Part 5 (2/2)

Disasters as tipping points for transformation.

We have seen through risk society the dangers of a naturalised modern worldview operating across all scales. The social contract has described the distribution of rights and responsibilities in society and shown this to be held in place through a balance of legitimacy and power. Human security adds to this an understanding that the rights and basic needs of individuals do not always coincide with those of the state and that play-offs in rights and risk are part of everyday development. In this discussion it has also been a.s.serted that disaster events a.s.sociated with climate change related hazards provide a distinct moment of challenge to established values and organisational forms that embody power relations. This section reviews existing secondary evidence to support this a.s.sertion as a precursor to detailed case study a.n.a.lysis in Chapter 8. The aim is to establish the extent to which disaster events provide leverage for academic study and also for practical movement that might be described as transformational. This should not be seen as suggesting that developmental periods outside of disaster are any less important, but simply that their review is outside the scope of this book.

The literature reveals that scholars and pract.i.tioners have long observed that the socio-political and cultural dynamics put into motion at the time of catastrophic natural disasters create the conditions for potential social (Carr, 1932) and political (Pelling and Dill, 2010) change, sometimes at the hands of a discontented civil society (Cuny, 1983). Pelling and Dill (2006) review a number of studies showing a government's incapacity or a lack of political will to respond quickly and adequately to a disaster representing a break in the social contract, while simultaneously revealing a provocative (albeit temporary) absence of instrumental state power. The destruction/production dynamic triggered by disaster creates, temporarily, a window of opportunity for both novel and traditional socio-political action at local, national, international and now supranational levels. This interpretation does not derive from an environmental determinism: it is not claimed that disasters cause socio-political change but rather that the instability generated by development failures made manifest at the point of disaster open scope for change. Indeed over the long-term there is ample evidence that human societies survive dramatic s.h.i.+fts in environmental conditions through a range of culturally specific adaptations (Rapparport, 1967; Waddell, 1975; Torry, 1978; Zaman, 1994). Hidden within this, though, are moments of short-term disruption, with the potential for long-term consequences.

Political change has been most comprehensively studied from drought events and related food insecurity crises (Glantz, 1976). These tend to unfold slowly and consequently are more clearly a product of development failures than rapid onset events which continue to be conceptualised as outside of human responsibility. A clear example of the interaction of environmental and political change comes from Ethiopia. In 1974, Emperor Haile Sela.s.sie of Ethiopia was ousted by a Marxist insurgency led by General Mengistu, who in turn oversaw his own government collapse in 1991. Both regimes were destabilised because their leaders failed to adequately address the deepening and progressive spread of drought, which in both cases originated in the drought-vulnerable northeast but moved southwards to envelope vast regions of the country in famine and social unrest (Keller, 1992; Comenetz and Caviedes, 2002). Violent conflict, blockades and the purposeful rerouting of supplies for political reasons have been identified as triggers in drought a.s.sociated famine. Even when food is not used as a weapon, delays and mismanagement in the early stages of drought make it increasingly difficult to mitigate the full social impact (Sen and Dreze, 1999). Moreover, researchers have shown that international aid has in some cases exacerbated rather than alleviated suffering (de Waal, 1997).

To add some breadth to this discussion, Table 5.2 summarises a number of nationally significant rapid-onset disaster events and their political outcomes. It includes geophysical alongside hydrometeorological hazard contexts to demonstrate the range of interactions between political change and disaster. Cases are organised according to the political context of the polity in question: post-colonial security: modernising nation-states; Cold War security: political stability; international economic security: liberalization; and global security: advanced privatisation. Each period describes the overarching political contexts and source of pressure. Tensions in early contexts are dominated by ideological compet.i.tion between state and counter-state ideologies from neo-colonial control, to nation building, proxy tensions sponsored during the Cold war; more contemporary contexts include greater influence from organised non-state actors in national and international civil society and the private sector but also a return to international political influence.

In Table 5.2, there are examples of regime change opening democratic s.p.a.ce following disaster (East Pakistan/Bangladesh, Nicaragua, Mexico), but also cases where neo-colonial or national autocratic powers tighten their hold on the national policy (Puerto Rico, Dominican Republic, Haiti). Elsewhere disasters serve as political capital in ongoing compet.i.tions within the political elite (China) and between competing ideologies (Guatemala) including those with armed struggles (Nicaragua). The most recent events show the complexity of civil society-state relations with civil society demonstrating both regressive and progressive impetus for change (Turkey, India), the influence of international civil society and intergovernmental actors (Sri Lanka). However, even where civil society is strong and organised the power of dominant political discourses to maintain the status quo and provide opportunities for exploitive capital acc.u.mulation in the face of development failure is impressive (USA).

Comparative a.n.a.lyses of disaster politics show political change is most likely where disaster losses are high, the impacted regime is repressive and income inequality and levels of national development are low (Drury and Olson, 1998). Albala-Bertrand (1993) also observes that the political, technological, social or economic effects of disasters are explained primarily by a society's pre-disaster conditions, and a government that immediately marshals what material and discursive powers it has may be rewarded with improved levels of popular post-disaster legitimacy regardless of culpability. This final point emphasises the depth of the cultural underpinnings in the social contract, recognised by both Gramsci and Habermas, that can allow discourses to be manipulated by those in power. Work by Pelling and Dill (2006) confirms this a.n.a.lysis but also shows that competing discourses can establish a critique when building on pre-disaster political momentum.

Conclusion.

The aim of this chapter has been to make a claim for transformation as a legitimate element of adaptation theory and practice. In doing so the challenges of escaping the fragmentation of modernity (Beck, 1992), the alienating loss of power to the global (Castells, 1997) and need to re-a.s.sert human rights and basic needs in an increasingly unequal world (Gasper, 2005) have been revealed as arguably the most fundamental challenges facing development and the social relations that underpin capacities to adapt to climate change risk.

The extent to which adaptation to climate change can embrace transformation will depend on the framing of the climate change problem. Where vulnerability is attributed to proximate causes of unsafe buildings, inappropriate land use and fragile demographics adaptation will be framed as a local concern. This is more amenable to resilience and transitional forms of adaptation. However, if vulnerability is framed as an outcome of wider social processes shaping how people see themselves and others, their relations.h.i.+p with the environment and role in political processes, then adaptation becomes a much broader problem. It is here that transformation becomes relevant.

How vulnerability and adaptation are framed have clear implications for apportioning blame and the locus of adaptation and its costs. Where vulnerability is an outcome of local context then it is local actors at risk who will likely carry the costs of adapting (for example, through transactions and opportunity costs incurred through changing livelihood practices). Where vulnerability is seen as an outcome of wider social causes then responsibility for change becomes broader, possibly more diffuse and less easy to manage and certainly more likely to touch those in power. These two approaches to the framing of vulnerability and subsequent adaptation are akin to the distinction between treating the symptoms and causes of illness.

Transformation does not come without its own risks, inherent in any project of change is uncertainty. History is replete with examples of transformation social change being captured by vested interested or new elites. As noted with regard to human security, both the poor and powerful are aware of the costs of change and prefer the known even if it is a generator of risk. As climate change proceeds and mitigation policy fails the potential for dangerous climate change increases. This forces us to reappraise the potential costs of transformation set against business as usual. Handmer and Dovers (1996) warned against the sudden collapse of Table 5.2 Disasters as catalysts for political change Post-colonial security: modernising nation-states Affected city/country Year Pre-disaster state civil society relations Hazard and loss Local/regional government/civil society response National government response International response Socio-political impact/change/legacy Puerto Rico 1899.

Recent political independence from Spain; rising US economic interests; emergent labour unions; local munic.i.p.alities key political actors Hurricane San Ciriaco; 28 days of rain; huge crop damage; estimated 3,1003,400 killed Munic.i.p.alities: distributed relief; a.s.sessed damage proposed financial plan for recovery Cooperates with acting US military governor to receive aid; popular resentment and finally acquiescence US uses humanitarian aid to undermine nascent nationalism movement and to solidify national influence State 'Anglicised'; social hierarchy adapted to economic modernisation; elites funded; 'deserving' poor become workforce; union gains reversed; cross-cla.s.s bid for independence thwarted Dominican Republic 1930.

US-groomed dictator Trujillo in power; coopting of civil society and suppression of political opposition Hurricane Zenon destroys most of capital city; estimated 28,000 killed Unknown Immediate request for international aid; reconstruction funds used to build city as symbol of a modern nation-state and presidential power; renamed Ciudad Trujillo US supports regime and reconstruction Entrenchment of new dictatorial (right-wing populist) regime; nation-state modernisation continues with ethnic cleansing of Haitian labour migrants East Pakistan (Bangladesh) 1970.

Deep political tensions between East and West Pakistan with economic and ethnic underpinnings; an organised independence movement in East Pakistan Cyclone Bhola estimated to lead to 500,000 deaths Local government overwhelmed; with no help from central government in West Pakistan, citizen support of local leaders.h.i.+p swells No disaster plan; state paralysis; post-election political repression Chaotic: US arms (West) Pakistan; humanitarian efforts directed to respond to ma.s.sive refugee crisis in India Complex political emergency; East Pakistan leaders.h.i.+p declares independence; Bangladesh established as state in 1971 Cold war security: from modernisation to political stability Affected city/country Year State/civil society Hazard and loss Local/regional government/civil society response National government response International response Socio-political impact/change/legacy Haiti 1954.

Predatory state; landed peasantry; relative openness (labour unions); major infrastructure modernisations Hurricane Hazel destroys cash crops; estimated 1,000 killed Unknown No disaster plan; corruption soars with international aid International funds flow; Catholic Relief and CARE begin first work in country Regime corruption sparks cross-cla.s.s protests; US-trained military takes control; Papa Doc Duvalier cuts deal with military leading to a long lasting and entrenched violent dictators.h.i.+p Managua, Nicaragua 1972.

Dynastic dictators.h.i.+p; civil society repressed; elites disenfranchised; vocal opposition movement Earthquake destroys much of capital city; estimated 10,000 killed Extended families provide relief; the city is evacuated No disaster plan; focus on physical reconstruction of capital and repression of civil society International funds flow; gross corruption by elite; military appropriates development Corruption provokes anger; liberation theology and Sandinismo provide oppositional discourse; social capital developed during recovery period feeds into cross-cla.s.s revolutionary movement leading to regime change Guatemala 1976.

20 years post CIA-coup; a military state; technocratic president; slight opening for human development; active opposition Earthquake destroys parts of capital and villages of central and northern highlands; estimated 23,000 killed Munic.i.p.alities inadequately funded; peasant groups and Church respond No disaster plan; focus on physical reconstruction of capital and repression of any non-state organised activities International a.s.sessment teams remain only in capital; few foreigners have firsthand knowledge of high losses in rural indigenous villages Military threatened by post-disaster peasant organisation in context of active insurgency; state represses indigenous earthquake reconstruction projects; guerrillas use earthquake as oppositional discourse (time for change) for organising purposes; counterinsurgency escalates; insurgency escalates International economic security: liberalisation Affected city/country Year State/civil society Hazard and loss Local/regional government/civil society response National government response International response Socio-political impact/change/legacy Tangshan, China 1976.

No theoretical distinction between state/civil society; a period of political transition during the last days of Mao and the cultural revolution Tangshan earthquake destroys important industrial city; estimated up to 655,000 killed Ma.s.sive self-help campaign; city requests and receives funds and relief from regional administrations Nationally significant disaster plan (prediction) fails: reconstruction distorted by ma.s.sive political struggle between Maoists and reformer Hua Guofeng International aid refused; West denied access and information Earthquake appropriated as political symbol for loss of 'Mandate from Heaven' (oppositional discourse); Cultural Revolution ended; return to previous plan for modernisation and liberalisation of economy Turkey 1999.

Authoritarian secular state, democracy, strong religious civil society seen as threatening secular state traditions Marmara earthquake; estimated 17,000 killed Limited, failure to regulate construction a major cause of loss State slow to respond, local and national civil society (religious and secular) filled vacuum Constrained by state failures to coordinate response Civil society demonstrated capacity to provide social support; state responded by closing bank accounts of religious groups in particular Gujarat, India 2001.

Democratic system with a strong civil society; hierarchical Earthquake in Kutch district; estimated over 20,000 killed Limited in contrast to widespread civil society mobilisation Initial response slow, ad hoc and chaotic Widespread; support for partic.i.p.atory reconstruction schemes from multilaterals Response reinforced the strength of civil society in India; reconstruction criticised for exacerbating socio-cultural inequalities; some a.s.sociate this with subsequent religious riots in Gujarat in 2002 Global security: advanced privatisation of national economies and services Affected city/country Year State/civil society Hazard and loss Local/regional government/civil society response National government response International response Socio-political impact/change/legacy Nicaragua 1998.

Electoral democracy; free press; active civil society politically polarised Hurricane Mitch; 2,000 die when entire town buried in mudslide; estimated 3,800 killed in total Following a decade of state downsizing, civil defence, fire and police poorly staffed, resourced, and disconnected from central government and scientists, unable to function properly Government scientists report on impending storm; President denies crisis World Bank and UNDP sponsor the development of a national disaster reduction system; international mediation to open governance in reconstruction Brief opening of discourse between state and civil society development actors under international mediation; joint development of a reconstruction plan; retrenchment and re-imposition of pre-disaster political culture with strengthened leverage for global economic interests; a lost opportunity for social reform Morocco 2004.

Authoritarian kingdom; failure of political liberalisation; civil society weak Earthquake strikes marginalised region; kills more than 560 Concentrates aid in port town; refuses to extend appropriate aid to villages Spends almost equal amounts of aid monies on reconstruction and repression US and European countries compete to come to Morocco's aid First political mobilisation in Riff mountain region for many years; youths protest failure of state response; neoliberal political economy; state repression Affected city/country Year State/civil society Hazard and loss Local/regional government/civil society response National government response International response Socio-political impact/change/legacy Sri Lanka 2004.

Entrenched political and armed conflict between Sinhalese majority and Tamil minority; Muslim minority marginalised from both; an electoral democracy with limited but free press Tsunami devastates coastline; 35,322 killed Civil society in rebel held areas especially prepared for emergency response Concentrates resources in government-held and economically important regions Ma.s.sive supranational and international humanitarian and geopolitical response; swamps local capacity and reignites political tensions International interventions fail to support transition from ceasefire to peace accords; fishermen worst affected sector; many barred from returning to home site while hotels acquire land; civil society continues to operate in a war zone New Orleans, USA 2005.

Electoral democracy; free press; strong civil society and private sector interests; voter alienation Hurricane Katrina floods city and region: 1,836 confirmed dead; more than 700 in New Orleans Mayor does not want to alienate business leaders by calling for mandatory evacuation; acts too late; governor fails to convey urgency of needs Federal government fails to act on warnings that levees might breached Some international aid accepted but also politicised, e.g. offers of aid from Venezuela and Cuba Nation undergoes intense but brief a.n.a.lysis race/cla.s.s relations; impact of neoliberal policies on disaster reduction now under scrutiny; maladaptive development under scrutiny; real estate speculation and investment soars in flooded region social systems that respond to threats with only limited, transitional change. The prospect that without transformational adaptation undertaken with some measure of planning and inclusivity dangerous climate change may force uncontrolled and more anarchic forms of transformation onto societies is worthy of consideration.

Part III.

Living with climate change.

6.

Adaptation within organisations.

What matters is not structures, but relations.h.i.+ps.

Scientific Advisor to the Welsh a.s.sembly.

This comment, made by a scientific advisor to the Welsh a.s.sembly, is a very clear acknowledgement of challenges facing managers having to consider the organisational challenges of climate change risk management alongside existing imperatives including efficiency and transparency. Here our respondent was clear that while formal inst.i.tutional structures are necessary to give organisations shape and direction, when adaptation is required to protect core functions this is nuanced potentially championed by the contingent, shadow world of informal relations.h.i.+ps. This chapter presents the viewpoints of actors within two different kinds of organisation who reflect on the interplay of social relations within canonical and shadow systems that characterise adaptive capacity. Communities of practice and networks of looser ties are considered. The aim is not simply to ill.u.s.trate adaptation as resilience but rather to give some substance to the complexity of social relations that give rise to adaptive capacity originating from within organisations. As noted in Chapter 3, while resilience may be the dominant external outcome of the social agency described within organisations, internal acts that could be cla.s.sified as transitional and arguably transformational are also observed.

The empirical evidence presented draws from interviews held with members of the UK Environment Agency active in Wales, and a dairy farmers' cooperative from Carmarthens.h.i.+re called Gra.s.shoppers. Earlier work (Pelling et al., 2007) has provided a synthesis of these interviews and also with those from scientific advisor groups to the Welsh a.s.sembly. The aim in this chapter is to provide a detailed examination of the viewpoints of key informants reflecting on their relations.h.i.+ps with organisational structures and other actors to use or open s.p.a.ce for social learning and self-organisation. Such internal acts of adaptation targeting inst.i.tutional modification are identified, as are adaptations directed at the external environment.

The following section provides policy and methodological context for the empirical data, which is then presented.

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