Part 33 (1/2)

Amongst the _exterior_ causes of decline that are general, none applies so completely to Great Britain as that of the envy and enmity, occasioned by the possession of colonies we have settled, or countries we have conquered.

The wealth of Britain and its power arise from agriculture, manufactures, commerce, colonies, and conquests. The envy they excite is not, however, in proportion to the wealth that arises from them, but rather to the right we have to possess them, and the consequent right that others have to contest the possession.

Improved agriculture has never been a source of enmity amongst civilized nations, though it has been an object of conquest when an opportunity presented itself.

Manufactures, the great source of our wealth, are, in a certain degree, beyond the reach of our enemies. Our greatest consumption for them is amongst ourselves, and if we did not export to any part of the world, except enough to procure materials, we should enjoy nearly all that we now do. Our wealth would not be very materially diminished, though our naval strength would. The means of destroying our manufactures is not then very easily to be found.

The commerce with other nations, our enemies, or rivals, have a more effectual means of diminis.h.i.+ng, by the laying on duties on our manufactures, and augmenting those duties when the goods happen to be carried in English vessels; but still the advantage we enjoy in this compet.i.tion is great.

Not so with our colonies and conquests. The whole imports from the East Indies, from 1700 to the present day, have only amounted [end of page #205] to 165,000,000 L. and our exports, during the same period, to 83,000,000 L. while our total exports have amounted to 1,486,000 L. during the same period. {167}

There would be much affectation, and little accuracy, in attempting to make any thing like a strict comparison between the relative proportions of the wealth procured by general trade, and that procured by trade with India. The exports amount to about one-nineteenth part of the whole; and, perhaps, as they are manufactured goods, to about one-tenth part of the whole manufactures of the country exported: but the manufactures exported are not equal to one-third part of those consumed at home, so that not above one-thirtieth part of our manufacturers are maintained by the trade to India.

In 1793, when the charter of the company was renewed, the India- budget stated the private fortunes acquired and brought home, at one million annually: that has probably increased since then; but it was at that time greater than it had been before: if, then, we take the annual arrival, since the year 1765, at one million, it will make forty millions, which, compared with the balance of trade during that period, amounts to about one-sixth part of the balance supposed to come into the country.

How much of our national debt might be set down to the account of India, is another question. By debt contracted, and interest of debt paid, during the same period, we have disbursed the sum of 1,100,000,000 L. which is equal to more than twelve times the whole of the property acquired by our India affairs, supposing the 45,000,000 L.

{167} Comparison between the total foreign trade of the country, to that with the East Indies only, for 104 years.

Total Exports. Total Balance Exports to India.

in our favour.

From

1700 to 1760, L540,000,000 L249,000,000 L18,000,000

1760 to 1785, L370,000,000 L101,000,000 L25,000,000

1785 to 1805, L576,000,000 L142,000,000 L40,000,000 ____________ ____________ ____________ L1,486,000,000 L492,000,000 L80,000,000 ____________ ____________ ____________

[Transcriber's note: L=GBP/Pounds Sterling.]

This is about a nineteenth part of our foreign trade, and the balance is greatly against us.

[end of page #206]

remitted, to be all gain, together with one-half of the 83,000,000 L.

which surely is allowing the gain at the highest rate for both. {168}

Supposing, then, that the wars that India has occasioned have cost (or the proportion of the debt they have occasioned) one-sixth part of the whole of our debt, and that the profits on goods to India, and private fortunes, came into the public treasury, there would still have been a great loss to the state; but this has not been the case, the interest of the debt has been levied on the people, and will continue to be so, till all is paid off; which, according to the plan of the sinking fund, will be in thirty-five years, so that we shall have about 750,000,000 L. more to pay, {169} supposing we have peace all that time, and continue to possess India.

There is something very gloomy in this view of national affairs, and yet there is no apparent method of making it more pleasing.

It is, on the contrary, very possible, that as Malta, on account of its being supposed the key to India, has cost us 20,000,000 L. within a few years, that, in less than thirty-five years, it may cost us _something_ more; and, it is not by any means impossible, that, before that period, we may either lose India, or give it away; on either of which suppositions, the arithmetical balance of profit and loss will be greatly altered, to our farther disadvantage.

On the possessions in India, and the complicated manner in which our imports (again exported) affect the nation, a volume might be written, but it would be to very little purpose, in a general inquiry of this sort.