Part 9 (1/2)
_Character of the Marques de la Romana._
In him the Spanish army have lost their brightest ornament, his country their most upright patriot, and the world the most strenuous and zealous defender of the cause in which we are engaged; and I shall always acknowledge with grat.i.tude the a.s.sistance which I received from him, as well by his operations as by his counsel, since he had been joined with this army.
_January 26, 1811._
_None but the worst men enter the Army as Privates._
In respect to recruiting the army, my own opinion is, that the government have never taken an enlarged view of the subject. It is expected that people will become soldiers in the line, and leave their families to starve, when, if they become soldiers in the militia, their families are provided for. This is an inconsistency that must strike the mind of even the least reflecting of mankind. What is the consequence?
That none but the worst description of men enter the regular service.
But admitting the truth of the expense, I say that the country has not a choice between army and no army, between peace or war. They must have a large and efficient army, one capable of meeting the enemy abroad, or they must expect to meet him at home; and then farewell to all considerations of measures of greater or lesser expense, and to the ease, the luxury, and happiness of England. G.o.d forbid that I should see the day on which hostile armies should contend within the United Kingdom; but I am very certain that I shall not only see that day, but shall be a party in the contest, unless we alter our system, and the public feel in time the real nature of the contest in which we are at present engaged, and determine to meet its expense. I have gone a little beyond the question of recruiting; but depend upon it that you will get men when you provide for the families of soldiers in the line and not in the militia, and not before.
_January 28, 1811._
_Buonaparte's ”disgusting Tyranny.”_
I am glad to hear such good accounts of affairs in the North. G.o.d send that they may prove true, and that we may overthrow this disgusting tyranny: however, of this I am certain, that whether true or not at present, something of the kind must occur before long, and, if we can only hold out, we shall yet see the world relieved.
_March 23, 1811._
_A French army in England would be the consequence of our withdrawal from the Peninsula._
I shall be sorry if government should think themselves under the necessity of withdrawing from this country, on account of the expense of the contest. From what I have seen of the objects of the French government, and the sacrifices they make to accomplish them, I have no doubt that if the British army were for any reason to withdraw from the Peninsula, and the French government were relieved from the pressure of military operations on the Continent, they would incur all risks to land an army in his majesty's dominions. Then indeed would commence an expensive contest; then his majesty's subjects discover what are the miseries of war, of which, by the blessing of G.o.d, they have hitherto had no knowledge; and the cultivation, the beauty, and prosperity of the country, and the virtue and happiness of its inhabitants, would be destroyed: whatever might be the result of the military operations; G.o.d forbid that I should be a witness, much less an actor, in the scene.[6]
[Footnote 6: At this time the clamours of the opposition regarding the expense of the war induced a fear that the government might determine to discontinue it.]
_March 23, 1811._
_The Peninsular Governments must not mind unpopularity._
I recommend to them (the Spaniards and Portuguese) to advert seriously to the nature of the task which they have to perform. Popularity, however desirable it may be to individuals, will not form, or feed, or pay an army; will not enable it to march and fight; will not keep it in a state of efficiency for long and arduous services. The resources which a wise government must find for these objects must be drawn from the people, not by measures which will render those unpopular who undertake to govern a country in critical circ.u.mstances, but by measures which must for a moment have a contrary effect. The enthusiasm of the people in favour of any individual never saved any country. They must be obliged by the restraint of law and regulation, to do those things and to pay those contributions, which are to enable the government to carry on this necessary contest.
_April 9, 1811._
_Coolness in action, not headlong bravery, is required in the Army._
The desire to be forward in engaging the enemy is not uncommon in the British array; but that quality which I wish to see the officers possess, who are at the head of the troops, is a cool, discriminating judgment in action, which will enable them to decide with prompt.i.tude how far they can and ought to go, with propriety; and to convey their orders, and act with such vigour and decision, that the soldiers will look up to them with confidence in the moment of action, and obey them with alacrity.
_May 15, 1811._