Part 39 (1/2)

The late and present wars, which have occasioned one-half of the debt, and for which our exertions are to be continued, were undertaken for the preservation of property; for, though the French system is so completely bad that even the beggars in England would be losers by adopting it, yet, it will be allowed, that the evil to people of property would be much greater than to those who have no property. Let us look to Flanders, Holland, and other countries, and say no if we can.

It was on this idea that an income-tax, afterwards termed a property- tax, was laid on, by which the rich are made to pay, and the poor are exempted. The justice and expediency of this was universally admitted: there might be some difference of opinion as to modes and rates, but there was none as to the general principle.

We would, then, propose to RAISE LOANS, at a low rate of interest to reimburse the present creditors, ON THE SAME PRINCIPLE ON WHICH THE PROPERTY-TAX EXISTS, in the following manner:

There are, by Mr. Pitt's calculation, (and his may be taken [end of page #243] in order to prevent caviling) 2,400,000,000 L. of capital in the kingdom. Let us then create a two and a half per cent. stock, into which every person possessed of property should be _compelled_ to purchase at par, in proportion to their capital, so as to redeem fifty millions every year, thereby creating fifty millions of new debt at two and a half per cent. and reimbursing an equal sum bearing an interest of five per cent.

A loan of two per cent. per annum, on each man's capital would do this, and would never be an object for the safety of the whole, particularly as it would only last for ten years. As he would have interest at two and a half per cent. he would, in reality, only lose half, that is, one per cent. a year during twelve years; so that a man, with 10,000 L. would only have given 100 L. a year for twelve years.

At the end of ten years, the interest of the national debt would be reduced to one-half its present amount, which, together with the war- taxes, would be sufficient to prevent the necessity of creating more debt. This, however, is not all, a more prompt effect and advantage may be expected. It is more than probable, that the moment our enemy found that the nation, could, without any great exertion, put its finances on a permanent footing, the present contest would finish. It is now only continued, in hopes of ruining our finances, and it is on the acc.u.mulation of the debt that the expectation of that is alone founded.

We observed, in the beginning of this Chapter, that most people are biased by hope or fear, in examining a question of great importance; and that, therefore, they do not state it quite fairly, without being sensible of their error. In the case of the gloomy calculators of this country, fear and anxiety operated in causing a misstatement; but, with regard to our enemies, hope is the cause of their magnifying the effect of our national debt, and, it must be allowed, that hope had seldom ever a more easy business to perform. The general conclusion is certain, and all the question that remains, is with respect to time.

The only mode of putting an end to this hope of our enemy, and to the war, at once, will be by shewing that enemy _that it is quite out of his power to augment our debt_, but untill =sic= a method shall be adopted by [end of page #244] us, that is PRACTICABLE AND EASILY UNDERSTOOD, that will not be believed by our enemy.

The rapidity of the operation of a sinking fund is easily calculated, but not so easily credited, particularly by people not inclined to do so, and who would not themselves have the constancy and self-denial to leave it time to operate. Besides, by this operation, we shall not get free of debt till the taxes are raised far above their present amount. Our enemies may be pardoned for believing it impracticable, particularly as many of our friends are of the same opinion.

France, which has always been the rival of this country, and hates it now more than ever, (envy being now an ingredient of its hatred,) knows well that it is fallen and degraded, that it has less wealth and happiness than England; but then it considers, that, however bad its finances may be, they are getting no worse; that to continue the war for twenty years will bring no more ruin on the nation, while half the term would probably ruin us. Till we show the fallacy of this calculation, we cannot expect a durable peace. Our ruin is become an object, not only of ambition, but of necessity, as it were, to France; and nothing but despair of being able to accomplish their object will make them abandon the attempt.

We must be permitted here to ask a few questions:

Is not the time favourable for the plan here proposed?

Would it not be fair in its operation?

Would it not bring relief effectually and speedily?

Would it not reduce our burthens, without breaking faith with the creditors of the state?

Would it not reduce the interest, without setting too much capital afloat, that might leave the country?

Could our enemies then calculate on the national debt destroying England?

The affairs of nations, it has been observed, become so complicated, and the details so multiplied, that those who have the management of them are scarcely equal to the business of the day; and they have no leisure to inquire into the best modes of keeping off evil when it is yet distant; of this we have had ample experience.

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Allowing all the credit possible to the sinking fund, (and a great deal is due,) still during war its operation is a sort of paradox; it does not obtain relief: it is liable to be questioned; but we are come to a point, where the stability of our finances ought to be put out of doubt, and beyond all question. The mode of settling our affairs ought not only to be such as in the end may succeed, but its efficacy and practicability ought to be such as our enemies can understand and give credit to.

Without this, we shall have no end to the contest.

With respect to what our enemies will give credit to, a good deal depends on their own natural disposition. A fickle and arbitrary people, who are continually breaking their faith, can have little belief in the constancy of a sinking fund, but they will be perfectly well inclined to believe, that men of property may be compelled, and will even be glad to pay one per cent. a year, for ten years, to ensure the safety of that property. Supposing then that the sinking fund were the better plan of the two in reality, it would not be so in the present circ.u.mstances, because it would not obtain credit, and the other will.

As to the rest, deprive the French of their hopes of ruining our finances, and they will make peace on reasonable terms, whenever we please; their object for continuing the war will then be at an end; and, if they do continue it, we can go on as long as they can, without any addition to our burthens.

Whatever the cause of a war may be, the hope of success is the only possible motive for persisting in it. The French have been led into two errors; first, by the comparison of this country to Carthage, and of their own to Rome, (an absurd comparison that does not hold,) and, in the second place, by looking on our ruin, from the increase of our debt, as certain. We ought to undeceive them, and then they will have less inclination to persist in war. No pains has. .h.i.therto been taken to set them right; nor, indeed, with respect to the national debt, can it ever be done by the present method, till they see the effect; for though the progress of a sinking fund in peace is easily understood, in time of war there is much appearance of deception; it looks like slight =sic= of hand more than a real and solid transaction.