Part 5 (1/2)
53.
Do we see then, that Providence so very sensibly manifests herself in the preservation of those admirable works, which we attribute to her? If it is she, who governs the world, we find her as active in destroying, as in forming; in exterminating, as in producing. Does she not every moment destroy, by thousands, the very men, to whose preservation and welfare we suppose her continually attentive? Every moment she loses sight of her beloved creature. Sometimes she shakes his dwelling, sometimes she annihilates his harvests, sometimes she inundates his fields, sometimes she desolates them by a burning drought. She arms all nature against man.
She arms man himself against his own species, and commonly terminates his existence in anguish. Is this then what is called preserving the universe?
If we could view, without prejudice, the equivocal conduct of Providence towards the human race and all sensible beings, we should find, that far from resembling a tender and careful mother, she resembles rather those unnatural mothers, who instantly forgetting the unfortunates of their licentious love, abandon their infants, as soon as they are born, and who, content with having borne them, expose them, helpless, to the caprice of fortune.
The Hottentots, in this respect are much wiser than other nations, who treat them as barbarians, and refuse to wors.h.i.+p G.o.d; because, they say, _if he often does good, he often does evil_. Is not this manner of reasoning more just and conformable to experience, than that of many men, who are determined to see, in their G.o.d, nothing but goodness, wisdom, and foresight, and who refuse to see that the innumerable evils, of which this world is the theatre, must come from the same hand, which they kiss with delight?
54.
Common sense teaches, that we cannot, and ought not, to judge of a cause, but by its effects. A cause can be reputed constantly good, only when it constantly produces good. A cause, which produces both good and evil, is sometimes good, and sometimes evil. But the logic of theology destroys all this. According to that, the phenomena of nature, or the effects we behold in this world, prove to us the existence of a cause infinitely good; and this cause is G.o.d. Although this world is full of evils; although disorder often reigns in it; although men incessantly repine at their hard fate; we must be convinced, that these effects are owing to a beneficent and immutable cause; and many people believe it, or feign believe.
Every thing that pa.s.ses in the world, proves to us, in the clearest manner, that it is not governed by an intelligent being. We can judge of the intelligence of a being only by the conformity of the means, which he employs to attain his proposed object. The object of G.o.d, is the happiness of a man. Yet, a like necessity governs the fate of all sensible beings, who are born only to suffer much, enjoy little, and die. The cup of man is filled with joy and bitterness; good is every where attended with evil; order gives place to disorder; generation is followed by destruction.
If you say, that the designs of G.o.d are mysterious and that his ways are impenetrable; I answer, that, in this case, it is impossible to judge whether G.o.d be intelligent.
55.
You pretend, that G.o.d is immutable! What then produces a continual instability in this world, which you make his empire? Is there a state, subject to more frequent and cruel revolutions, than that of this unknown monarch? How can we attribute to an immutable G.o.d, sufficiently powerful to give solidity to his works, a government, in which every thing is in continual vicissitude? If I imagine I see a G.o.d of uniform character in all the effects favourable to my species, what kind of a G.o.d can I see in their continual misfortunes? You tell me, it is our sins, which compel him to punish. I answer, that G.o.d, according to yourselves, is then not immutable, since the sins of men force him to change his conduct towards them. Can a being, who is sometimes provoked, and sometimes appeased, be constantly the same?
56.
The universe can be only what it is; all sensible beings in it enjoy and suffer; that is, are moved sometimes in an agreeable, and sometimes in a disagreeable manner. These effects are necessary; they result necessarily from causes, which act only according to their properties. These effects necessarily please, or displease, by a consequence of nature. This same nature compels me to avoid, avert, and resist some things, and to seek, desire, and procure others. In a world, where every thing is necessary, a G.o.d, who remedies nothing, who leaves things to run in their necessary course,--is he any thing but destiny, or necessity personified? It is a deaf and useless G.o.d, who can effect no change in general laws, to which he is himself subject. Of what importance is the infinite power of a being, who will do but very little in my favour? Where is the infinite goodness of a being, indifferent to happiness? Of what service is the favour of a being, who, is able to do an infinite good, does not do even a finite one?
57.
When we ask, why so many miserable objects appear under the government of a good G.o.d, we are told, by way of consolation, that the present world is only a pa.s.sage, designed to conduct man to a happier one. The divines a.s.sure us, that the earth we inhabit, is a state of trial. In short, they shut our mouths, by saying, that G.o.d could communicate to his creatures neither impossibility nor infinite happiness, which are reserved for himself alone. Can such answers be satisfactory? 1st. The existence of another life is guaranteed to us only by the imagination of man, who, by supposing it, have only realized the desire they have of surviving themselves, in order to enjoy hereafter a purer and more durable happiness. 2ndly. How can we conceive that a G.o.d, who knows every thing, and must be fully acquainted with the dispositions of his creatures, should want so many experiments, in order to be sure of their dispositions? 3rdly. According to the calculations of their chronologists, our earth has existed six or seven thousand years. During that time, nations have experienced calamities. History exhibits the human species at all times tormented and ravaged by tyrants, conquerors, and heroes; by wars, inundations, famines, plagues, etc. Are such long trials then likely to inspire us with very great confidence in the secret views of the Deity?
Do such numerous and constant evils give a very exalted idea of the future state, his goodness is preparing for us? 4thly. If G.o.d is so kindly disposed, as he is a.s.serted to be, without giving men infinite happiness, could he not at least have communicated the degree of happiness, of which finite beings are susceptible here below? To be happy, must we have an _infinite_ or _divine_ happiness? 5thly. If G.o.d could not make men happier than they are here below, what will become of the hope of a _paradise_, where it is pretended, that the elect will for ever enjoy ineffable bliss? If G.o.d neither could nor would avert evil from the earth, the only residence we can know, what reason have we to presume, that he can or will avert evil from another world, of which we have no idea? Epicurus observed: ”either G.o.d would remove evil out of this world, and cannot; or he can, and will not; or he has neither the power nor will; or, lastly, he has both the power and will. If he has the will, and not the power, this shews weakness, which is contrary to the nature of G.o.d. If he has the power, and not the will, it is malignity; and this is no less contrary to his nature. If he is neither able nor willing, he is both impotent and malignant, and consequently cannot be G.o.d. If he be both willing and able (which alone is consonant to the nature of G.o.d) whence comes evil, or why does he not prevent it?” Reflecting minds are still waiting for a reasonable solution of these difficulties; and our divines tell us, that they will be removed only in a future life.
58.
We are told of a pretended _scale of beings_. It is supposed, that G.o.d has divided his creatures into different cla.s.ses, in which each enjoys the degree of happiness, of which it is susceptible. According to this romantic arrangement, from the oyster to the celestial angels, all beings enjoy a happiness, which is suitable to their nature. Experience explicitly contradicts this sublime reverie. In this world, all sensible beings suffer and live in the midst of dangers. Man cannot walk without hurting, tormenting, or killing a mult.i.tude of sensible beings, which are in his way; while he himself is exposed, at every step, to a mult.i.tude of evils, foreseen or unforeseen, which may lead him to destruction. During the whole course of his life, he is exposed to pains; he is not sure, a moment, of his existence, to which he is so strongly attached, and which he regards as the greatest gift of the Divinity.
59.