Part 2 (1/2)

There was also another thing worthy of admiration, which is, that as Servius Tullius's division into cla.s.ses was in some measure the fundamental principle of the const.i.tution, it thence followed that an equal levying of the taxes was so connected with this fundamental principle that the one could not be abolished without the other.

But while the city paid the taxes as she pleased, or paid none at all,83 the provinces were plundered by the knights, who were the farmers of the public revenue. We have already made mention of their oppressive extortions, with which all history abounds.

”All Asia,” says Mithridates,84 ”expects me as her deliverer; so great is the hatred which the rapaciousness of the proconsuls,85 the confiscations made by the officers of the revenue, and the quirks and cavils of judicial proceedings,86 have excited against the Romans.”

Hence it was that the strength of the provinces did not increase, but rather weakened, the strength of the republic. Hence it was that the provinces looked upon the loss of the liberty of Rome as the epoch of their own freedom.

20.-The End of this Book I should be glad to inquire into the distribution of the three powers, in all the moderate governments we are acquainted with, in order to calculate the degrees of liberty which each may enjoy. But we must not always exhaust a subject, so as to leave no work at all for the reader. My business is not to make people read, but to make them think.

1 ”I have copied,” says Cicero, ”Scaevola's edict, which permits the Greeks to terminate their difference among themselves according to their own laws; this makes them consider themselves a free people.”

2 The Russians could not bear that Czar Peter should make them cut if off.

3 The Cappadocians refused the condition of a republican state, which was offered them by the Romans.

4 ”Omnes legum servi sumus ut liberi esse possimus.”-Cicero, ”pro Cluentio,” 53.

5 The natural end of a state that has no foreign enemies, or that thinks itself secured against them by barriers.

6 Inconvenience of the ”Liberum veto.”

7 The greater part of the principles produced in this chapter by Montesquieu is derived from Locke's ”Treatise upon Civil Government,” xii.-Ed.

8 At Venice.

9 As at Athens.

10 See Aristotle, ”Polit.” III. cap. vii.

11 See Aristotle, ”Repub.” II. cap. x.

12 Ibid. cap. ix.

13 These were magistrates chosen annually by the people. See Stephen of Byzantium.

14 It was lawful to accuse the Roman magistrates after the expiration of their several offices. See in Dionys. Halicarn. lib. IX. the affair of Genutius the tribune.

15 De minoribus rebus principles consultant de majoribus omnes; ita tamen ut ea quoque quorum penes plebem arbitrium est, apud principles pertractentur.

16 Nevertheless, during the same epoch there were kings in Macedonia, Syria, Egypt, etc.-Crevier.

17 ”Polit.” book III. chap. xiv.

18 Notwithstanding the fact that Arybas sought to render his monarchy more stable, the kings of Epirus retrained their power until overthrown by Paulus aemilius.-D 19 See Justin, book XVII.

20 Arist. ”Polit.” book V. chap. viii. Montesquieu seems to have misconstrued Aristotle, since the Molossi never had but one king.-P.

21 Ibid., book III. chap. xiv.

22 Ibid.

23 See what Plutarch says in the ”Life of Theseus.” See likewise ”Thucydides,” book I.

24 Aristot. ”Polit.” book IV. chap. viii.

25 Dionys. Halicarn. book II. p. 120, and book IV. pp. 242 and 243.

26 See Tanaquil's ”Discourse on Livy,” book I. dec. 1, and the regulations of Servius Tullius in Dionys. Halicarn. book IV. p. 229.

27 See Dionys. Halicarn. book II. p. 118, and book III. p. 171.

28 It was by virtue of a senatus-consultum that Tullius Hostilius ordered Alba to be destroyed.-Dionys. Halicarn. book III. pp. 167 and 172.

29 Ibid. book IV. p. 276.

30 Ibid., book II. And yet they could not have the nomination of all offices, since Valerius Publicola made that famous law by which every citizen was forbidden to exercise any employment, unless he had obtained it by the suffrage of the people.

31 Book III. p. 159.

32 Ibid., book IV.

33 He divested himself of half the regal power, says Dionys. Halicarn. book IV. p. 229.

34 It was thought that if he had not been prevented by Tarquin he would have established a popular government.-Dionys. Halicarn. book IV. p. 243.

35 Ibid., book IV.

36 Livy, dec. 1, book VI.

37 ”Quaestores parricidii.”-Pomponius, leg. 2 ff. ”de Orig. Jur.”

38 Plutarch, ”Life of Publicola.”

39 Comitiis centuriatis.

40 See Livy, book I.; Dionys. Halicarn. books IV. and VII.

41 Dionys. Halicarn. book IX. p. 598.

42 Dionys. Halicarn. book VII.

43 Contrary to the ancient custom, as may be seen in Dionys. Halicarn. book V. p. 320.

44 Dionys. Halicarn. book V. pp. 410 and 411.

45 Ibid. book IX. p. 650.

46 Dionys. Halicarn. book XI. p. 725.