Part 20 (1/2)

There really were no s.h.i.+ps of any importance available to join the Chinese ironclads, so one is puzzled to imagine what Ito saw. It was only when the firing died away that Admiral Ting sent orders to the ”Kw.a.n.g-ping,” the transports, gunboats, and torpedo craft to come out. Only the ”Kw.a.n.g-ping”

and the torpedo boats obeyed. As the sun went down he formed line ahead, and steered for Port Arthur. First came the two ironclads; then the ”Lai-yuen,” with her upper works still on fire in places; then the ”Ching-yuen,” ”Ping-yuen,” ”Kw.a.n.g-ping,” and the torpedo boats. Far astern the abandoned ”Chao-yung” blazed like a bonfire in the twilight. Ting honestly believed he had beaten off the j.a.panese fleet, and on his arrival at Port Arthur reported a victory. But though j.a.panese opinion was not quite satisfied, Ito had so damaged the Chinese fleet that henceforth he held command of the sea. He had won his success with comparatively small loss. Of all the units of his fleet his flags.h.i.+p, the ”Matsus.h.i.+ma,” had suffered most. She had two officers killed and three wounded, and 33 men killed and 71 wounded, a total of 109, and about a third of the losses in the entire fleet. The ”Hiyei” came next in the casualty list, with 56 killed and wounded. The losses of the other s.h.i.+ps were trifling. The ”Ikitsus.h.i.+ma” had 31 killed and wounded; the ”Akagi,” 28; the ”Akitsus.h.i.+ma,” 15; the ”Fuso,” 14; and the ”Yos.h.i.+no” and ”Saikio,” each 11.

The ”Takachico” had an officer and two men wounded; the ”Naniwa Kan”

(Captain Togo's s.h.i.+p) one man wounded. The ”Chiyoda,” which lay next to the ”Matsus.h.i.+ma,” in the main squadron, had not one single casualty. The official return of losses gave these totals:--

Killed. Wounded. Totals.

Officers 10 16 26 Men 80 188 268 -- --- --- 90 204 294

There are no available returns of the Chinese loss. It was certainly much heavier, perhaps a thousand men. But, thanks to their armour, the two ”battles.h.i.+ps” suffered comparatively little loss, notwithstanding the terrible fire to which they were exposed for hours. The ”Ting-yuen” had 14 killed and 20 wounded, the ”Chen-yuen” 7 killed and 15 wounded. The two s.h.i.+ps afterwards took part in the defence of Wei-hai-wei, where one was torpedoed and the other captured by the j.a.panese.

When the first reports of the Yalu battle reached Europe there was much exaggerated talk about the value of the protected cruiser. It was even said by amateur ”naval experts” that this type and not the battles.h.i.+p would be the wars.h.i.+p of the future. It is almost needless to say that the battle conveyed no such lesson. If anything, it rather proved the enormous resisting power of the armoured s.h.i.+p. If Ting, instead of his two antiquated coast-defence armour-clads, had had a couple of up-to-date battles.h.i.+ps manned with trained crews, he would certainly have disposed of a good many of the j.a.panese cruisers. The j.a.panese quite realized this, and proceeded to build a heavily armoured fleet.

The most valuable lesson of the battle was the warning of the danger of fires lighted by exploding sh.e.l.ls. This had an immediate influence on s.h.i.+p construction, and on the methods adopted by all navies in clearing for action.

But the most important point of all was that the conduct of the j.a.panese officers and men in the battle, and in the subsequent naval operations in the siege of Wei-hai-wei, made the world realize that a new naval power had arisen in the Far East.

CHAPTER XIII

SANTIAGO DE CUBA

1898

The United States Navy had taken a decisive part in securing victory for the Union in the War of Secession. It had effectively blockaded the Atlantic and Gulf coasts of the Confederacy, captured New Orleans, given valuable help to the army, in seizing the line of the Mississippi, and by the combined effect of these operations isolated the Confederate States from the rest of the world, destroyed their trade, and cut off their supplies.

One would have expected that the importance of sea-power would have been fully appreciated in the United States after such experiences, and that steps would have been taken to form and maintain an effective fleet. But for some twenty years after the war the American Navy was hopelessly neglected. During this period the fleet consisted mainly of some of the miscellaneous collection of s.h.i.+ps of various types built or purchased during the years of conflict. Old monitors that had engaged the batteries of Charleston figured in the Navy List, beside sloops and steam frigates that were little better than armed merchantmen. The only good work that was done by the Navy Department was the training and maintenance of a corps of excellent officers, and to their influence it was due that at last a beginning was made of the building of a new navy.

The first s.h.i.+ps built were of two cla.s.ses. Public opinion was still clinging to the idea that the ”Monitor” was a supremely effective type of wars.h.i.+p, and accordingly considerable sums were expended on the building of coast-defence vessels of this type, low-freeboard turret-s.h.i.+ps, carrying a couple of heavy guns in an armoured turret. But s.h.i.+ps were also required that could make ocean voyages, and show the flag in foreign waters, and for this purpose a number of protected cruisers were built, full-rigged, masted steamers, with their guns in broadside batteries.

Still, the United States possessed only a fourth or fifth-rate fleet, and could not have sent to sea a squadron that could rank with the fleets kept in commission regularly by several of the European powers. Advocates of the old American plan of ”having no foreign policy” even maintained that the country had no need of an ocean-going fleet, and required only coast-defence s.h.i.+ps and a few light cruisers.

It was not till the end of the 'eighties that American opinion was aroused to the danger of neglecting the sea-power of the States. The splendid American Navy of to-day is the creation of less than twenty years of systematic development. When the war broke out between the United States and Spain over the Cuban question several of the new cruisers and battles.h.i.+ps were available, but many older s.h.i.+ps were still in the service, and a number of armed liners and other makes.h.i.+ft auxiliaries were taken into the navy.

During the period of tension that immediately preceded the war two fleets were concentrated on the Atlantic coast. The North Atlantic Fleet, under Admiral Sampson, at Key West, Florida, and the reserve fleet, officially known as the ”Flying Squadron,” under Commodore Schley, at Hampton Roads.

The Pacific Squadron, under Commodore Dewey, was at Hong Kong, waiting to sail for the Philippines as soon as war was declared.

In the following list of Sampson's and Schley's squadrons, besides the displacement of each s.h.i.+p, the date of her launch is noted, so as to distinguish between the older and the newer types of wars.h.i.+ps:--

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON.

Displacement. Date of Speed.

Tons. Launch. Knots.

Armoured cruiser (flags.h.i.+p)-- _New York_ 8,480 1891 21

Battles.h.i.+ps-- _Iowa_ 11,296 1896 16 _Indiana_ 10,231 1893 15 1/2

Cruisers-- _Cincinnati_ 3,183 1892 19 _Detroit_ } _Montgomery_ } 2,000 1892 17 _Marblehead_ }