Part 3 (1/2)
[33] Hall's ”Journal,” Vol. I, p. 194.
[34] Holstein, ”Life of Bolivar.” Boston, 1829.
[35] Hall's ”Journal,” Vol. II, p. 188.
[36] See the statement of Iturbide in regard to his political life published in the _Pamphleteer_, London, 1827.
CHAPTER II
THE RECOGNITION OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS
The struggle of the South American peoples for independence was viewed from the first with feelings of profound satisfaction and sympathy in the United States. From the commencement of the revolution South American vessels were admitted into the ports of the United States under whatever flag they bore. It does not appear that any formal declaration according belligerent rights to the said provinces was ever made, though a resolution to that effect was introduced into the House by committee as early as December 10, 1811.[37] Such formal action was apparently not deemed necessary and, as there was no Spanish minister resident in the United States at that time to protest, our ports were probably thrown open, as a matter of course.[38] The fact that they were accorded full belligerent rights from the first was afterwards stated by President Monroe in his annual messages of 1817 and 1818 and in his special message of March 8, 1822.[39]
At an early date of the revolution commissioners arrived in Was.h.i.+ngton seeking recognition of independence, and agents were forthwith dispatched to South America to obtain information in regard to the state of the revolutionary governments and to watch the movements of England and other European powers. Joel R. Poinsett was sent to Buenos Aires in 1811, and the following year Alexander Scott was sent to Venezuela.[40] In 1817 Caesar A. Rodney, Theodorick Bland, and John Graham were dispatched as special commissioners to South America. They proceeded to Buenos Aires, where they arrived in February, 1818, and remained until the last of April. Rodney and Graham then returned to the United States while Bland proceeded across the continent to Chile. Their reports were transmitted to Congress November 17, 1818.[41] In 1820 Messrs. J. B. Prevost and John M. Forbes were sent as commercial agents to Chile and Buenos Aires. Reports from them on the state of the revolutions were transmitted to Congress, March 8 and April 26, 1822.[42]
In the meantime a strong sentiment in favor of the recognition of South American independence had arisen in the United States. The struggling colonies found a ready champion in Henry Clay, who, for a period of ten years labored almost incessantly in their behalf, pleading for their recognition first with his own countrymen and then, as secretary of state under the Adams administration, with the governments of Europe.
His name became a household word in South America and his speeches were translated and read before the patriot armies.
In spite of the fact that our own political interests were so closely identified with the struggling republics, the President realized the necessity of following a neutral course, and in view of the aid the colonies were receiving from citizens of the United States, called upon Congress for the enactment of a more stringent neutrality law. Clay delivered a vigorous speech in opposition to this measure in January, 1817. His greatest effort in behalf of South America, however, was his speech of March 25, 1818, on the general appropriation bill. He moved an amendment appropriating $18,000 for the outfit and year's salary of a minister to the United Provinces of the Plate. Without waiting to hear the report of the three commissioners who had been sent to inquire into the state of the revolutionary governments, he urged that a minister be regularly accredited to Buenos Aires at once. In a speech, three hours in length, he concluded the arguments he had begun the day before.
Painting with even more than his usual fire and enthusiasm the beauties and resources of the Southern continent, he said:
Within this vast region, we behold the most sublime and interesting objects of creation; the loftiest mountains, the most majestic rivers in the world; the richest mines of the precious metals; and the choicest productions of the earth.
We behold there a spectacle still more interesting and sublime--the glorious spectacle of eighteen millions of people struggling to burst their chains and be free.[43]
He went on to say that in the establishment of the independence of the South American states the United States had the deepest interest. He had no hesitation in a.s.serting his firm belief that there was no question in the foreign policy of this country, which had ever arisen, or which he could conceive as ever occurring, in the decision of which we had so much at stake. This interest concerned our politics, our commerce, our navigation. There could be no doubt that Spanish America, once independent, whatever might be the form of the governments established in its several parts, those governments would be animated by an American feeling and guided by an American policy. They would obey the laws of the system of the new world, of which they would compose a part, in contradistinction to that of Europe.[44] The House turned a deaf ear to his brilliant rhetoric. The motion was defeated by a vote of 115 to 45, but Clay did not abandon the cause of South America.
Two years later he reopened the question in a direct attack on the policy of the administration, which greatly disturbed President Monroe.
On May 20, 1820, he again introduced a resolution declaring it expedient to send ministers to the ”governments in South America which have established and are maintaining their independence of Spain.” His arraignment of the administration became more violent than ever:
If Lord Castlereagh says we may recognize, we do; if not, we do not. A single expression of the British minister to the present secretary of state, then our minister abroad, I am ashamed to say, has molded the policy of our government toward South America.
A charge of dependence upon Great Britain in affairs of diplomacy was as effective a weapon then as it has been since in matters financial.
Clay's resolution pa.s.sed the House by a vote of 80 to 75, but still the executive arm of the government did not move. In 1817 and 1818 the question of South American independence was continually before the cabinet for discussion. President Monroe seemed strongly inclined toward recognition, but in this he was opposed by Adams and Calhoun, who were unwilling to act in the matter without some understanding with England, and if possible with France. Our relations with Spain in regard to the Indian troubles in Florida were in a very strained condition and any action taken at that time in recognition of South America would have involved us in war with Spain and almost inevitably with other European powers. The President, therefore, as a matter of expediency postponed the action which his sympathy prompted, and, in his annual message of November 16, 1818, expressed his satisfaction at the course the government had hitherto pursued and his intention of adhering to it for the time being.[45] Under the President's direction, however, efforts were made to secure the cooperation of Great Britain and France in promoting the independence of South America.[46]
In 1819 an amicable adjustment of our differences with Spain seemed to have been reached by the negotiation of a treaty providing for the cession of the Floridas to the United States and the settlement of long-standing claims of American citizens against Spain. An unforeseen difficulty arose, however, which proved embarra.s.sing to the administration. The Spanish monarch very shrewdly delayed ratifying the treaty for two years and thus practically tied the hands of the administration during that time as far as the South American question was concerned.
In spite of the awkward position in which the administration found itself, Clay, who was opposed to the treaty on account of its unwarranted surrender of our claims to Texas, continued to plead the cause of South America. Early in the year, 1821, a declaration of interest in the South American struggle, introduced by him, was carried by an overwhelming majority (134 to 12), but the administration held back another year until the _de facto_ independence of the colonies no longer admitted of reasonable doubt. Meanwhile the Florida treaty had been ratified. On March 8, 1822, President Monroe, in a special message to Congress, expressed the opinion that the time had come for recognition and asked for the appropriations necessary for carrying it into effect. The President's recommendation was received with approval, and in due course the sum of $100,000 was appropriated for ”such missions to the independent nations on the American continent as the President of the United States may deem proper.” In accordance with this act Mr. R. C. Anderson of Kentucky was appointed minister to Colombia, Mr. C. A. Rodney of New Jersey to the Argentine Republic, and Mr. H.
Allen of Vermont to Chile, in 1824, and Mr. Joel R. Poinsett of South Carolina to Mexico in 1826.
While the United States government was concerning itself with the political interests of the Spanish provinces, Great Britain was quietly reaping all the commercial advantages to be derived from the situation and was apparently well satisfied to let things follow the drift they had taken. By the destruction of the combined fleets of France and Spain at Trafalgar, in 1805, Nelson had won for Great Britain undisputed control of the Atlantic and laid open the route to South America. Ever since the _a.s.siento_ of 1713 had placed the slave trade in her hands, Great Britain had realized the possibilities of South American commerce, and the intercourse, which had been kept up with that country after the termination of the slave monopoly by smugglers, now that the danger was removed, became more regular and profitable. During the changes of ministry that followed the death of Pitt, the policy of England in regard to South America was weak and vacillating. We have already called attention to the political indecision that marked the attack upon the provinces of the Plate. With Napoleon's invasion of Spain and the national uprising it occasioned, British policy became once more intelligible. It was wisely deemed of more importance to spare the colonies and to win Spain over to the European alliance against Napoleon, than to take her colonies at the cost of driving her permanently into the arms of France. Meanwhile British commerce with the South American states was steadily growing and that too with the connivance of Spain.
At the close of the Napoleonic wars, Spain, fearing that England, through her desire to keep this trade, would secretly furnish aid to the colonies in their struggle for independence, proposed to the British government to bind itself to a strict neutrality. This England agreed to, and when the treaty was signed, there was, according to Canning, ”a distinct understanding with Spain that our commercial intercourse with the colonies was not to be deemed a breach of its stipulations.”[47]
Notwithstanding this tacit compact, British commerce suffered greatly at the hands of Spanish privateers and even Spanish war vessels. Numbers of British merchantmen were captured by Spanish s.h.i.+ps, carried into the few ports left to Spain on the Main, and condemned as prizes for trading with the insurgent colonies. Thus at the time of the acknowledgment of South American independence by the United States, a long list of grievances had acc.u.mulated in the hands of the British amba.s.sador at Madrid, and in spite of urgent and repeated remonstrances, remained unredressed.
Canning was deterred from making final demands upon the government of Madrid by the consideration that he did not wish to hamper the const.i.tutional government of Spain, which had come into being by the revolution of March, 1820, and against which the other powers of Europe were preparing to act. The condition of affairs on the Spanish Main was, however, critical and demanded instant redress. He decided, therefore, to take matters into his own hands without hara.s.sing the government of Spain, and to dispatch a squadron to the West Indies to make reprisals.