Part 13 (2/2)

With this highly mobile force a brilliant victory was achieved, but of course the historian will not give to the E.E.F. campaign the extravagant praise which has been lavished upon it by an ill-informed public, ignorant as yet of the fact that in the field of operations the strength of the British to that of the Turk was as that of a tiger to a tom-cat.

The bulk of the Turkish forces were on or south of a line drawn from Jisr ed Damie, on the Jordan, through Nablus and Tul Keram to the Mediterranean. His fighting strength on this front was, roughly, 17,000 Infantry, 1,000 Cavalry, and 266 guns. His line of communication was long and bad. He was about 1,200 miles from his base at Constantinople, and, owing to incomplete tunnels at Ama.n.u.s and Taurus and a change of gauge at Ryak, there were no less than three bad breaks in the single line of railway which had to carry his reinforcements, munitions, equipment, and food both to the Palestinian and Mesopotamian fronts.

His troops were badly fed and badly led; medical arrangements were very poor; there was considerable friction between the Turks and Germans, and the Turkish Army was composed of a mixture of races, many of them hating their masters with a fierce hatred.

Here were all the elements of a _debacle_ on a grand scale.

On the morning of September 19th one of the most triumphant cavalry marches ever recorded in the world's history began at Jaffa, and before the troops engaged in it drew rein in far-off Aleppo, five weeks later, they had covered some 500 miles through an enemy's country, captured or destroyed over 50,000 Turks, seized Damascus, Beyrout, and Aleppo, and brought to an inglorious end the Ottoman Empire.

This was no mean record for a mere handful of mounted men to accomplish.

We must not forget, however, that without the lavish help of the other arms--infantry, artillery, and especially the Air Force, victory on such a colossal scale could not have been achieved.

It almost seems as if this crowning victory had been pre-ordained to take place in the year 1918. Everybody knows that the Jewish era differs from the Christian era, but perhaps not so many are aware that the Jewish year 5679 corresponds to the year 1918 of our era. A peculiarity of the Hebrew language is that every numeral has a special meaning other than that connected with time or figures. In the dim and distant past, when seers, sages, and scribes were devoutly engaged in evolving such things, was it even then pre-ordained that this crowning victory--this victory which will surely hasten the restoration of Israel--should take place in the year 5679? However that may be, it is certainly extraordinary that the figures 5, 6, 7, 9, being interpreted, should mean Ha-atereth--”Crown of Victory.”

CHAPTER XIX.

THE STRATEGICAL VALUE OF PALESTINE.

When Turkey, unfortunately for herself, ranged her forces on the side of our enemies in the Great War she severed a friends.h.i.+p which had lasted for the greater part of a century. Our policy had for many years been to uphold the integrity of the Ottoman Empire because, with that Power holding Palestine, our Egyptian interests were quite safe. Now that the Turkish Empire has practically ceased to exist, Palestine becomes of cardinal importance to our Eastern interests.

Situated as it is at the Gate of the three Continents of Europe, Asia, and Africa, its strategical, political, and economic importance is beyond computation and out of all proportion to the size of this diminutive country.

Students of strategy and military history will agree that Palestine, although some distance from the Suez Ca.n.a.l region, dominates that main artery of our trade and commerce.

The eastern boundary of Egypt, running from Rafa on the Mediterranean to Akaba on the Gulf of that name in the Red Sea, is, from a military point of view, worthless. History tells us that all down the ages armies have crossed the Sinai Desert and worked their will on the dwellers by the Nile. Early in the War we ourselves were unable to hold this Egyptian Frontier and were forced to retire to the line of the Suez Ca.n.a.l. It is true we defeated the Turks there and drove them out of Egypt, but the risk to our communications was very grave. It is a risk that should never again be taken, and for the future the Suez Ca.n.a.l must be defended, at all events on the Eastern side, from its strategical frontier--Palestine. With a friendly people established in the Judaean strongholds, and with sea power in our hands, the invasion of Egypt from the East or North would be a well-nigh impossible enterprise. It was always a cause of surprise to me that we did not very early in the War seize and fortify the harbours of Haifa and Jaffa. This might easily have been done, as they were practically undefended, and the people were in their hearts pro-British. Even Gaza could have been occupied and fortified in the early days. With these three towns in our hands no Turkish force could have been organised in Palestine or used against Egypt. No army could possibly march down the maritime plain with these occupied towns menacing their flank, while the other route to Egypt by the eastward of the Jordan Valley is almost impossible for a large army.

Some eighty years ago Ibrahim Pasha was forced to retire to Egypt from Damascus by this eastern route because we held the coast ports. He left the ancient capital of Syria with some eighty thousand men, and, although he fought no battle on the way, his losses from sickness, hunger, thirst, and fatigue amounted to over sixty-five thousand men.

This gives one some little idea of the chance we missed in not making adequate use of our sea power by seizing the coast towns in the Levant during the Great War.

The physical conformation of Palestine adds enormously to its strategical strength.

The country is divided into four longitudinal belts running practically throughout the length of the country from North to South. Along the sea coast run the narrow maritime plains of Philistia, Sharon, and Acre.

These narrow plains stretch from the borders of Egypt to the mountains of Lebanon.

The next belt of country consists of the continuation of the Lebanon range, which runs down practically unbroken through central Palestine, losing itself in the Southern Desert.

This hilly range const.i.tutes the heart of the Holy Land and comprises the provinces of Galilee, Samaria, and Judaea. The only complete break in this range occurs between Galilee and Samaria, where the Plain of Esdraelon and the Valley of Jezreel cut right across and leave an open doorway from East to West. Through this gap from time immemorial armies have marched and counter-marched to and from Egypt.

The next belt of country is the great depression of the Jordan Valley, the deepest known in the world. It runs from ”the waters of Merom,” near the foothills of Hermon, where it is on a level with the Mediterranean, to the Dead Sea, where it is nearly 1,300 ft. below sea-level.

To the eastward of the Jordan Valley runs the table-land of the Hauran, Gilead, and Moab. This rich belt of territory is from twenty to sixty miles wide and ranges from 2,000 ft. to 4,000 ft. above sea-level. It loses itself to the South and East in the Arabian and Syrian Deserts.

<script>