Part 10 (1/2)
The British showed how damage might be dealt naval bases supposedly secure under the guns of fortifications, but something more than a sally will be necessary to smoke out the German fleet, or to root out the nests of submarines along the coast of Belgium. Again, there is the theory that eventually the Germans will come out and give battle. There is a psychological backing for this a.s.sumption, for the irksomeness of being penned up wears and wears until it is not to be borne. At least this seems to have been the case in blockades in past wars, notably the dash of Admiral Cervera's squadron from Santiago Harbor.
But when the Germans come it will be no such forlorn hope as that--at least not according to the German expectation; what they expect, however, and what they may get are contingencies lying wide apart.
In connection with our far-flung naval policy the establishment of a naval base on the Azores Islands was announced last spring. The arrangement was made with the full consent of Portugal, and the design was the protection of the Atlantic trade routes to southern Europe. Guns have already been landed on the island, and fortifications are now in process of construction. The station, besides being used as a naval base for American submarines, destroyers, and other small craft, will serve as an important homing-station for our airplanes, a number of which have already been a.s.sembled there.
The establishment of this station greatly simplifies the task of protecting the great trade routes, not only to southern Europe and the Mediterranean, but also returning traffic to South American and southern Gulf ports in the United States.
CHAPTER X
Great Atlantic Ferry Company, Incorporated, But Unlimited--Feat of the Navy in Repairing the Steams.h.i.+ps Belonging to German Lines Which Were Interned at Beginning of War in 1914--Welding and Patching--Triumph of Our Navy With the ”Vaterland”--Her Condition--Knots Added to Her Speed--Damage to Motive Power and How It Was Remedied--Famous German Liners Brought Under Our Flag
In an address delivered not long ago, Admiral Gleaves, commander-in-chief of the United States Cruiser and Transport Force, referred to ”The Great Atlantic Ferry Company, Incorporated, but Unlimited.” He referred to our transport fleet, of course, a fleet which, under naval supervision and naval operation, has safely transported more than a million of our soldiers to France. When the history of the war finally comes to be written, our success in the handling of oversea transportation will not be the least bright among the pages of that absorbing history.
When the European nations first went to war in 1914 I happened to be at the Newport Naval Training Station, and I asked an officer what would happen if we went into the war.
”Not much,” he said. ”We would stand on our sh.o.r.es and the Germans on theirs and make faces at each other.”
Events have proved that he was not looking into the future wisely, not taking into account the enormous energy and get-things-doneness of Secretary Daniels and his coadjutors. Not only did the Navy Department send our destroyer fleet to the war zone--the Allied officers, believing co-operation of the sort not feasible, had neither requested nor expected this--but performed many other extraordinary feats, among them the equipping of transports to carry our men to France, and the conduct of the service when they were ready.
We had only a fair number of American steams.h.i.+ps adapted for the purpose, but lying in our ports were interned German and Austrian vessels aggregating many hundreds of thousands of tons. From 1914 until we entered the war commuters on North River ferry-boats seemed never weary of gazing at the steams.h.i.+ps lying in the great North German Lloyd and Hamburg-American line piers in Hoboken. There was a small forest of masts and funnels appearing above the pier sheds, while many a graceful stern protruded out beyond the pier lines into the river.
Among them was the great _Vaterland_, the largest vessel in the world, and the outward and visible expression of that peaceful maritime rivalry between Great Britain and the German Empire, which in the transatlantic lanes as in the waters of all the seven seas had interested followers of s.h.i.+pping for so many years. There was, so far as pa.s.senger traffic was concerned, the rivalry for the blue ribbon of the sea--the swiftest ocean carrier, a fight that was waged between Great Britain and Germany from the placid eighties to the nineties, when the Germans brought out the _Deutschland_, and later the _Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse_, the _Kaiser Wilhelm II_--all champions--whose laurels were to be s.n.a.t.c.hed away by the _Mauretania_ and the _Lusitania_--the two speed queens--when war ended compet.i.tion of the sort.
But the contest in speed had, to an extent, been superseded by the rivalry of size, a struggle begun by the White Star Line when the great _Oceanic_ slipped past quarantine in the early 1900's, and carried on by that line, by the Atlantic Transport Line, and by the German companies with unceasing vigor. Great carrying capacity and fair speed were the desiderata, and the studious Germans were quick to see that it was a far more profitable battle to wage, since speed meant merely advertising, with a more or less slight preponderance in the flow of pa.s.senger patronage to the line which owned the latest crack greyhound, whereas size meant ability to carry greater cargoes, and thus enhanced earning capacity.
So great hulls were the order of the years preceding 1914. There came the new _Baltic_, the new _Cymric_, the new _Adriatic_ of the White Star Line, and for the Germans there came the _Amerika_ and other craft of that type. Finally there was the _t.i.tanic_ and her ill-fated maiden voyage; the Cunarder _Aquitania_, and the _Vaterland_, and the _Imperator_, which bore the German ensign. These facts, presented not altogether in chronological order, are necessary to give the reader an idea of the manner in which the Americans were taking back seats in the unceasing fight for commercial maritime supremacy. It is quite likely, so far back was our seat, that the Germans held little respect for our ability, either to man or to fit the immense number of German vessels in our harbors. In truth, the events that followed our entrance into the war showed just how supreme the contempt of the Germans was for our knowledge of things nautical.
We are about to record just how erroneous that att.i.tude of the Germans was, but wish first to point out that they had failed to take into consideration the fact that at Annapolis is situated a school of the sea that asks nothing of any similar school in the world, and that they had also failed to note that, while we had not gone in heavily for s.h.i.+pping, we have been rather effective in other lines which in event of emergency might be brought to bear upon the problem of correcting such deficiencies as might exist in our store of modern nautical tradition.
Well, while the German waged their unrestricted warfare on the sea, those German vessels lay at Hoboken and at other ports of the country, gathering the rust and barnacles of disuse. Then one day Congress spoke definitely, and the next morning North River ferry voyagers saw lying off the German docks a torpedo-boat destroyer flying the American flag.
Some days later the American flag floated over the taffrails of the _Vaterland_, the _Kaiser Wilhelm II_, and other Teutonic craft. Their employment in the way of providing transportation of our soldiers, of course, was contemplated. In fact, the accession to our marine of such a large number of hulls seemed to provide for us all the necessary means which otherwise we would have lacked.
But not so fast. When our officers began to look over these German craft they found that they were in a woful condition, not so much because of disuse as because of direct damage done to them by the German crews who had been attached to the s.h.i.+ps ever since they were laid up in 1914.
There is evidence in Was.h.i.+ngton that the German central authorities issued an order for the destruction of these s.h.i.+ps which was to be effective on or about February 1, 1917--simultaneous, in other words.
with the date set for unrestricted warfare. There is not the slightest doubt that the purpose of the order was to cause to be inflicted damage so serious to vital parts of the machinery of all German vessels in our ports, that no s.h.i.+p could be operated within a period of time ranging from eight months to two years, if at all.
But the Germans miscalculated, as already set forth. We took over the 109 German vessels in April, and by December 30 of that year, 1917, all damage done to them had been repaired and were in service, adding more than 500,000 tons gross to our transport and cargo fleets. In general the destructive work of the German crews consisted of ruin which they hoped and believed would necessitate the s.h.i.+pping of new machinery to subst.i.tute for that which was battered down or damaged by drilling or by dismantlement.
To have obtained new machinery, as a matter of fact, would have entailed a mighty long process. First, new machinery would have had to be designed, then made, and finally installed. These would have been all right if time was unlimited. But it was not; it was, on the other hand, extremely limited. The army wished to send troops abroad, the Allies were pleading for men, and the only way to get them over in time to do anything was to do quick repair jobs on the damaged vessels. But how?
Investigation revealed how thorough the work of the German seamen--now enjoying themselves in internment camps--had been. Their destructive campaign had been under headway for two months, and they had thus plenty of time in which to do all sorts of harm, ranging from the plugging of steam-pipes to the demolition of boilers by dry firing.
The s.h.i.+pping Board experts were the first to go over the German craft, and as a result of their survey it was announced that a great deal of new machinery would have to be provided, and that a fair estimate of the work of remedying the damage inflicted would be eighteen months. But this was too long, altogether so. The officers of the Navy Bureau of Steam Engineering took a hand, and finally decided that it would be possible to clear the s.h.i.+ps for service by Christmas of that year. (As a matter of record, the last of the 109 s.h.i.+ps was ordered into service on Thanksgiving Day.)
To accomplish the purposes they had in mind, the Navy Department engaged the services of all available machinery welders and patchers, many of whom were voluntarily offered by the great railroad companies. Most of the time that was required was due not so much to actual repair work as to the devious and tedious task of dismantling all machinery from bow to stern of every s.h.i.+p in order to make certain that every bit of damage was discovered and repaired. In this way all chance of overlooking some act of concealed mutilation was obviated.
[Ill.u.s.tration: _From a photograph copyright by International Film Service._ REPAIRING A DAMAGED CYLINDER OF A GERMAN s.h.i.+P FOR FEDERAL SERVICE.]
It would appear that explosives were not used in the process of demolition by the Germans, but at the time the engineers could not be sure of this, and as a consequence as they worked they were conscious of the danger of hidden charges which might become operative when the machinery was put to the test, or even while the work of dismantling and inspection was being carried on. There were, however, discovered, as a result of this rigid investigation of every mechanical detail, many artful cases of pipe-plugging, of steel nuts and bolts concealed in delicate mechanical parts, of ground gla.s.s in oil-pipes and bearings, of indicators that were so adjusted as to give inaccurate readings, of fire-extinguishers filled with gasoline--in fact, the manifold deceits which the Germans practised would make a chapter of themselves.
Suffice to say, that through painstaking investigation every trick was discovered and corrected. On each vessel there was no boiler that was not threaded through every pipe for evidence of plugging, no mechanism of any sort that was not completely dismantled, inspected, and rea.s.sembled. On one s.h.i.+p the engineers chanced to find a written record of the damage inflicted. In every other case the search for evidence of sabotage was blind. This memorandum in the case of the one s.h.i.+p was evidently left on board through an oversight, and written in German, was a veritable guide-book for our engineers. In order that the reader may have some idea of the sort of damage done, the following extracts from that memorandum of destructiveness is herewith presented: