Part 20 (1/2)
In 1867 Admiral Porter and Mr. F. W. Seward, the a.s.sistant secretary of state, were sent to Santo Domingo for the purpose of securing the lease of Samana bay as a naval station. Their mission was not successful, but the following year the president of the Dominican Republic sent an agent to Was.h.i.+ngton proposing annexation and requesting the United States to occupy Samana bay at once. In his annual message of December 8, 1868, President Johnson advocated the annexation of Santo Domingo and a joint resolution to that effect was introduced into the House, but it was tabled without debate by an overwhelming vote. President Grant became much interested in this scheme, and soon after entering the White House he sent one of his private secretaries, Colonel Babc.o.c.k, to the island to report on the condition of affairs. Babc.o.c.k negotiated a treaty for the annexation of the Dominican Republic, and another for the lease of Samana bay. As Colonel Babc.o.c.k was without diplomatic authority of any kind, the Cabinet received the treaties in silent amazement, and Hamilton Fish, who was secretary of state, spoke of resigning, but Grant persuaded him to remain in office. The annexation treaty was submitted to the Senate in January, 1870, but encountered violent opposition, especially from Sumner, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations.
It was finally rejected June 30 by vote of 28 to 28.
The advance of the United States into the Caribbean was thus delayed until the Spanish War. As a result of that conflict the United States acquired Porto Rico and a protectorate over Cuba. The real turning-point in the recent history of the West Indies was the Hay-Pauncefote treaty of 1901, under the terms of which Great Britain relinquished her claim to an equal voice with the United States in the control of an Isthmian ca.n.a.l on which she had insisted for half a century. While the Hay-Pauncefote treaty was limited in terms to the ca.n.a.l question, it was in reality of much wider significance. It amounted in effect to the transference of naval supremacy in the West Indies to the United States, for since its signature Great Britain has withdrawn her squadron from this important strategic area. So marked was Great Britain's change of att.i.tude toward the United States at this time that some writers have concluded that a secret treaty of alliance was made between the two countries in 1897. The absurdity of such a statement was pointed out by Senator Lodge several years ago. England's change of att.i.tude is not difficult to understand. For one hundred years after the battle of Trafalgar England had pursued the policy of maintaining a navy large enough to meet all comers. With the rapid growth of the navies of Russia, j.a.pan, and Germany during the closing years of the nineteenth century, England realized that she could no longer pursue a policy of isolation. Our acquisition of the Philippines, the Hawaiian Islands, and Porto Rico and our determination to build an Isthmian ca.n.a.l made a large American navy inevitable. Great Britain realized, therefore, that she would have to cast about for future allies. It was on considerations of this kind that she signed the Hay-Pauncefote treaty with the United States in 1901, and the defensive alliance with j.a.pan in 1902. In view of the fact that the United States was bent on carrying out the long deferred ca.n.a.l scheme, Great Britain realized that a further insistence on her rights under the Clayton-Bulwer treaty would lead to friction and possible conflict. She wisely decided, therefore, to recede from the position which she had held for half a century and to give us a free hand in the acquisition and control of the ca.n.a.l at whatever point we might choose to build it. In signing the Hay-Pauncefote treaty she gracefully recognized the fact that the United States had paramount interests in the Caribbean which it was unwise for her to contest. Since the signature of that treaty American supremacy in this area has not been seriously questioned.
The determination to build a ca.n.a.l not only rendered inevitable the adoption of a policy of naval supremacy in the Caribbean sea, but led to the formulation of new political policies to be applied in the zone of the Caribbean--what Admiral Chester calls the larger Panama Ca.n.a.l Zone--that is, the West Indies, Mexico and Central America, Colombia and Venezuela. The policies referred to included the establishment of protectorates, the supervision of finances, the control of all naval routes, the acquisition of naval stations, and the policing and administration of disorderly countries.
The advance of the United States in the Caribbean since the Spanish War has been rapid. The acquisition of Porto Rico and the establishment of a protectorate over Cuba were the natural outcome of that struggle. In 1903 we acquired the ca.n.a.l zone under circ.u.mstances already described.
The following year President Roosevelt established financial supervision over the Dominican Republic. In 1915 the United States landed marines in Haiti and a treaty was soon drafted under which we a.s.sumed financial supervision and administrative control over the affairs of that country. In 1916 we acquired by treaty from Nicaragua an exclusive right of way for a ca.n.a.l through her territory and the lease of a naval station on Fonseca bay, and in 1917 we acquired by treaty from Denmark her holdings in the West Indies known as the Virgin Islands. These successive steps will be considered in detail.
The methods employed by President Roosevelt in the acquisition of the Panama Ca.n.a.l Zone described in a previous chapter caused indignation and alarm throughout Latin America and created strained relations with Colombia. The Colombian government refused to recognize the independence of the Republic of Panama and demanded that her claim to Panama as well as her interests in the ca.n.a.l should be submitted to arbitration.
Colombia claimed that President Roosevelt had misinterpreted the treaty of 1846, which established mutual obligations between the United States and Colombia with reference to the isthmus, by construing its provisions as obligations to the world at large against Colombia. As the United States had always advocated the submission to arbitration of questions involving the construction of treaties, the demand of Colombia proved embarra.s.sing, but both Secretary Hay and his successor, Secretary Root, rejected the demand for arbitration on the ground that the questions involved were of a political nature.[260]
In January, 1909, shortly before the close of the Roosevelt administration, Secretary Root undertook to reestablish friendly relations with Colombia through the negotiation in the city of Was.h.i.+ngton of three treaties, one between the United States and the Republic of Colombia, one between the United States and the Republic of Panama, and one between Colombia and Panama. In the treaty between Colombia and Panama the Republic of Colombia recognized fully the independence of Panama, and the Republic of Panama made an a.s.signment to Colombia of the first ten installments of $250,000, the amount due annually to the Republic of Panama from the United States as rental for the ca.n.a.l. According to the treaty between the United States and the Republic of Panama, concluded November 18, 1903, the payment of this annual sum was to begin nine years from date. It was now agreed that the first annual payment should be regarded as due four years from the exchange of ratifications of the said treaty, so that of the $2,500,000 to be paid to Colombia, half would be paid by the United States and half by Panama. In the new treaty between the United States and Panama the necessary modification of the treaty of 1903 was made so as to permit of this a.s.signment of the first ten installments to Colombia. In the treaty between the United States and Colombia the most important provision was as follows:
The Republic of Colombia shall have liberty at all times to convey through the s.h.i.+p ca.n.a.l now in course of construction by the United States across the Isthmus of Panama the troops, materials for war, and s.h.i.+ps of war of the Republic of Colombia, without paying any duty to the United States; even in the case of an international war between Colombia and another country.
It was further provided that the products of the soil and industry of Colombia should be admitted to the ca.n.a.l zone subject only to such duty as would be payable on similar products of the United States under similar conditions, and Colombian mails were to have free pa.s.sage through the ca.n.a.l zone on payment of such duties or charges as were laid on the mails of the United States.[261]
These tripart.i.te treaties were of course to stand or fall together. The United States and Panama promptly ratified the agreements to which they were parties, but Colombia rejected the arrangement with indignation. In fact, when the terms of the settlement were made public, the Colombian administration that urged their acceptance was overthrown, and the Colombian envoy who partic.i.p.ated in the negotiation of the treaties was forced to flee from the country with an indignant mob at his heels.
Colombia was not to be appeased by the paltry sum of $2,500,000.
The Taft administration made repeated efforts to placate Colombia, but without success. On September 30, 1912, Mr. Du Bois, the American minister to Colombia, submitted to Secretary Knox an interesting review of the whole question in the course of which, after referring to the friendly relations that had so long subsisted between the two countries, he said:
Nine years ago this was changed suddenly and unexpectedly when President Roosevelt denied to Colombia the right to land her troops upon her own soil to suppress a threatened revolt and maintain a sovereignty guaranteed by treaty stipulations. The breach came and it has been growing wider since that hour. By refusing to allow Colombia to uphold her sovereign rights over a territory where she had held dominion for eighty years, the friends.h.i.+p of nearly a century disappeared, the indignation of every Colombian, and millions of other Latin-Americans, was aroused and is still most intensely alive. The confidence and trust in the justice and fairness of the United States, so long manifested, has completely vanished, and the maleficent influence of this condition is permeating public opinion in all Latin-American countries, a condition which, if remedial measures are not invoked, will work inestimable harm throughout the Western Hemisphere.[262]
Mr. Du Bois reported that on inquiry of prominent Colombians of the causes of the rejection of the Root proposals he received replies to the following effect:
Five years after President Roosevelt had taken Panama from us with rank injustice, your government, still under his chief magistracy, offered us a paltry $2,500,000 if Colombia would recognize the independence of her revolted province, fix our frontier at a further loss of territory, open all our ports free to the refuge of vessels employed in the ca.n.a.l enterprise, and exempt them from anchorage or tonnage dues, renounce our rights to all of our contracts and concessions relating to the construction and operation of the ca.n.a.l or railroad across the isthmus, release Panama from obligation for the payment of any part of our external debt, much of which was incurred in the interest of Panama, and enter into negotiations for the revision of the treaty of 1846, which five years before had been openly violated by the United States in their failure to help maintain the sovereignty over the rebellious province which they had solemnly guaranteed. The reply was to this, banishment of our minister who negotiated the treaty, and all South America applauded our att.i.tude.[263]
Mr. Du Bois then proceeded to state at length Colombia's claims which he summarized as follows: ”Panama Railroad annuities, $16,000,000; value of railroad, $16,446,942; Panama Ca.n.a.l rights, $17,500,000; cost of Costa Rican boundary arbitration, $200,000; total, $50,446,942. [The total should be $50,146,942.] Besides this sum, Colombia has lost the Province of Panama, whose value cannot be readily estimated.”[264]
In conclusion he urged the importance of a speedy adjustment of the differences with Colombia in the following words:
South America is advancing along commercial lines with giant strides. The character of the future relations of the United States with that country will be of signal importance.
Friendly intercourse with all Latin America should be carefully developed and maintained, and especially is this important with Colombia, which borders the isthmus, has fine ports on both oceans, and is destined to become an influential factor in the political and commercial life of South America, especially in all countries bordering on the Caribbean sea. To approach Colombia in a conciliatory spirit and seek a renewal of her ancient friends.h.i.+p would not only be a wise and just move on the part of the United States, but as Colombia and all South and Central America firmly believe that the government of the United States was unjust in the Panama incident, from which has come infinite distress to Colombia, it would be a benevolent and fraternal act, and the time to move is the present, before the ca.n.a.l opens and while the public sentiment of both countries is in harmony with the movement.[265]
At the time that the above report on relations with Colombia was prepared by Mr. Du Bois he was in this country, having come home to confer with the Department of State as to the program to be followed in the settlement of the differences with Colombia. On his return to Bogota, Mr. Du Bois submitted the following proposals to the Colombian government: (1) ratification of the Root treaties, involving the payment to Colombia of the first ten installments of the annual rental of the ca.n.a.l zone amounting to $2,500,000; (2) the payment of $10,000,000 by the United States to Colombia for the right to build an interoceanic ca.n.a.l by the Atrato route and for the lease of the islands of Old Providence and St. Andrews as coaling stations; (3) the good offices of the United States on behalf of Colombia in bringing about an adjustment of the boundary line between Colombia and Panama; (4) the submission to arbitration of the claims of Colombia to reversionary rights in the Panama Railroad a.s.sumed by the United States under Article XXII of the treaty of 1903 between the United States and Panama, estimated by Mr.
Taft's secretary of war at over $16,000,000; and (5) the granting of preferential rights to Colombia in the use of the Panama Ca.n.a.l.
The Colombian government promptly rejected these proposals and in reply demanded ”arbitration of the whole question of Panama or a direct proposition on the part of the United States to give Colombia compensation for all the moral, physical, and financial losses which she sustained as a result of the separation of Panama.” The Colombian minister declared:
Should Colombia grant any territorial privileges to the United States after the wrong that country has inflicted upon this republic, it would result in intense agitation and possible revolution. It seems as though your people have never fully realized the enormity of the wrong the United States has perpetrated against the Colombian people.
Mr. Du Bois then asked whether Colombia would accept $10,000,000, the good offices of the United States in settling the differences with Panama, arbitration of the reversionary rights in the Panama Railroad, and preferential rights in the ca.n.a.l, without granting to the United States any privileges or concessions whatever. Receiving a negative reply to this proposal, Mr. Du Bois, acting on his own responsibility, then inquired informally whether $25,000,000 without options of any kind would satisfy Colombia. The answer was that Colombia would accept nothing but the arbitration of the whole Panama question. Mr. Du Bois was instructed February 20, 1913, to stop negotiations. In reporting the matter to the President, Secretary Knox said that Colombia seemed determined to treat with the incoming Democratic administration.[266]
When the Wilson administration came in, Secretary Bryan took up the negotiations with Colombia where Knox dropped them, and concluded a treaty according to the terms of which the United States was to express ”sincere regret that anything should have occurred to interrupt or to mar the relations of cordial friends.h.i.+p that had so long subsisted between the two nations,” and to pay Colombia $25,000,000. The treaty further granted Colombia the same preferential rights in the use of the ca.n.a.l which the Taft administration had proposed, and in return Colombia agreed to recognize the independence of Panama and to accept a boundary line laid down in the treaty. This treaty was submitted to the Senate June 16, 1914. As soon as its terms were made public ex-President Roosevelt denounced it as blackmail, and wrote a letter to the chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs requesting to be heard before any action was taken on the treaty. During the first session of the Sixty-sixth Congress in 1919 the Colombian treaty was reported from the Committee on Foreign Relations with important amendments. Article I, containing expressions of regret on the part of the United States for the events that had taken place on the isthmus, was entirely stricken out. The clause giving Colombia the right to transport through the ca.n.a.l its troops, materials of war, and s.h.i.+ps of war, ”even in case of war between Colombia and another country,” was amended by the elimination of the words in quotations. The sum of $25,000,000, instead of being paid in cash, was to be paid in five annual installments. The Senate refused, however, to give its consent to the ratification of the treaty even in this form, and it is understood that it was proposed to cut the payment to Colombia down to $15,000,000.
A great nation like the United States, which has always professed to be guided in international questions by high standards of justice and morality, cannot afford to delay indefinitely the settlement of a dispute of this kind with a weak nation like Colombia. President Roosevelt's action in the Panama matter made a bad impression throughout Latin America and caused our policy in the Caribbean to be regarded with grave suspicion. As to Colombia's rights in the matter, Secretary Bryan made the following statement in his argument before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in support of the treaty:
It is contended by some that the action taken by the United States was based upon the necessities of the case, and those necessities, as stated by those who take this position are, that Colombia was not able to build the ca.n.a.l herself and was not willing to sell to the United States upon reasonable terms the right to build the ca.n.a.l. Those who take this position put the United States in the att.i.tude of exercising the right of eminent domain in the interest of the world's commerce; but the exercise of the right of eminent domain does not relieve those who exercise it of liability for actual damages suffered. Take, for ill.u.s.tration, the condemning of a block of ground for a public building.