Part 7 (2/2)
Individual acts had successfully challenged dominant cultural and social norms; for example, through the provision of civic amenities including the Ceiba Park to show local residents that they too, and not only tourists or the locally wealthy, were worthy of a healthy local environment. Speaking up in public consultations was claimed to have symbolic as well as instrumental significance through demonstrating the exercising of a local voice. The facilitating of neighbourhood talking groups aimed to strengthen families. Still many residents did not see themselves as citizens of Playa but of their home towns and states, making the building of any gra.s.sroots-led call for change very challenging. Greater capacity for adaptation, albeit of a resilient kind, was observed with civil society groups operating close to the private sector: innovation included dive companies that opened inland cave-diving sites in response to deteriorating coastal environments. The importance of local and global ecosystem services to the local tourist economy also provided a narrative for current development planning and regulation and one that could be adapted to include climate-proofing.
Tulum.
Tulum was until the 1970s a Mayan ejido of subsistence farmers. The ejido's settlement was established about 2km inland, and thus protected from hurricanes by a generous stretch of mangroves and forest. Driven by in-migration, Tulum's population grew exponentially following the construction of a highway and in the 1980s, as low density hotels proliferated along its outlying beach front. By 2004 there were 53 hotels in Tulum offering 1,235 rooms and a permanent population of around 1,000. Hotel designs range from concrete three-storey buildings to very basic thatched cabins, and often include renewable energy and other eco-friendly features. Although some of the hotels are owned by external actors (Mexican and foreign entrepreneurs), the majority are owned and managed by local or partly local entrepreneurs. As in Playa, ejidatarios benefited from selling land and some of them are now wealthy even if still preserving some of their traditional ways of life. In April 2008 the state government granted the independence of Tulum as a new munic.i.p.ality.
Today, Tulum is at a crossroads with two competing development narratives. The dominant narrative portrays Tulum as an opportunity for speculative development. This is symbolised by the 'Downtown Tulum' development, a project forged and implemented by Yucatecan entrepreneurs in concomitance with the governor of the state. The works for the first phase started in January 2008 and contemplate the urbanisation of 77 hectares located between the town and the beach. The second phase comprises 450 hectares including a mega golf course that would extend up to the beach and a grid of water channels resembling an inland marina.
An alternative narrative is oriented more towards local Mayan values and ecological and community sustainability. This vision was championed by a small group of well-educated local businesses leaders and civil society groups, but optimism for the future of Tulum as a sustainable tourism centre is limited. Respondents presented striking visions for an alternative development, but felt in reality small gains that can build resiliency into development are all that is likely to be achieved in resisting the corporate transformation of Tulum.
We already have failed models such as Acapulco and Cancun and we do not want to fall into the same in Tulum. It is almost impossible for local people to affect the model or direction of development. However, there are local pressures to, for instance, make wider sidewalks or guarantee the connection of drainage to a waste water treatment. We want that they build drainage before paving any street. (Former president, Tulum Hotel a.s.sociation) Alternative economic vision is provided by community (ejido) owned development at the Dos Ojos cave system and at a bio-region project at Jacinto Pat Ejido. Most ejido lands and individual owners have sold to speculative capital and subsequently left Tulum but these examples show an economic rationale for development led by and for the benefit of local people with a concern for environmental integrity. Some medium-scale migrant entrepreneurs support this vision, with the Chan Chay Ecological Shop providing green cleaning products for the hotel sector but also organsing workshops, and a Green Expo in Tulum to promote this site as a 'green spot on the Maya Riviera'.
Local consequences of climate change are recognised, most significantly a.s.sociated with increased hurricane activity and higher temperatures, both exacerbated locally by deforestation of mangroves and coastal forest and intensive urbanisation.
Climate change is impacting through housing development. The areas that were for conservation are now being urbanized and this is generating disequilibrium. There have been protests against the Aldea Zama project and now we have an environmental department in the Munic.i.p.al Council, but this type of progress is s.c.r.e.w.i.n.g us up. (Manager, Zero Workshop Foundation) Tourist occupation as well as local quality of life is reported to be affected directly, with concerns on a s.h.i.+ft from high- to low-end tourists at periods of hurricane activity, and indirectly; for example, through the loss of a section of coast road with every pa.s.sing hurricane. For other civil actors climate change presented an opportunity to press dominant development processes and lobby for change. For the Centro Ecologico Ak.u.mal 'climate change can slow down development due to the recurrence of hurricanes. This would give us a chance to s.h.i.+ft the dynamics'. Similarly, the Chan Chay Ecological Shop saw climate change and its media coverage as contributing to ongoing efforts to motivate individuals and businesses to become more ecologically responsible. For most civil society actors capacity to respond was limited to raising awareness through public workshops and school visits. Coastal reef management has generated some local research and conservation work receives international coverage but is not framed by climate change adaptation.
Social leaders identified considerable barriers to organising for adaptation and change. There was no culture of active resistance in Tulum, but rather one of silence and compliance; at the same time new migrants were less concerned about Tulum's environment than economic opportunities and so supported the dominant vision of development. For the local and migrant populations compliance was underwritten by a lack of educational opportunities, with TV being the primary source of information and opinion forming. Several respondents saw the promotion of an alternative development not as a challenge of providing information but of working with partners to raise critical consciousness a deep s.h.i.+ft in local mindsets that are accustomed to mediating development through adaptive ingenuity, to use Freire's terminology; an ambitious aim and one made more so by the weaknesses of the civil sector in Tulum, which was acknowledged to be small with isolated organisations easily coopted by dominant business interests. Middle cla.s.ses and young professionals that might be at the forefront of organising local social movements were overworked and had little time for public work. The crisis in leaders.h.i.+p was such that some respondents looked hopefully to international NGOs.
While undermining local visions for development, the urbanisation process itself also offered opportunities for organising alternatives. Development increased the external visibility of Tulum, and provided opportunities for accessing information; for example, through technical support from the federal agency SEDESOL and the French Emba.s.sy, which offered knowledge exchanges with French Munic.i.p.alities. Drafting of the Urban Development Plan included citizen consultation but with limited impact, with the most positive consequence of this experiment in partic.i.p.atory governance being its slowing down development providing time for alternative discourses to a.s.sert themselves outside of the formal planning process. The new munic.i.p.al authority expressed concern about the loss of Tulum's existing cultural and ecological character in the tidal wave of approaching development, but looked to the federal government for leaders.h.i.+p and capacity.
Mahahual.
Mahahual is a pioneer settlement with a population of about 500, largely in-migrants from Mexico and internationally. From 2008 Mahahual was conferred the status of Alcaldia and administered through a local council with responsibility for the tourism centre with its beach properties, modern residential properties, cruise s.h.i.+p terminal and several small satellite residential and farming communities, including an informal settlement located two kilometres away from the main centre. As the economic base s.h.i.+fted from fis.h.i.+ng to tourism rapid in-migration and land speculation have changed the physical and social structure of the town. Few original families remain and these are a small minority compared to the immigrant population. The local economy has experienced a boom since the construction of the cruise s.h.i.+p terminal, with land speculation driving a healthy virtual economy. Hurricane Dean made a direct hit on Mahuhual in August 2007, with the subsequent closure of the cruise s.h.i.+p terminal stalling the local economy.
As a pioneer settlement there was a feeling of excitement and opportunity directed by a desire to build Mahahual without being dominated by cruise tourism. It was an 'open frontier' where local residents had a central stake in shaping the future. Here, the need to build community was a common aspiration with some working towards this, but mistrust in social organisation and leaders.h.i.+p was pervasive, in business, social and local government organisation alike. Environmental concerns were marginal; for residents development meant the improvement of critical physical and social infrastructure and promotion of the local economy. However, one leader of a social development group suggested that following Hurricane Dean a slow process of cultural change may have begun: 'after Dean one is starting to feel more solidarity. It is happening as in Cozumel, people there are building solidarity as a result in part of facing many hurricanes'.
The common construction of climate change in terms of hurricane risk played down long-term thinking. Accepting hurricane risk as a development externality also contributed to individual businesses and the regional and federal state being cast as the actors with primary responsibility for responding to climate change. The local council, which should be a driving force for adaptation, had not yet taken this role. Practical action was limited to a.s.sociated environmental agendas; for example, the Tourism Entrepreneurs a.s.sociation of Costa Maya campaigned to clean the village with the partic.i.p.ation of the authorities, and lobbied to prevent trucks coming into the village and for investment in waste recycling. Information networks were extensive stretching to other parts of the state, Mexico and overseas, and led, for example, to calls for a local civil protection body in local government.
Before Hurricane Dean, low levels of trust with any form of social organisation was aggravated by Mahajual's diverse and atomised society, with many immigrants and a small population base that constrained the leap from individual to collective action. The leader of a fis.h.i.+ng cooperative reflected on the impact of low trust on the formation of his group: 'We had to make three meetings before we could elect a president. People tend to attack those who stand out from the rest. They think one is looking for his own benefit.' The combination of economic and governance constraints was exemplified well by the residents of Km55, a satellite settlement with formal and informal land holdings where one leader reported that 'only 36 of 400 plots are occupied, the rest are held speculatively; this makes it hard to organise'. Another noted that 'uncertainty about land t.i.tling is delaying; for example, people will not put electricity in their lots until this is solved'.
After Hurricane Dean, reconstruction opened a window for building common ident.i.ty (as temporary labour migrants and uncommitted investors left) and potential for collective action. A businessman reported that: Before Dean I tried many times to create an a.s.sociation, but without Dean and all this easy money n.o.body paid much attention. All the ideas that I was proposing turned out to be right after Dean. Now people are starting to build common culture because the ones who have stayed do not see this place only in terms of money.
Some individuals also took advantage of governance failures post-Dean with examples of mangroves being illegally cleared, but for those seeing potential in collective action reconstruction served as a common context for organising. A sense that local civil society actors had a stake in shaping the future of Mahahual was reinforced by a search for alternative tourist markets following the temporary closure of the cruise terminal. This was driven by individual companies with minimal state support. Still many respondents felt that Mahahual's recent Alcaldia status would also open new opportunities for collaboration with local government and the Alcadia was also concerned to project itself as seeking to build partners.h.i.+ps with local civil society, providing real scope for mainstreaming climate change.
Conclusion.
The preceding a.n.a.lysis presented dominant and alternative discourses on development, climate change and scope for adaptation in each study site from the viewpoint of local civil society actors. Here a comparative a.n.a.lysis is presented to draw out differences in the ways in which adaptation was used to promote resilience, transition or transformation within the particular development contexts of each site. Table 7.1 summarises this a.n.a.lysis. As a caveat, it is important to note the methodological challenges in capturing and then representing the diversity of views on development and climate change in a reductive but Table 7.1 Adaptation as an opportunity and narrative for development discourse and action Cancun Playa Tulum Mahahual Dominant development vision Intensive, large scale, corporate extractive capitalism Corporate and local extractive capitalism Transform environment into commodity for speculative investors Small scale pioneer capitalism Perceived climate change risk Translated into a challenge for tourism marketing, insurance and engineering design; not a concern for local social and environmental integrity Risk of marginal concern in the planning horizon of businesses and government Risk denied or a.s.sumed to be planned out in the future so of little consequence for future investments Climate change threatens economic base through damage to cruise tourism Adaptation opens scope for: Resilience as discourse Improve coastal engineering and tourist building design Maintain beach and coastal water quality An opportunity for greening business and promoting mitigation Generate new markets independent of cruise tourism Resilience as action Beach replenishment, artificial reef design, hotel retrofit Beach replenishment, dive companies market interior sites Marketing and informing businesses Individual acts of marketing Lead actors Munic.i.p.ality, engineering consultants Munic.i.p.ality, SMEs SMEs SMEs Transition as discourse a.s.sert rights to police dominant vision by exercising ent.i.tlements for environmental sustainability a.s.sert rights to challenge dominant vision by exercising ent.i.tlements for development control Economic growth is welcome if controlled a.s.sertion of ident.i.ty through new council status and following Dean to leverage funds for local development Transition as action Engage in development consultation and take legal action Legal challenges prevent developments Engage in citizens consultation for Urban Development Plan Collective acts of reconstruction after Hurricane Dean Lead actors Environmental NGOs and lawyers Local environmental NGOs and Cancun based lawyers Some local civil society organisations Local council, SMEs Cancun Playa Tulum Mahahual Adaptation opens scope for: Transformation as discourse Call for extension of basic needs and risk management to migrant worker colonies; puts distributional equity at the heart of alternative vision Building self-worth and critical consciousness amongst migrant workers as a first step for reclaiming a voice in development Raise critical consciousness of environmental and cultural costs of extractive development None Transformation as action None Symbolic acts, e.g. La Ceiba Park reclaims quality green s.p.a.ce for locals Popular education None Lead actors Independent journalists and social development NGOs Social and cultural development NGOs Cultural NGOs None meaningful way are not insubstantial. Table 7.1 seeks only to represent the most influential narratives and a.s.sociated actions and key actors linked to resilience, transitional and transformative adaptations. Resilience is indicated by efforts to maintain business-as-usual development paths; transition exercises existing legal and governance rights to confront unsustainable development, and transformation uses adaptation to promote fundamentally alternative forms of development from those described for each site as dominant.
Across the sites some commonalities emerge. Local government and business interests are prominent in responding to climate change through building resilience, which is also the predominant form that adaptation takes in each case. In contrast civil society groups and environmental lawyers are most prominent in transitional acts, using adaptation to push for greater transparency, partic.i.p.ation and accountability within the existing governance system. Cultural actors, including NGOs and journalists, emerge as leading transformation, which exists largely at the level of discourse, with some acts of popular education and symbolic initiatives aimed at promoting popular critical consciousness. Given the strong voice of government and business in shaping the limits of adaptation it is perhaps not surprising that ecological modernisation is the dominant overarching worldview within which adaptation is being constructed as resilience (from coastal engineering in Cancun and Playa to the greening of business in Tulum), and transition (the use of legislation to regulate development in Cancun and Playa).
For individual workers coping with risks, including those a.s.sociated with climate change but driven more by a search for economic opportunity, is played out within the use of migration as a livelihood strategy. Emotional commitment to locales in Quintana Roo is spread thin and legitimised through cultural norms that accept local residence as temporary and extractive. In contrast migrant workers maintain close links with places of origin, even sending children 'home' to be educated. This offers an opportunity for individual and familial resilience with low social transactions costs without the need to engage in social or political collective action in the place of residence.
Given the general acceptance that climate change is already impacting negatively through beach erosion, high temperatures and hurricane activity the level of proactive planning is minimal. This may be a function of the linking of climate change with environmental management and subsequent policy marginalisation, but possibly also points to a denial of risk, especially by those most vulnerable. The common tendency amongst the poor and vulnerable to prioritise economic opportunity over risk reduction is heightened through a majority migrant population that has little a.s.sociation with place or community. Corporate interests in Cancun and Playa have access to engineering solutions and international insurance, and beyond this possibly view their investment in Quintana Roo as temporary. For smaller businesses and the resident population scope to adapt is more limited, and as was most keenly demonstrated in Tulum, for many migrants rapid transformation of the environment into a form that can be exploited by capital has attracted them to the coast. Climate change is pushed to the margins of people's imagination as well as their actions. The one major exception is Mahahual where Hurricane Dean caused the loss of the town's economic base. While Mahahual's population is almost entirely composed of recent migrants, the effect of Dean as well as the recent awarding of town council status has begun to build a social ident.i.ty.
The aim of this chapter has been to reveal the messiness of a.n.a.lysing adaptation where political values and actions are both contested and tightly circ.u.mscribed by a rigid political and economic framework. In the language of transitions theory the cases all display strong tendencies for stability with limited scope for local innovations to affect change in regimes through adaptation, partly a result of the limited range of innovations observed (examples included the La Ceiba Park in Playa, which provided the dual function of meeting a service need for urban green s.p.a.ce but also potentially inspiring critical consciousness, and material alternatives such as ejido controlled development and the Chan Chay Ecological Shop in Tulum). This is compounded by a lack of a supporting inst.i.tutional architecture (including values and a legaladministrative framework) to aid the dissemination of innovations; and a strong dominant existing political-economic and administrative regime. Even where disaster events have been experienced, revealing failures in the dominant regimes and development pathways, pre-disaster political, economic and cultural structures have changed little. Resilience remains the dominant mode of adaptation across this region. It remains to be seen how far this will be true as increasing population, physical and financial a.s.sets are exposed to climate change a.s.sociated hazards in the future.
8.
Adaptation as national political response to disaster.
... moments when underlying causes can come together in a brief window, a window ideally suited for mobilizing broader violence. But such events can also have extremely positive outcomes if the tensions [...] are recognized and handled well.
(USAID, 2002).
This description of post-disaster political s.p.a.ce highlights the possibility that political outcomes are not predetermined by history but open to influence, in this case by the interests of an international political and economic actor.
Context: policy and methods.
The reflexivity of socio-ecological systems allows us to envision climate change impacts as unfolding within ongoing socio-political trajectories. Disaster events, and especially reconstruction periods, open s.p.a.ce for change in dominant technical, policy and political regimes (Pelling and Dill, 2010). Very often such changes are best cla.s.sified as adding resilience to pre-disaster socio-technological systems. New technology to improve the resistance of infrastructure, or policy reform such as the enforcement of building regulations, allow political and economic business as usual. Sometimes, however, unacceptable failures in the dominant regime to meet its responsibilities for risk reduction and response can act as a catalyst for political level change and open scope for transformational adaptation that goes beyond disaster risk management to influence social life and the distribution of political power in society. Chapter 7 identifies the most likely pre-conditions for such changes, which include economic inequality, a pre-existing and organised alternative to dominant politics and a sufficiently high impact event (Albala-Bertrand, 1993; Drury and Olson, 1998; Pelling and Dill, 2006).
It is not only natural disasters that provide sufficient shocks to destabilise dominant political regimes, but these are perhaps the most directly related to the influence of climate change. In the future, climate change will likely be a factor of growing significance in many other kinds of shock, especially those compound events felt locally from the conjuncture of multiple factors. The most recent example of this was the 2008 global food crisis. A combination of changes in local planting regimes (a s.h.i.+ft from wheat and maize for consumption to bio-fuels), increasing demand (for example, from China's rapidly expanding middle cla.s.s), exceptional drought and the failure of key regional harvests (for example, the Australian rice harvest), and instability in the global financial systems (commodity speculation at a time of high carbon fuel price) destabilised water-food systems resulting in increased hunger and malnutrition for the poorest with crises in 37 countries. At places this has fed back into the political system through violent protests in such diverse countries as Cameroon, Egypt, Haiti, Indonesia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Senegal and Yemen (FAO, 2008). In this context, natural disaster events provide early insight into the ways in which specific political systems respond to shocks and what we might reasonably expect if failure to adapt to reduce risk leads to more frequent and severe events (Schipper and Pelling, 2006).
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