Part 41 (1/2)

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CHAP. VI.

_Causes of Decline, peculiar to England_.

In addition to the causes of decline which Britain, as a wealthy country, has, in common with most other nations, it has some peculiar to itself, (or of which the degree at least is peculiar to it).

The national debt, the high rate of taxation, the prodigious expense of the poor, and the nature of the government, are peculiar to this country. There are other circ.u.mstances in its favour, of which we shall speak in the next chapter; but, in this, we shall review those that are against it, and of an unfavourable nature and operation.

The high rate of taxation, for the very reason that it is the highest ever known, inspires our enemies with hopes of our downfall, and makes them persevere in continuing to put us to expense.

The unprecedented commerce we enjoy, of which every other nation would wish to have a share, (and of which each, most mistakenly, thinks it would have a share, if Britain was undone,) is a cause of attracting envy and enmity, and repelling friends.h.i.+p. Our colonies in the West, and our possessions in the East, act like the conductors that draw the electric fluid to a building, but they do not, like those conductors, serve to protect it from violence. We have seen, that the advantage arising from them is more than doubtful, that they enrich individuals and impoverish the state; but all this would be nothing new, were it not for the vast scale on which those evils exist.

The poor's rate, which is in itself completely unexampled, though a common thing to all nations, is so exorbitant in England, that it may very properly be ranked amongst the dangers peculiar to this country.

Who would believe, that Frederick the Great of Prussia carried on his brilliant and successful wars against the most formidable enemies, expended more than one-eighth of his revenues annually on the encouragement of industry, and left his treasury well stored, yet all this with an income, less by one-fourth than the sums that go to support [end of page #257] the poor in England, notwithstanding all the miserable manoeuvres that are practiced =sic= to avoid giving them a.s.sistance?

The form of government in England, though best for the liberty of the subject, and for the security of persons and property, is deficient in the means of repressing those infringements which particular bodies of people make upon the community at large. The representative system, when well understood, divides itself into parties, having different interests. There are the commercial, the landed, the East India, the West India, and the law, all of which have great parliamentary influence, and can be formidable to any minister; they therefore have a means of defending their interests, and they are concerned so deeply as to take a very active part whenever any questions are agitated relative to them.

The landed interest and the law are, indeed, the only ones that have any great party in the House of Peers; but then the House of Peers seldom interferes in matters that concern the interests of the others.

The Lords seem not to think it their province; and, in general, more through diffidence than negligence, they avoid meddling, though, to do that honourable house justice, to it we owe much. Many bills, of a dangerous tendency, have been thrown out by it, after they had pa.s.sed the other house; and it has been generally done with a wisdom, magnanimity, and moderation, which is only to be accounted for by a true love of the country and an upright intention. {201}

{201} It is wonderful to what a length good intention, (zeal apart,) will go in leading men right, even when they have not paid very particular attention to a subject. There is a feeling of what is wise, as well as of what is right, that partakes a little of instinct, perhaps, but is more unerring than far fetched theory on many occasions. This was seen in a most exemplary manner, at the time that the principles of the French revolution were most approved of here. Those principles were plausible, though flimsy, and founded on sophisms, and a species of reasoning, that plain unlettered men could not answer, and men who did give themselves the pains to reason might have answered; yet, three times in four, it was the man who could not answer it, who, guided by upright intentions, rejected it as bad, without being able to tell why. The most acute were, in this case, the most deceived; for it must now be allowed, that all approbation of the theories, relative to the rights of man, and the manner of a.s.serting them were wrong.

Many of those who fell into the error had, no doubt, unblameable intentions, but they did not consult common sense.

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In every a.s.sembly, a small number, who completely understand their own interest, can do a great deal, if they will act together; but, this is not all, they can use arguments with a minister that pave the way for obtaining the ends they have in view, while the general interests of the country alarm no one but upon great occasions.

Under arbitrary monarchs, all bodies with separate interests, are kept in due order, they have no means of defending themselves but by remonstrance, which, against power, is but a very inadequate protection.

There is nothing forced or chimerical in this statement of the case, and the consequence is, that no country ever saw any bodies rise to such a height, except the clergy in Roman Catholic countries, and the barons during the feudal system, when they had arms in their hands; who, if they could not absolutely resist their sovereign, were at least able to refuse him aid, and could annoy him greatly. But those examples will bear no comparison with the separate interests in England at this time.

The barons have long lost their power, and the Roman Catholic clergy have lost the greatest part of their power and revenue also. If they had not, wealthy and powerful kingdoms would not have existed.

Under a free government, where people think that an opposition to a minister in parliament is a most excellent thing, the energies of the nation, as to war, are greatly lessened. This must, in its connections with other nations, produce very hurtful effects; but, where the evil is without a remedy, there is no advantage in dwelling upon it; and it does not appear that there is any possibility of separating from a free government, some sort of an opposing power, that must hamper the executive, and lessen the energies of the nation.

Under pure monarchies, kings can reward merit; they can encourage talents, and act according to circ.u.mstances. In England, the king, or his ministers, have no fund from which they can do this. An application to parliament is expensive and troublesome; and, in many cases, where the object would be fair, it would be unattainable. But this is not all, for when, by act of parliament, any thing of the sort is [end of page #259] once done, it is left without proper controul, and the expense is generally double what it ought to be.

On the whole, there is too little of discretional =sic= power in a representative government; good cannot be done but by rules, which, in many cases, it is impossible to comply with. This is a disadvantage which we labour under, and is a sort of drawback on our excellent form of government; but this is not like the opposition in the senate, it may be got over, and merits attention.

Such appear to be the disadvantages to which Britain is peculiarly liable, either in toto, or in the degree; but, on the other hand, she has many circ.u.mstances in her favour, if they are properly taken hold of; and, indeed, some, of which the effect will be favourable, whether any particular attention is paid to them or not. To those we shall advert with peculiar pleasure, and hope that they will not be neglected, but that they may afford a means of continuing our career of prosperity on the increasing scale, or that, at least, they may prevent us from sharing the fate of those nations that have gone before.

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