledge thereof is in G.o.d, in so far only as he has the idea of the object.

Proof.--Whatsoever takes place in the object of any idea, its idea is in G.o.d (by Prop. iii. of this part), not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected by another idea of an individual thing (by the last Prop.); but (by Prop. vii. of this part) the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things. The knowledge, therefore, of that which takes place in any individual object will be in G.o.d, in so far only as he has the idea of that object.

Q.E.D.

PROP. X. The being of substance does not appertain to the essence of man--in other words, substance does not const.i.tute the actual being[2] of man.

[2] ”Forma”

Proof.--The being of substance involves necessary existence (Part i., Prop. vii.). If, therefore, the being of substance appertains to the essence of man, substance being granted, man would necessarily be granted also (II. Def. ii.), and, consequently, man would necessarily exist, which is absurd (II. Ax. i.). Therefore, &c. Q.E.D.

Note.--This proposition may also be proved from I.v., in which it is shown that there cannot be two substances of the same nature; for as there may be many men, the being of substance is not that which const.i.tutes the actual being of man. Again, the proposition is evident from the other properties of substance--namely, that substance is in its nature infinite, immutable, indivisible, &c., as anyone may see for himself.

Corollary.--Hence it follows, that the essence of man is const.i.tuted by certain modifications of the attributes of G.o.d.

For (by the last Prop.) the being of substance does not belong to the essence of man. That essence therefore (by i. 15) is something which is in G.o.d, and which without G.o.d can neither be nor be conceived, whether it be a modification (i. 25. Coroll.), or a mode which expresses G.o.d's nature in a certain conditioned manner.

Note.--Everyone must surely admit, that nothing can be or be conceived without G.o.d. All men agree that G.o.d is the one and only cause of all things, both of their essence and of their existence; that is, G.o.d is not only the cause of things in respect to their being made (secundum fieri), but also in respect to their being (secundum esse).

At the same time many a.s.sert, that that, without which a thing cannot be nor be conceived, belongs to the essence of that thing; wherefore they believe that either the nature of G.o.d appertains to the essence of created things, or else that created things can be or be conceived without G.o.d; or else, as is more probably the case, they hold inconsistent doctrines. I think the cause for such confusion is mainly, that they do not keep to the proper order of philosophic thinking. The nature of G.o.d, which should be reflected on first, inasmuch as it is prior both in the order of knowledge and the order of nature, they have taken to be last in the order of knowledge, and have put into the first place what they call the objects of sensation; hence, while they are considering natural phenomena, they give no attention at all to the divine nature, and, when afterwards they apply their mind to the study of the divine nature, they are quite unable to bear in mind the first hypotheses, with which they have overlaid the knowledge of natural phenomena, inasmuch as such hypotheses are no help towards understanding the divine nature. So that it is hardly to be wondered at, that these persons contradict themselves freely.

However, I pa.s.s over this point. My intention her was only to give a reason for not saying, that that, without which a thing cannot be or be conceived, belongs to the essence of that thing: individual things cannot be or be conceived without G.o.d, yet G.o.d does not appertain to their essence. I said that ”I considered as belonging to the essence of a thing that, which being given, the thing is necessarily given also, and which being removed, the thing is necessarily removed also; or that without which the thing, and which itself without the thing can neither be nor be conceived.” (II. Def. ii.)

PROP. XI. The first element, which const.i.tutes the actual being of the human mind, is the idea of some particular thing actually existing.

Proof.--The essence of man (by the Coroll. of the last Prop.) is const.i.tuted by certain modes of the attributes of G.o.d, namely (by II. Ax. ii.), by the modes of thinking, of all which (by II.

Ax. iii.) the idea is prior in nature, and, when the idea is given, the other modes (namely, those of which the idea is prior in nature) must be in the same individual (by the same Axiom).

Therefore an idea is the first element const.i.tuting the human mind. But not the idea of a non--existent thing, for then (II.

viii. Coroll.) the idea itself cannot be said to exist; it must therefore be the idea of something actually existing. But not of an infinite thing. For an infinite thing (I. xxi., xxii.), must always necessarily exist; this would (by II. Ax. i.) involve an absurdity. Therefore the first element, which const.i.tutes the actual being of the human mind, is the idea of something actually existing. Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Hence it follows, that the human mind is part of the infinite intellect of G.o.d; thus when we say, that the human mind perceives this or that, we make the a.s.sertion, that G.o.d has this or that idea, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind, or in so far as he const.i.tutes the essence of the human mind; and when we say that G.o.d has this or that idea, not only in so far as he const.i.tutes the essence of the human mind, but also in so far as he, simultaneously with the human mind, has the further idea of another thing, we a.s.sert that the human mind perceives a thing in part or inadequately.

Note.--Here, I doubt not, readers will come to a stand, and will call to mind many things which will cause them to hesitate; I therefore beg them to accompany me slowly, step by step, and not to p.r.o.nounce on my statements, till they have read to the end.

PROP. XII. Whatsoever comes to pa.s.s in the object of the idea, which const.i.tutes the human mind, must be perceived by the human mind, or there will necessarily be an idea in the human mind of the said occurrence. That is, if the object of the idea const.i.tuting the human mind be a body, nothing can take place in that body without being perceived by the mind.

Proof.--Whatsoever comes to pa.s.s in the object of any idea, the knowledge thereof is necessarily in G.o.d (II. ix. Coroll.), in so far as he is considered as affected by the idea of the said object, that is (II. xi.), in so far as he const.i.tutes the mind of anything. Therefore, whatsoever takes place in the object const.i.tuting the idea of the human mind, the knowledge thereof is necessarily in G.o.d, in so far as he const.i.tutes the essence of the human mind; that is (by II. xi. Coroll.) the knowledge of the said thing will necessarily be in the mind, in other words the mind perceives it.

Note.--This proposition is also evident, and is more clearly to be understood from II. vii., which see.

PROP. XIII. The object of the idea const.i.tuting the human mind is the body, in other words a certain mode of extension which actually exists, and nothing else.

Proof.--If indeed the body were not the object of the human mind, the ideas of the modifications of the body would not be in G.o.d (II. ix. Coroll.) in virtue of his const.i.tuting our mind, but in virtue of his const.i.tuting the mind of something else; that is (II. xi. Coroll.) the ideas of the modifications of the body would not be in our mind: now (by II. Ax. iv.) we do possess the idea of the modifications of the body. Therefore the object of the idea const.i.tuting the human mind is the body, and the body as it actually exists (II. xi.). Further, if there were any other object of the idea const.i.tuting the mind besides body, then, as nothing can exist from which some effect does not follow (I.

x.x.xvi.) there would necessarily have to be in our mind an idea, which would be the effect of that other object (II. xi.); but (I. Ax. v.) there is no such idea. Wherefore the object of our mind is the body as it exists, and nothing else. Q.E.D.

Note.--We thus comprehend, not only that the human mind is united to the body, but also the nature of the union between mind and body. However, no one will be able to grasp this adequately or distinctly, unless he first has adequate knowledge of the nature of our body. The propositions we have advanced hitherto have been entirely general, applying not more to men than to other individual things, all of which, though in different degrees, are animated.[3] For of everything there is necessarily an idea in G.o.d, of which G.o.d is the cause, in the same way as there is an idea of the human body; thus whatever we have a.s.serted of the idea of the human body must necessarily also be a.s.serted of the idea of everything else. Still, on the other hand, we cannot deny that ideas, like objects, differ one from the other, one being more excellent than another and containing more reality, just as the object of one idea is more excellent than the object of another idea, and contains more reality.

[3] ”Animata”