Part 3 (1/2)
In order to give th of the fortifications, and the difficulties overcoe of the officers and men of the British Army, I cannot do better than to copy the official reports ineer officers on the subject They contain a full detail of the operations up to the moment when the citadel fell into our possession
_Meineers' operations before Ghuznee, in July, 1839, by Captain George Thoineer Army of the Indus_
The accounts of the Fortress of Ghuznee, received from those who had seen it, were such as to induce his Excellency the Co train then with the Ar a scarcity of transport cattle The place was described as very weak, and coe of hills to the north
When we ca of the 21st of July ere very ood repair, built on a scarped h, flanked by numerous towers, and surrounded by a faussebraye and wet ditch The irregular figure of the ”enceinte” gave a good flanking fire, whilst the height of the citadel covered the interior fro it nugatory In addition to this, the towers, at the angles, had been enlarged, screen walls had been built before the gates, the ditch cleared out and filled ater, stated to be unfordable, and an outwork built on the right bank of the river so as to coarrison was variously stated fro five hundred Cavalry, and from subsequent information we found that it had not been overrated
On the approach of the army, a fire of artillery was opened fro gardens A detachment of Infantry cleared the latter, and the former was silenced for a short time by shrapnells from the Horse Artillery, but the fire from the neork on the bank of the river was in no way checked A nearer view of the works was, however, obtained froardens which had been cleared This was not at all satisfactory The works were evidently er than we had been led to expect, and such as our arular e Ghuznee in forer one would be required than the arreat command of the parapets from sixty to seventy feet, with the wet ditch, were insur or escalading
It therefore became necessary to examine closely the whole _contour_ of the place, to discover if any other ineers, with an escort, went round the works, approaching as near as they could find cover The garrison were on the alert, and kept up a hot and well regulated fire upon the officers whenever they were obliged to show thee, and the Cavalry at a still greater distance, only onehit byparty
The fortifications were found equally strong, all round, the only tangible point observed being the Cabul gatehich offered the following advantages for a _coup-de-e over the ditch unbroken, there were good positions for the Artillery within three hundred yards of the walls on both sides of the road, and we had information that the Gateas not built up, a reinforce expected
The result of this reconnaisance was a report to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that if he decided upon the immediate attack on Ghuznee, the only feasible , and the only one which held out a prospect of success was a dash at the Cabul gateway, blowing the gate open by bags of powder
His Excellency decided upon the atte to the Cabul road, and the next , the 22nd, Sir John Keane in person reconnoitred the proposed point of attack, approved of the plan, and gave orders for its execution Preparations were ly, positions for the artillery were carefully exaarrison, who opened a sed that an explosion party, consisting of three officers of Engineers, Captain Peat, Lieutenants Durand and McLeod, three Serjeants, and eighteen300lbs of powder in twelve sand bags, with a hose seventy-two feet long, should be ready to ht the first battery left camp, followed by the other four, at intervals of half an hour Those to the right of the road were conducted to their positions by Lieutenant Stuart, those to the left by Lieutenant Anderson The ground for the guns was prepared by the Sappers and Pioneers, taking advantage of the irregularities of the ground to the right, and of soarden walls to the left
The Artillery was all in position, and ready by 3 A M of the 23rd, and shortly after, at the first dawn, the party under Captain Peat ateway, accoht Infantry, without their belts, and supported by a detachht and left of the road; when they arrived at the ditch, taking advantage of what cover they could find, and endeavouring to keep down the fire from the rah it had been rehts were shohich rendered surrounding objects distinctly visible, but luckily they were buried on the top of the parapet instead of being thrown into the passage below
The explosion party marched steadily on, headed by Lieutenant Durand; the poas placed, the hose laid, the train fired, and the carrying party had retired to tolerable cover in less than two hts appeared, and theparty at the same time So quickly was the operation performed, and so little was the enemy aware of the nature of it, that not a man of the party was hurt
As soon as the explosion took place, Captain Peat, although hurt by the concussion, his anxiety preventing hiate, accoht Infantry, and ascertained that it was co a bugler to sound at the advance, the signal agreed on for the assaulting column to push on, and this was the onlycoluiiht Infantry, and her Majesty's 17th regiadier Sale, the advance under Lieutenant Colonel Dennie, accoh the gateway, through a passage inside the gateway, in a do on one side rendered everything very obscure, andit difficult to find the outlet into the town Theya peak in the colu over the rubbish in the gateway, ood adier and several other officers These swordsular opposition; the surprise and alarreat when they saw the colu upon thearrison of the Citadel following their exae in the houses, firing on the coluood deal of desultory fighting took place in consequence, by which some loss was sustained The Citadel was occupied as soon as daylight showed that it had been abandoned by the enemy, and the whole of the works were in our possession before 5 A M
We lost seventeen hteen officers, and one hundred and seventeen Europeans, and thirty Natives wounded--total one hundred and eighty-two Of the Affghans more than five hundred and fourteen were killed in the town, that nu been buried, and about one thousand outside by the Cavalry, one thousand six hundred prisoners were taken, but I have nothe nuuns of different calibres found in the place, a large quantity of good powder, considerable stores of shot, lead, &c, &c, and a large supply of attar and other provisions
GEO THOMSON, Capt Engrs
_Chief Engineer Ar report by Captain Peat, of the Boives a ate, which, it will be seen, were attended with difficulties of no ordinary nature
”During the reconnaissance the wall pieces were particularly troublesome This weapon is almost unknown in our service, but it is a very efficient one, especially in the defence of works, and its use should not be neglected Every fortified post should be supplied with a proportion of theie recoates is from sixty to one hundred and twenty pounds, and this is, doubtless, sufficient in ordinary cases; but in this instance ere apprehensive that the ene so much on that side of the place, and in consequence, partially or wholly, built up the gateway It was afterwards found that soate with beae was so heavy, that it not only destroyed the gate, but brought down a considerable portion of the roof of the square building in which it was placed, which proved a very considerable obstacle to the assaulting column, and the concussion acted as far as the tower, under which an officer's party of her Majesty's 13th regi any casualties In cases of this nature it is of course the first object to guard against any chance of failure; and it is iht have been reduced with safety
The enemy appeared so much on the alert, and the faussebraye was soable to effect our object by surprise The only question hether it ought to be done by day or night It was argued in favor of the former, that the Artillery would be able to make so much more correct practice that the defences would be in a considerable degree destroyed, and the fire so completely kept under as to enable the explosion party to advance with but little loss, and with the advantage of being able to see exactly what they were about Captain Thompson, however, adhered to the latter, and ere afterwards convinced it was the h the fire of the Artillery was necessarily ht, still it was so well directed as to take up a good deal of the attention of the besieged, and draw upon their batteries a portion of the fire, which in daylight would have been thron upon the explosion party and assaulting coluht, have been difficult, with our Light Artillery, to have kept down the fire so coht have kept their position near the gateway; and in that narrow space a sed the party to retire The obscurity of the night, to say nothing of the confusion which itundisciplined troops, is certainly the best protection to a body of hts certainly render objects distinctly visible, but their light is glaring and uncertain, especially to hteen officers, twenty-eight sergeants, seven buglers, and two hundred and seventy-six rank and file
It was th, not only to keep up a heavy fire upon the parapets, and thereby divert attention froateway, but also because ere not ahether the faussebraye was occupied or not, and as it extends so ate completely in reverse, it would have been necessary, had a fire opened from it, to have carried it by assault before the party with the bags could have advanced The party with Lieutenant Durand was accompanied by six men of the 13th, without their belts, the better to secure theht be ht, or even froate itself, while another party under an officer, Lieutenant Jennings, accompanied ht have been made fro up a fire on such of the enemy as showed their heads above the parapet; of this party onecould have been allant than the conduct of Lieutenants Durand and McLeod, and the men under their command; or more efficient than the manner in which they executed their duty