Part 2 (2/2)

Proof.--If this be denied, then G.o.d is not the cause of the essence of things; and therefore the essence of things can (by Ax. iv.) be conceived without G.o.d. This (by Prop. xv.) is absurd. Therefore, G.o.d is the cause of the essence of things.

Q.E.D.

Note.--This proposition follows more clearly from Prop. xvi.

For it is evident thereby that, given the divine nature, the essence of things must be inferred from it, no less than their existence--in a word, G.o.d must be called the cause of all things, in the same sense as he is called the cause of himself. This will be made still clearer by the following corollary.

Corollary.--Individual things are nothing but modifications of the attributes of G.o.d, or modes by which the attributes of G.o.d are expressed in a fixed and definite manner. The proof appears from Prop. xv. and Def. v.

PROP. XXVI. A thing which is conditioned to act in a particular manner, has necessarily been thus conditioned by G.o.d; and that which has not been conditioned by G.o.d cannot condition itself to act.

Proof.--That by which things are said to be conditioned to act in a particular manner is necessarily something positive (this is obvious); therefore both of its essence and of its existence G.o.d by the necessity of his nature is the efficient cause (Props.

xxv. and xvi.); this is our first point. Our second point is plainly to be inferred therefrom. For if a thing, which has not been conditioned by G.o.d, could condition itself, the first part of our proof would be false, and this, as we have shown is absurd.

PROP. XXVII. A thing, which has been conditioned by G.o.d to act in a particular way, cannot render itself unconditioned.

Proof.--This proposition is evident from the third axiom.

PROP. XXVIII. Every individual thing, or everything which is finite and has a conditioned existence, cannot exist or be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and action by a cause other than itself, which also is finite, and has a conditioned existence; and likewise this cause cannot in its turn exist, or be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and action by another cause, which also is finite, and has a conditioned existence, and so on to infinity.

Proof.--Whatsoever is conditioned to exist and act, has been thus conditioned by G.o.d (by Prop. xxvi. and Prop. xxiv., Coroll.).

But that which is finite, and has a conditioned existence, cannot be produced by the absolute nature of any attribute of G.o.d; for whatsoever follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of G.o.d is infinite and eternal (by Prop. xxi.). It must, therefore, follow from some attribute of G.o.d, in so far as the said attribute is considered as in some way modified; for substance and modes make up the sum total of existence (by Ax. i.

and Def. iii., v.), while modes are merely modifications of the attributes of G.o.d. But from G.o.d, or from any of his attributes, in so far as the latter is modified by a modification infinite and eternal, a conditioned thing cannot follow. Wherefore it must follow from, or be conditioned for, existence and action by G.o.d or one of his attributes, in so far as the latter are modified by some modification which is finite, and has a conditioned existence. This is our first point. Again, this cause or this modification (for the reason by which we established the first part of this proof) must in its turn be conditioned by another cause, which also is finite, and has a conditioned existence, and, again, this last by another (for the same reason); and so on (for the same reason) to infinity.

Q.E.D.

Note.--As certain things must be produced immediately by G.o.d, namely those things which necessarily follow from his absolute nature, through the means of these primary attributes, which, nevertheless, can neither exist nor be conceived without G.o.d, it follows:--1. That G.o.d is absolutely the proximate cause of those things immediately produced by him. I say absolutely, not after his kind, as is usually stated. For the effects of G.o.d cannot either exist or be conceived without a cause (Prop. xv. and Prop.

xxiv. Coroll.). 2. That G.o.d cannot properly be styled the remote cause of individual things, except for the sake of distinguis.h.i.+ng these from what he immediately produces, or rather from what follows from his absolute nature. For, by a remote cause, we understand a cause which is in no way conjoined to the effect.

But all things which are, are in G.o.d, and so depend on G.o.d, that without him they can neither be nor be conceived.

PROP. XXIX. Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all things are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular manner by the necessity of the divine nature.

Proof.--Whatsoever is, is in G.o.d (Prop. xv.). But G.o.d cannot be called a thing contingent. For (by Prop. xi.) he exists necessarily, and not contingently. Further, the modes of the divine nature follow therefrom necessarily, and not contingently (Prop. xvi.); and they thus follow, whether we consider the divine nature absolutely, or whether we consider it as in any way conditioned to act (Prop. xxvii.). Further, G.o.d is not only the cause of these modes, in so far as they simply exist (by Prop.

xxiv, Coroll.), but also in so far as they are considered as conditioned for operating in a particular manner (Prop. xxvi.).

If they be not conditioned by G.o.d (Prop. xxvi.), it is impossible, and not contingent, that they should condition themselves; contrariwise, if they be conditioned by G.o.d, it is impossible, and not contingent, that they should render themselves unconditioned. Wherefore all things are conditioned by the necessity of the divine nature, not only to exist, but also to exist and operate in a particular manner, and there is nothing that is contingent. Q.E.D.

Note.--Before going any further, I wish here to explain, what we should understand by nature viewed as active (natura naturans), and nature viewed as pa.s.sive (natura naturata). I say to explain, or rather call attention to it, for I think that, from what has been said, it is sufficiently clear, that by nature viewed as active we should understand that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself, or those attributes of substance, which express eternal and infinite essence, in other words (Prop. xiv., Coroll. i., and Prop. xvii., Coroll. ii) G.o.d, in so far as he is considered as a free cause.

By nature viewed as pa.s.sive I understand all that which follows from the necessity of the nature of G.o.d, or of any of the attributes of G.o.d, that is, all the modes of the attributes of G.o.d, in so far as they are considered as things which are in G.o.d, and which without G.o.d cannot exist or be conceived.

PROP. x.x.x. Intellect, in function (actu) finite, or in function infinite, must comprehend the attributes of G.o.d and the modifications of G.o.d, and nothing else.

Proof.--A true idea must agree with its object (Ax. vi.); in other words (obviously), that which is contained in the intellect in representation must necessarily be granted in nature. But in nature (by Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.) there is no substance save G.o.d, nor any modifications save those (Prop. xv.) which are in G.o.d, and cannot without G.o.d either be or be conceived. Therefore the intellect, in function finite, or in function infinite, must comprehend the attributes of G.o.d and the modifications of G.o.d, and nothing else. Q.E.D.

PROP. x.x.xI. The intellect in function, whether finite or infinite, as will, desire, love, &c., should be referred to pa.s.sive nature and not to active nature.

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