Volume I Part 7 (1/2)
His army, numbering four thousand two hundred men, was collected by the 21st of August, and on that day it was embarked at Valparaiso in the whole Chilian squadron. Lord Cochrane proposed to go at once to Chilca, the nearest point both to Lima and to Callao. San Martin, however, decided upon Pisco as a safer landing-place, and there the troops were deposited on the 8th of September. For fifty days they were detained there, and the fleet was forced to share their idleness, capturing only a few pa.s.sing merchantmen. On the 28th of October they were re-embarked, and Lord Cochrane again urged a vigorous attack on the capital and its port. Again he was thwarted by San Martin, who requested to be landed at Ancon, considerably to the north of Callao, and as unsuitable a halting-place as was the southerly town of Pisco.
Lord Cochrane had to comply; but he bethought him of a plan for achieving a great work, in spite of San Martin. Sending the main body of his fleet to Ancon with the troops, no the 20th, he retained the _O'Higgins_, the _Independencia_, and the _Lautaro_, with the professed object of merely blockading Callao at a safe distance.
”The fact was,” he said, ”that, annoyed, in common with the whole expedition, at this irresolution on the part of General San Martin, I determined that the means of Chili, furnished with great difficulty, should not be wholly wasted, without some attempt at accomplis.h.i.+ng the object of the expedition. I accordingly formed a plan of attack with the three s.h.i.+ps which I had kept back, though, being apprehensive that my design would be opposed by General San Martin, I had not even mentioned to him my intentions. This design was, to cut out the _Esmeralda_ frigate from under the fortifications, and also to get possession of another s.h.i.+p, on board of which we had learned that a million of dollars was embarked.”
The plan was certainly a bold one. The _Esmeralda_, of forty-four guns, was the finest Spanish s.h.i.+p in the Pacific Ocean. Now especially well armed and manned, in readiness for any work that had to be done, she was lying in Callao Harbour, protected by three hundred pieces of artillery on sh.o.r.e and by a strong boom with chain moorings, by twenty-seven gunboats and several armed block-s.h.i.+ps. These considerations, however, only induced Lord Cochrane to proceed cautiously upon his enterprise. Three days were spent in preparations, the purpose of which was known only to himself and to his chief officers. On the afternoon of the 5th of November he issued this proclamation:--”Marines and seamen,--This night we shall give the enemy a mortal blow. To-morrow you will present yourself proudly before Callao, and all your comrades will envy your good fortune.
One hour of courage and resolution is all that is required for you to triumph. Remember that you have conquered in Valdivia, and have no fear of those who have hitherto fled from you. The value of all the vessels captured in Callao will be yours, and the same reward will be distributed amongst you as has been offered by the Spaniards in Lima to those who should capture any of the Chilian squadron. The moment of glory is approaching. I hope that the Chilians will fight as they have been accustomed to do, and that the English will act as they have ever done at home and abroad.”
A request was made for volunteers, and the whole body of seamen and marines on board the three s.h.i.+ps offered to follow Lord Cochrane wherever he might lead. This was more than he wanted. ”A hundred and sixty seamen and eighty marines,” said Lord Cochrane, whose own narrative of the sequel will best describe it, ”were placed, after dark, in fourteen boats alongside the flag-s.h.i.+p, each man, armed with cutla.s.s and pistol, being, for distinction's sake, dressed in white, with a blue band on the left arm. The Spaniards, I expected, would be off their guard, and consider themselves safe from attack for that night, since, by way of ruse, the other s.h.i.+ps had been sent out of the bay under the charge of Captain Foster, as though in pursuit of some vessels in the offing.
”At ten o'clock all was in readiness, the boats being formed in two divisions, the first commanded by Flag-Captain Crosbie and the second by Captain Gruise,--my boat leading. The strictest silence and the exclusive use of cutla.s.ses were enjoined; so that, as the oars were m.u.f.fled and the night was dark, the enemy had not the least suspicion of the impending attack.
”It was just upon midnight when we neared the small opening left in the boom, our plan being well-nigh frustrated by the vigilance of a guard-boat upon which my launch had unluckily stumbled. The challenge was given, upon which, in an undertone, I threatened the occupants of the boat with instant death if they made the least alarm. No reply was made to the threat, and in a few minutes our gallant fellows were alongside the frigate in line, boarding at several points simultaneously. The Spaniards were completely taken by surprise, the whole, with the exception of the sentries, being asleep at their quarters; and great was the havoc made amongst them by the Chilian cutla.s.ses whilst they were recovering themselves. Retreating to the forecastle, they there made a gallant stand, and it was not until the third charge that the position was carried. The fight was for a short time renewed on the quarterdeck, where the Spanish marines fell to a man, the rest of the enemy leaping overboard and into the hold to escape slaughter.
”On boarding the s.h.i.+p by the main-chains, I was knocked back by the sentry's musket, and falling on the tholl-pin of the boat, it entered my back near the spine, inflicting a severe injury, which caused me many years of subsequent suffering. Immediately regaining my footing, I reascended the side, and, when on deck, was shot through the thigh.
But, binding a handkerchief tightly round the wound, I managed, though with great difficulty, to direct the contest to its close.
”The whole affair, from beginning to end, occupied only a quarter of an hour, our loss being eleven killed and thirty wounded, whilst that of the Spaniards was a hundred and sixty, many of whom fell under the cutla.s.ses of the Chilians before they could stand to their arms.
Greater bravery I never saw displayed than by our gallant fellows.
Before boarding, the duties of all had been appointed, and a party was told off to take possession of the tops. We had not been on deck a minute, when I hailed the foretop, and was instantly answered by our own men, an equally prompt answer being returned from the frigate's main-top. No British man-of-war's crew could have excelled this minute attention to orders.
”The uproar speedily alarmed the garrison, who, hastening to their guns, opened fire on their own frigate, thus paying us the compliment of having taken it; though, even in this case, their own men must still have been on board, so that firing on them was a wanton proceeding. Several Spaniards were killed or wounded by the shot of the fortress. Amongst the wounded was Captain Coig, the commander of the _Esmeralda_, who, after he was made prisoner, received a severe contusion by a shot from his own party.
”The fire from the fortress was, however, neutralized by a successful expedient. There were two foreign s.h.i.+ps of war present during the contest, the United States frigate _Macedonian_ and the British frigate _Hyperion_; and these, as had been previously agreed upon with the Spanish authorities in case of a night attack, hoisted peculiar lights as signals, to prevent being fired upon. This contingency being provided for by us, as soon as the fortress commenced its fire on the _Esmeralda_, we also ran up similar lights, so that the garrison did not know which vessel to fire at. The _Hyperion_ and _Macedonian_ were several times struck, while the _Esmeralda_ was comparatively untouched. Upon this the neutral vessels cut their cables and moved away. Contrary to my orders, Captain Gruise then cut the _Esmeralda's_ cables also, so that there was nothing to be done but to loose her topsails and follow. The fortress thereupon ceased its fire.
”I had distinctly ordered that the cables of the _Esmeralda_ were not to be cut, but that after taking her, the force was to capture the _Maypeu_, a brig of war previously taken from Chili, and then to attack and cut adrift every s.h.i.+p near, there being plenty of time before us. I had no doubt that, when the _Esmeralda_ was taken, the Spaniards would desert the other s.h.i.+ps as fast as their boats would permit them, so that the whole might have been either captured or burnt. To this end all my previous plans had been arranged; but, on my being placed _hors de combat_ by my wounds, Captain Gruise, on whom the command of the prize devolved, chose to interpose his own judgment and content himself with the _Esmeralda_ alone; the reason a.s.signed being that the English had broken into her spirit-room and were getting drunk, whilst the Chilians were disorganized by plundering.
It was a great mistake. If we could capture the _Esmeralda_ with her picked and well-appointed crew, there would have been little or no difficulty in cutting the other s.h.i.+ps adrift in succession. It would only have been the rout of Valdivia over again, chasing the enemy, without loss, from s.h.i.+p to s.h.i.+p instead of from fort to fort.”
Lord Cochrane's exploit, however, though less complete than he had intended, was as successful in its issue as it was brilliant in its achievement. ”This loss of the _Esmeralda_,” wrote Captain Basil Hall, then commanding a British war-s.h.i.+p in South American waters, ”was a death-blow to the Spanish naval force in that quarter of the world; for, although there were still two Spanish frigates and some smaller vessels in the Pacific, they never afterwards ventured to show themselves, but left Lord Cochrane undisputed master of the coast.”
The speedy liberation of Peru was its direct consequence, although that good work was seriously impaired by the continued and increasing misconduct of General San Martin, inducing troubles, of which Lord Cochrane received his full share.
In the first burst of his enthusiasm at the intelligence of Lord Cochrane's action, San Martin was generous for once. ”The importance of the service you have rendered to the country, my lord,” he wrote on the 10th of November, ”by the capture of the frigate _Esmeralda_, and the brilliant manner in which you conducted the gallant officers and seamen under your orders to accomplish that n.o.ble enterprise, have augmented the grat.i.tude due to your former services by the Government, as well as that of all interested in the public welfare and in your fame. All those who partic.i.p.ated in the risks and glory of the deed also deserve well of their countrymen; and I have the satisfaction to be the medium of transmitting the sentiments of admiration which such transcendent success has excited in the chiefs of the army under my command.” ”It is impossible for me to eulogize in proper language,”
he also wrote to the Chilian administration, ”the daring enterprise of the 5th of November, by which Lord Cochrane has decided the superiority of our naval forces, augmented the splendour and power of Chili, and secured the success of this campaign.”
A few days later, however, San Martin wrote in very different terms.
”Before the General-in-Chief left the Vice-Admiral of the squadron,”
he said, in a bulletin to the army, ”they agreed on the execution of a memorable project, sufficient to astonish intrepidity itself, and to make the history of the liberating expedition of Peru eternal.” ”This glory,” he added, ”was reserved for the Liberating Army, whose efforts have s.n.a.t.c.hed the victims of tyranny from its hands.” Thus impudently did he arrogate to himself a share, at any rate, in the initiation of a project which Lord Cochrane, knowing that he would oppose it, had purposely kept secret from him, and a.s.sign the whole merit of its completion to the army which his vacillation and incompetence were holding in unwelcome inactivity.
Lord Cochrane was too much accustomed to personal injustice, however, to be very greatly troubled by that fresh indignity. It was a far heavier trouble to him that his first triumph was not allowed to be supplemented by prompt completion of the work on which, and not on any individual aggrandis.e.m.e.nt, his heart was set--the establishment of Peruvian as well as Chilian freedom.
San Martin, having done nothing hitherto but allow his army to waste its strength and squander its resources, first at Pisco and afterwards at Ancon, now fixed upon Huacha as another loitering-place. Thither Lord Cochrane had to convey it, before he was permitted to resume the blockade of Callao. This blockade lasted, though not all the while under his personal direction, for eight months.
”Several attempts were now made,” said Lord Cochrane, with reference to the first few weeks of the blockade, ”to entice the remaining Spanish naval force from their shelter under the batteries by placing the _Esmeralda_ apparently within reach, and the flags.h.i.+p herself in situations of some danger. One day I carried her through an intricate strait called the Boqueron, in which nothing beyond a fifty-ton schooner was ever seen. The Spaniards, expecting every moment to see the s.h.i.+p strike, manned their gunboats, ready to attack as soon as she was aground; of which there was little danger, for we had found, and buoyed off with small bits of wood invisible to the enemy, a channel through which a vessel could pa.s.s without much difficulty. At another time, the Esmeralda being in a more than usually tempting position, the Spanish gunboats ventured out in the hope of recapturing her, and for an hour maintained a smart fire; but on seeing the _O'Higgins_ manoeuvring to cut them off, they precipitately retreated.”
In ways like those the Spaniards were locked in, and hara.s.sed, in Callao Bay. Good result came in the steady weakening of the Spanish cause. On the 3rd of December, six hundred and fifty soldiers deserted to the Chilian army. On the 8th they were followed by forty officers; and after that hardly a day pa.s.sed without some important defections to the patriot force.'
Unfortunately, however, there was weakness also among the patriots.
San Martin, idle himself, determined to profit by the advantages, direct and indirect, which Lord Cochrane's prowess had secured and was securing. It began to be no secret that, as soon as Peru was freed from the Spanish yoke, he proposed to subject it to a military despotism of his own. This being resented by Lord Cochrane, who on other grounds could have little sympathy or respect for his a.s.sociate, coolness arose between the leaders. Lord Cochrane, anxious to do some more important work, if only a few troops might be allowed to co-operate with his sailors, was forced to share some of San Martin's inactivity. In March, 1821, he offered, if two thousand soldiers were a.s.signed to him, to capture Lima; and when this offer was rejected, he declared himself willing to undertake the work with half the number of men. With difficulty he at last obtained a force of six hundred; and by them and the fleet nearly all the subsequent fighting in Peru was done. Lord Cochrane did not venture upon a direct a.s.sault on the capital with so small an army; but he used it vigorously from point to point on the coast, between Callao and Arica, and thus compelled the capitulation of Lima on the 6th of July.