Part 3 (2/2)
In this little flotilla of eighteen submarines, s.h.i.+ps that disappeared had to be replaced by others. For in the course of the war twenty ”E”
boats, two ”D” boats, and one ”L” boat belonging to the flotilla were lost, and these figures do not include the submarines that were detached from the Harwich Flotilla to be lost in the Mediterranean and Baltic. The sailor of to-day has not all the superst.i.tions of his forefathers, but, like most people, he has some belief in omens.
Certain coincidences made him regard it as very unlucky to sail in a submarine when a new captain was making his first voyage in her.
Within a short period four submarines that had sailed out of Harwich under new captains were never heard of again. It was also recognised that ill luck was likely to attend the first voyage of a newly launched submarine; but that, so soon as the first voyage had been safely accomplished, all was well with the s.h.i.+p, which would then be faced only by the ordinary chances of war.
To turn to an amusing example of the superst.i.tion of the sea. In the course of one cruise a submarine of the Harwich Flotilla had fired seven torpedoes at various enemy s.h.i.+ps without result. The captain discovered one of his crew kneeling on the deck over a bucket of sea-water. He was holding under the water and mercilessly wringing an object against which he was directing a volume of abuse in terms frankly nautical. Disgusted at the failure of the torpedoes, he was drowning the s.h.i.+p's mascot, a teddy bear or similar doll, hoping to change the luck. I wish that I could state that the next torpedo fired sank a Hun battles.h.i.+p, but I have no record of the sequel.
Even in war there are humorous incidents, and, indeed, there are many of them. One submarine captain of this flotilla attacked a German submarine on the surface and gave chase to her with the intention of torpedoing her. But the Hun had the greater speed; the British submarine had no gun, and could not get near enough to the receding foe to use a torpedo. So the captain had to content himself with signalling insulting messages to the Hun, hoping to taunt him into fighting; but the shocked Hun dived under the surface and disappeared in order to avoid the language.
On another occasion a submarine of this flotilla and a German submarine pa.s.sed very close to each other in such foul weather that nothing could be done in the way of fighting, so the two captains waved their hands cheerily at each other and went their respective ways. This is the only instance that I can recall of any Hun having displayed anything remotely resembling a sense of humour in the course of this war.
Our submarine commanders appear to have been adepts in the art of successfully bluffing the enemy when the occasion arose. For example, after one of our air raids on the German coast, a submarine of the Harwich Flotilla went to the rescue of one of our seaplanes that had fallen disabled to the water. While she was engaged in sinking the seaplane and taking off her pilot, a German aircraft came over very close. The captain of the submarine waved his cap to the enemy airmen, who concluded that the submarine was a German boat which had brought down an English seaplane and was capturing her pilot. As soon as the captain of the submarine had completed his task he dived quickly. The German must have then realised too late that he was dealing with an enemy, for as the submarine was moving away beneath the surface there was felt the shock caused by the bursting of bombs dropped by the Hun aircraft.
On another occasion, in June 1915, one of the Harwich submarines, on coming to the surface somewhere near the German coast, found that her engines were partly disabled. There was a German trawler in sight, and within range of the submarine's gun. The trawler would certainly have made a bolt for it, and in all probability would have got safely away, had she known that the submarine was incapable of giving chase to her.
But the captain of the submarine induced the German to surrender and compelled him to tow the crippled submarine across the North Sea back to Harwich, where the trawler and her crew of eight men were handed over to the authorities.
CHAPTER VIII
RECONNAISSANCE AND MINE-LAYING
CHAPTER VIII
RECONNAISSANCE AND MINE-LAYING
The eyes of the Fleet--The _Westphalen_ torpedoed--Mine-laying submarines--Destruction of U boats.
The princ.i.p.al duties of our submarines in the North Sea were reconnaissance, attack on the enemy's s.h.i.+ps, especially on his submarines, and mine-laying. The Germans were the first to introduce the system of laying mines with submarines, but we quickly followed their example and constructed submarines for this purpose. One of our submarines carries about twenty mines. The weapon of our submarines is, of course, the torpedo, of which an ”E” boat carries ten. Our submarines, unlike the German, usually carry nothing heavier than the twelve-pound gun. But towards the end of the war we were constructing submarines with heavier armament. Our latest ”M” boat is armed with a twelve-inch gun; she was despatched to the Mediterranean, but the armistice was signed, and prevented her from showing what she could do in the war.
For reconnaissance work in the North Sea our submarines were invaluable, for they could patrol close under the enemy sh.o.r.es, seeing much without being seen themselves, and could do what surface s.h.i.+ps could not do--remain there on the watch for several days at a time if necessary, for they were able to dive and disappear if detected and in serious danger. The submarines of the Harwich Flotilla had often to travel under our own and the enemy minefields. They were ever patrolling our own great minefields on the east side of the North Sea, and sending home wireless information as to the movements of the enemy light forces, and reporting any mine-sweeping operations on the part of the enemy that seemed to indicate preparations for a sortie. It was the ambition of every British submarine captain, by giving timely notice, to bring about what the Huns used to term ”The Day,” that is, an action between their somewhat over-shy capital s.h.i.+ps and our own.
It was regarded as being of so great importance to obtain the earliest possible warning of Hun activities in the North Sea that an order was issued by the Admiralty to the effect that a submarine on lookout patrol had for her primary duty to come to the surface and send home, by wireless, information as to _outward_-bound enemy surface craft; while her secondary duty was to attack. In the case of _homeward_-bound enemy surface craft, the primary duty was to attack. If there should be any doubt as to the destination of an enemy surface craft, it was the duty of the submarine first to report by wireless and then to attack.
I have already shown how, during the critical eight days that saw our First Expeditionary Force cross the Channel to France, the Harwich submarines kept a sleepless watch on the German coast, to attack the enemy s.h.i.+ps should they come out to interfere with the transport of our troops. I have also explained that these submarines had a good deal to do with the preparation for the action in Heligoland Bight.
It was the E23, too, of this flotilla that, while patrolling, sighted the German High Sea Fleet on August 19, 1916. She first wirelessed home the news that the Germans had come out, and then delivered a bold attack. She torpedoed the battles.h.i.+p _Westphalen_ on the port side.
The result of the explosion gave the battles.h.i.+p a big list, but for a while she still went on with the battle fleet. As the list increased, she at last left the line and turned for home, escorted by destroyers.
Thereupon the E23 set out to intercept her, pa.s.sed through the screen of enemy destroyers that were zigzagging round the _Westphalen_, and torpedoed her on the starboard side. The battles.h.i.+p contrived to get away, but in so damaged a condition that she must have been out of the war for a considerable time.
The strategical position occupied by the Harwich Flotilla also imposed upon it another duty of great responsibility. The submarines had to be ever ready to go south at a moment's notice to cover the eastern approach to the English Channel against the enemy capital s.h.i.+ps, should these attempt to break through. Had the Germans made the attempt in earnest, there is no doubt that they would have had to pay a very heavy toll.
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