Part 11 (1/2)

Then followed in rapid succession the naval blockade, the arrival of the insurgent leaders from Hongkong, the raising of the insurgent army, which blockaded Manila on the land side, and finally, the American troops. At the end of 104 days after the destruction of the Spanish fleet, the city surrendered to a combined land and naval attack of the American forces. On the day after the capitulation, the American Commander in Chief issued his proclamation establis.h.i.+ng a military government, appointed a Military Governor, a Minister of Finance, a Collector of Customs, Collector of Internal Revenue, Postmaster and Judge of the Provost Court; took possession of all public funds (about $900,000), and all public offices, and as rapidly as possible put this government in operation.

The machinery of the Spanish Government was thoroughly disorganized when we entered Manila. The Courts of Justice, except the inferior criminal courts, had not been in session since early in May; the officials had been cut off from communication with the other islands and with Spain for over three months; there had been no customs to collect, and, owing to the entire suspension of business, but little internal revenue; a forced loan of $2,000,000 for military purpose had been extracted from the Spanish-Philippine Bank, and yet the troops were several months in arrears of pay; all government offices outside the walled city had been moved to temporary quarters within the walls and their records had been lost or thrown into confusion; the officials seeing the inevitable end in sight, were intent only on planning for their return to Spain.

This disorganization was completed when the American Military officers took charge of the Government, and every Spanish official, without exception, refused absolutely to continue in service. They were immediately dismissed and dispersed.

The situation thus created is without precedent in American history. When Scott captured the City of Mexico it was acknowledged on both sides that his occupation was only to be temporary, and there were no insurgents to deal with. When the Americans entered California they found only a scanty population, who were soon outnumbered by the American immigrants. But in the Philippine Islands there is a population of more than 7,000,000, governed by an alien race, whose representatives present in the Islands, including military and naval forces, clergy and civil employes do not exceed 30,000 in number. Against this Government an insurrection is in progress, which claims to have been successful in provinces containing a population of about 2,000,000. The city and province of Manila, with a population of 400,000 more, have been captured and occupied by a foreign army, but whether its occupation is to be temporary or permanent has not yet been decided.

Finally, the Government officials of all cla.s.ses refuse to perform their functions; the desire of most of them is to escape to Spain. It was stipulated in the capitulation that they should have the right to do so at their own expense, and numbers of them, as well as friars, have already taken their departure. The Spanish officials have intense fear of the Insurgents; and the latter hate them, as well as the friars, with a virulence that can hardly be described. They have fought them with success, and almost without interruption for two years, and they will continue to fight them with increased vigor and still greated prospects of success, if any attempt is made to restore the Spanish Government. In its present disorganized condition the Spanish Government could not successfully cope with them; on the other hand, it would not surrender to them. The result, therefore, of an attempted restoration of Spanish power in any of the islands would simply be civil war and anarchy, leading inevitably and speedily to intervention by foreign nations whose subjects have property in the islands which they would not allow to be destroyed.

Insurgent Troops.

It is very difficult to give figures for the exact numbers of insurgent troops. In his message to foreign governments of August 6th, asking for recognition of belligerency and independence, Aguinaldo claims to have a force of 30,000 men, organized into a regular army. This included the force in the provinces of Luzon outside of Manila. What was in evidence around Manila varied from 10,000 to 15,000. They were composed of young men and boys, some as young as fifteen years of age, recruited in the rural districts, having no property and nothing to lose in a civil war. They have received no pay and, although Aguinaldo speaks in his proclamation of his intention and ability to maintain order wherever his forces penetrate, yet the feeling is practically universal among the rank and file that they are to be compensated for their time and services and hards.h.i.+ps by looting Manila.

Their equipment consists of a gun, bayonet and cartridge box; their uniform of a straw hat, gingham s.h.i.+rt and trousers and bare feet; their transportation of a few ponies and carts, impressed for a day or week at a time; for quarters they have taken the public building in each village or pueblo, locally known as the Tribunal, and the churches and convents; from these details are sent out to man the trenches. Their food while on duty consists of rice and banana leaves, cooked at the quarters and sent out to the trenches. After a few days or a week of active service they return to their homes to feed up or work on their farms, their places being taken by others to whom they turn over their guns and cartridges. Their arms have been obtained from various sources, from purchases in Hongkong, from the supply which Admiral Dewey found in the a.r.s.enal at Cavite, from capture made from the Spaniards. They are partly Mausers and partly Remingtons. Their ammunition was obtained in the same way. They have used it freely and the supply is now rather short. To replenish it they have established a cartridge factory at the village of Imus, about ten miles south of Cavite, where they have 400 people engaged in re-loading cartridges with powder and lead found at Cavite, or purchased abroad. They have no artillery, except a few antique Columbiads obtained from Cavite, and no cavalry. Their method of warfare is to dig a trench in front of the Spanish position, cover it with mats as a protection against the sun and rain, and during the night put their guns on top of the trench above their heads and fire in the general direction of the enemy. When their ammunition is exhausted they go off in a body to get a fresh supply in baskets and then return to the trenches.

The men are of small stature, from 5 feet to 5 feet 6 inches in height, and weigh from 110 to 130 pounds. Compared with them our men from Colorado and California seemed like a race of giants. One afternoon just after we entered Manila a battalion of the insurgents fired upon the outposts of the Colorado regiment, mistaking them, as they claimed, for Spaniards. The outpost retreated to their support, and the Filipinos followed; they easily fell into an ambush and the support, numbering about fifty men, surrounded the 250 Filipinos, wrenched the guns out of their hands and marched them off as unarmed prisoners--all in the s.p.a.ce of a few minutes. Such a force can hardly be called an army, and yet the service which it has rendered should not be underestimated. Between 2,000 and 3,000 Spanish native troops surrendered to it during the months of June and July. It constantly annoyed and harra.s.sed the Spaniards in the trenches, keeping them up at night and wearing them out with fatigue; and it invested Manila early in July so completely that all supplies were cut off and the inhabitants as well as the Spanish troops were forced to live on horse and buffalo meat, and the Chinese population on cats and dogs. It captured the water works of Manila and cut off the water supply, and, if it had been in the dry season, would have inflicted great suffering on the inhabitants for lack of water. These results, it is true, were obtained against a dispirited army, containing a considerable number of native troops of doubtful loyalty. Yet, from August, 1896, to April, 1897, they fought 25,000 of the best regular troops sent out from Spain, inflicting on them a loss of over 150 officers and 2,500 men, killed and wounded, and they suffered still greater losses themselves. Nevertheless, from daily contact with them for six weeks, I am very confident that no such results could have been obtained against an American army, which would have driven them back to the hills and reduced them to a petty guerilla warfare. If they attack the American army this will certainly be the result, and, while these guerilla bands might give some trouble so long as their ammunition lasted, yet, with our navy guarding the coasts and our army pursuing them on land, it would not be long before they were reduced to subjection.

Insurgent Civil Administration.

In August, 1896, and insurrection broke out in Cavite, under the leaders.h.i.+p of Emilio Aguinaldo, and soon spread to other provinces on both sides of Manila. It continued with varying successes on both sides, and the trial and execution of numerous insurgents, until December, 1897, when the Governor-General, Primo de Rivera, entered into written agreement with Aguinaldo, the substance of the doc.u.ment, which is in possession of Senor Felipe Agoncillo, who accompanies me to Was.h.i.+ngton, being attached hereto and marked ”A.” In brief, it required that Aguinaldo and the other insurgent leaders should leave the country, the Government agreeing to pay them $800,000 in silver, and promising to introduce numerous reforms, including representation in the Spanish Cortes, freedom of the press, amnesty for all insurgents, and the expulsion of secularization of the monastic orders. Aguinaldo and his a.s.sociates went to Hongkong and Singapore. A portion of the money, $400,000, was deposited in banks at Hongkong, and a lawsuit soon arose between Aguinaldo and one of his subordinate chiefs, named Artacho, which is interesting on account of the very honorable position taken by Aguinaldo. Artacho sued for a division of the money among the insurgents, according to rank. Aguinaldo claimed that the money was a trust fund and was to remain on deposit until it was seen whether the Spaniards would carry out their promised reforms, and if they failed to do so it was to be used to defray the expenses of a new insurrection. The suit was settled out of court by paying Artacho $5,000.

No steps have been taken to introduce the reforms, more than 2,000 insurgents who had been deported to Fernando Po and other places are still in confinement, and Aguinaldo is now using the money to carry on the operations of the present insurrection.

On the 24th day of April Aguinaldo met the United States Consul and others at Singapore and offered to begin a new insurrection in conjunction with the operations of the United States navy at Manila. This was telegraphed to Admiral Dewey and, by his consent, or, at his request, Aguinaldo left Singapore for Hongkong on April 26th, and, when the McCullough went to Hongkong early in May to carry the news of Admiral Dewey's victory, it took Aguinaldo and seventeen other revolutionary chiefs on board and brought them to Manila Bay. They soon after landed at Cavite, and the Admiral allowed them to take such guns, ammunition and stores as he did not require for himself. With these and some other arms which he had brought from Hongkong Aguinaldo armed his followers, who rapidly a.s.sembled at Cavite and, in a few weeks, he began moving against the Spaniards. Part of them surrendered, giving him more arms, and the others retreated to Manila.

Soon afterwards two s.h.i.+ps, which were the private property of Senor Agoncillo and other insurgent sympathizers, were converted into cruisers and sent with insurgent troops to Subig Bay and other places, to capture provinces outside of Manila. They were very successful, the native militia in Spanish service capitulating with their arms in nearly every case without serious resistance. On the 18th of June Aguinaldo issued a proclamation from Cavite establis.h.i.+ng a Dictatorial Government, with himself as Dictator. In each village or pueblo a Chief (Jefe) was to be elected, and in each ward a Nendrum (Cabeza); also in each pueblo three delegates, one of Police, one of Justice, and one of Taxes. These were to const.i.tute the Junta, or a.s.sembly, and after consulting the Junta the Chiefs of pueblos were to elect a Chief of Province and three Counsellors, one of Police, one of Justice, and one of Taxes. They were also to elect one or more Representatives from each Province to form the Bevolutionary Congress. This was followed on June 20th by a decree giving more detailed instructions in regard to the elections. On June 23d another decree followed, changing the t.i.tle of the Government from Dictatorial to Revolutionary, and of the chief officer from Dictator to President; announcing a Cabinet with a Minister of Foreign Affairs, Marine and Commerce, another of War and Public Works, another of Police and Internal Order, Justice, Instruction and Hygiene, and another of Taxes, Agriculture and Manufactures; the powers of the President and Congress were defined, and a code of military justice was formulated. On the same date a manifesto was issued to the world explaining the reasons and purposes of the Revolution. On June 27th another decree was issued containing instructions in regard to elections. On August 6th an address was issued to Foreign Governments, stating that the Revolutionary Government was in operation and control in fifteen Provinces, and that in response to the pet.i.tion of the duly elected Chiefs of these Provinces an appeal is made for recognition of belligerency and independence. Translations of these various doc.u.ments are all apended, marked ”B,” ”C,” ”D,” ”E,” ”F,” ”G” and ”H.”

The scheme of Government is set forth in the decree of June 23d, marked ”D.” An examination of this doc.u.ment shows that it provides a Dictators.h.i.+p of the familiar South American type. All power is centered in the President, and he is not responsible to any one for his acts. He is declared to be ”the personification of the Philippine public, and in this view cannot be held responsible while he holds office. His term will last until the Revolution triumphs.” He appoints not only the heads of the departments, but all their subordinates, and without reference to Congress. This body is composed of a single Chamber of Representatives from each Province. The election is to be conducted by an agent of the President, and the qualifications of electors are ”those inhabitants most distinguished for high character, social position and honorable conduct.”

If any Province is still under Spanish rule its Representative is to be appointed by the President. Congress is to deliberate on ”all grave and transcendental questions, whose decision admits of delay and adjournment, but the President may decide questions of urgent character, giving the reasons for his decision in a message to Congress.” The acts of Congress are not binding until approved by the President, and he has power of absolute veto.

Congress was to hold its first session at Saloles about September 28th.

While this scheme of Government is a pure despotism, yet it claims to be only temporary, and intended to ”prepare the country so that a true Republic may be established.” It also provides a rude form of governmental machinery for managing the affairs of the Provinces. To what extent it has actually gone into operation it is difficult to say. Aguinaldo claims, in his address of August 6th, that it is in force in fifteen Provinces, whose aggregate population is about 2,000,000. They include the island of Mindoro and about half of Luzon. None of those (except Cavite) have yet been visited by Americans, and all communication with them by the Spanish Government at Manila has been cut off since May 1st.

In the province of Cavite and that portion of the Province of Manila outside of the city and of its suburbs, which was occupied by the insurgent troops as well as those of the United States, their military forces, military headquarters, etc., were very much in evidence, occupying the princ.i.p.al houses and churches in every village and hamlet, but there were no signs of Civil Government or administration. It was reported, however, that Aguinaldo's agents were levying taxes or forced contributions not only in the outside villages, but (after we entered Manila) by means of secret agents, in the market places of the city itself. At Aguinaldo's headquarters, in Bacoor, there were signs of activity and business, and it was reported that his Cabinet officers were in constant session there.

Aguinaldo never himself failed to claim all the prerogatives due to his alleged position as the de facto ruler of the country. The only general officer who saw him or had any direct communication with him was General Anderson. He did much to thwart this officer in organizing a native wagon train and otherwise providing for his troops, and he went so far, in a letter of July 23d (copy herewith marked ”J”), as to warn General Anderson not to land American troops on Philippine soil without his consent--a notice which, it is hardly necessary to say, was ignored. The day before the attack on Manila he sent staff officers to the same General, asking for our plans of attack, so that their troops could enter Manila with us. The same request had previously been made to me by one of his Brigade Commanders, to which I replied that I was not authorized to give the information desired.

Aguinaldo did not call upon General Merritt on his arrival, and this enabled the latter to avoid any communication with him, either direct or indirect, until after Manila had been taken. General Merritt then received one of Aguinaldo's staff officers in his office as Military Governor. The interview lasted more than an hour. General Merritt referred to his proclamation as showing the conditions under which the American troops had come to Manila and the nature of the Military Government, which would be maintained until further orders from Was.h.i.+ngton. He agreed upon the lines outside of the city of Manila, up to which the insurgent troops could come, but no further with arms in their hands. He asked for possession of the water works, which was given, and, while expressing our friends.h.i.+p and sympathy for the Philippine people, he stated very positively that the United States Government had placed at his disposal an ample force for carrying out his instructions, and even if the services of Aguinaldo's forces had been needed as allies he should not have felt at liberty to accept them.

The problem of how to deal with Aguinaldo's Government and troops will necessarily be accompanied with embarra.s.sment and difficulty, and will require much tact and skill in its solution. The United States Government, through its Naval Commander, has, to some extent, made use of them for a distinct military purpose, viz.: to hara.s.s and annoy the Spanish troops, to wear them out in the trenches, to blockade Manila on the land side, and to do as much damage as possible to the Spanish Government prior to the arrival of our troops, and for this purpose the Admiral allowed them to take the arms and munitions which he had captured at Cavite, and their s.h.i.+ps to pa.s.s in and out of Manila Bay in their expeditions against other Provinces. But the Admiral has been very careful to give Aguinaldo no a.s.surances of recognition and no pledges or promises of any description. The services which Aguinaldo and his adherents rendered in preparing the way for attack on Manila are certainly ent.i.tled to consideration, but, after all, they were small in comparison with what was done by our fleet and army.

There is no reason to believe that Aguinaldo's Government has any elements of stability. In the first place, Aguinaldo is a young man of twenty-three years. Prior to the insurrection of 1896 he had been a schoolmaster, and afterward Gobernadorcillo and Munic.i.p.al Captain in one of the pueblos in the Province of Cavite. He is not devoid of ability, and he is surrounded by clever writers. But the educated and intelligent Filipinos of Manila say that not only is he lacking in ability to be at the head of affairs, but if an election for President was held he would not even be a candidate. He is a successful leader of insurgents, has the confidence of young men in the country districts, prides himself on his military ability, and if a Republic could be established the post he would probably choose for himself would be General-in-Chief of the Army.

In the next place, Aguinaldo's Government, or any entirely independent Government, does not command the hearty support of the large body of Filipinos, both in Manila and outside, who have property, education and intelligence. Their hatred of the Spanish rule is very keen and they will co-operate with Aguinaldo or any one else to destroy it. But after that is done they fully realize that they must have the support of some strong nation for many years before they will be in a position to manage their own affairs alone. The nation to which they all turn is America, and their ideal is a Philippine Republic, under American protection--such as they have heard is to be granted to Cuba. But when it comes to defining their ideas of protection and the respective rights and duties of each under it, what portion of the Government is to be administered by them and what portion by us; how the revenues are to be collected, and in what proportion the expenses are to be divided; they have no clear ideas at all; nor is it expected that they should have, after generations of Spanish rule without any experience in self government. The sentiment of this cla.s.s, the educated native with property at stake, looks upon the prospect of Aguinaldo's Government and forces entering Manila with almost as much dread as the foreign merchants or the Spaniards themselves.