Part 14 (1/2)

The argument of this book, therefore, is not to abandon trade unions, but, on the contrary, to appeal to the unorganized employee to join the trade union in order to strengthen it industrially; and on the other hand to appeal to all employees, organized or unorganized, to combine politically for the purpose of securing by franchise what they never can accomplish by the strike.

The moral then to be drawn from the following pages is not that trade unions have come to an end of their usefulness, but that whereas their task in the past has been to check exploitation, their role in the future will be to put an end to it altogether.

-- 3. THE UNSOLVED AND INSOLUBLE PROBLEMS OF TRADE UNIONISM

John Mitch.e.l.l in his book ”Organized Labor” has very properly stated that ”the ideal of Trade Unionism is to combine in one organization _all_ the men employed, or capable of being employed, at a given trade, and to demand and secure for each and _all_ of them a definite minimum standard of wages, hours and conditions of work;”[85] and the principle of Trade Unionism is also well described as ”the _absolute and complete prohibition_ of contracts between employers and individual men.”[86] In other words, the object of the Trade Union is to put an end to compet.i.tion between employees in order to subst.i.tute what is called ”collective bargaining,” which, if complete, would put the employer at the mercy of the employee, for individual bargaining, which on the contrary puts the employee at the mercy of the employer.

The above is stated in other words in the Report of the Industrial Commission:[87]

”The union is conceived as a means of bettering the condition of its members by united action. If this action is to be thoroughly effective, it must be taken by or on behalf of _all the members of the craft_. It is by the establishment of an _absolute monopoly of labor power_ and to ameliorate the conditions under which it is sold and used.”

Now the inherent and necessary defect of trade unionism under the compet.i.tive system is to be found in the words I have italicized in the above extract. If the trade union could be a ”real monopoly of labor,” it could dictate terms to the employer; but it must not be forgotten that, with the employer, it would remain subject to the conditions created by the market. The very fact, however, that all relations between labor and capital are determined by the conditions of the market makes it impossible and will always make it impossible for the trade union to attain its ideal; that is to say, to const.i.tute an absolute monopoly of labor power, to bind in one organization _all_ the men employed, to secure the absolute and complete prohibition of contracts between employers and individual men, to demand and secure for each and _all_ of them a definite minimum standard of labor, wages, and conditions of work. This is the crux of the whole question.

It has taken over a century of organization on the part of the employer and employee, of conflict between the two, of bankruptcy for the employer and of misery for the employee, to demonstrate that the ideal of trade unionism has not been and can never, so long as the compet.i.tive system persists, be attained. The trade unionist will answer that even though it be impossible to attain the ideal, trade unions have accomplished much and can accomplish more for the wage-earning cla.s.s. To this it may be fairly answered that whatever trade unions have in fact accomplished has been accomplished only at a ruinous price--that the price they must continue to pay for this accomplishment will continue to be ruinous and insufferable until either by the revolt of the discontented as predicted by Karl Marx, or by the awakening conscience of the whole community, as has already to a limited degree taken place, the betterment aimed at by the trade unionist will be attained and maintained without the payment of the awful toll now exacted by the compet.i.tive system.

It is probable that both employers and employees, during a century's struggle, have failed to take proper account of the extent to which both were hampered by the exigencies of the market. The blindness of both to this fact was perhaps due to the expansion of trade both in England and America during most of the century; this expansion being due to the development of the country in the United States and, in England, to the conquests of new markets and colonies. So long as expansion continued, trade unionists could insist upon increasing wages out of increasing prices, and the success which attended trade unions in raising wages during a large part of the century, brought about a false idea that there was no limit to the extent to which trade unions could by organization increase their share in the profits of industry. Unfortunately, the era of expansion could not last forever, and it was not until the lockout of the engineers in 1898-1899 that the British trade unionists began to discover how narrow were the limits within which they could improve conditions.

Until 1897 the employees had on an average the best of it. In 1893 no less than 63 per cent of strikes were decided in favor of the employees. In 1896 again the proportion of working people involved in disputes settled in their favor was greater than in any of the previous years since 1892 with the exception of 1893; and it may be interesting to note that during this year there was a lower percentage of unemployed than during any year since 1890.[88] It is not surprising, therefore, that trade unionists were convinced that there was no limit to the extent to which they might increase their share in the profits of industry. In 1897, however, the condition of the steel industry in England became such that the employers could no longer comply with the exactions of the trade unionists. In 1895 American manufacturers for the first time attempted to export their steel to other lands,[89] and their exports grew to $121,913,548 in 1900 and to $183,982,182 in 1908.[90]

In the presence of American as well as German compet.i.tion, the pressure of the market was such that the employers felt they must either break the power of the union or go out of business. They therefore locked out the engineers in July, 1897, and the lockout lasted until January, 1898, when the union was obliged to abandon all its contentions. This lockout is the turning point in the history of trade unionism in England. Up to that time, the idea that workingmen could be induced to abandon the parties to which they belong in order to organize a party of their own was never seriously taken into consideration at their conventions, and resolutions in favor of Socialism were overwhelmingly voted down. But as soon as the power of the engineers--the strongest union in England--was broken in 1897 we find trade union conventions entertaining the idea of political organization and resolutions in favor of Socialism receiving careful consideration.

The history of trade unionism in America has not as yet resulted in any such definite climax as this; but what foreign compet.i.tion has compelled English employers to do a combination of employers in the Steel Trust has done for the steel workers in America. In other words, the trade union has to face one of two alternatives: either foreign compet.i.tion is bound ultimately to compel the employer to destroy the union; or in the absence of foreign compet.i.tion owing to a high protective tariff, a combination of employers will do for their own benefit what compet.i.tion compelled British employers to do as a condition of survival.

If we turn from the history to the nature of trade unions it will be seen that what has happened must have happened. As has been stated, all agree that the ideal of trade unionism is to unite all the workers in one trade so as to subst.i.tute collective bargaining for individual bargaining. Unfortunately by the very nature of things such a combination is impossible. It is impossible to read any work on trade unions, whether it emanates from the government, or from employers, or from employees, without being struck by the fact that trade unions seek to be comprehensive, to include all the members in the trade on the one hand, while on the other hand there is a perpetual pressure upon them to be exclusive. For example, we find locals charging heavy initiation fees of a character to keep out members, for instance the longsh.o.r.emen, the garment workers, gla.s.s workers; and it may be ”stated as a general rule that when a union does succeed in establis.h.i.+ng a monopoly against employers it is exceedingly likely to go on, if it feels strong enough, to establish a monopoly against the employees.”[91]

It is perfectly true that this tendency is frowned upon by the trade unionists at large; but the reason for this is that every union which tries to be exclusive cultivates a crop of non-unionists who const.i.tute a menace to the union.

A better ill.u.s.tration of the quandary in which unionists find themselves between the importance of being comprehensive in the one hand and the importance of being exclusive on the other, is found in their att.i.tude towards boy labor.

Modern conditions have made apprentices.h.i.+p practically obsolete, and yet many national organizations endeavor to maintain the practice with a view to preventing too great a supply of skilled workers in the trade. The limit generally fixed by national organizations is 1 to 10, though some, such as pressmen, trunk and bag workers, flint gla.s.s workers, allow 1 to 4. Lithographers allow 1 to 5.[92] ”It is obvious,” says the Report of the Industrial Commission, ”that the chief motive which influences the unions in the shaping of their apprentices.h.i.+p rules is the desire to maintain their wages, by diminis.h.i.+ng compet.i.tion within the trades.”[93]

It is true that many unions in controlling apprentices.h.i.+p are animated by a much higher purpose; that is to say, to provide that when a boy undertakes to learn a trade he shall have a chance to learn it.

John Mitch.e.l.l in his book[94] claims that the restriction of admission of apprentices in the United States is negligibly small, and yet deplores the fact that ”the great ma.s.s of youths to-day receive little or no training in their particular trade as a result of the breakdown of the apprentices.h.i.+p system.” In his opinion the solution to the problem is not to be found in apprentices.h.i.+p, but in industrial schools; yet he deplores the hostility of graduates of trade schools to trade unions, without apparently recognizing that this hostility is due to the hostility first evinced by unions to trade schools. But let us turn from conflicting opinions and look the facts in the face.

When a unionist approaches the age of forty years, he is confronted by the fact that he cannot rival in speed and efficiency the work of a young graduate of an industrial school. He looks forward to the time when his place will be taken by the graduate of the industrial school.

He is very naturally therefore hostile to the industrial school and the graduate of the industrial school is for the same reason hostile to him. And here we come to the real difficulty: When a trade union fails to include _all_ the members in the trade, it does _not_ succeed in eliminating compet.i.tion between workingmen. On the contrary, it begins by creating two hostile cla.s.ses of workingmen: Those within the union and those without--cla.s.ses which bitterly hate one another because they are both fighting for the same job. But they do more than this: They create compet.i.tion within the trade union because by insisting upon high wages and short hours they are making it impossible for the employer to utilize the service of any but the most efficient. John Mitch.e.l.l himself points this out. In resisting the charge that trade unions tend to level down, he says: ”If there is a levelling at all in the trade union world, it is a levelling up and not a levelling down. The only levelling which the trade union does is _the elimination of men who are below a certain fixed standard of efficiency_.”[95] He further expresses it in another pa.s.sage:[96]

”Trade unionism tends to improve workmen not only directly, through an increase in wages and a reduction in hours, but it attains the same end in an indirect manner. The general policy of trade unionism, as has been explained before, is the establishment of a minimum wage, safeguarding, as a rule, the right of the employer to discharge for proved inefficiency. The result of this is the gradual creation of a dead line of a standard of efficiency, to which all who work must attain. Where there is a minimum wage of four dollars a day, the workman can no longer choose to do only three dollars' worth of work and be paid accordingly, but he must earn four dollars, _or else cease from work_, at least in that particular trade, locality, or establishment. The consciousness that he may be employed for a varying wage permits many a man to give way to his natural idleness and carelessness, whereas the maintenance of a rigid standard causes a rapid and steady improvement. The minimum wage acts upon the workman, as the school examination upon the child. If a child falls, by however small a margin, below the standard set by the school, he fails of promotion, and the stimulus which is strong in the case of a school child is infinitely more intense in that of a worker with a family dependent upon him. The principle of the survival of the fittest through union regulations works out slowly and unevenly; nevertheless its general effect is towards a steady and continuous progress of workingmen to a permanently higher standard of efficiency.”[97]

There is one point upon which the author is silent--yet it is the point which enormously interests the workingman at large: this is that while trade unionism guarantees high wages and short hours to the efficient, it throws out of the trade altogether those workingman who do not attain a high standard of efficiency or who, having attained it, fall back from it owing to overwork, sickness, or old age.

There is, therefore, a perpetual struggle going on in the trade unions, not only between members and non-members, but even amongst the members of the union itself, in view of the fact that diminished efficiency must eventually lead to the weeding out of the inefficient.

In periods of industrial depression such as we have just pa.s.sed through it is obvious that the most inefficient are the first to be dismissed, and being the most inefficient, they are the ones least able to find employment in other industries.

Under the t.i.tle of Unemployment, the extent of this evil has been pointed out; it must not be lost sight of; it reaches a population of a million at the best of times and of five millions at such times as these.

But the problem raised by the importance of comprehensiveness to prevent ”scabbing” on the one hand and of exclusiveness to maintain wages on the other, is not confined to such details as initiation fees and apprentices.h.i.+p. It covers the whole question of the employment of boys, women, old men, and half-supported persons, and includes the ”sweating” system.

The higher the wages exacted by trade unions the more employers are compelled to have recourse to cheap labor of women and children, and this labor is all the cheaper because the unionist himself contributes to the supply; for the unionist supports his wife and children, and the very fact of the support he gives them permits them to accept a lower rate of wages than if they were not supported. To understand the operation of this principle it must be borne in mind that rates of wages are determined, not by the wishes of the employee or even by the greed of the employer; they are determined by the market price.

Unionists are not the only persons who object to the labor of women and boys. There is indeed no divergency of opinion as to the unwisdom of working boys before their education is complete or their bodies matured; or the unwisdom of employing women, destined by Nature to perform other more important functions. No better witness to the control exercised by the market on this important subject can be found than a member of the English Ministry, the Right Honorable H.O.