Part 27 (1/2)
_The Universities--their Education System the admiration of the World._
The working of all these colleges and of the system on which they are regulated, is for the benefit of the public; and in each and every college the object is to carry into execution the will of the founder, just as it would probably have been had he lived to this period. In every case the great object of the governing authorities is, to benefit the public by the education of the youth who resort to these inst.i.tutions. The n.o.ble viscount (Melbourne) could not help admitting that these inst.i.tutions have worked well, and that latterly a great improvement has taken place in the system of education pursued under their auspices. The n.o.ble viscount has also spoken of the great improvement in the system of education pursued in the new university of Durham, and in other new universities elsewhere. But, nevertheless, the n.o.ble viscount could not help admitting that the old universities of Oxford and Cambridge possess the merit of having established in England an excellent system of education, which is, in point of fact, the envy and admiration of the world.
_April_ 11, 1837.
_The Quadruple Treaty condemned_.
My lords, I must confess that I did not approve of the original Quadruple Treaty. I considered it inconsistent with the ancient principle and the policy and practice adopted in this country with regard to Portugal, to avoid to interfere in the disputes between the two princes of the House of Braganza, which had been the policy of this country for many years. It sanctioned the introduction of Spanish troops into Portugal, which measure was inconsistent with our defensive relations with Portugal, and which had been objected to and prevented in that very contest between the rival princes of the House of Braganza.
Yet it gave no fresh a.s.sistance to bring the contests in Portugal to a conclusion, excepting the promise to give the aid of this country by the employment of a naval force in co-operation with the Spanish and Portuguese troops, which aid was not necessary. Another objection which I entertained to the Quadruple Treaty was, that it mixed up France and this country in the offers and promises made to Don Carlos and Don Miguel, in the fifth and sixth articles of the treaty. These powers became, in fact, guarantees for the performance of these engagements, as well as for the performance of the engagements made under the same articles of the treaty to the subjects of Portugal and Spain. It is impossible to describe the inconvenience of such articles; they require the interference of government in hundreds of little questions. I have felt the inconvenience of those articles since their adoption; I stated my objections to them at the time, and I have seen no reason, since, to alter the opinions I then formed.
_April_ 21, 1837.
_Effects of the Additional Articles to the Quadruple Treaty._
By the first of the additional articles to the treaty, the King of the French obliged himself to take such measures in those parts of his dominions which adjoined to Spain, as might be calculated to prevent succours of men, arms, and warlike stores being sent from France into Spain; and the King of Great Britain engaged, under the second of the said additional articles, to furnish such arms and warlike stores as her majesty the Queen of Spain might require; and further to a.s.sist her majesty with a naval force if necessary. The Duke of Braganza was to give his best a.s.sistance to serve her majesty, that he might be called upon to render. So that those additional articles were essentially different from the terms and provisions of the original treaty, by which the removal of the two princes from Portugal was effected. I do not mean to say, that, in the preamble to that treaty, allusion is not made to the affairs both of Spain and Portugal, but there still is a remarkable difference between the words used in the treaty and the additional articles; and moat particularly in relation to the part to be taken by this country.
_April_ 21, 1837.
_The Legion and the Stock Exchange.--Impotency of our interference_.
I contend, as I have before contended in this house, that his majesty's present ministers (Lord Melbourne's government) ought not to have departed from the position which the previous administration had established while they were in power. I will not pretend to say what would have been the result of their following out that course, but this I do say, that the course pursued by his lords.h.i.+p's government has not benefited the military or the financial affairs of Spain, or promoted the peace of that country or the general tranquillity of Europe, or attained any of the political advantages which the n.o.ble viscount boasts have been attained by his departure from that position which the previous government had occupied and left to their successors. But, my lords, it did unfortunately happen that certain parties in this country had been connected with the Spanish finances; and it was important to those parties that the red coats should make their appearance in Spain, and that the name of ”Great Britain,” and of the British legion, should be mixed up in the operations of the war. Money was raised in this country to defray the expense of the equipment of the ”Legion,” as it was called, of 10,000 or 12,000 men, and also of their pay, their food, and maintenance, for a certain number of months; and the n.o.ble lords, in order that this scheme might be carried into execution, gave their consent to the order in council for the suspension of the Foreign Enlistment Act. The corps gathered in this country, and went to Spain, in the spring of the year 1835, nearly two years ago. Their first operation upon their arrival at St. Sebastian, was a march over the very same ground to the very spot which was the scene of the late disaster.
My lords, up to that moment, the Eliot convention, as it is most honourably and justly called, had been carried into execution. It was on that day departed from on both sides, and from that day to this, I firmly believe, from all I have seen and read,--and I have read much on the subject within the last few days--there has been no certainty in the execution of that convention. Not only has there been no certainty in the execution of that convention, but, notwithstanding the millions of money that Spain has expended,--notwithstanding the blood which has been shed and the number of lives that have been lost,--I will venture to say, that the military affairs of the Queen of Spain are in a worse condition now than they were in the month of May, 1835.
The whole of the policy of the British government, therefore; all the operations of the British legion, backed by the British squadron; have effected nothing more nor less towards putting an end to the war, and giving peace to Spain and to Europe, than the removal of the blockade of St. Sebastian from one point to another, so as not to come within the liability of being affected by the 68-pounders of the British steamers, under the command of Lord John Hay.
_April_ 21,1837.
_Uselessness of the operations of the Legion, and Lord John Hay's Squadron, at St. Sebastian_.
If the n.o.ble lord supposes that the safety of St. Sebastian had been more or less endangered by the blockade, I can a.s.sure him that he is much mistaken; for, from what I know of that fortified town, which is one of the first or second order in Europe, I can take upon myself to say that the Carlists might have been left in their original position without any danger whatever to the town, because they could not make an attack upon such a fortress. In the whole course of the war they have not, to my knowledge, taken by an attack any fortified post; or even any open town of any magnitude, prepared for its defence. They could not have distressed St. Sebastian for provisions, because its communication with the sea could not be prevented. I say, it could not be prevented, even if the whole British fleet were blockading it, instead of being there to relieve it. The amount of inconvenience felt in the town from the Carlist force being in the neighbourhood, was neither more nor less than the unpleasantness of ladies and gentlemen, residing there, being prevented taking their evening walks in the neighbourhood. This is the whole amount of the inconvenience from which the town was relieved. This was the whole amount of the service rendered.
_April_ 21,1837.
_Strictures on General Evans_.
My lords, I will go a little further. I will say, that I firmly believe that the connexion between the legion and the fleet has been injurious to the military operations of the queen of Spain's generals. That is my decided opinion, founded upon my knowledge of the nature of the country, and of the position of both parties. My lords, there is one point to which I refer; that is, the want of communication between the Queen of Spain's generals, which can be relied upon. If corps of the size of those now employed are not actually joined, there must be a certain communication between them; for, without communication there can be no co-operation; and any attempt at co-operation would, in my opinion, in all probability, lead to disasters such as have recently taken place at Hernani. How are these troops situated? General Evans's troops are at St. Sebastian; General Saarsfield is at the other side of the Borunda, at Pampeluna; and Espartero, with his army, is at Bilboa. It is impossible that there can be any communication between these three, except by the French frontier, and by sea from Socoa, or by the Ebro. An arrangement is made for an attack, and a day named. What was the consequence? General Evans made an attack, but General Saarsfield, at Pampeluna, does not attack; there is a frost or snow, or rain, or some physical impediment which prevents a movement on the part of Saarsfield.
General Evans cannot be informed in time, and the enemy has opportunity and leisure to throw his whole force upon General Evans; who, even if the troops had behaved well, would have been compelled to retire. The position, therefore, of the legion at St. Sebastian, in order to co-operate with the British squadron, that there might be something like British co-operation, was not an operation of war, it was one of stock-jobbing. My lords, it is a matter of much surprise to me, that General Evans, who, having acquired the confidence of his majesty's government, and that of the Queen of Spain, I presume must be an able man--it is, certainly, a surprising circ.u.mstance, that having had experience of the difficulties of carrying on communication in that country, and having met with a check in the month of January, 1836, for want of communication, he should not have felt the danger of his position, and should have omitted to put himself in communication to a certainty with corps in whose co-operation he was to act, instead of keeping himself at a distance, in order that he might carry on operations in concert with his majesty's fleet.
_April_ 21,1837.