Part 44 (1/2)
The preservation of the ancient customs is a very considerable point in respect to manners. Since a corrupt people seldom perform any memorable actions, seldom establish societies, build cities, or enact laws; on the contrary, since most inst.i.tutions are derived from people whose manners are plain and simple, to keep up the ancient customs is the way to preserve the original purity of morals.
Besides, if by some revolution the state has happened to a.s.sume a new form, this seldom can be effected without infinite pains and labor, and hardly ever by idle and debauched persons. Even those who had been the instruments of the revolution were desirous it should be relished, which is difficult to compa.s.s without good laws. Hence it is that ancient inst.i.tutions generally tend to reform the people's manners, and those of modern date to corrupt them. In the course of a long administration, the descent to vice is insensible; but there is no reascending to virtue without making the most generous efforts.
It has been questioned whether the member of the senate we are speaking of ought to be for life or only chosen for a time. Doubtless they ought to be for life, as was the custom at Rome,17 at Sparta,18 and even at Athens. For we must not confound the senate at Athens, which was a body that changed every three months, with the Areopagus, whose members, as standing patterns, were established for life.
Let this be, therefore, a general maxim; that in a senate designed to be a rule, and the depository, as it were, of manners, the members ought to be chosen for life: in a senate intended for the administration of affairs, the members may be changed.
The spirit, said Aristotle, waxes old as well as the body. This reflection holds good only in regard to a single magistrate, but cannot be applied to a senatorial a.s.sembly.
At Athens, besides the Areopagus, there were guardians of the public morals, as well as of the laws.19 At Sparta, all the old men were censors. At Rome, the censors.h.i.+p was committed to two particular magistrates. As the senate watched over the people, the censors were to have an eye over the people and the senate. Their office was, to reform the corruptions of the republic, to stigmatize indolence, to censure neglects, and to correct mistakes; as to flagrant crimes, these were left to the punishment of the laws.
That Roman law which required the accusations in cases of adultery to be public was admirably well calculated for preserving the purity of morals; it intimidated married women, as well as those who were to watch over their conduct.
Nothing contributes more to the preservation of morals than an extreme subordination of the young to the old. Thus they are both restrained, the former by their respect for those of advanced age, and the latter by their regard for themselves.
Nothing gives a greater force to the laws than a perfect subordination between the citizens and the magistrate. ”The great difference which Lycurgus established between Sparta and the other cities,” says Xenophon,20 ”consists chiefly in the obedience the citizens show to their laws; they run when the magistrate calls them. But at Athens a rich man would be highly displeased to be thought dependent on the magistrate.”
Paternal authority is likewise of great use towards the preservation of morals. We have already observed, that in a republic there is not so coercive a force as in other governments. The laws must, therefore, endeavor to supply this defect by some means or other; and this is done by paternal authority.
Fathers at Rome had the power of life and death over their children.21 At Sparta, every father had a right to correct another man's child.
Paternal authority ended at Rome together with the republic. In monarchies, where such a purity of morals is not required, they are controlled by no other authority than that of the magistrates.
The Roman laws, which accustomed young people to dependence, established a long minority. Perhaps we are mistaken in conforming to this custom; there is no necessity for so much constraint in monarchies.
This very subordination in a republic might make it necessary for the father to continue in the possession of his children's fortune during life, as was the custom at Rome. But this is not agreeable to the spirit of monarchy.
8.-In what Manner the Laws should relate to the Principle of Government in an Aristocracy If the people are virtuous in an aristocracy, they enjoy very nearly the same happiness as in a popular government, and the state grows powerful. But as a great share of virtue is very rare where men's fortunes are so unequal, the laws must tend as much as possible to infuse a spirit of moderation, and endeavor to re-establish that equality which was necessarily removed by the const.i.tution.
The spirit of moderation is what we call virtue in an aristocracy; it supplies the place of the spirit of equality in a popular state.
As the pomp and splendor with which kings are surrounded form a part of their power, so modesty and simplicity of manners const.i.tute the strength of an aristocratic n.o.bility.22 When they affect no distinction, when they mix with the people, dress like them, and with them share all their pleasures, the people are apt to forget their subjection and weakness.
Every government has its nature and principle. An aristocracy must not therefore a.s.sume the nature and principle of monarchy; which would be the case were the n.o.bles to be invested with personal privileges distinct from those of their body; privileges ought to be for the senate, and simple respect for the senators.
In aristocratic governments there are two princ.i.p.al sources of disorder: excessive inequality between the governors and the governed; and the same inequality between the different members of the body that governs. From these two inequalities, hatreds and jealousies arise, which the laws ought ever to prevent or repress.
The first inequality is chiefly when the privileges of the n.o.bility are honorable only as they are ignominious to the people. Such was the law at Rome by which the patricians were forbidden to marry plebeians;23 a law that had no other effect than to render the patricians on the one side more haughty, and on the other more odious. The reader may see what advantages the tribunes derived thence in their harangues.
This inequality occurs likewise when the condition of the citizens differs with regard to taxes, which may happen in four different ways: when the n.o.bles a.s.sume the privilege of paying none; when they commit frauds to exempt themselves;24 when they engross the public money, under pretence of rewards or appointments for their respective employments; in fine, when they render the common people tributary, and divide among their own body the profits arising from the several subsidies. This last case is very rare; an aristocracy so inst.i.tuted would be the most intolerable of all governments.
While Rome inclined towards aristocracy, she avoided all these inconveniences. The magistrates never received any emoluments from their office. The chief men of the republic were taxed like the rest, nay, more heavily; and sometimes the taxes fell upon them alone. In fine, far from sharing among themselves the revenues of the state, all they could draw from the public treasure, and all the wealth that fortune flung into their laps, they bestowed freely on the people, to be excused from accepting public honors.25 It is a fundamental maxim that largesses are pernicious to the people in a democracy, but salutary in an aristocratic government. The former make them forget they are citizens, the latter bring them to a sense of it.
If the revenues of the state are not distributed among the people, they must be convinced at least of their being well administered: to feast their eyes with the public treasure is with them the same thing almost as enjoying it. The golden chain displayed at Venice, the riches exhibited at Rome in public triumphs, the treasures preserved in the temple of Saturn, were in reality the wealth of the people.
It is a very essential point in an aristocracy that the n.o.bles themselves should not levy the taxes. The first order of the state in Rome never concerned themselves with it; the levying of the taxes was committed to the second, and even this in process of time was attended with great inconveniences. In an aristocracy of this kind, where the n.o.bles levied the taxes, the private people would be all at the discretion of persons in public employment; and there would be no such thing as a superior tribunal to check their power. The members appointed to remove the abuses would rather enjoy them. The n.o.bles would be like the princes of despotic governments, who confiscate whatever estates they please.
Soon would the profits hence arising be considered as a patrimony, which avarice would enlarge at pleasure. The farms would be lowered, and the public revenues reduced to nothing. This is the reason that some governments, without having ever received any remarkable shock, have dwindled away to such a degree as not only their neighbors, but even their own subjects, have been surprised at it.
The laws should likewise forbid the n.o.bles all kinds of commerce: merchants of such unbounded credit would monopolize all to themselves. Commerce is a profession of people who are upon an equality; hence among despotic states the most miserable are those in which the prince applies himself to trade.
The laws of Venice debar26 the n.o.bles from commerce, by which they might even innocently acquire exorbitant wealth.
The laws ought to employ the most effectual means for making the n.o.bles do justice to the people. If they have not established a tribune, they ought to be a tribune themselves.
Every sort of asylum in opposition to the execution of the laws destroys aristocracy, and is soon succeeded by tyranny.
They ought always to mortify the l.u.s.t of dominion. There should be either a temporary or perpetual magistrate to keep the n.o.bles in awe, as the Ephori at Sparta and the State Inquisitors at Venice-magistrates subject to no formalities. This sort of government stands in need of the strongest springs: thus a mouth of stone27 is open to every informer at Venice-a mouth to which one would be apt to give the appellation of tyranny.
These arbitrary magistrates in an aristocracy bear some a.n.a.logy to the censors.h.i.+p in democracies,28 which of its own nature is equally independent. And, indeed, the censors ought to be subject to no inquiry in relation to their conduct during their office; they should meet with a thorough confidence, and never be discouraged. In this respect the practice of the Romans deserved admiration; magistrates of all denominations were accountable for their administration,29 except the censors.30 There are two very pernicious things in an artistocracy-excess either of poverty, or of wealth in the n.o.bility. To prevent their poverty, it is necessary, above all things, to oblige them to pay their debts in time. To moderate the excess of wealth, prudent and gradual regulations should be made; but no confiscations, no agrarian laws, no expunging of debts; these are productive of infinite mischief.
The laws ought to abolish the right of primogeniture among the n.o.bles,31 to the end that by a continual division of the inheritances their fortunes may be always upon a level.
There should be no subst.i.tutions, no powers of redemption, no rights of Majorasgo, or adoption. The contrivances for perpetuating the grandeur of families in monarchical governments ought never to be employed in aristocracies.32 When the laws have compa.s.sed the equality of families, the next thing is to preserve a proper harmony and union amongst them. The quarrels of the n.o.bility ought to be quickly decided; otherwise the contests of individuals become those of families. Arbiters may terminate, or even prevent, the rise of disputes.
In fine, the laws must not favor the distinctions raised by vanity among families, under pretence that they are more n.o.ble or ancient than others. Pretences of this nature ought to be ranked among the weaknesses of private persons.
We have only to cast an eye upon Sparta; there we may see how the Ephori contrived to check the foibles of the kings,33 as well as those of the n.o.bility and common people.
9.-In what Manner the Laws are in relation to their Principle in Monarchies As honor is the principle of a monarchical government, the laws ought to be in relation to this principle.
They should endeavor to support the n.o.bility, in respect to whom honor may be, in some measure, deemed both child and parent.
They should render the n.o.bility hereditary, not as a boundary between the power of the prince and the weakness of the people, but as the link which connects them both.
In this government, subst.i.tutions which preserve the estates of families undivided are extremely useful, though in others not so proper.
Here the power of redemption is of service, as it restores to n.o.ble families the lands that had been alienated by the prodigality of a parent.
The land of the n.o.bility ought to have privileges as well as their persons. The monarch's dignity is inseparable from that of his kingdom; and the dignity of the n.o.bleman from that of his fief.
All these privileges must be peculiar to the n.o.bility, and incommunicable to the people, unless we intend to act contrary to the principle of government, and to diminish the power of the n.o.bles together with that of the people.
Subst.i.tutions are a restraint to commerce, the power of redemption produces an infinite number of processes; every estate in land that is sold throughout the kingdom is in some measure without an owner for the s.p.a.ce of a year. Privileges annexed to fiefs give a power very burdensome to those governments which tolerate them. These are the inconveniences of n.o.bility-inconveniences, however, that vanish when confronted with its general utility: but when these privileges are communicated to the people, every principle of government is wantonly violated.
In monarchies a person may leave the bulk of his estate to one of his children-a permission improper in any other government.
The laws ought to favor all kinds of commerce34 consistent with the const.i.tution, to the end that the subjects may, without ruining themselves, be able to satisfy the continual cravings of the prince and his court.
They should establish some regulation that the manner of collecting the taxes may not be more burdensome than the taxes themselves.
The weight of duties produces labor, labor weariness, and weariness the spirit of indolence.
10.-Of the Expedition peculiar to the Executive Power in Monarchies Great is the advantage which a monarchical government has over a republic: as the state is conducted by a single person, the executive power is thereby enabled to act with greater expedition. But as this expedition may degenerate into rapidity, the laws should use some contrivance to slacken it. They ought not only to favor the nature of each const.i.tution, but likewise to remedy the abuses that might result from this very nature.
Cardinal Richelieu35 advises monarchs to permit no such things as societies or communities that raise difficulties upon every trifle. If this man's heart had not been bewitched with the love of despotic power, still these arbitrary notions would have filled his head.
The bodies intrusted with the deposition of the laws are never more obedient than when they proceed slowly, and use that reflection in the prince's affairs which can scarcely be expected from the ignorance of a court, or from the precipitation of its councils.36 What would have become of the finest monarchy in the world if the magistrates, by their delays, their complaints and entreaties, had not checked the rapidity even of their princes' virtues, when these monarchs, consulting only the generous impulse of their minds, would fain have given a boundless reward to services performed with an unlimited courage and fidelity?
11.-Of the Excellence of a Monarchical Government Monarchy has a great advantage over a despotic government. As it naturally requires there should be several orders or ranks of subjects, the state is more permanent, the const.i.tution more steady, and the person of him who governs more secure.