Part 4 (2/2)
I cannot but observe, what a pompous (but false) Account, the Author gives of our Loss; he roundly affirms, ”_That Numbers of Drums and Colours were left behind in the Retreat_,” of which there was not in Fact One; some few Firelocks belonging to the Soldiers, who fell upon the Top of the Hill, could not be brought off; and most of the Scaling Ladders, _&c._ which had been intrusted to the Care of the _American_ Soldiers, remained upon the Ground. What Use the Enemy might make of them, I cannot say; but we, who could distinctly see with the naked Eye, what pa.s.sed on the Hill of St. _Lazar_, could perceive nothing of what the Author mentions. It was never before alledged, that the Guide, who return'd, complained of his not having been followed by the Troops the Way he would have led them; but it is certain, that both the Officers and the Engineer, who were in the Front, complained of their having been mislead by the Guide. Had the contrary appeared, the Offenders could scarcely have escaped Censure; for the Instant before the Troops advanced to the Attack, the General in Person gave Directions to two of the princ.i.p.al Officers, who were to lead on the Grenadiers, to mount the Hill upon the Right, and to push at once into the Enemy's Works.
What the Author insinuates, that the Retreat was too long delayed, is without any Grounds whatsoever. The Moment it appeared there was no room to hope for Success, the Troops were directed to retire, which was done in so good Order, that the Enemy did not think it adviseable to advance one Step to give them the least Disturbance.
I cannot finish my Observations upon this long Note (_g_) without remarking that what palpable Falsehoods, and gross Misrepresentations, the Author herein aggravates our Loss at St. _Lazar_; such as the generous _Spaniard_ (tho' as an Enemy authorized to do it by Custom) would be ashamed of; but in an _Englishman_ it is a Crime, for which Language has not yet found a Name, and which nothing but the highest innate Malevolence, and the strongest Inveteracy against his Majesty's Land Forces, _there employed_, could have produced.]
[Footnote 29: I do not know what might be the Opinion of the Officers employed by the Admiral (_Vide_ Note (_h_) page 44) to sound: But I am well a.s.sured, that experienced Pilots, who have sounded the whole Harbour of _Carthagena_ in open Day-Light, do affirm, that large s.h.i.+ps can approach so near to the Walls, as easily to batter the Town; of which the _Spaniards_ seem very sensible, from their having lately erected a Battery of forty Pieces of large Cannon, which commands the Bason, where the Galleons usually lie at Anchor.
The _Galicia_'s being sent in had a quite contrary Effect from what the Author suggests; for not only the General, but every unprejudiced Man, both in the Army, and in the Fleet, was thereby convinced, that our large s.h.i.+ps could have got in near enough to batter the Town. For the _Galicia_ being deeply loaden, by the Cases filled with Sand (which served no other End, but to blind the Men, when the Enemy's Shot took place) drew some Feet more Water, than our eighty Gun s.h.i.+ps, and yet lay near enough to the Walls of the Town to fire with very good Effect, tho'
she had no more Guns mounted, than twelve eighteen Pounders, and four twelve Pounders.
I submit it to the Reader, tho' he be neither Soldier nor Sailor, to judge with what Prospect of Success a Vessel so armed, could be sent in singly to stand the Fire of all the Guns on that Side of the Town, of which the Event sufficiently proved to Absurdity, ”For the enemy had demolished her so in two or three Hours, that she would have sunk in half an Hour more, if she had not been drawn off:” But if, instead of _Galicia_, some of his Majesty's eighty Gun s.h.i.+ps had been ordered in; there are (and those very good Judges) who affirm, that they could have approach'd near enough to have done effectual Service.]
[Footnote 30: The Author of the Pamphlet (in his Note _i_, page 45.) affirms, that from _Thursday_ Morning to _Friday_ Night, by the Accounts delivered in, and by the General's Report, the Troops on Sh.o.r.e had dwindled from 6645, to 3200. A base and palpable Falsehood! as it will evidently appear by the Return given in (_April_ the 12th) by Mr.
_Wallis_, Agent to the Transports, to Vice-Admiral _Vernon_, of the whole Number then victualled on Board, and on Sh.o.r.e, amounting at that time to 6645, in which Number were included all the Sick, the Women, the Negroes, and Men left in _Boca-Chica_ and _Castillo Grande_, the Officers, with their Servants, and People of all Denominations belonging to the Land Forces, who received the King's Provisions, whether they were on Board, or on Sh.o.r.e.
The Adjutant's Books will shew, that the highest Number of Men landed at _La Quinta_ never exceeded 4340 Rank and File, tho' repeated Demands were made from the General, and from the Council of War, for their Troops on Sh.o.r.e being compleated from the Fleet to 5000 Men, Rank and File. At the time of holding the General Council of War, they were, by Sickness, and the late Loss, reduced to 3569, feeble, and scarcely fit for the ordinary Duty; including 1140 _American_ Soldiers, of whom 600 were employed upon no other Service, but on working Parties.]
[Footnote 31: It was raised 2600 Yards from the Fort, which is the utmost Distance those Mortars can throw a Sh.e.l.l, when their Chambers are quite filled with Powder; an Allowance only given for Proof, and never upon Service. Tho' appriz'd of this Circ.u.mstance by the Colonel of the Train, the Captain could not be prevailed upon to advance his Battery nearer, but (as it was expected) wasted above two hundred Sh.e.l.ls, to little or no Purpose whatsoever.
_N.B._ This Battery was begun upon the 8th, but did not Fire before the 14th.]
[Footnote 32: The imbarking the Troops, (_vide k_) in the cool of the Evening, was not only approved by the General, but by the Council of War; who had but too justly deserved Censure, should they have unnecessarily exposed the Men, not only to the violent Heat of the Sun, but to the Enemy's Cannon, which commanded one of the Places of Imbarkation.
Had the Author's Apprehensions suffered him to go on Sh.o.r.e at the time of the Retreat, he might have observed that it was made without any Precipitation, and that neither Tents, Arms, working Tools, nor Baggage were left behind.
The General in Person brought up the Rear with his Guard, and having perceived, after the Troops had begun their March, that five Tents belonging to one of the _American_ Battalions were left standing (for which their Lieutenant Colonel had undergone a severe Censure, if his Death had not prevented it) and likewise that some Arms and working Tools remained upon the Ground, he ordered them to be carried off by the Serjeant's Guard which came from _La Popa_, to which Lieutenant _Forest_, at the General's Request, added some Sailors, so that the whole Ground might be carefully searched to prevent any thing whatsoever from falling into the Hands of the Enemy. We having lost no Tents, none could (as the Author alledges) be pitched by the Enemy on the top of the Hill.
The Admiral having, (when a Flag of Truce was to be sent into the Vice-Roy) refused to admit of a particular Messenger from the General, I cannot say what idle Expressions might be then made use of to the Disadvantage of the Land Forces. If there were any such, possibly they did not loose in the Report; but if what the Enemy might throw out deserves repeating, it is well known that they frequently expressed their Astonishment, that so fine a Fleet should lie unactive within their very Harbour; and it was affirmed by Persons of Credit, that a _Spanish_ Officer of Rank, who served in _Carthagena_, declared that they only waited for the coming in of our great s.h.i.+ps, to have surrendered.]
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