Part 14 (1/2)

Two days after the signing of this Doyle convention the Spanish minister in Mexico also signed a convention on behalf of some Philippine missionaries, known as the ”Padre Moran” convention, on almost the same basis as the British. The consolidated fund in this case was $983,000, the sinking fund five per cent., and the interest three per cent.

The interest was paid on both funds in almost the whole amount, but the sinking fund was not kept up. Succeeding agreements were made in 1858, in 1859, and in 1860, by which the custom-house a.s.signments to satisfy both conventions (British and Spanish) were raised from twelve per cent.

in 1851, to twenty-nine per cent. in 1860.[194]

It will thus be seen that the British and Spanish claims were perfectly legitimate. The French claims, however, were of a somewhat different character. During Miramon's administration arrangements were made through the agency of Jecker, a Swiss banker, by which $750,000 were to be raised through an issue of $15,000,000 of bonds. These bonds fell into the hands of Jecker's French creditors and were pressed by the French government, which thus demanded the repayment of twenty times the original sum advanced. A claim was made also for $12,000,000 for torts on French subjects.[195]

When the Liberal party came into power again in 1860, they were unable to meet the situation and showed a disposition to question the obligatory force of engagements entered into by their various revolutionary predecessors. The British government had undertaken to provide against this contingency upon the occasion of extending recognition to the Juarez administration. Under date of March 30, 1861, Lord John Russell wrote to Sir Charles Wyke, recently appointed minister to Mexico, as follows:

The instructions addressed to Mr. Mathew, both before and since the final triumph of the Liberal party, made the recognition by Great Britain of the const.i.tutional government contingent upon the acknowledgment by that government of the liability of Mexico for the claims of British subjects who, either in their persons or in their property, for a long series of years, can be proved to have suffered wrong at the hands of successive governments in Mexico.[196]

And further on in the same communication the att.i.tude of the British government is expressed yet more strongly:

Her majesty's government will not admit as an excuse for hesitation in this respect the plea that the robbery was committed by the late government. For, as regards this, as indeed all other claims, her majesty's government cannot admit that the party who committed the wrong is alone responsible. Great Britain does not recognize any party as const.i.tuting the republic in its dealing with foreign nations, but holds the entire republic, by whatever party the government of it may from time to time be administered, to be responsible for wrongs done to British subjects by any party or persons at any time administering the powers of government.

Mexico, however, was slow to admit this principle of international law.

In a letter to Lord John Russell, June 25, 1861, and in other communications, Sir Charles Wyke urged the necessity of a naval demonstration against Mexico. His plan was to take possession of the custom-houses of Vera Cruz, Tampico, and Matamoros on the Atlantic, and of one or two on the Pacific, lower the duties so as to attract the great bulk of trade from other ports, and pay themselves by the percentage to which they were ent.i.tled by treaty stipulation.

On the 17th of July, 1861, President Juarez brought matters to a crisis by the publication of a decree, the first article of which declared that ”all payments are suspended for two years, including the a.s.signments for the loan made in London and for the foreign conventions.”[197]

On the 23rd, Sir Charles Wyke, the British minister, demanded the repeal of this law within forty-eight hours. On the 24th, the French minister demanded its repeal within twenty-four hours. These demands were not complied with and diplomatic relations were immediately broken off by the British and French representatives.

The Spanish government had acted somewhat in advance of the other governments and was already preparing to back its claims by an armed expedition against Mexico. The rupture with the British and French governments very naturally pointed to joint action with Spain as the best means of securing their interests. The United States government, which had just entered upon one of the greatest struggles of modern times and had its hands practically tied as far as Mexico was concerned, regarded the contemplated intervention of European powers in Mexico with grave apprehension, not to say suspicion. So great was the uneasiness occasioned in the United States by the measures in contemplation and so strong was the desire to ward off the threatened danger to republican inst.i.tutions on this continent, that Mr. Seward authorized (September 2, 1861) the negotiation of a treaty with Mexico for the a.s.sumption by the United States of the payment of the interest, at three per cent., upon the funded debt of Mexico (the princ.i.p.al of which was about $62,000,000) for the term of five years from the date of the decree of the Mexican government suspending such payment, ”provided that the government of Mexico will pledge to the United States its faith for the reimburs.e.m.e.nt of the money so to be paid, with six per cent.

interest thereon, to be secured by a specific lien upon all the public lands and mineral rights in the several Mexican states of Lower California, Chihuahua, Sonora, and Sinaloa, the property so pledged to become absolute in the United States at the expiration of the term of six years from the time when the treaty shall go into effect, if such reimburs.e.m.e.nt shall not have been made before that time.”[198] All this, of course, was subject to the confirmation of the Senate.

This step was communicated informally to the British and French governments, and the validity of the convention was to be conditioned upon those governments engaging not to take any measures against Mexico to enforce the payment of the interest of the loan until time should have been given to submit the convention to the ratification of the United States Senate at its approaching session. It was also to be a condition that, if the convention should be ratified, Great Britain and France should engage, on their part, not to make any demand upon Mexico for the interest, except upon its failing to be punctually paid by the United States.[199]

Grave objections to Mr. Seward's plan of paying the interest on the Mexican debt were entertained both in Paris and in London. The French minister of state, M. Thouvenel, said to the British minister at Paris:

It might not be possible to prevent the United States offering money to Mexico, or to prevent Mexico receiving money from the United States, but neither England nor France ought in any way to recognize the transaction.[200]

Lord Lyons declared to Mr. Seward:

That her majesty's government were as apprehensive as Mr.

Seward himself could be, of an attempt to build upon a foundation of debts due, and injuries inflicted, by Mexico, a pretension to establish a new government in that country.

Her majesty's government thought, however, that the most effectual mode of guarding against this danger would be for Great Britain, the United States, and France to join Spain in a course of action, the objects and limits of which should be distinctly defined beforehand. This certainly appeared more prudent than to allow Spain to act alone now, and afterwards to oppose the results of her operations, if she should go too far.[201]

The British government avoided beforehand the necessity of a point-blank refusal of the plan of Mr. Seward, in case the treaty should go through, by declaring that the interest on the funded debt was not the only cause of complaint, but that there remained over and above that the outrages perpetrated upon British subjects still unredressed.

Mr. Charles Francis Adams, the United States minister to England, did not approve the plan of guaranteeing the Mexican interest, and in his dispatch to Mr. Seward of November 1, 1861, he expressed his opinion rather more frankly than is usual for a minister to do in discussing an instruction from the state department.

You will permit me here, however, to make a single remark in this connection upon the importance of appearing to divest the United States of any personal and selfish interest in the action it may think proper to adopt. The view customarily taken in Europe is that their government is disposed to resist all foreign intervention in Mexico, not upon any principle, but simply because it is itself expecting, in due course of time, to absorb the whole country for its own benefit. Hence any proposal like that which I had the honor to receive, based upon the mortgage of portions of Mexican territory as security for engagements entered into by the United States, naturally becomes the ground of an outcry that this is but the preliminary to an entry for inevitable foreclosure. And then follows the argument that if this process be legitimate in one case, why not equally in all. As against Great Britain and France, it would be difficult to oppose to this the abstract principle contained in what has been denominated the Monroe Doctrine, however just in substance.[202]

While Mr. Corwin was still in negotiation with the Mexican government in reference to some method of releasing Mexico from her complications with the allied governments of Europe, the United States Senate, in reply to two successive messages of the President, pa.s.sed a resolution, February 25, 1862, declaring the opinion ”that it is not advisable to negotiate a treaty that will require the United States to a.s.sume any portion of the principle or interest of the debt of Mexico, or that will require the concurrence of European powers.” This effectually put an end to Mr. Seward's plan.

Meanwhile Sir Charles Wyke had reopened negotiations with the Mexican government and negotiated a treaty which might have satisfied British claims, but the treaty was thrown out by the Mexican congress by a large majority, and also disapproved by the British government in view of an agreement entered into with France and Spain unknown to Sir Charles Wyke.[203]

The agreement referred to was the convention signed at London, October 31, 1861, between Spain, France, and Great Britain, in reference to the situation of affairs in Mexico and looking to armed intervention for the purpose of securing their rights. The preamble of the convention recites that the three contracting parties ”being placed by the arbitrary and vexatious conduct of the authorities of the republic of Mexico under the necessity of exacting from those authorities a more efficient protection for the persons and property of their subjects, as well as the performance of the obligations contracted toward them by the republic of Mexico, have arranged to conclude a convention between each other for the purpose of combining their common action.” The most important article of the convention in view of its subsequent violation by the Emperor Napoleon, was the second, which declared that: