Part 8 (1/2)
Again Dr. Hodge cites the incident of Elisha at Dothan[1] as if in ill.u.s.tration of the rightfulness of deception under certain circ.u.mstances. But in this case it was concealment of facts that might properly be concealed, and not the deception of enemies as enemies, that Elisha compa.s.sed. The Syrians wanted to find Elisha. Their eyes were blinded, so that they did not recognize him when in his presence.
In order to teach them a lesson, Elisha told the Syrians that they could not find him, or the city which was his home, by their own seeking; but if they would follow him he would bring them to the man whom they sought. They followed him, and he showed himself to them.
When their eyes were opened in Samaria he would not suffer them to be harmed, but had them treated as guests, and sent back safely to their king.
[Footnote 1: Kings 6: 14-20.]
Having cited these three cases, no one of which can fairly be made to apply to the argument he is pursuing, Dr. Hodge complacently remarks: ”Examples of this kind of deception are numerous in the Old Testament.
Some of them are simply recorded facts, without anything to indicate how they were regarded in the sight of G.o.d; but others, as in the cases above cited, received either directly or by implication the divine sanction.”
But Dr. Hodge goes even farther than this. He ventures to suggest that Jesus Christ deceived his disciples by intimating what was not true as to his purpose, in more than one instance. ”Of our blessed Lord himself it is said in Luke 24:28, 'He made as though [Greek: prosepoieito]--he made a show of: he would have gone further.' He so acted as to make the impression on the two disciples that it was his purpose to continue his journey. (Comp. Mark 6: 48.)”[1] This suggestion of Dr. Hodge's would have been rebuked by even Richard Rothe, and would have shocked August Dorner. Would Dr. Hodge deny that Jesus _could_ have had it in his mind to ”go further,” or to have ”pa.s.sed by” his disciples, if they would not ask him to stop? And if this were a possibility, is it fair to intimate that a purpose of deception was in his mind, when there is nothing in the text that makes that a necessary conclusion? Dr. Hodge, indeed, adds the suggestion that ”many theologians do not admit that the fact recorded in Luke 24:28 [which he cites as an ill.u.s.tration of justifiable deception by our Lord] involved any intentional deception;” but this fact does not deter him from putting it forward in this light.
[Footnote 1: When Jesus came walking on the sea, toward his disciples in their tempest-tossed boat, ”he would have pa.s.sed them by;” but their cry of fear drew him toward them.]
In the discussion of the application to emergencies, in practical life, of the eternal principle which he points out at the beginning, Dr. Hodge is as far from consistency as in his treatment of Bible narratives. ”It is generally admitted,” he says, ”that in criminal falsehoods there must be not only the enunciation or signification of what is false, and an intention to deceive, but also a violation of some obligation.” What obligation can be stronger than the obligation to be true to G.o.d and true to one's self? If, as Dr. Hodge declares, ”a man who violates the truth, sins against the very foundation of his moral being,” a man would seem to be always under an obligation not to violate the truth by speaking that which is false with an intention to deceive. But Dr. Hodge seems to lose sight of his premises, in all his progress toward his conclusions on this subject.
”There will always be cases,” he continues, ”in which the rule of duty is a matter of doubt. It is often said that the rule above stated applies when a robber demands your purse. It is said to be right to deny that you have anything of value about you. You are not bound to aid him in committing a crime; and he has no right to a.s.sume that you will facilitate the accomplishment of his object. This is not so clear. The obligation to speak the truth is a very solemn one; and when the choice is left a man to tell a lie or lose his money, he had better let his money go. On the other hand, if a mother sees a murderer in pursuit of her child, she has a perfect right to mislead him by any means in her power [including lying?]; because the general obligation to speak the truth is merged or lost, for the time being, in the higher obligation.” Yet Dr. Hodge starts out with the declaration that the obligation ”to keep truth inviolate,” is highest of all; that ”truth is at all times sacred, because it is one of the essential attributes of G.o.d;” that G.o.d himself cannot ”suspend or modify” this obligation; and that man is always under its force. And now, strangely enough, he claims that in various emergencies ”the general obligation to speak the truth is merged, or lost, for the time being, in the higher obligation.” The completest and most crus.h.i.+ng answer to the vicious conclusions of Dr. Hodge as to the varying claims of veracity, is to be found in the explicit terms of his unvaryingly correct premises in the discussion.
Dr. Hodge appears to be conscious of his confusion of mind in this discussion, but not to be quite sure of the cause of it. As to his claim that the general obligation to speak the truth may be merged for the time being in a ”higher obligation,” he says: ”This principle is not invalidated by its possible or actual abuse. It has been greatly abused.” And he adds, farther on, in the course of the discussion:
”The question now under consideration is not whether it is ever right to do wrong, which is a solecism; nor is the question whether it is ever right to lie; but rather what const.i.tutes a lie.”
Having claimed that a lie necessarily includes falsity of statement, an intention to deceive, and ”a violation of some obligation,” Dr.
Hodge goes on to show that ”every lie is a violation of a promise,”
as growing out of the nature of human society, where ”every man is expected to speak the truth, and is under a tacit but binding promise not to deceive his neighbor by word or act.” And, after all this, he is inclined to admit that there are cases in which falsehoods with the intention of deceiving are not lying, and are justifiable. ”This, however,” he goes on to say, ”is not always admitted. Augustine, for example, makes every intentional deception, no matter what the object or what the circ.u.mstances, to be sinful.” And then, in artless simplicity, Dr. Hodge concludes: ”This would be the simplest ground for the moralist to take. But as shown above, and as generally admitted, there are cases of intentional deception which are not criminal.”
According to the principles laid down at the start by Dr. Hodge, there is no place for a lie in G.o.d's service; but according to the inferences of Dr. Hodge, in the discussion of this question, there are places where falsehoods spoken with intent to deceive are admissible in G.o.d's sight and service. His whole treatment of this subject reminds me of an incident in my army-prison life, where this question as a question was first forced upon my attention. The Union prisoners, in Columbia at that time, received their rations from the Confederate authorities, and had them cooked in their own way, and at their own expense, by an old colored woman whom they employed for the purpose.
Two of us had a dislike for onions in our stew, while the others were well pleased with them. So we two agreed with old ”Maggie,” for a small consideration, to prepare us a separate mess without onions. The next day our mess came by itself. We took it, and began our meal with peculiar satisfaction; but the first taste showed us an unmistakable onion flavor in our stew. When old Maggie came again, we remonstrated with her on her breach of engagement. ”Bless your hearts, honeys,” she replied, ”you must have _some_ onions in your stew!” She could not comprehend the possibility of a beef stew without onions, even though she had formally agreed to make it.
Dr. Hodge's premises in the discussion of the duty of truthfulness rule out onions; but his inferences and conclusions have the odor and the taste of onions. He stands on a safe platform to begin with; but he is an unsafe guide when he walks away from it. His arguments in this case are an ill.u.s.tration of his own declaration: ”An adept in logic may be a very poor reasoner.”
Dr. Thornwell's ”Discourses on Truth”[1] are a thorough treatment of the obligation of veracity and the sin of lying. He is clear in his definitions, marking the distinction between rightful concealment as concealment, and concealment for the purpose of deception. ”There are things which men have a right to keep secret,” he says, ”and if a prurient curiosity prompts others officiously to pry into them, there is nothing criminal or dishonest in refusing to minister to such a spirit. Our silence or evasive answers may have the effect of misleading. That is not our fault, as it was not our design. Our purpose was simply to leave the inquirer as nearly as possible in the state of ignorance in which we found him: it was not to misinform him, but not to inform him at all.
[Footnote 1: In Thornwell's _Collected Writings_, II., 451-613.]
”'Every man,' says Dr. d.i.c.k, 'has not a right to hear the truth when he chooses to demand it. We are not bound to answer every question which may be proposed to us. In such cases we may be silent, or we may give as much information as we please, and suppress the rest. If the person afterward discover that the information was partial, he has no t.i.tle to complain, because he had no right even to what he obtained; and we are not guilty of a falsehood unless we made him believe, by something which we said, that the information was complete.'” ”The _intention_ of the speaker, and the _effect_ consequent upon it, are very different things.”
Dr. Thornwell recognizes the fact that the moral sense of humanity discerns the invariable superiority of truth over falsehood. ”If we place virtue in sentiment,” he says, ”there is nothing, according to the confession of all mankind, more beautiful and lovely than truth, more ugly and hateful than a lie. If we place it in calculations of expediency, nothing, on the one hand, is more conspicuously useful than truth and the confidence it inspires; nothing, on the other, more disastrous than falsehood, treachery, and distrust. If there be then a moral principle to which, in every form, humanity has given utterance, it is the obligation of veracity.” ”No man ever tells a lie without a certain degree of violence to his nature.”
Dr. Thornwell bases this obligation of veracity on the nature of G.o.d, and on the duty of man to conform to the image of G.o.d in which he was created. ”Jesus Christ commends himself to our confidence and love,”
he says, ”on the ground of his being the truth;... and makes it the glory of the Father that he is the G.o.d of truth, and the shame and everlasting infamy of the prince of darkness that he is the father of lies;” and he adds: ”The mind cannot move in charity, nor rest in Providence, unless it turn upon the poles of truth.” ”Every man is as distinctly organized in reference to truth, as in reference to any other purpose.”
In Dr. Thornwell's view, it is not, as Dr. Paley would have it, that ”a lie is a breach of promise,” because as between man and man ”the truth is expected,” according to a tacit understanding. As Dr.
Thornwell sees it, ”we are not bound by any other expectations of man but those which we have authorized;” and he deems it ”surprising to what an extent this superficial theory of 'contract' has found advocates among divines and moralists,” as, for example, Dr. Robert South, whom he quotes.[1] ”If Dr. Paley had pushed his inquiries a little farther,” adds Thornwell, ”he might have accounted for this expectation [of truthfulness] which certainly exists, independently of a promise, upon principles firmer and surer than any he has admitted in the structure of his philosophy. He might have seen it in the language of our nature proclaiming the will of our nature's G.o.d.” The moral sense of mankind demands veracity, and abhors falsehood.
[Footnote 1: Smith's _Sermon, on Falsehood and Lying_.]
Dr. Thornwell is clear as to the teachings of the Bible, in its principles, and in the ill.u.s.tration of those principles in the sacred narrative. The Bible as he sees it teaches the unvarying duty of veracity, and the essential sinfulness of falsehood and deception. He repudiates the idea that G.o.d, in any instance, approved deception, or that Jesus Christ practiced it. ”When our Saviour 'made as though he would have gone farther,' he effectually questioned his disciples as to the condition of their hearts in relation to the duties of hospitality. The angels, in pretending that it was their purpose to abide in the street all night, made the same experiment on Lot. This species of simulation involves no falsehood; its design is not to deceive, but to catechize and instruct. The whole action is to be regarded as a sign by which a question is proposed, or the mind excited to such a degree of curiosity and attention that lessons of truth can be successfully imparted.”
And so on through other Bible incidents. Dr. Thornwell has no hesitation in distinguis.h.i.+ng when concealment is right concealment, and when concealment is wrong because intended to deceive.